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SEPTEMBER 23, 24, AND 25, 1975 

Printed for the use of the Select Committee To Study Governmental 
Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities 

62-6M O WASHINGTON : 1976 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price $4.00 


PBANK CHURCH, Idaho, Chairman 
JOHN G. TOWER, Texas, Vice Chairman 

PHTTTP A HART Michigan HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., Tennessee 

SrVmS Minnesota ^^f^^^^Z Havana 

IS MO r N 0L L S rCa^r y SS5E rCHW^KER, PennsWanU 

GARY HART, Colorado 

William G. Miller, Staff Director 

Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Chief Counsel 

Curtis R Smothers, Counsel to the Minority 

Audrey Hatry, Clerk of the Committee 





Tuesday, September 23, 1975 3 

Wednesday, September 24, 1975 51 

Thursday, September 25, 1975 95 


Tuesday, September 23, 1975 

Huston, Tom Charles, former Associate Counsel and Staff Assistant to 
President Richard M. Nixon 3 

Wednesday, Septembeb 24, 1975 

Angleton, James, former Central Intelligence Agency official, accompanied 
by John T. Brown, Counsel 52 

Thursday, Septembeb 25, 1975 

Brennan, Charles, former Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investiga- 
tion, Domestic Intelligence Division 96 


No. 1 — Special Report, Interagency Committee on Intelligence (ad hoc), 

Chairman J. Edgar Hoover, June, 1970, the "Huston Plan" 141 

No. 2 — July 1970 memorandum to H. R. Haldeman from Tom Charles 

Huston; Subject: Domestic Intelligence Review 189 

No. 3 — July 14, 1970 memorandum to Tom Charles Huston from H. R. 

Haldeman; Subject: Domestic Intelligence Review 198 

No. 4 — July 23, 1970 memorandum to Richard Helms from Tom Charles 

Huston ; Subject : Domestic Intelligence 199 

No. 5 — June 20, 1969 memorandum to Cartha D. DeLoach from William 

C. Sullivan ; Subject : Tom Charles Huston, Staff Assistant to the 
President 203 

No. 6 — June 20, 1969 memorandum to the Director of the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation from Tom Charles Huston, Staff Assistant to the 
President 204 

No. 7— June 30, 1969 memorandum to William C. Sullivan from Charles 

D. Brennan ; Subject : Foreign Support for Revolutionary Protest 
Movements in the United States 205 

No. 8 — June 5, 1970 memorandum to Cartha D. DeLoach from William 
C. Sullivan ; Subject : Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Es- 
tablished by the President, June 5, 1970) 207 

No. 9 — June 5, 1970 memorandum to Cartha D. DeLoach from William C. 
Sullivan ; Subject : Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Estab- 
lished by the President, June 5, 1970). 

June 6, 1970 memorandum to Cartha D. DeLoach from William C. 
Sullivan; Subject: Interagency Intelligence Committee (Estab- 
lished by the President, June 5, 1970) 209 

..u 1 U? dcr criteria determined by the Committee. In consultation with the White House, 
the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, the Central Intelligence Agency, 
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, certain materials have been deleted from those 
documents, some of which were previously classified, to maintain the internal operating 
procedures of the agencies involved, and to protect Intelligence sources and methods. 
* urther delitions were made with respect to protecting the privacy of certain Individuals 
and groups. These deletions do not change the material content of these exhibits. 



No. 10— June 8, 1970 memorandum to Cartha D. DeLoach from William C. **& 
Sullivan ; Subject : Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Estab- 
lished by the President, June 5, 1970), Meeting in the Director's 
Office, 11 a.m.. June 8, 1970. ' „. 

June 8, 1970 memorandum to Cartha D. DeLoach from William C. 
Sullivan ; Subject : Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Estab- 
lished by the President, June 5, 1970). 

June 9, 1970 memorandum to Cartha D. DeLoach from William C. 
Sullivan ; Subject : Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Estab- 
lished by the President, June 5, 1970) 213 

No. 11 — June 10, 1970 memorandum to Cartha D. DeLoach from William C. 
Sullivan ; Subject : Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Estab- 
lished by the President, June 5, 1970), Meeting of the Working 
Subcommittee June 9, 1970 218 

No. 12— Report on USIB (U.S. Inteligence Board) Subcommittee on Do- 
mestic Intelligence 224 

No. 13 — June 15, 1970 memorandum to Cartha D. DeLoach from William 
C. Sullivan ; Subject: Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Es- 
tablished by the President June 5, 1970), Meeting of the Working 
Subcommittee June 12, 1970 22 ' 

No. 14— June 19, 1970 agenda of the Working Subcommittee of the Inter- 
agency Committee on Intelligence. June 19, 1970 minutes of the 
Working Subcommittee of the Interagency Committee on Intelli- 
gence : 

No. 15-^June 19, 1970 memorandum to Cartha D. DeLoach from William 
C. Sullivan; Subject: Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Es- 
tablished by the President June 5, 1970), Meeting of the Working 
Subcommittee June 18, 1970 235 

No. 16-^June 20, 1970 memorandum to Clyde A. Tolson from William C. 
Sullivan ; Subject : Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Estab- 
lished by the President, June 5, 1970) 2 s7 

No. 17-^June 19, 1970 agenda of the Working Subcommittee of the Inter- 
agency Committee on Intelligence. June 24, 1970 memorandum to 
Clyde A. Tolson from William C. Sullivan ; Subject : Interagency 
Committee on Intelligence (ad hoc), (Established by the Presi- 
dent, June 5, 1970) — -- 240 

No. 18-^June 26, 1970 memorandum to Clyde A. Tolson from William C. 
Sullivan; Subject: Interagency Committee on Intelligence (ad 
hoc), (Established by the President, June 5, 1970). June 25, 1970 
letter to the President 24 *> 

No 19-^July 9, 1970 memorandum to Richard Helms from Tom Charles 
Huston; Subject: Domestic Intelligence and Internal Security 
Affairs 246 

No. 20 — July 28," 1970 memorandum for the Record from Richard Helms ; 
Subject : Discussion with Attorney General Mitchell on Domestic 
Intelligence vr~r~ _ .r 

No 21 — July 28, 1970 memorandum to George. McManis from Richard 

Helms 248 

No. 22— August 5, 1970 memorandum to H. R. Haldeman from Tom Charles 

Huston ; Subject : Domestic Intelligence 249 

No. 23— August 7, 1970 memorandum to H. R. Haldeman from Tom Charles 

Huston; Subject: Domestic Intelligence Review 254 

No. 24— September 18, 1970 memorandum to the Attorney General from 

John Dean — - — 255 

No 25 — December 4, 1970 memorandum to the Attorney General from 
Robert C. Mardian ; Subject : Intelligence Evaluation Committee 
Status Report 258 

No. 26— February 3, 1970 memorandum to Assistant Attorney General, 
Internal Security Division from Director, FBI ; Subject : Intelli- 
gence Evaluation Committee, Internal Security— Miscellaneous. 
February 10, 1971 memorandum to George C. Moore, Benson Buff- 
ham, Thomas J. Kellfy, Col. John W. Downey, and Richard Ober 
from Robert C. Mardian ; Subject : Intelligence Evaluation Com- 
mittee 261 

No. 27 — February 12, 1971 memorandum to the Attorney General from Page 
Robert 0, Mardian ; Subject : Intelligence Evaluation Committee 265 

No. 28 — June 11, 1973 memorandum to Col. Werner E. Micherirom Henry *"~ 
E - Petersen; Subject: Intelligence Evaluation Committee 266 

No. 29— January 19, 1971 unsigned memorandum to John Mitchell, John 

Ehrlichman, and H. B. Haldeman 267 

No. 30— March 25, 1971 memorandum to Charles D. Brennan from" W. 
Baymond Wannall; Subject: Director's Meeting March 31, 1971 
•with the Attorney General, Mr. Bichard Helms and Adm. Noel 
Gayler. March 29, 1971, memorandum to Charles D. Brennan from 
•W. Baymond Wannall; Subject: Director's Meeting March 31, 
•1971, with Attorney General, Bichard Helms and Adm. Noel 
Gayler 268 

No. 31 — April 12, 1971 memorandum for the files from J. Edgar Hoover__ 272 

No. 32 — July 19, 1966 memorandum to Cartha D. DeLoach from William 

C. Sullivan ; Subject : "Black Bag" Jobs 273 

No. 33— January 6, 1967 memorandum to Clyde A. Tolson and Cartha D. 

DeLoach from J. Edgar Hoover 276 

No. 34— September 24, 1975 letter to Senator Frank Church from Michael 
E. Shaheen, Jr., with September 23, 1975 attachment entitled: 

Surreptitious Entries — Domestic Targets— _ 277 

No. 35— May 9, 1975 letter to Hugh K. Kline from John C. Keeney ; Sub- 
ject: United States v. Ehrlichman 281 

No. 36— February 26, 1970 letter to J. Edgar Hoover from Bichard Helms" 283 
No. 37— February 26, 1970 letter to Egil Krogh with attached memo- 
randum _ 287 

No. 38 — March 12, 1970 memorandum to William C. Sullivan fromCharles 

D. Brennan ; Subject : New Left Movement— Finances— IS— Mis- 
cellaneous 309 

No. 39— March 16, 1970 memorandum to Special Agent in Charge, Albany 
from the Director, FBI; Subject: New Left Movement— Fi- 
nances — IS — Miscellaneous 311 

No. 40— July 27, 1970 memorandum to the Attorney General" from" the 

tvt a- 5 irector- FBI ; Subject: Interagency Committee on Intelligence— 313 

No. 41— October 29, 1970 memorandum to Clyde Tolson; Subject: Execu- 
tives Conference — October 29, 1970 317 

No. 42— November 3, 1970 memorandum to Charles D. Brennan from 
George C. Moore; Subject: Black Student Groups on College Cam- 
puses, Bacial Matters; with attached November 4, 1970 memo- 
randum to Special Agent in Charge, Albany from the Director, 
FBI ; Subject : Black Student Groups on College Campuses, Bacial 
Matters 390 

No. 43— November 3, 1970 memorandum to"~Charles~D. Brennan" "from 
Bobert L. Shackleford ; Subject : Security Investigations of Indi- 
viduals who are Members of the Students for a Democratic So- 
ciety and Militant New Left Campus Organizations ; with attached 
November 4, 1970 memorandum to Special Agent in Charge Al- 
bany from the Director, FBI ; Subject : Security Investigations of 
Individuals who are Members of the Students for a Democratic 
Society and Militant New Left Campus Organizations— 325 

No. 44— September 2, 1970 memorandum to Clyde Tolson from W. Mark 
Felt ; Subject : Security Informants, Bacial Informants 
September 15, 1970 SAC (Special Agent in Charge) letter from 
J. Edgar Hoover 32g 

No. 45— November 2, 1970 memorandum to Charles d" Brennan from 
George C. Moore ; Subject : Racial Conference, October 22-23 1970 
Becommendation to Modify Instructions Concerning Becordings of 
Black and New Left Public Appearances ; with attached Novem- 
ber 5, 1970 memorandum to Special Agent in Charge, Albany from 
the Director, FBI ; Subject : Use of Concealed Becording Devices 
in Covering Public Appearances by Black and New Left Extrem- 

lSCS __ QQA' 

No. 46— December 22, 1970 memorandum t"o"Cn"a"r"les"D.""Brennan""from 
George C. Moore; Subject: Key Black Extremist Program, Bacial 
Matters; with attached December 23, 1970 memorandum to Spe- 
cial Agent in Charge, Albany from the Director, FBI ; Subject • 
Key Black Extremist Program, Bacial Matters— _ 338 


No. 47— February 26, 1970 letter to J. Edgar Hoover from Richard Helms— 342 
No. 48 — March 6, 1970 memorandum to Cartha D. DeLoach from William 
O. Sullivan; Subject: Relationships with Central Intelligence 
Agency (Positive Intelligence) 346 

No. 49 — March 7, 1970 memorandum to Cartha D. LeLoach from William 
C. Sullivan; Subject: Relationships with CIA, The President's 

Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and John McCone 348 

No. 50— March 20, 1970 letter to J. Edgar Hoover from Richard Helms— 349 

No. 51 — March 31, 1970 letter to Richard Helms from J. Edgar Hoover— 354 

No. 52 — April 14, 1970 memorandum to Cartha D. LeLoach from William 

C. Sullivan ; Subject : Relations with Central Intelligence Agency- 357 

No. 53 — November 21, 1965 memorandum to Chief of Operations from 

James Angleton; Subject: Project HTLINGUAL 359 

No. 54 — March 10, 1972 memorandum to James Angleton from J. Edgar 

Hoover; Subject: Hunter Project 362 

No. 55 — April 8, 1969 CIA Memorandum for the record ; Subject : 


No. 56 — May 19, 1971 memorandum for the record ; Subject : DCI's Meet- 
ing Concerning HTLINGUAL 365 

No. 57 — June 3, 1971 Memorandum for the record; Subject: Meeting at 

DCI's Office Concerning HTLINGUAL 368 

No. 58 — July 22, 1971 Memorandum for the record from Deputy Director 

of Security (IOS) ; Subject: Project SRPOINTER 370 

No. 59 — February 15, 1973 Memorandum for the record from William E. 
Colby; Subject: Mail Intercept Program; with attached Febru- 
ary 14, 1973 talking paper ; Subject : Mail Intercept Program 372 

No. 60— Title 18 of the United States Code: Crimes and Criminal Proce- 
dure, pp. 4322-23 387 

No. 61 — May 18, 1973 memorandum from James Angleton ; Subject : Inter- 
agency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc), Chairman J. Edgar 
Hoover, June 1970. July 9, 1970 memorandum to Richard Helms 
from Tom Charles Huston; Subject: Domestic Intelligence and 
Internal Security Affairs 389 

No. 62— September 21, 1970 memorandum to H. R. Haldeman from Tom 

Charles Huston; Subject: IRS and Ideological Organizations 395 

No. 63 — Presidential Talking Paper for meeting with J. Edgar Hoover, 

Richard Helms, Lt. Gen. Donald Bennett and Adm. Noel Gayler— 396 

No 64— April 8, 1970 memorandum for file from D. O. Virdin ; Subject : 

Students for a Democratic Society— List of Contributors 400 

No 65— February 18, 1969 memorandum for Henry A. Kissinger from 
Richard Helms; Subject: Student Unrest. September 4, 1968 
memorandum for The President 401 



U.S. Senate, 
Select Committee To Study Governmental, Operations 

With Kesfect to Intelligence Activities, 

Washington, B.C. 

The committee met pursuant to notice at 10 :05 a.m., in room 318, 
Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Frank Church (chairman) 

Present: Senators Church, Tower, Mondale, Huddleston, Hart 
(Colorado), Baker, Goldwater, Mathias, and Schweiker. 

Also present: William G. Miller, staff director; Frederick A. O. 
Schwarz, Jr., chief counsel; and Curtis R. Smothers, counsel to the 

The Chairman. The hearing will please come to order. 

The end of our involvement in Vietnam brought to a close a tragic 
and turbulent chapter in American history. In Southeast Asia, well 
over 50,000 American soldiers lost their lives. 

Here at home, massive antiwar demonstrations filled the streets. At 
Kent State and Jackson State, college students were shot down as they 
protested the policies of their Government. 

Just as the country was obsessed by Vietnam, so too the White House 
became transfixed by the wave of domestic protest that swept the 
country. On June 5, 1970, President Nixon called in J. Edgar Hoover 
of the FBI, Richard Helms of the CIA, and others from the military 
intelligence agencies. He charged them with getting better informa- 
tion on domestic dissenters, and directed them to determine whether 
they were subject to foreign influence. 

After a series of meetings throughout June 1970, a special report 
was prepared for the President. It set forth several options which 
ranged from the innocuous to the extreme, from doing nothing to 
violating the civil liberties of American citizens. In a memorandum, 
White House aide Tom Charles Huston recommended the extreme op- 
tions to the President. These recommendations have become known 
as the Huston plan. The President approved the plan, and it was sent 
to the FBI, the CIA, and the military intelligence agencies for 

Some provisions of the plan were clearly unconstitutional; others 
violated Federal statutes. As the distinguished American journalist 
Theodore White has observed, the Huston plan would have permitted 
Federal authorities to reach "all the way to every mailbox, every col- 
lege camous, every teleohone. every home." 

Five days after the President approved the plan, he revoked it at 
the insistence of the FBI Director and the Attorney General — to the 


dismay of those CIA, NSA, and FBI representatives -who had helped 
Huston develop it. 

All this is apart of the public record, thanks to Senator Sam ErvhVs 
hearings on Watergate. Yet, the matter does not rest here. Our investi- 
gations have revealed that the Huston plan itself was only an episode 
in the lawlessness which preceded and followed its brief existence. 

First, we have discovered that unlawful mail openings were being 
conducted long before the President was asked to authorize them in 
June 1970. The President and Mr. Huston, it appears, were deceived 
by the intelligence officials. 

Second even though the President revoked his approval of the 
Huston plan, the intelligence agencies paid no heed to the revocation. 
Instead, they continued the very practices for which they had sought 
presidential authority, expanding some of them and reinstating others 
which had been abolished years before. As in the case of the shellfish 
toxin, the decision of the President seemed to matter little. 

Finally, the Huston plan, as we now know, must be viewed as but 
one episode in a continuous effort by the intelligence agencies to secure 
the sanction of higher authority for expanded surveillance at home 
and abroad. 

As these hearings will reveal, the leaders of the CIA and individuals 
within the FBI continued to seek official blessing for the very wrongs 
envisaged in the Huston plan. 

We open this public inquiry to reveal these dangers, and to begin the 
task of countering the erosion of our freedoms as American citizens. 

Senator Tower? 

Senator Tower. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, I think the hearings that we are about to undertake 
raise some of the fundamental issues that exist in an open society 
governed by the Constitution which guarantees certain basic rights to 
its citizenry. 

We get to the point where we have to determine the extent to which 
the individual liberties and the rights of individuals must be protected 
by Government, rather than infringed on by Government. We also 
^explore the question of the extent to which Government is able to 
protect-its^citizens from those who would jeopardize their lives, their 
safety, or threaten their property. 

The question is whether or not our system provides the climate in 
which too much surveillance of individual citizens can occur, or 
whether, in given situations, perhaps the proscriptions of the law are 
an inhibition on effective law enforcement, and the restraint of those 
who would engage in violence against the peace and security of our 

I think this is brought sharply into focus by the fact that there have 
been two attempts made on the life of the President of the United 
States in the last 17 days. There is no question that Government, 
or agencies thereof, in the instances we are going to investigate, has 
infringed on the rights of its citizens. 

I am wondering, however, that if laws that are set up for the general 
governance of the citizenry in terms of the preservation of law and 
order might not, from time to time, carry some exceptions so that we 
can afford reasonable protection to the President of the United States 
and others who are set in governance over our people. I think these 

hearings could bs vst 17 useful and Productive Thank '"ou Mr. Chair- 

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Tower. 

I might say that with reference to this second attempt on the life 
of the President, I have been asked what this committee intends in con- 
nection with its mandate to investigate, not only the CIA and the FBI, 
but also, the Secret Service, and all other Federal agencies connected 
with law enforcement or intelligence activities. 

It is my view, as chairman of the committee, that while the com- 
mittee itself will have to consider its proper role, it should certainly 
look very carefully at the way that the CIA, the FBI, and the Secret 
Service coordinates. Any intelligence information that might consti- 
tute a possible threat to the President, or any other high official of the 
Government, should be passed between them, and procedures then 
should be followed to carry out tjhe responsibility to protect the Presi- 
dent. This is a matter that clearly falls within the mandate of this 
committee, and I would hope that the committee would want to look 
very carefully into that aspect of the general question of protecting 
the President. 

Now, our first witness this morning is Mr. Huston. I wonder if you 
will stand and take the oath. Do you solemnly swear that all of the 
testimony you give in this proceeding will be the truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God ? 

Mr. Huston. I do. 

The Chairman. Mr. Schwarz will commence the questioning. 


Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Huston, were you employed in the White House 
as of 1970? 

Mr. Huston. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Schwarz. Prior to that time, had you been employed in the 
White House and had you worked on intelligence matters? 

Mr. Huston. Yes. 

Mr. Schwarz. Prior to June 1970, had you had numerous conversa- 
tions with Mr. William Sullivan of the FBI ? 

Mr. Huston. Yes. 

Mr. Schwarz. In the course of those conversations had you dis- 
cussed inhibitions upon intelligence collections? 

Mr. Huston. Yes. 

Mr. Schwarz. And did he take the position that the FBI was being 
unduly inhibited in its efforts to collect intelligence on domestic radi- 
cals and other groups in this country ? 

Mr. Huston. I think it was his opinion that the Bureau was operat- 
ing under restraints ; yes. 

Mr. Schwarz. And by operating under restraints, what do you 
mean ? 

Mr. Huston. That they did not have available for use the tools that 
they felt were necessary to do the job. 

Mr Schwarz. Did President Nixon call a meeting in his office on 
June 5, 1970, to discuss with the heads of the. intelligence agencies the 
subject of restraints upon intelligence collection A 

Mr Huston. The President did not really touch on -jure. detail on 
restrains He was more concerned with making sure that the mtelb, 
gence community was aware of the seriousness with which he viewed 
the escalating level of revolutionary violence. nmm „ n \^, tn do 

Mr. Schwarz. And what did he ask the intelligence community to do 

ab Mr. Huston e He directed that each of the agencies should join under 
a committee, and a committee to be chaired by Mr Hoover, which 
would prepare a report for him which would cover three areas. *irst, 
it should have a threat assessment; second, it should specify the vari- 
ous restraints under which the agencies thought they were operating 
that hindered them; and, third, it should contain a series of options ot 
how to deal with these various restraints which would enable him to 
make a decision. 

Mr. Schwarz. Who was present at that meeting l - , 

Mr. Huston. Mr. Hoover, Mr. Helms, Admiral Gayler, general 
Bennett, Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Erlichman, Mr. Finch, and myselt. 

Mr Schwarz. Mr. Hoover was head of the FBI; Mr. Helms was 
head of the CIA. What position did Admiral Gayler hold? 

Mr. Huston. Director of the National Security Agency. 

Mr. Schwarz. And what position did General Bennett hold* 

Mr. Huston. Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. 

Mr. Schwarz. All right. Following the meeting in the President s 
office, did you and the agencies proceed to hold a number of meetings 
on the subjects which the President had directed you to discuss? 

Mr. Huston. Yes. . 

Mr. Schwarz. Did you meet with the heads of the agencies, or with 
second-level people in the agencies? 

Mr. Huston. There were two meetings among the heads of the agen- 
cies in addition to the meeting with the President. But the bulk of the 
activity was undertaken by a working group consisting of second-level 

Mr. Schwarz. All right. The first meeting that took place with the 
heads of the agencies was in Mr. Hoover's office? 

Mr. Huston. Yes. 

Mr. Schwarz. And did Mr. Hoover, in the first instance, ask the 
other agency heads to do what the President had asked them to do, 
or did he seek to go down another course? 

Mr. Huston. It was my opinion that he was heading down a course 
different from that that the President had outlined. 

Mr. Schwarz. And how did Mr. Hoover's first proposal differ from 
that which the President had asked the representatives to do? 

Mr. Huston. Mr. Hoover indicated that he was under the impres- 
sion that what the President wanted was a historical overview of the 
problem of revolutionary violence. 

Mr. Schwarz. And instead, what did the President want? 

Mr. Huston. Well, as I said to Mr. Hoover, it was my understand- 
ing the President was less interested in the past than in the future, 
and that he was concerned about the problems that may come up, and 
what could be done to deal with them. 

Mr. Schwaez. And he was also concerned in knowing what re- 
straints were being applied to the power of the agencies to collect 
information on Americans, is that right ? 

Mr. Huston. Yes. 

Mr. Schwarz. Did the working group proceed to investigate that 
question of what restraints were being placed upon the intelligence 
community in their efforts to collect information on American citizens? 

Mr. Huston. That was my impression, yes. 

Mr. Schwarz. Who chaired the working group ? 

Mr. Huston. Mr. Sullivan. 

Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Sullivan of the FBI ? 

Mr. Huston. Yes. 

Mr. Schwarz. There were representatives, also, from the CIA? 

Mr. Huston. Yes. 

Mr. Schwarz. And those persons were Mr. Angleton and Mr. Ober, 
is that correct ? 

Mr. Huston. Yes. 

Mr. Schwarz. And then there were representatives from the NSA? 

Mr. Huston. Yes. 

Mr. Schwarz. And the DIA? 

Mr. Huston. Yes. 

Mr. Schwarz. And the Army, Navy, and Air Force intelligence 
community, is that right? 

Mr. Huston. Yes. 

Mr. Schwarz. And in addition to Mr. Sullivan from the FBI, 
there were other FBI personnel such as Mr. Brennan, is that right? 

Mr. Huston. Yes. 

Mr. Schwarz. How many meetings did the working group have? 

Mr. Huston. I am unclear. It seems to me there were three, maybe 

Mr. Schwarz. Stemming from those three or four meetings, did you 
come up with a report? 

Mr. Huston. Yes. A draft report was prepared by the committee. 

Mr. Schwarz. Was it prepared by the committee and approved by 
the entire working group ? 

Mr. Huston. Yes. 

Mr. Schwarz. What happened then? Was it submitted to the Di- 
rectors for their signatures? 

Mr. Huston. Well, it was submitted to three of the four Directors 
for their approval. 

Mr. Schwarz. To which three was it submitted in the first instance? 

Mr. Huston. To Admiral Gayler, General Bennett, and Mr. Helms. 

Mr. Schwarz. Now, you picked those three out and not Mr. Hoover. 
"Why was it submitted to the three Directors, other than Mr. Hoover, 
before being submitted to Mr. Hoover ? 

Mr. Huston. Because the Bureau personnel on the committee felt 
that if they took the report back to Mr. Hoover, that he would go 
completely— he would refuse to go along with it, and they felt that, 
tactically, if they went to him and said, the report has already been 
approved by the other three Directors, that perhaps he would then 


Mr. Schwarz. Now, in saying Bureau personnel on the committee, 
do you mean Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Brennan ? 

Mr. Huston. Yes. 

Mr. Schwarz. What was your understanding of why they believed 
Mr. Hoover might resist the proposals? 

Mr. Huston. I think they were concerned that Mr. Hoover would 
not appreciate anyone outside the Bureau commenting upon the way 
in which the Bureau conducted its domestic intelligence operations. 

Mr. Schwarz. So your understanding was that Mr. Hoover's sub- 
ordinates themselves felt that the restraints which were being placed 
upon the intelligence agencies were excessive on the one hand, but felt 
that Mr. Hoover, for bureaucratic or personal pride reasons, would not 
agree with any proposals to change or eliminate those restraints. Is 

that right? . T A , . , -. 

Mr. Huston. Well, I think it went beyond restraints. I think it 
went to the entire purpose of the report, particularly to the recom- 
mendation for a continuing, permanent, interagency committee. 

Mr. Schwarz. Did you have a view as to what they thought Mr. 
Hoover's attitude would be toward that part of the report dealing 
with restraints ? 

Mr. Huston. Well, I think their attitude was that he would be 
opposed to any change whatsoever in the way in which the Bureau was 
operating. . , . , 

Mr. Schwarz. Whereas they favored changing the restraints which 
they thought were inhibiting the Bureau's ability to collect intelligence 
on American citizens ? 

Mr. Huston. That was certainly my impression ; yes. 

Mr. Schwarz. That was clearly your impression? 

Mr. Huston. Yes ; it was. ,.,... . x^i j ua ■ -\ 

Mr. Schwarz. The document which is exhibit 1 * is entitled Special 
Keport, Interagency Committee on Intelligence, (Ad Hoc) , Chairman, 
J. Edgar Hoover, June 1970." Was this document signed by the four 
intelligence community directors ? . . 

Mr. Huston. I do not have exhibit 1, but I will assume that it is. 

The Chairman. Well, let us get you the exhibit. 

Mr. Schwarz. In any event, are you aware that certain footnotes 
were affixed reflecting Mr. Hoover's disagreement with certain 
language in the reports? 

Mr. Huston. Yes. _ , 

Mr. Schwarz. When were Mr. Hoover's footnotes affixed? Were they 
affixed before the three other Directors approved, or were they affixed 
after the three other Directors approved ? 

Mr. Huston. After. .. 

Mr. Schwarz. So Admiral Gavler, Director Helms and (general 
Bennett approved the report prior to any footnotes that Mr. Hoover 
inserted ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Huston. Yes. 

Mr. Schwarz. All right. Now, have you seen exhibit 1 ( 

Mr. Huston. Yes. ,, ,, , 

Mr. Schwarz. Is that the document which was approved by the four 

Mr. Huston. Yes, with the deletions that are 

i See p. 141. 

Mr. Schwarz. The deletions^ which are for 

Mr. Huston [continuing]. For security reasons. 

Mr. Schwarz [continuing]. For security reasons which are 
disclosed ? 

Mr. Huston. Yes. 

Mr. Schwarz. What was the attitude of Messrs. Helms, Gayler, 
and Bennett when they discovered that Director Hoover was affixing 
footnotes to the report which the entire intelligence community had, 
prior to then, agreed to ? 

Mr. Huston. I do not recall Mr. Helms having any comment. 
Admiral Gayler called me and was very upset. General Bennett called 
me and was very upset. They wanted to either have another meeting 
among the Directors and demand that the footnotes be withdrawn, or 
else they wanted to insert their own footnotes saying that they favored 
certain things. 

I was very much interested in not creating any difficulties with Mr. 
Hoover that could at all be avoided, and I told both General Bennett 
and Admiral Gayler that I thought it was unnecessary for them to 
take such action ; that in my cover memorandum to the President, I 
would set forth their views as they had expressed them to me, and that 
I would appreciate it if they would not raise this question with the 

Mr. Schwarz. So their position, in summary, was that either the 
Hoover footnotes should be eliminated, or they would like to insert 
footnotes indicating that they approved the changes which Mr. 
Hoover was indicating he disapproved. Is that correct ? 

Mr. Huston. Yes. 

Mr. Schwarz. After the signing of the document which we have 
identified as exhibit 1, did you submit to the President certain recom- 
mendations with respect to the restraints on intelligence collection? 

Mr. Huston. Yes. 

Mr. Schwarz. And have you got in front of you the document which 
is exhibit 2 *? 

Mr. Huston. Yes. 

Mr. Schwarz. And is that the document which you did submit to the 

Mr. Huston. Which I submitted to Mr. Haldeman for transmittal 
to the President. 

Mr. Schwarz. You submitted it to Mr. Haldeman for transmission 
to the President ? Is that right ? 

Mr. Huston. Yes. 

Mr. Schwarz. And now, in that document, you make certain recom- 
mendations with respect to changing restraints which you felt had 
been placed upon intelligence collection; is that right? 

Mr. Huston. Yes. 

Mr. Schwarz. In making those recommendations, did you believe 
you were representing the consensus of the entire working group that 
had worked on the study for yourself and for the President? 

Mr. Huston. Yes. 

Mr. Schwarz. So that whatever recommendations you made with 
respect to illegal opening of the mail, or burglary, or surreptitious 
entry, were ones which you believe represented the views of the entire 

» See p. 189. 


intelligence community with the exception of the footnotes of Mr. 
Hoover himself ; is that right ? 

Mr. Huston. Yes. 

Mr. Schwarz. Now you did recommend, did you not, that the 
United States should commence — in your view, commence — as you 
understood it, commence or recommence, the illegal opening of mail. 
Is that correct? 

Mr. Huston. Yes. My understanding, from my contacts with the 
Bureau and through the working committee, was that in the past, this 
had been a technique that had been employed, particularly on matters 
relating to espionage, and that the professional intelligence community 
indicated that they thought it was a necessary technique to be under- 
taken under extreme circumstances, and that they felt that they 
should be authorized to do so. 

Mr. Schwarz. Basing your views on the recommendations of the 
entire intelligence community, except for Mr. Hoover's footnotes, you 
also advocated that the United States should commence, or recom- 
mence, to commit burglaries, to acquire valuable intelligence informa- 
tion. Is that right ? 

Mr. Huston. Yes. I was told that the Bureau had undertaken "black 
bag" jobs for a number of years — up until 1966. That it had been suc- 
cessful and valuable, again, particularly in matters involving 
espionage. And that they felt this, again, was something that, given 
the revolutionary climate, they thought they needed to have the 
authority to do. ... 

Mr. Schwarz. And in both cases, your position and their position 
was, in effect, that the end justifies the means? ... 

Mr. Huston. No. I'm not going to speak for what their position is, 
but I do not think that fairly summarizes what my position was. 

Mr. Schwarz. Well, I'm sure some of the other persons here are 
going to question you on that issue. 

Did President Nixon, through Mr. Haldeman, approve the recom- 
mendations for change which you had made on behalf of the entire 
intelligence community ? 

Mr. Huston. Yes. 

Mr. Schwarz. What happened after that ? 

Mr. Huston. The question then arose as to how the decisions were 
to be implemented. I had recommended to Mr. Haldeman that I felt 
that the President ought to call the Directors back into his office and 
inform them personally of his decisions. It seemed to me that that was 
a proper course to take, particularly in view of the sensitivity of the 
decisions relative to Mr. Hoover. 

However, the President and Mr. Haldeman did not think that that 
was necessary, so then the question became how should a decision 
memorandum go out. Mr. Haldeman seemed to think that it was not 
necessary for either he or the President to do that, so I was nominated. 

Mr. Schwarz. And you sent it out ? 

Mr. Huston. Yes, I did. Over my signature. 

Mr. Schwarz. You sent a memorandum indicating that the Presi- 
dent had approved, and that the restraints that the intelligence com- 
munity wished to have removed could now be removed, and they should 
proceed with their business. Is that right ? N 


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for a subsequent meeting of what would then become a permanent 
interagency committee. And at that point, the methods of implementa- 
tion would be discussed. 

Mr. Schwakz. At that point, the methods of implementation would 
be implemented ? 

Mr. Huston. Yes. 

Mr. Schwarz. Now I just have two more questions, Mr. Huston, 
having to do with the attitudes of the intelligence community in the 
meetings that you attended with them. 

First, I would like to read to you from exhibit 9 *, a document pre- 
pared for Mr. Sullivan, for Mr. Hoover's first address to the Directors 
after the President's meeting on June 5. And Mr. Sullivan proposed 
this language : 

Individually, those of us in the intelligence community are relatively small 
and limited. Unified, our own combined potential is magnified and limitless. It 
is through unity of action that we can tremendously increase our intelligence- 
gathering potential, and, I am certain, obtain the answers the President wants. 

Was that, in substance, the view of the intelligence community 
with which you met? 

Mr. Huston. Well, I do not know quite how to answer that. It 
seemed to me the people at the working-group level felt that it was 
important that there be a greater degree of community coordination 
than there had been in the past, particularly, as you know, at that 
time, the CIA and the FBI liaison had been terminated. So I think 
there was a high degree of sensitivity at working-group level with 
respect to interagency coordination. 

Mr. Schwarz. In connection with your answer that that liaison had 
been terminated, at the June 5 meeting, was the President told that, 
or was he told something inconsistent with that? 

Mr. Huston. Well, I think he was told — well, the trouble with deal- 
ing with these people is that what they say is not often so untrue as 
it is misleading. 

But, the President — I had told the President the problem that 
existed as a result of Mr. Hoover terminating the liaison. When the 
President asked Mr. Hoover and Mr. Helms, "Are you people getting 
along, working well together?", and they both said, "Well yes, we're 
doing very well", and I think both of them probably thought that was 
an honest answer, because I think both of"them felt that they didn't 
need to have any formal method of liaison. 

Mr. Schwarz. One final question, Mr. Huston. Throughout the 
meetings you had on this subject, did any person, other than 
Mr. Hoover in the footnotes, suggest or argue that the activities being 
proposed ought not to be done because they were either unconstitu- 
tional or illegal ? 

Mr. Huston. No. 

Mr. Schwarz. I have nothing further. 

The Chairman. Mr. Smothers, do you have any questions? 

Mr. Smothers. Yes, Mr. Chairman, just as a matter of brief inquiry. 
Mr. Huston, I think we have so far the impression of your functioning 
as the vehicle for transmission of the intelligence community's views 

1 See p. 209. 


to the President. I think it might be useful to inquire whether your 
functions indeed went beyond that point. 

Mr. Huston, during the time of this effort on the development of 
the Huston plan, for whom did you work? Who was your immediate 
superior ? 

Mr. Huston. Until August of 1970, it would have been Jim Keogh. 
I was assigned to the speech writing staff. 

Mr. Smothers. Did you also work for Mr. Haldeman ? 

Mr. Huston. Well, anyone who was on the White House staff 
worked for Mr. Haldeman. 

Mr. Smothers. Did you, from time to time, receive guidance from 
Mr. Haldeman regarding the intelligence or investigative capabilities 
desired by the President ? 

Mr. Huston. No, not really. I don't think I received any guidance 
from Mr. Haldeman on that until we got into this period on April or 
June of 1970. 

Mr. Smothers. Until you got into the period April and June 1970? 

Mr. Huston. Yes. 

Mr. Smothers. What kind of guidance did you receive during the 
April-June 1970 period? 

Mr. Huston. We had discussions on the staff with Mr. Haldeman 
as to who should have staff responsibility for coordination of intelli- 
gence matters, which Mr. Haldeman regarded simply as a housekeep- 
ing detail. 

Mr. Smothers. Did you also receive from Mr. Haldeman a commu- 
nication regarding the desires of the President on the nature and 
extent of surveillance that ought to be accomplished ? 

Mr. Huston. No. 

Mr. Smothers. Did you undertake, at Mr. Haldeman's direction, 
an effort to use the Internal Revenue Service as a surveillance 

Mr. Huston. No. 

Mr. Smothers. Let me read to you from a memorandum which 
you sent to Mr. Haldeman on September 21, 1970 [exhibit 62 1 ]. You 
do not have a copy of this memorandum. It is short, though, and I 
believe you will be able to follow it. 

Memorandum for Mr. Haldeman, from you. First paragraph be- 
gins, "I am attaching a copy of a report from the IES on the activities 
of its 'Special Service group' which is supposed to monitor the activi- 
ties of ideological organizations (for example, Jerry Rubin Fund, 
Black Panthers, et cetera) and take appropriate action when violations 
of DJS regulations turn up. You will note that the report is long on 
words and short on substance." 

Second paragraph, "Nearly 18 months ago, the President indicated 
a desire for IRS to move against leftist organizations taking advan- 
tage of tax shelters. I have been pressing IRS since that time to 
no avail." . 

Did this pressing of IRS, Mr. Huston, represent Presidential guid- 
ance communicated to you ? 

Mr. Huston. The extent of the pressing — we talked before to the 
fact that a meeting was held with the Commissioner of Internal Reve- 
nue, Dr. Burns, and I in June of 1969, at which meeting Dr. Burns 
expressed to the Commissioner the President's concern that as a result 

1 See p. 395. 


of testimony that had come out, both before the House Ways and 
Means Committee and the Senate Government Operations Committee, 
that it appeared that there were organizations, ideological organiza- 
tions, that were in violation of the tax laws. And we were talking in 
that context about 501 (c) (3) organizations. 

Subsequent to that, I had sent a memorandum to Mr. Barth who 
was the Assistant to the Commissioner, asking him specifically a ques- 
tion with regard to why the Sierra Club had had its exemption re- 
voked when two REMC's (Eural Electrification Membership Corpo- 
rations) had been brought to my attention who seemed to be similarly 
involved in advocating environmental legislation had not. I received 
a memorandum back indicating to me the reason was the two groups 
fell into different tax classifications. 

I also, in July 1969, received from the IRS copies of the minutes 
of two meetings that were held by what then I think was called the 
Activist Organizations Committee, or something like that; all of 
which I received in July 1969. From July 1969 to August 1970, to the 
best of my recollection, there was no further written communication. 
And if there were any telephonic communication, I do not recall it 
and Mr. Barth does not have any recollection of it. So in August 1970 
I sent the memorandum to the IRS, having read the story in the news- 
paper that Mr. Rubin was now channeling all of his lecture fees to a 
tax-exempt foundation, and asked what was going on and what had 
happened to this committee that had been established a year prior. 

At that point I then received from the Commissioner a copy of a 
report that indicated what the committee had been doing. I then sent 
a copy of that report to Mr. Haldeman with the memorandum you 
just read. Neither Mr. Haldeman nor anyone else in the White House 
responded to that memorandum and I had no subsequent contact with 
the IRS. 

Mr. Smothers. Is it not true that since this investigation, which 
IRS was ordered to initiate, had been going for some 18 months, and 
for some 15 months even at the time your Huston plan was completed, 
that you and your supervisors had some very clear ideas regarding the 
kinds of surveillance you wanted conducted ? 

Mr. Huston. By whom ? 

Mr. Smothers. By any governmental agencies. 

Mr. Huston. Well, as I say, I never talked with any of my superiors 
about the type of surveillance activities they wanted undertaken. 

Mr. Smothers. But you were aware, were you not, Mr. Huston, of 
the intention of these various surveillance efforts? Is it not clear 
from your memorandum that you are intending to identify people who 
are in conflict or believed to be in conflict with the administration's 
ideas ? 

Mr. Huston. I am sorry, in what memorandum ? 

Mr. Smothers. Concerning the purpose of your investigative effort 
with IRS. 

Mr. Huston. I did not have any investigative effort with IRS. That 
is the point I am trying to make. 

Mr. Smothers. What was the intent of the administration, as you 
understood it, in asking IRS to look closely at these leftist organiza- 
tions ? 

Mr. Huston. As far as I know, if by the administration you mean the 
White House, the White House never asked the IRS to look at these 

62-685 O - 76 -2 


leftist organizations. Dr. Bums conveyed to the Commissioner the 
President's concern about 501(c) (3) organizations. 

Mr. Smothers. Let me ask you then two questions about that memo- 
randum. First, the words, "nearly 18 months ago the President indi- 
cated a desire for IRS to move against leftist organizations." Those 
are your words ; how do you interpret them ? 

Mr. Huston. Well, the President frankly did express that concern. 
However, Dr. Burns did not express his concern to the Commissioner 
in the same way. 

Mr. Smothers. Just one other statement then from that same memo- 
randum. In the last paragraph you indicate in communicating to Mr. 
Haldeman : 

What we cannot do in a courtroom via criminal prosecution to curtail the 
activities of some of these groups, IRS could do by administrative action. More- 
over, valuable intelligence type information could be turned up by IRS as a 
result of their field audits. 

Is this not a move against these organizations? Is this not an indica- 
tion of the philosophy you were asked to communicate to the intelli- 
gence groups when you sat down with them ? 

Mr. Huston. No. First of all, after the time that that memorandum 
was written I never sat down with any intelligence community people. 

Second, what that concept denoted at that point in time was essen- 
tially the strike force concept that had been successful in organized 
crime. Going back to the Johnson administration, the White House 
had been concerned about the sources of funding of many of these 
groups. And the point that was being made there was that through 
the audit process undertaken in. connection with alleged violation of 
tax laws, it was entirely likely to uncover the source of funds. However, 
that was an opinion that I expressed to Mr. Haldeman. Mr. Haldeman 
never responded to it. I never talked to anyone at the IRS about it. 
And so far as I know, no one at the White House asked the IRS to do 
anything. In fact, I might add, that each of the people in the Special 
Service Staff have testified — an affidavit indicated that the White 
House had absolutely no influence whatsoever in the creation of the 
Special Service Staff. That includes Mr. Thrower, Mr. Barth, Mr. 
Green, Mr. Bacon. Each one of these people, by affidavit, have indi- 
cated that the Special Service Staff was set up at the initiative of the 
IRS personnel and not at the request of the White House and that the 
White House had made no effort to influence the work undertaken by 
that committee. And I know in my own case, I did not even know about 
the committee until after it was established. 

Mr. Smothers. I have nothing further at this time, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. I might say that this committee is looking into 
the question of the Special Service Staff and the ways that the In- 
ternal Revenue Service has been used to harass citizens and organiza- 
tions for purposes other than determining their tax liability. And we 
will get to that in the course of our hearings. 

Coming back now to the Huston plan, I would like to call your 
attention to exhibit l. 1 You have it now, do you not, Mr. Huston? 

Mr. Huston. Yes, sir. 

The Chatrman. I would ask you to turn to exhibit 2 2 , and turn to 

i See p. 141. 
1 See p. 189. 


page 2, please, of your recommendations to the President. Now first 
of all, as I understand it, this document represented your proposals 
to the President for lifting or relaxing certain restraints on the intel- 
ligence community with respect to gathering information on what you 
call the revolutionary climate. I would suppose that had reference to 
the antiwar demonstrations and antiwar protest groups. 

Mr. Huston. Senator, I really was peripherally interested in the 
antiwar demonstrations. What I was concerned about was the 40,000 
bombings that took place in 1 year. What I was concerned about was 
the 39 police officers who were killed in sniping incidents. 

The Chairman. Yes, and everything connected with that. 

Mr. Huston. Well, that is what I am talking about when I am 
talking about revolutionary violence as opposed to antiwar demon- 

The Chairman. Well, whatever your purpose, the document you 
sent to the President contained your recommendations for lifting or 
relaxing certain restraints. 

Mr. Huston. Or keeping restraints as in the case of the military. 

The Chairman. And in some cases, keeping restraints. 

Mr. Huston. Yes. 

The Chairman. Now, was it your understanding, when you sub- 
mitted that document to the President, that his authority was being 
requested for lifting or relaxing restraints if he chose to accept your 
recommendation ? 

Mr. Huston. Yes. 

The Chairman. Now, turning to the question of mail coverage, on 
page 2 of your recommendations I read, "recommendation: restric- 
tions on legal coverage should be removed." And I take it by legal 
coverage you had reference to the procedure that enables intelligence 
agencies, law enforcement agencies, to look at the envelopes. If the 
procedure is followed, there is a legal way for doing that. 

Mr. Huston. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Then you recommended, "also, present restrictions 
on covert coverage should be relaxed on selected targets of priority, 
foreign intelligence and internal security interests." Now here you 
were referring to opening the mail, were you not ? 

Mr. Huston. Yes. 

The Chairman. And that was against the law, was it not ? 

Mr. Huston. Yes. 

The Chairman. So you were making a very serious recommendation 
to Mr. Nixon. You were recommending that he authorize mail 
openings, even though such openings were in violation of the law. 

Mr. Huston. Well, I think what was being recommended was that 
they be employed in spite of the fact that there was a Federal law 
that prohibited it but, as in relationship both to mail and to 
surreptitious entry, and of course electronic surveillance, there 
was the whole question as to whether in essence the fourth amendment 
applied to the President in the exercise of his internal security power. 
And I think that is where — that is why I earlier said, when you asked 
me about our thinking, I think this is where the question arose. In 
my mind, what we were talking about is something that I had been 
told had been done for 25 years. It had been done with the knowledge 


of the professional intelligence community, the people who had been 
here long before we got in town, and would be here long after we 
left town. 

The question really was a question of whether inherent in the Execu- 
tive power, in matters involving internal security or the security of 
the state, the President could act contrary to the dictates of a statute. 
And I think that was the kind of dilemma that we had ourselves in. 

The Chairman. You were recommending that the President, in this 
case, authorize mail openings, even though such action was contrary 
to the Federal statute. 

Mr. Huston. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And you have suggested that there might be some 
inherent right that circumvents the fourth amendment to the Consti- 
tution of the United States guaranteeing citizens against unreasonable 
searches and seizures without a warrant, bearing upon the national 
security responsibilities of the President. 

Mr. Huston. Senator, I think this really goes to the heart of the 
matter, as you well know. And I think if you recall in the Safe Streets 
Act, there was a proviso clause in there that said to the effect that 
nothing in this act is to be deemed to limit whatever power the 
President might have with respect to national security matters. I 
think it was that kind of approach to this whole area of fourth amend- 
ment rights as they evolved, in terms of national security, internal 
security, that opened the door to men, who in good conscience thought 
they could go ahead and do it. 

The Chairman. Now, you yourself have suggested this was a very 
serious question. 

Mr. Huston. Yes. 

The Chairman. And you were asking the President to take action 
that violated the Federal statute, upon the theory that he had some 
inherent right to do this. Now since that is such a central question, 
since it does go to the protection offered American citizens in) the 
fourth amendment to the Constitution, did you take the matter up with 
the Attorney General of the United States to secure his opinion ? 

Mr. Huston. No. 

The Chairman. No ? 

Mr. Huston. No. 

The Chairman. Was the Attorney General of the United States ad- 
vised of the recommendations that were being made to the President 
or of all of the activity by the CIA, the NSA, the FBI that preceded 
your submitting recommendations to the President ? 

Mr. Huston. In terms of activity, do you mean in connection with 
the preparation of a report, or whatever they had done for the last 
25 years? 

The Chairman. My question relates to those particular meetings 
that you have described. 

Mr. Huston. No, the Attorney General was not aware of the ap- 
pointment of the committee or the fact that the committee was 

The Chairman. He did not know of the appointment of the com- 
mittee, the purpose of the committee ? 

Mr. Huston. No. 

The Chairman. The fact that it had met, the fact that recommenda- 
tions had been made to you, and that you were making recommenda- 


tions to the President involving actions that constituted a violation 
of Federal statutes. Why was the Attorney General never informed ? 

Mr. Huston. Well, I think there are two answers to that; well, 
there are really three answers. The first answer is that when the de- 
cision was made for the President to hold this meeting, the context 
in which the discussion occurred related to intelligence collection 
matters. It was viewed as an intelligence matter and not a law enforce- 
ment or criminal matter. And in that case, we simply brought in the 
people who were the professional intelligence people and they are the 
ones who had the responsibility for handling the problem, and as to 
whom the President would turn. 

Now, the second aspect of it is that after all, theoretically at least, 
the FBI is the division of the Justice Department and it would have 
seemed to be incumbent upon the Director before he signed the report 
to have cleared it with his superior just as Admiral Gayler and Gen- 
eral Bennett, before they signed the report, got clearance from the 
Deputy Director of the Department of Defense. 

The third problem or third answer probably is that I was the one 
who was responsible for — or at least initially responsible for — suggest- 
ing who would be appropriate to be involved in these proceedings. I, 
at that time, did not nave any clear preconception of where the com- 
mittee was going to end up, in terms of what it specifically would 
recommend. Many of these things, particularly as they related to the 
NSA for example, or the CIA, I did not know anything about. 

And finally, I frankly did not have a whole lot of confidence in the 
Justice Department, and its sensitivity with respect to distinguish- 
ing between types of protest activity. 

The Chairman. And it never occurred to you, as the President's 
representative, in making recommendations to him that violated the 
law, that you or the White House should confer with the Attorney 
General before making those recommendations. 

Mr. Huston. No, it didn't. It should have, but it didn't. 

The Chairman. Well, now, you have described this report to the 
President, which has become known as the Huston plan, as a report 
in which you were requesting the President to authorize certain 
actions, some of which were illegal. And one of those illegal actions 
had to do with the subject about which I am now inquiring, mail 

Mr. Huston. Yes. 

The Chairman. When you testified earlier in executive session, you 
were asked the following question : "You were not aware of the fact, 
I take it, that at this time, the time you were submitting your recom- 
mendations to the President, the CIA was opening mail ?" 

You replied, "No. In fact, I think one of the more interesting 
things in this whole thing is why I didn't know half the things I 
didn't know, when the President of the United States sat across the 
table from the Directors of the intelligence agencies, and said, 'I want 
a complete report on what is going on.' I did not know about the CIA 
mail openings. I didn't know about the COINTEL Program. These 
people were conducting all of these things on their own that the Presi- 
dent of the United States did not know about." 

Do you still stand by that testimony ? 


Mr. Huston. With the exception, I assume — I guess I can't be 
positive that the President didn't know, if he had learned from other 
sources, but I can say I certainly didn't know about it, and it was 
my responsibility to see that the President knew what was going on. 

The Chairman. And to your knowledge, he did not know. 

Mr. Huston. No. To my knowledge, he did not know. 

The Chairman. And it would have been a very curious exercise for 
him, wouldn't it, to look at your recommendations asking for his 
authority to open the mail, if he already knew that the practice had 
been going on for a long time before his authority was asked ? 

Mr. Huston. Yes. 

The Chairman. Yes. And he never raised that with you ? 

Mr. Huston. No. 

The Chairman. And 5 days later, upon reconsideration, when he 
pulled back this report or this directive, did he do that for the pur- 
pose of revoking the authority that he had given ? 

Mr. Huston. Yes, because Mr. Hoover and Attorney General 
Mitchell had prevailed upon him to change his decision, which he did. 
And there was certainly no doubt in my mind, nor do I think there 
could have conceivably been any doubt in the minds of any of the 
other people who had been involved, that the revocation of the — the 
recall of the decision memoranda meant a reversal of the President's 

The Chairman. So the President revoked the authority he had 

Mr. Huston. Yes. 

The Chairman. For such things as mail openings? 

Mr. Huston. Yes. 

The Chairman. And yet, are you aware that the mail openings 
continued for a long time after that revocation? 

Mr. Huston. Well, I have read the Eockefeller Commission re- 
port, yes, sir. That is all I know about it. 

The Chairman. So we have a case where the President is asked 
to authorize mail openings, even though they are illegal, and quite 
apart from whether he should have done it, and quite apart from 
whether or not the advice of the Attorney General should have been 
asked, he acceded to that request. He did so thinking that he was au- 
thorizing these openings, not knowing that his authority was an idle 
gesture, since these practices had been going on for a long time prior 
to the request for his authority. And after he revoked that authority, 
the practices continued, even though he had revoked it. That is the 
state of the record, based on your testimony ? 

Mr. Huston. Yes ; I think it is. 

The Chairman. Senator Tower. 

Senator Tower. A fundamental question is whether the intelligence 
community itself provided the inspiration to the Huston plan, or 
whether you went to them with either the clear guidance of the White 
House or with your own ideas. Can you enlighten us on that ? 

Mr. Huston. Well, I had been involved peripherally in the intel- 
ligence area since June of 1969, when I was first asked to undertake 
the assignment of preparing a report on foreign financing of revolu- 
tionary protest activity. And in October and November of 1969, I 


was responsible for the coordination of intelligence relating to the 
antiwar demonstrations in Washington. 

During this period I became, I think, close to Mr. Sullivan and 
Mr. Brennan. I think I had their confidence, in that I think they 
thought I understood a little bit about who the players were and what 
was going on in the country in internal security matters. And they cer- 
tainly had my confidence. In fact, I do not think there was anyone 
in the Government who I respected more than Mr. Sullivan. 

So that by the time of April when Mr. Haldeman held a meeting 
at which it was decided that the President would call the Directors 
together, I had had many discussions with the Bureau about what 
their problems were. And by the time the committee met, I had a 
clear view of what they thought they needed. 

Now, the question- becomes, who was the inspiration. No one, 
Mr. Haldeman or the President, ever said to me — who were the only 
two who were directly involved — "Here is what we want," except that 
Mr. Haldeman did say to me that the President leaned toward the use 
of the military in domestic intelligence. As a matter of fact, I was 
strongly opposed to that, if for no other reason than being a former 
Army intelligence officer, I had seen first hand who was doing that 
work, and accordingly, I thought they ought to stay in the military 
business. The military services wanted to stay in the military busi- 
ness; the FBI wanted them to stay. So that was the only guidance 
I ever received from Mr. Haldeman or indirectly through the Pres- 
ident as to what might be preconceived. And in that instance, we came 
in with a recommendation that was contrary to what their initial 
reaction had been. 

So, in summary, the impression, Senator, of course, is that I kind 
of sat down here and created out of whole cloth an entire array of 
new techniques to exploit and infringe upon the civil liberties of the 
American people, and that I forced it down Dick Helms' throat, and 
I blackjacked Admiral Gayler, and I really used my heavy weight 
on all of these poor little professional intelligence people and forced 
them into coming up with all of this. 

Now, I think the fact of the matter is that the entire intelligence 
community, in the summer of 1970, thought we had a serious crisis 
in this country. I thought we had a serious crisis in this country. My 
attitude was that we have got to do something about it. Who knows 
what to do about it ? The professional intelligence community. 

The professional intelligence community tells me, this is what — 
you give us these tools; we can solve the problem. I recommended 
those tools. 

The thing that is interesting to me about the fact that I did not 
know about the mail openings, I did not know about the COINTEL 
Program, is that if we had known that many of these tools that they 
were asking for permission to use were already being used and we 
still were not getting any results, it conceivably would have changed 
our entire attitude toward the confidence we were willing to place 
in the hands of the intelligence community in dealing with this 

So, since I have been out in front, as you know, Senator, since the 
first time we talked, back in May, in the Armed Services Committee, 


I have been out front in this thing, that the Huston plan — I never 
wrote this report that everyone calls the Huston plan. I did not 
write that report. 

But all I want to say for the record is, I thought we had a seri- 
ous problem. I was not concerned about people who didn't like the 
war. I wasn't concerned about people who thought Nixon was a louse. 
I was not concerned about who was going to be the Democratic nom- 
inee. I am talking about — we were talking about bombers; we were 
talking about assassins; we were talking about snipers. And I felt 
something had to be done. These people said, here are the tools we 
need. I take full responsibility. I recommended it. 

Senator Tower. So what you are saying is that the inspiration for 
the report, in most of its aspects, in the absence of anything but the 
scantiest guidelines by the White House, actually came from the 
agencies involved? 

Mr. Huston. Yes, Senator. As a matter of fact, I never heard of 
NSCTD 6. In fact, I never saw NSCID 6. For all I know, NSCTD 6 
says you get a free lunch in the White House mess. And you know, it's 
in here as a recommendation. 

Senator Tower. You got no guidance from anybody, in addition to 
the President, Mr. Haldeman, or any of the Presidential staffers? In 
other words, all that was contributed by the White House was what 
you attested to here ? 

Mr. Huston. Yes. After the meeting with the President, I was then 
responsible for giving the committee a guideline as to what the Presi- 
dent wanted, which was the three areas we discussed — threat assess- 
ment, restraints, and options. The committee then prepared the report, 
and it came back to me. 

In the meantime, I think I sent Mr. Haldeman a memo some time 
in mid- June, saying the committee is coming along fine ; we hope to 
have a report by the end of the month. At no time from June 5 until 
July 23 or after July 23, when Mr. Haldeman called me to recall the 
decision memoranda, did I talk either to him or to the President about 
anything relating to this report. 

Senator Tower. After completion of the report, who took the initia- 
tive in seeking the President's approval of it? 

Mr. Huston. Of the recommendations ? 

Senator Tower. Yes ; of the recommendations. 

Mr. Huston. It was my responsibility, when the committee pre- 
pared its report and submitted it to the President, to prepare a sum- 
mary of the report and, if deemed appropriate, to prepare recommen- 
dations, which I then did. I prepared the cover memorandum, which is 
exhibit 2 l and sent it forward to the President, trying to set forth 
all of the strongest arguments pro and con in a summarized form, 
with respect to the various options. 

And in that connection, I made the recommendations which I felt, 
in my judgment, represented the consensus of the professional intelli- 
gence community as to what we ought to do. 

Senator Tower. Are you saying in the report that the recommen- 
dations, then, are vours ? 

Mr. Huston. Yes: they are my recommendations, because in the 
formal report — and I insisted on that with the working group that 

1 See p. 189. 


the President wanted options. He did not want someone to say — the 
committee people themselves— to say, "this is what you should do. 
However, there was simply never any doubt in my mind as to who 
wanted what. . 

And, in fact, in my cover memorandum to Mr. Haldeman, 1 tried to 
outline who was in favor of what. I pointed out, for example, that 
the CIA was not in favor of a permanent interagency committee. They 
only wanted an ad hoc committee. I said Mr. Helms cooperated. I 
would not have said Mr. Helms cooperated, if he didn't. For all I 
knew, the President would pick up the phone and say, "Dick, what did 
you think of this committee?" So I had tried to tell the President, 
through Mr. Haldeman, what I had felt was the result and the attitude 
of the committee. 

Senator Tower. What was your attitude toward the President s 
reversal of the decision that resulted in revoking the plan? 

Mr. Huston. I thought it was a mistake for several reasons. The 
first reason I thought it was a mistake, is it put us back to ground 
zero, which is not merely back to ground zero in terms of operational 
techniques, but back to ground zero in terms of lack of any coordina- 
tion among the intelligence agencies. 

Second, I felt in my own mind that Mr. Hoover's objections were 
not based — I do not want to phrase it — I felt that not all of Mr. 
Hoover's objections had been meritoriously submitted to the President 
as to what hb was really concerned about. 

And third, frankly, I was concerned about what effects this would 
have on the intelligence community other than the FBI, if they could 
put their back into this project which was supposed to have been a 
joint effort, they all reached a consensus and then one person, the 
Director of the FBI, could succeed in reversing it. 

Senator Tower. While you did not prepare this plan, you were in 
fact its advocate. 

Mr. Huston. Yes, sir. 

Senator Tower. Thank you. 

The Chairman. Senator Mondale? 

Senator Mondale. Mr. Huston, in the preparation of the options 
presented to the President, several recommendations were presented 
to the President which were described as being illegal. 

Mr. Huston. Yes, sir. 

Senator Mondale. And I gather that you were not raising any ques- 
tions except that it was understood by all concerned that they were 
illegal but they were recommended nonetheless. 

Mr. Huston. Well, as I indicated earlier, Senator, I think that in 
the case of surreptitious entry, for example, based upon the fact that 
this had been occurring for many, many years, that there were ob- 
viously in line with numbers of who had been involved, that there had 
to be some justification, legal justification. But I think that in the 
terms of the use of the word, for example, "burglary," frankly, I think, 
I am sure what this committee will find out if it talks to enough intelli- 
gence community people, that the final bottom line on that is what 
happens to the guy who gets caught. And that is where clearly he is 
going to take the heat, under the local or State statute that he violates, 
because Mr. Hoover is not going to come and bail him out. 


Senator Mondale. Let me return to my question. There was no doubt 
in your mind that opening people's mail and reading it, tapping con- 
versations by U.S. citizens, burglarizing embassies and the rest was 
illegal. That is why you said it was illegal in your memo to the Presi- 
dent, is that correct ? 

Mr. Huston. Two areas— I do not think the tapping falls into that 

Senator Mondale. Let us pick one area. 

Mr. Huston. Yes, certainly. "We said it was illegal. Mr. Hoover 
said it was illegal. I put it in the memorandum to the President. In 
fact, I escalated the rhetoric from, I think, breaking and entering 
to burglary, so that the President would have no doubt whatsoever 
what the worst case was on that question. 

Senator Mondale. All right. So it is agreed that recommendations 
and actions were presented to the President which called for a response 
by which the President would approve illegal acts by the Government. 
What legal justification or other justification do you have, as an at- 
torney and an officer of the court and as a public officer sworn to up- 
hold the Constitution and the laws of the land, to entertain and recom- 
mend illegal acts by the Government ? 

Mr. Huston. "Well, as I said, Senator, it was my opinion at the time 
that simply the fourth amendment did not apply to the President in 
the exercise of matters relating to the internal security or national se- 
curity. It was an argument that Mr. Justice Douglas, for example, an- 
ticipated in the U.S. District Court case that ruled unconstitutional the 
domestic wiretaps because up until 1972 every President, and with 
the possible exception of Attorney General Clark, every Attorney 
General, argued that the President had inherent authority under Ex- 
ecutive power to engage in warrantless wiretaps, although the Court in 
criminal matters had clearly held that a warrantless wiretap violated 
the fourth amendment. Yet, the Justice Department even took the 
case to the Supreme Court because they felt there was that inherent 

Now you and I both know as lawyers that if there is an exception 
to the fourth amendment for electronic surveillance, which is a tres- 
pass in common law, then it does not take a lot of imagination to extend 
that from the trespass via the telephone to trespass via surreptitious 
entry or mail opening. That is frankly the kind of dangerous road we 
were hustling down at this point. 

Senator Mondale. All right. If that is your justification, why did you 
call it illegal then ? What you are arguing, then, is that it is legal for the 
President to violate rights, constitutional and legal rights of citizens, 
if he is the President and if he invokes national security as a justifica- 
tion. But you did not say that in your memo. You said these things are 
illegal. Now, which is it? 

Mr. Huston. Well, I think that for the purposes that seem to me 
to be most relevant at the time — that is, that the operative action — the 
operation was going to be the undertaken by an individual, who, if he is 
caught, is going to go to jail, it is clearly illegal. 

Senator Mondale. Yes. So that it would be fair to say that you 
understood and told the President it was illegal, but to justify it now, 
you invoke a national security defense which would make it legal. 

Mr. Huston. No ; I am not 

Senator Mondale. Which position is it? 


Mr. Huston. Senator, I am not invoking any defense now because 
you asked me what my opinion was at the time and not what my opinion 
is now. r 

Senator Mondale. All right. 

Mr. Huston. What I am saying to you is that the consideration 
that was given by not only me, but by the other people who signed 
this report and discussed these things, was that frankly it was within 
the power of the President to do it. 

Senator Mondale. All right. Why did you not say in your memo 
that this would appear to be illegal, but that in fact it is legal be- 
cause, the President has powers not mentioned in the Constitution, but 
powers which we feel every President possesses. These powers are such 
that the law does not apply to the President and the constitutional 
rights of the citizens do not apply where the President decides that the 
national security dictates; Why did you not say that? Instead of that, 
you said it was illegal. 

Mr. Huston. I said that because that is what the report had said. 

Senator Mondale. All right. Now, do you recall, at the time you 
were discussing these various options to be recommended to the Presi- 
dent, what the position was of the principals representing the various 
agencies? You had a representative from the NSA, one from the CIA, 
one from the DIA, and one from the FBI. During the course of mak- 
ing up these options, which of them objected to these recommendations 
which involved illegal acts ? 

Mr. Huston. At the working-group level, I do not recall any 

Senator Mondale. Do you recall any of them ever saying, "We can- 
not do this because it is illegal" ? 

Mr. Huston. No. 

Senator Mondale. Can you recall any discussion whatsoever con- 
cerning the illegality of these recommendations? 

Mr. Huston. No. 

Senator Mondale. Does it strike you as peculiar that top public 
officers in the most high-level and sensitive positions of Government 
would discuss recommending to the President actions which are clearly 
illegal, and possibly unconstitutional, without ever asking themselves 
whether that was a proper thing for them to be doing? 

Mr. Huston. Yes ; I think it is, except for the fact that I think that 
for many of those people we were talking about something that they 
had been aware of, had been undertaking for a long period of time. 

Senator Mondale. Is that an adequate justification ? 

Mr. Huston. Sir, I am not trying to justify, I am just trying to 
tell you what my impression is of what happened at the time. 

Senator Mondale. Because if criminals could be excused on the 
grounds that someone had done it before, there would not be much of 
a population in any of the prisons today, would there? 

Mr. Huston. No. 

Senator Mondale. Second, I gather it is your testimony that 
although these agencies were asked to supply information on what 
they were doing, in fact, none of them offered evidence that they were 
opening mail or intercepting private communications and performing 
other acts which it was requested that the President authorize. Is that 
correct ? 


Mr. Huston. The reports indicated that there were no mail open- 
ings, there were no surreptitious entries. 

Senator Mondale. And in fact there were ? 

Mr. Huston. Well, apparently there were, but that was the informa- 
tion I had. 

Senator Mondale. Now, not only did they not tell the President 
that those acts and actions were underway, but they did not talk about 
it with each other. Is that correct? When they met and discussed this, 
the CIA did not tell the others that they were already engaging in 
illegal mail openings. 

Mr. Huston. Yes, I think that was part of the problem of not 
telling us. 

Senator Mondale. Then after these options were turned down by 
the President, they continued and, in fact, increased in scope in some 
respects, did they not ? 

Mr. Huston. I do not know, Senator, any more than what is in the 
Rockefeller Commission report. 

Senator Mondale. All right. Now suppose you were a President 
who wanted the law obeyed in this field. In the light of this record, 
what on earth would you do to gain accountability to the law? 

Mr. Huston. The first thing I would do is move the Domestic 
Intelligence Division out of the FBI. 

Senator Mondale. First of all, what would you do to get the truth? 

Mr. Huston. To get the truth? 

Senator Mondale. Yes. 

Mr. Huston. Well, I think that if— I have to think that if President 
Nixon had sat Mr. Helms across his desk, and said, "Are you opening 
any mail ?", Mr. Helms would have said yes. 

Senator Mondale. Why would it occur to the President to ask that 
question ? 

Mr. Huston. It would not occur to him and that is the whole 

Senator Mondale. You see, time and time again we come to this 
point. The only way the President can control these agencies is 
to get them over to the White House for dinner and spend hour after 
hour to find out what is going on, and then get on his knees and plead 
that they might do as he wished. 

Mr. Huston. I do not know how you find out except that I think we 
are at a threshold period in which the entire attitude toward the 
means of collecting intelligence is dramatically changed. I think that 
25 years ago that people would not have been at all surprised, nearly 
as surprised, as people are or as people are today. It is interesting to 
me, Senator, that in October 1971, on the Sunday edition of the New 
York Times, there was a front page article which was obviously 
planted to attack J. Edgar Hoover, which criticized Mr. Hoover for 
the fact that he had refused to engage in "black bag" jobs that were 
necessary in dealing with espionage. Now this was on the front page 
of the New York Times. There was not any editorial in that paper 
saying what in the world kind of criticism is that of J. Edgar Hoover, 
that he is not helping you guys out with black bag jobs. But this is 
the attitude that existed at that time and it was nothing that was un- 
known to any sophisticated person. I think that 

Senator Mondale. Yes, but what I do not understand is that as a 
lawyer and one trained to uphold the law, and as an officer of the 


court and one who is sworn to uphold the law, why on earth you felt 
that mood was a justification for violating the law. You know better 
than that. That is not the basis for law in this country. The law is a 
law and we are to uphold it and if it is not popular, then we should 
change it. You do not take the law into your hand and play God and 
interfere with the rights of the American people just because there is 
something you do not like. 

Mr. Huston. Senator, I agree with that. 

Senator Mondaije. But that is not what you did. 

Mr. Huston. Well, Senator, I understand that is not what I did. 

Senator Monda^e. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Senator Baker? 

Senator Baker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
_. Mr. Huston, there have been references from time to time in. your 
testimony and that of other witnesses to the effect that J. Edgar 
Hoover put the kibosh on the Huston plan. Do you know why he did ? 
Did he ever tell you why ? 

Mr. Huston. No, sir, he never talked to me about it. 

Senator Baker. Do you have any information that would indicate 
why he disagreed with the recommendation of the plan ? 

Mr. Huston. I did not think his objections were principled, Senator, 
because in many instances he says, not that this is illegal, it should not 
be done, he says, "I do not want to do it, but I do not care if somebody 
else does it," which does not strike me as being a principled objection. 

Senator Baker. Did he say that ? 

Mr. Huston. Yes, I think you will find, particularly with regard 
to the National Security Agency, indicated that he did not want to do 
it but if NSA wanted to do it themselves they had no objection. 

Senator Baker. Are there documents that indicate that Mr. Hoover 
said that while he did not want the FBI to do certain things, it was 
all right with him if the NSA did it ? 

Mr. Huston. It was in the report in the footnote, Senator. 

Senator Baker. What techniques was Mr. Hoover referring to at 
that time ? 

Mr. Huston. Of course he was opposed to everything, from the NSA 
requests for surreptitious entry down to allowing the FBI to in- 
crease its campus coverage by employing informers who were less than 
21 years old. He had established a policy that to qualify as a campus 
informant for the FBI you had to be 21 years old. The Bureau opera- 
tions people thought that imposed a difficult restraint on them since 
the most likely people to cooperate with the FBI were the younger 
freshmen and sophomores who had not yet become involved in a lot 
of these things. And so they wanted, in essence, to get the age where 
you could qualify as an FBI informant reduced to 18. 

Mr. Hoover did not want to do that because apparently he felt that 
the risk of exposure was too great. So in order simply to get the age 
reduced from 21 to 18, we couched — the FBI people couched — this 
recommendation in terms that campus informant coverage shall be 
expanded because they did not want to zero in on the specific problem^ 
because it would make Mr. Hoover mad. 

Senator Baker. Why were you worried about making Mr. Hoover 
mad ? This is the second or third time in your testimony that I have 


either heard you say or gotten the impression that you were scared 
to death of J. Edgar Hoover. 

Mr. Huston. Well, Mr. Hoover was a very influential man in the 
Government and it seemed to me that it was unlikely that any sort of 
successful intelligence — domestic intelligence capability — could be de- 
veloped without the cooperation of the Director of the FBI, since the 
FBI is the primary agency in this area. And it has always been my 
view to try — if you can get a fellow to go along without ruffling his 
feathers too much by trying to be — that is why I wanted the President 
to invite him in and give him the decision because it seemed to me it 
would be easier maybe to get him to accept it. But as it turns out, that 
did not work. 

And finally, on the 18-year-old thing, after Congress said 18-year- 
olds could vote 

Senator Baker. You mean it did not work because the President 
did not call Mr. Hoover in or because the President did not convince 

Mr. Huston. I do not know that even if the President would have 
called him in it would have made any difference, but that was the kind 
of approach that I would have taken. 

Senator Baker. Did you broach the idea to the President ? 

Mr. Huston. Yes, I did. 

Senator Baker. What did the President say about that ? 

Mr. Huston. Well, Mr. Haldeman said — as you know, Senator, there 
was not much of a disposition in the West Wing to take up valuable 
time with dealing with individuals, in a word, just to convince him. 

Senator Baker. Did you receive word through Mr. Haldeman that 
the President was not about to ask J. Edgar Hoover to the White 
House ? 

Mr. Huston. That is right. 

Senator Baker. Was the President also apprehensive about J. Edgar 
Hoover's approval of this? 

Mr. Huston. I do not have any idea. I do not know. 

Senator Baker. Did you talk to Attorney General Mitchell about 
the plan? 

Mr. Huston. No. 

Senator Baker. But you received word that he disapproved of it? 

Mr. Huston. Yes. 

Senator Baker. How did you receive that word ? 

Mr. Huston. Mr. Sullivan told me that Mr. Hoover had gone to 
the Attorney General after the decision memorandum had gone out, 
and Haldeman called me and indicated to me that either the Attorney 
General had talked to him or to the President, and it was at that point 
that the decision memorandum was to be recalled. 

Senator Baker. As I recall the testimony of Mitchell in the Water- 
gate hearings, he indicated that he was considerably distressed, if not 
in fact irate, about these proposals, and as quick as he could he got in 
touch with the President to put a stop to it. Is that in accord with 
^our recollection? 

Mr. Huston. That is my understanding, yes, sir. 

Senator Baker. Did he give the reasons for his indignity over the 
report, according to your information? 


Mr. Huston. No. I do not know. I assume his arguments were that 
it is not the kind of thing we ought to be doing. 

Senator Baker. There is a fine difference here that may or may not 
be important depending on how things develop later. But is 
it your impression, if you have any impression, that Mr. Mitchell was 
putting the kibosh on the plan to support Hoover for the sake of sup- 
porting Hoover, or because he was indignant that it proposed certain 
illegal activities, or for some other reason ? 

I was intrigued with your statement a minute ago, which was, I 
believe, that Hoover did not really state his concerns about the plan. 
What was your impression of the Mitchell objection? 

Mr. Huston. I only got second hand from Haldeman, and Bob did 
not spend a lot of time explaining to a junior staff member why he 
was doing things. So I did not know what it was. I assumed that prob- 
ably the Attorney General did not see any reason for a bunch of people 
in the White House to be rocking the boat with the Justice Department 
and getting Mr. Hoover all upset. And I also would give the Attorney 
General the benefit of the doubt and conclude that he thought this was 
something that we should not be doing. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Huston, you have indicated that, as far as you 
know, the President did not know, and you certainly did not know, that 
at the time you made the recommendation for mail cover, for surrepti- 
tious entry, for illegal wiretaps, those activities were already being 
conducted by those agencies. Is that a correct recollection of your 

Mr. Huston. Well, Senator, again on this wiretap thing, everybody 
has assumed all along that these wiretaps were illegal. Until 1972 it 
was the position of every President, every Attorney General and many 
Federal District Courts that they were not illegal. 

Senator Baker. That is sort of like the young lawyer who was argu- 
ing the case before the Supreme Court and the Chief Justice stopped 
him and said, "Young man, that is not the law," and he said, "Well, 
it was the law until your Honor spoke." So until 1972 the law was 
different in that respect? 

Mr. Huston. Yes, sir. 

Senator Baker. And unwarranted, meaning taps without a search 
warrant for national security purposes ? 

Mr. Huston. Yes, sir. 

Senator Baker. Without that fine distinction. 

Mr. Huston. On the other two areas, there clearly was no authority. 

Senator Baker. You did not know at the time you made the recom- 
mendation that these things were ongoing? 

Mr. Huston. That is right. 

Senator Baker. And the other two. 

Mr. Huston. Yes. 

Senator Baker. What other things were being done by the intelli- 
gence community, as you later discovered, that may or may not have 
been recommended in your report that dealt with similar matters? 

Mr. Huston. I think there were several things that were critically 
important that we should have known about that we did not and could 
very easily have influenced our judgment. One, of course, was the CO 
INTELPRO — Counterintelligence Program which we did not know 


about; Operation CHAOS, was— that the CIA had its own 
private operation going that we did not know about. 

Senator Baker. Can you tell us, or is there any reason why the wit- 
ness should not tell us, what COINTELPRO and CHAOS were, the 
nature of the programs ? 

The Chairman. No; there is no reason. The Justice Department has 
now made disclosures on COINTELPKO and I think the Rockefeller 
report set out Operation CHAOS. 

Senator Baker. Briefly, for this record, Mr. Huston, what was 
COINTELPRO and what was CHAOS? 

Mr. Huston. As I understand, the COINTEL Program was essen- 
tially designed to sow discord and I do not know what the correct 
technical term for it is, but it was an offensive program against desig- 
nated targets by the FBI in terms of 

Senator Baker. Well, give us an example. 

Mr. Huston. For example, Professor Jones is a member of the So- 
cialist Workers Party and he is running for the school board so the 
friendly neighborhood FBI agent sends a letter to the newspaper say- 
ing, "You may not know this, but this bird that is running for the 
school board is a member of the Socialist Workers Party." 

Senator Baker. You did not know about the COINTEL Program at 
the time of the filing of the Huston report ? 

Mr. Huston. No. 

Senator Baker. And you later learned of it? 

Mr. Huston. Yes. 

Senator Baker. How did you later learn of it? 

Mr. Huston. Well, when the Justice Department released the re- 

Senator Bakeb. Do you know whether or not the President of the 
United States knew of the COINTEL Program ? 

Mr. Huston. I do not believe so. All of the information that has 
been made public indicates that no one outside of the Bureau was to 
know about it including anyone in the Justice Department. 

Senator Baker. Including the Attorney General and the President ? 

Mr. Huston. Yes, including the Attorney General. 

Senator Baker. What was the other operation ? 

Mr. Huston. The Operation CHAOS and that is that apparently 
the CIA had a group set up that was concerned directly with matters 
affecting domestic intelligence collection or events that were occurring 
within the continental United States. We did not know about that. In 
fact, the impression that we had all along was that the CIA had very 
little interest in or coverage of areas which we thought were important, 
which was what happened abroad when these people, who were under 
surveillance by the FBI, left the country. That is where we thought the 
CIA effort should be. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Huston, let me ask you this. Can you tell me 
who authorized either COINTELPRO or CHAOS? Was it a Presi- 
dential authorization? 

Mr. Huston. I do not think so. I do not think any President knew 
about it and I think both of those programs were originated before 
this administration. I think COINTELPRO went back into the John- 
son administration and Operation CHAOS went back to the Johnson 


Senator Baker. I am not trying to establish blame or responsibility. 
I am just trying to establish in my own mind's eye whether in these 
projects the agencies were self-starters or whether someone up the scale 
may have authorized them. 

Mr. Huston. I do not know except that they were originated in a 
prior administration and my understanding is that President John- 
son did not know about it, and I do not believe President Nixon knew 
about it. 

Senator Baker. Thank you, sir. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Do you suppose they were just covenants that ran 
with the land? They were established in some previous administra- 
tion. There was no responsibility to let successive Presidents know. 

Mr. Huston. Senator, I do not know. 

The Chairman. Well, I might say that with respect to both Opera- 
tion CHAOS and COINTELPRO this committee intends to hold pub- 
lic hearings and explore all of the ramifications of those programs. 

Senator Huddleston. 

Senator Huddleston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Huston, did 
you attach any significance to the fact that after your plan was de- 
veloped, and at least for a few days, because the official policy of the 
administration, that neither the President nor Mr. Haldeman signed 
this plan, that went out over your signature, and subsequently be- 
came known as the Huston plan ? 

Mr. Huston. Senator, I think that was the intention. I was the 
person who was given this responsibility. It was my job, and I think 
that it was supposed to be me sitting here rather than Mr. Haldeman. 

Senator Huddleston. But, it was a significant change in policy, and 
one accepted by an administration that had put great store in its law 
and order theme during its campaign, and it would seem to me that 
this was something that might, with all deference to you, have a higher 
classification of importance in the administration. 

Mr. Huston. I would think so, too. I was never under any illusions 
about my influence in the administration. 

Senator Huddleston. Were you flattered by the fact that this plan 
carried your name ? 

Mr. Huston. It was an honor at the time I would have been very 
happy to do without, particularly since it had been my intention to 
leave the administration at the end of the second year anyway. 

Senator Huddleston. Could it have been that the administration 
was reluctant to put any higher official title on the plan, knowing that 
it did include extralegal activity ? 

Mr. Huston. Well, I think there was no doubt that in matters of 
great sensitivity there is always a conscious policy too, in any agency, 
to have a cutoff point, but I think more importantly if you understand 
the attitude in the White House at this time, Mr. Haldeman felt that 
if he said the President had made a decision and you worked in the 
Government, you ought to assume that he made the decision, and that 
if he designated someone else on his staff to tell you that the President 
made a decision, then you ought to believe that person. So, I think it 
probably never occurred to him that there is any reason in the world 
why a low-ranking White House aide could not simply send out a 
decision, a paper that said the President has made these decisions. 

62-685 O - 76 - 3 


Senator Huddleston. Even though that policy pursued such alsfty 
objective, as you pointed out a moment ago, of simply quelling the dis-x 
turbances that were going on in this country restoring peace and tran- 
quility, eliminating the bombings, eliminating the killing of policemen. 

Mr. Huston. I think that if there had been any mileage in putting 
out a press release, Senator, I am sure it would not have gone out in 
my name. 

Senator Huddleston. That is what I am curious about, with such a 
lofty objective as you have described previously. 

Mr. Huston, are you familiar with the Special Service Staff, or the 
Special Service groups, of the IRS? 

Mr. Huston. Yes, sir. 

Senator Huddleston. Are you familiar with some of its activities ? 

Mr. Huston. Yes. 

Senator Huddleston. Would you say that it is a proper response 
and a logical response to the interest that you, on behalf of the Presi- 
dent, showed in this field ? 

Mr. Huston. No. Well, I never expressed any interest in this field, 
Senator. The interest that I expressed to the IRS predated by a year 
my activity in this matter and was related to 501(c) (3) organizations. 

Senator Huddleston. Which were ideological organizations on 
which you were interested in getting information through the IRS ? 

Mr. Huston. No, I never asked for any information on any organi- 
zation from the IRS. 

Senator Huddleston. How would you expect that your memoran- 
dum would be interpreted, first of all, when you, after previously 
meeting with representatives of the IRS, and then nearly 13 months 
later asking for a progress report on operations of ideological organi- 
zations, and going to the pains of putting in that request the fact that 
you had made your original request back in July of 1969? This memo 
was dated August 14. It seems to me you are very pointedly indicating 
to the Director that over a year has passed and you have not received 
any evidence or any activity. 

What impression do you think the IRS would receive from that 

Mr. Huston. Well, I think the impression that they received was 
that I would like to have a progress report, and Commissioner Thrower 
sent me a progress report. 

Senator Huddleston. And that there was at least keen interest on 
the part of the White House. 

Mr. Huston. I do not know how much importance he attached to my 
inquiry for a progress report. He indicates he did not attach any, but, 
beyond that, I do not know. 

Senator Huddleston. I note, too, that in response to your request 
that a report was filed, and the cover memorandum to that report from 
Mr. Randolph Thrower of the IRS says, "I would stress that knowl- 
edge of the existence and operation of this group should be carefully 
limited." From whom did you think the information of this group 
should be kept? T 

Mr. Huston. Senator, I did not give any thought to that at all. 1 
was getting at that time every day piles of documents that had all sorts 
of elaborate classifications, restraint, hold-back, don't disclose stuff on 
it. Whenever something came across my desk like that, I attached no 
importance to that characterization whatsoever. 


Senator Huddleston. You did not wonder whether or not he even 
Ranted the other intelligence-gathering agencies to know about this 
activity ? 

Mr Huston. I did not know because there was nothing in that re- 
port that was of any interest to an intelligence agency. 

Senator Huddleston. But, as a matter of fact, you pointed out as 
you relayed that report on to Mr. H. R. Haldeman in a subsequent 
memorandum the next day, the memorandum that Mr. Smothers re- 
ferred to earlier, in which you indicate that the report had very little 
substance to it. Is that correct? 

Mr. Huston. Yes. 

Senator Htjddleston. And you pointed out to Mr. Haldeman that 
you had been pressing the IRS for over a year now, to no avail, to get 
some action, I presume, in this field. What form did this pressing 

Mr. Huston. As I indicated earlier, I told you each instance in which 
I had a communication with the IRS, and that was primarily in June- 
Juiy, 1969, and thereafter I have no recollection, nor does anyone at 
the IRS have any recollection, of any subsequent contact until August 
ox j_y i \j, 

^Senator Huddleston. What did you mean then to Mr. Haldeman? 
You said you had been pressing for 

Mr. Huston. Well, I had, in fact, on occasions when the initial re- 
quest that something be done has come down. The Counsel to the Presi- 
dent and I had met with the Commissioner, and I had subsequently 
sent two memoranda to the Commissioner regarding 501(c) (3) or- 
ganizations, and, as a result of that, we had never gotten— the thing 
that happened was we had asked a very narrow question relating to 
the enforcement of the tax laws with respect to tax-exempt organiza- 
tions. We never got any answer on that. What we got instead was the 
creation of this Special Service Staff that was out rooting around in a 
thousand different organizations, and never once did we get any re- 
sponse back specifically, except on the inquiry I raised about why the 
Sierra Club exemption had been revoked. Never did we get any specific 
response to the original message that Dr. Burns had conveyed to the 

Senator Huddleston. But your memo to Mr. Haldeman [exhibit 
62 1 ], certainly suggests something more than a narrow interest in 
tax exemption because it points out again, in the sentence that Mr. 
Smothers read, that "Moreover valuable intelligence-type information 
could be turned up by IRS as a result of their field audits." This sug- 
gests to me that you are looking beyond the question of whether or not 
some tax law might be violated. 

Mr. Huston. A year later my interest in the question of financing 
these groups had arisen in the context of this report. That was my 
view, which I conveyed to Mr. Haldeman. However, I never expressed 
that viewl to anyone in the IRS. Mr. Haldeman never indicated to me 
whether he agreed or disagreed with that view. As far as I know and 
as far as the record shows from the IRS, no one from the White House 
ever conveyed that view to them. 

Senator Huddleston. How did you expect to get a report from the 
IRS in this area if you had not expressed a view to them that this is 
what you were looking for ? 

Mr. Huston. The request for a report went to the earlier area of con- 
cern which was after the committee had been set up. They sent me the 

1 See p. 395. 


minutes of the first two meetings. After a year I sent a memo asking 
for a progress report of what had happened in the IRS from July 1969 
to August of 1970. 

Senator Huddleston. Are you suggesting to this committee that at 
the time of the plan neither you nor anyone else in your group had an 
interest in intelligence-gathering operations that might be conducted 
through the IRS ? 

Mr. Huston. Senator, if we had attached any importance to the use 
of the IRS as an intelligence-collecting agency, we would have in- 
cluded them in the committee that met to discuss this problem. The 
Bureau was under standing instructions from the President, just as it 
had been from President Johnson, to provide the White House with 
information with regard to the sources of financing of many of these 
activities. Now, where the Bureau got that information, I do not know, 
but I do know that there was information that came from the Bureau 
regarding that. 

Senator Huddleston. Let me go back then to two statements that 
you have made today which seem to me somewhat contradictory. 

First, you said it was not necessary in your mind to consult with 
the Attorney General about this proposed plan because you conceived 
it to be directed chiefly at intelligence gathering, rather than law en- 
forcement. Later this morning you said that you were not concerned 
about what people thought about who was for or against the war, if 
I might paraphrase, you were not concerned about who the next Presi- 
dent was going to be, or who the candidates were going to be, but you 
were concerned about bombings and the killing of policemen. 

Now, these are law enforcement problems, it seems to me. Now, do 
you find a basic conflict there in what the objectives were of this? 

Mr. Huston. Well, there may be a conflict, but it does not seem to 
be a conflict to me, and it goes to the entire difference of approach 
to this problem, and that my concern was stopping things before 
they happened and not having some sort of derivative satisfaction 
of having the perpetrator in jail, and to me the purpose of intelligence 
was to collect the information in advance that would allow you to 
forestall the creation of overt acts, as, for example, the Bureau had 
been successful in doing in Detroit, where sniping incidents had been 
planned and was done. 

Senator Huddleston. That is intelligence. That is what you were 
talking about with the IRS, the kind of intelligence they could gather, 
was it not? 

Mr. Huston. You mean that was the kind of thing I was talking 
about by memo to Mr. Haldeman ? Yes : that was the kind of thing 
I was talking about to Mr. Haldeman by memo. 

Senator Huddleston. Once the IRS had this capability and had it 
in place and being used, could they also not use that same intelligence- 
gathering capability against any citizen that they, might want to 
audit for any purpose? 

Mr. Huston. Well, yes ; I think so. but I think you are leaping one 
step over from what I indicated to Haldeman in terms of my view 
that the strike force concept against organized crime was a model for 
a strike force concept against terrorist activities. You are leaping from 
that point which ran into a dead end, to some conclusion that Mr. 


Smothers tried to make, and perhaps you, that that was translated 
into some directive to the IRS, and it was not. 

Senator Huddleston. It would be very simple, would it not, to 
make even a logical extension of this IRS capability, to extend it to 
any other group or any other person that the White House might 
want some special intelligence information about? 

Mr. Huston. Well, as I indicated, I do not think the White House, 
in my knowledge, ever asked for any intelligence raw tax data from 
the IRS. Any such data would have gone to the Bureau. 

Senator Htjddleston. Do you know of any case where the White 
House has ever directed the Internal Revenue Office to conduct 
any specific audit? 

Mr. Huston. No. 

The Chairman. Senator Goldwater? 

Senator Goldwater. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to speak first about the IRS, and I am very happy that the 
chairman has mentioned this subject. Somebody on this committee has 
likened the CIA to a bull elephant running rampant. I liken the IRS 
to a rattlesnake sliding along in the grass, probably the greatest 
threat to American freedom and Americans of anything we have. And 
yet, this morning is the first public indication I have heard that the 
IRS is going to De investigated, and I think it is time. 

I notice a report, or a letter, written by you on September 21 

[exhibit 62 *] in which you said, "Nearly 18 months ago the President 

indicated a desire for IRS to move against leftist organizations taking 

advantage of tax shelters. I have been pressing IRS since that time 

to no avail." 

In other words, the IRS will protect any organization in this coun- 
try they feel like protecting. I thmk it is high time that this committee, 
or some other committee, expose just what we are up against in this 
country because the power to tax is the power to destroy. 

Mr. Huston, have you ever been a member of the CIA? 

Mr. Huston. No, sir. 

Senator Goldwater. FBI? 

Mr. Huston. No, sir. 

Senator Goldwater. DIA? 

Mr. Huston. Yes. I was assigned to the DIA when I was an Army 
intelligence officer. 

Senator Goldwater. Were you hired by the White House as a 
speech writer at one time? 

Mr. Huston. Yes, sir. 

Senator Goldwater. And it was from that that you went into the 
preparation of the so-called Huston plan? 

Mr. Huston. Yes, sir. 

Senator Goldwater. Was the Huston plan ever used? 

Mr. Huston. No. 

Senator Goldwater. Never put into effect? 

Mr. Huston. No. 

Senator Goldwater. What do you think about the Huston plan 
as you sit here today ? 

Mr. Huston. Well, Senator, I think that the — I still believe that 
there is a threat that may be characterized and defined as an internal 
security threat. I think there are people that want to destroy this 

1 See p. 395. 


country; I think there are people who are willing to go to great 
lengths to do it. I think the two attempts upon the life of the President 
are symptomatic of that. And so I think there is a necessary place in 
our society for an effective domestic intelligence-collection effort. And 
more importantly than collection, for professional analysis of that 

I think that it is perhaps easy to justify the emphasis that we 
attached in 1970, but I think it is just as easy to discount it. We were 
sitting in the White House getting reports day in and day out of what 
was happening in this country in terms of the violence, the numbers 
of bombings, the assassination attempts, the sniping incidents — 40,000 
bombings, for example, in the month of May in a 2- week period were 
averaging six arsons a day against ROTC facilities. 

What happened then, I think is — at least from my perspective — is 
that we convinced ourselves that this was something that was going to 
just continue to get worse until we reached the point where all of the 
people who were predicting police-state repression were going to get 
what they — it was going to become a self-fulfilling prophecy, because 
that was the only way it was going to be handled. As for example, I 
suspect it had been true in the Chicago Black Panther raid, and in 
the Los Angeles Black Panther shootout. So my view was that we had 
to do something to stop it. 

Mr. White would say that this authorized the extension into every 
person's mailbox. Theoretically, that may be true, although I do not 
think that the terms that we used in terms of highly selected targets 
or top priority targets were a bit looser than the terms that Attorney 
General Clark used when he got authorization from President Roo- 
sevelt, and when President Truman authorized electronic surveillance. 

But the fact of the matter is that we were motivated, unjustly per- 
haps, unreasonably or unconscionably, by a legitimate concern which 
related to the lives and property of people that were subject to random 
acts of violence. My view was, I had confidence in the professional 
intelligence community. These were the professionals, these were the 
people who had been authorized to solve these problems. 

What I did not realize then was that these kinds of programs, al- 
though theoretically and conceptually could be narrowly used in the 
best interests of the country by responsible people, can lead to the type 
of thing that happened with the Plumbers and with the Watergate. 
Now everyone tries to link the Huston plan as a precursor of the 
Plumbers and the Watergate, and in my mind it is totally untrue. 

But it is obvious to me that this kind of thing lends itself too easily 
to the type of corruption that we have seen, and, therefore, I have come 
to the conclusion that whereas I would traditionally have taken the 
position that I am willing to run some small risk of infringing upon 
some small portion of the public's otherwise legitimate rights for the 
greater good security of all of the people, I now come to the conclu- 
sion that we have no practical alternative but to take a far greater 
risk that there are goinor to be these kinds of things that we cannot deal 
effectively against until such time as perhaps our recourse is simply to 
the ongoing criminal process. 

But I do not want to leave the impression that I think there is no 
problem because I think that we need to deal with this thing in such a 
way as to maximize the respect for the rights of the citizens; at the 


same time, not destroying the capability of the people acting through 
their Government to protect themselves against those who would 
destroy this country. 

Senator Goldwater. I thank you, Mr. Huston, for that statement. I 
agree with that statement 100 percent, and I have no other questions, 
so I will just comment that as long as we have Daniel Ellsbergs, some 
newspapers, journalists, media people, and organizations intent on 
changing the basic philosophy of this country, by the same kind of 
subversion that you are. now being at least charged with part way, I 
think we have to be forever on our toes. I think you have expressed 
your purpose well. 

Every time I pick up a morning paper or an evening paper, and I 
see the disclosure of secrets that I thought were locked up in my brain, 
or my heart, or my safe, I get worried about my country. And I hope 
that this committee, through the continued diligence of its chairman 
and staff members, will disclose everything wrong with this country. 

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Goldwater. 

Senator Hart? 

Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. Huston, you expressed unhappiness 
that the plan that we are discussing here today has come to be known 
as the Huston plan. I suppose there is a degree of logic in that dis- 
may on your part. If you had your choice, what do you think this 
plan should be called, with the benefit of hindsight ? 

Mr. Huston. I think it ought to be called simply what it was : the 
Report of the Interagency Committee on intelligence. But let me say 
that after 2 years of having that tagged on me by the enterprising 
members of the press, I have learned to live with it. 

Senator Hart of Colorado. You have indicated that after the fact, 
you f ound out that many of the agencies that were on that interagency 
task force were already using the tools that they were sitting there dis- 
cussing obtaining White House approval. Why do you think they 
were going through this charade? 

Mr. Huston. I wish I knew. I do not know. I think that part of 
the problem was that if the other agencies knew they were doing it 
there would have been all sorts of problems, because, for example, 
the FBI greatly resented President Johnson ordering the military 
intelligence into the domestic collection area in 1967 because that was 
their charter. But the President directly ordered it, and they had to 
live with it, although they certainly were anxious and happy that 
the Ervin committee hearings blew that out of the water and got those 
people out of the business. 

I think, for example, the FBI — Mr. Hoover would have had an abso- 
lute stroke if he had known that the CIA had an Operation CHAOS 
going on. So I think the last thing in the world the CIA would have 
done was to disclose to the Bureau that they were working on their 
turf. So I think interagency jealousies and rivalries had part to do 
with it. 

I think the second thing is that if you have got a program going and 
you are perfectly happy with its results, why take the risks that it 
might be turned off if the President of the United States decides he 
does not want to do it ; because they had no way of knowing in advance 
what decision the President might make. So, why should the CIA — 


that the President may say, "hell no, I don't want you guys opening 
any mail." Then if they had admitted it, they would have had to close 
the thing down. 

The COINTEL Program— apparently even the Justice Department 
did not know about that. If they had told me, it was obvious that the 
word would have been out. So it seems to me that many of these agen- 
cies just kind of operated in their own world, and had their own pro- 
grams going. They did not want anyone else to know it. And the thing 
that intrigues me is that I always was under the illusion that the pur- 
pose of intelligence was to provide policymakers with information 
upon which to make policies. But if the policymaker does not even 
know that there are sources of information available, I do not know 
what in the world good it does anybody except the people who are 
operating it for their own gratification. 

Senator Hart of Colorado. You were complaining that there were no 
available results. Can you account for the fact that they were using 
the tools that they, at the same time, were seeking to obtain, and weren t 
achieving better results? 

Mr. Huston. I think that is what would have been the key show- 
down in my mind, because my idea was that what these people were 
saying, "if we had the tools we could get the job done." Well, if they 
already had the tools and they weren't getting the job done, then you 
have to look at some other reason why we weren't getting information 
that we wanted. 

Senator Hart of Colorado. What do you think that reason is? 

Mr. Huston. Well, I think there needs to be some shakeups myself, 
and some changes made in the intelligence community. You know, each 
of these agencies has great strengths. I think the FBI is the greatest 
law enforcement agency in the world. I think the CIA is perhaps the 
best foreign intelligence-collection agency in the world. But they have 

The FBI, for example, does not have any effective analytical capa- 
bility. I mean, they are very good at collecting raw intelligence data, 
but what needs to be done to make it useful to a policymaker is to put 
that data into context and to analyze it. Now this is a strength that the 
CIA is very good at in many respects. 

So I think that — plus, the intelligence community is always on the 
short end of personnel and budget. The FBI's Intelligence Division 
is always the last in line for new people, always the last in line for 
money. There are shortages of people and personnel, and I am, for ex- 
ample, convinced that there are vastly inadequate resources available 
in the Bureau to deal with the espionage threat in this country,, simply 
because they do not have the manpower for it. 

So I am hopeful that that is what this committee is going to do, in 
addition to merely exposing things that went on that should not have 
gone on. I am hopeful that this committee is going to come up and 
propose some specific changes, if you operate on the assumption that 
there is a need for some sort of intelligence-collection capability, both 
domestically and in foreign areas. 

Senator Hart of Colorado. I am not sure the record accurately re- 
flects why J. Edgar Hoover objected to this report. We have touched 
on that several times this morning. In your judgment, was he afraid 
of encroachment by the other agencies, or did he genuinely feel that 
some of these activities were illegal ? 


Mr. Huston. Well, I think that Mr. Hoover, since he cannot defend 
himself, ought to be entitled to the benefit of the doubt, and his stated 
objection was that he did not feel that these things were permissible, 
although, as the record will clearly indicate, at one, time or another, for 
a substantial period of time, he had authorized each of those things. 
But I assume, giving him the benefit of the doubt, he had a change of 
heart and that was the basis on which he objected. 

I think, however, that the record will also show that he was very 
much concerned about any attempt of any other agency to be involved 
in programs of which he was ultimately responsible. 

Senator Hakt of Colorado. Would you tell the committee what 
President Nixon's and Mr. Haldeman's views were on the use of the 
military in domestic intelligence and internal security matters? 

Mr. Huston. The President never expressed any opinion to me on 
that subject, but it is my recollection that Mr. Haldeman had indicated 
to me thai; the President felt that perhaps the problem was one of man- 
power, and that we could use the military intelligence services for that 
purpose. I did not say anything to Haldeman about that, but it struck 
me as being a silly thing to say because at that very time we had ap- 
proved, at the White House, the request from the Secretary of the 
Army to dismantle the CONUS intelligence operation, and Senator 
Ervin was getting ready to start his hearings. The FBI had never 
wanted to have the military involved. 

Senator Hart of Colorado. Did Mr. Sullivan say that ? 

Mr. Huston. Yes ; he told me that. 

Senator Hart of Colorado. Did he say this in the interagency group ? 

Mr. Huston. I don't recall what he said. I certainly recall Colonel 
Downey and the other military people saying that they simply did not 
want anything. And I said, look, I can understand that, but let us put 
down — you know, this is something that the President wants to con- 
sider, we've got to give him an option, so let us put it down. But if 
you read those options — I mean, there are absolutely no even re- 
motely convincing arguments in the paper for using the military. So 
it was quite obvious that the committee did not want to do that, and 
I recomended that we not use the military. 

Senator Hart of Colorado. What did the military people say in the 
committee ? 

Mr. Huston. They said they simply did not want to be involved ; 
that they had limited manpower, that they had problems with Con- 
gress as a result of this, that they had their own problems — service-re- 
lated problems — to deal with and that they did not think it was ap- 
propriate for the military to be involved in the collection of intel- 
ligence relating to civilians. 

Senator Hart of Colorado. In your judgment, did the other mem- 
bers of that interagency group share what you profess to be your con- 
cern about bombings and snipings ? Or were they more interested in 
lifting some of the restraints so that they could perhaps use some 
other devices? Were they using the bombings and the snipings as a 
device to broaden their capabilities? 

Mr. Huston. Well, it certainly was my impression, and Mr. Sulli- 
van, in many talks that we had, certainly indicated to me that he was 
as concerned about this problem as I was. The other agencies really 


didn't discuss it. And of course, the intelligence community's concern 
was a lot broader than my concern. 

They were talking about a lot of groups that I had never heard of 
before, and didn't interest me at all. But I think their concern was as 
great as ours because in 1970— up to that May of 1970, you would have 
been hard pressed not to be concerned. I do not think there is any 
problem about who was concerned. Everybody was concerned. The only 
question was what the results of that concern would be. 

Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. Helms has indicated that the struc- 
turing of Operation CHAOS was in response to a Presidential request. 
I think you have indicated the President didn't know anything about 
Operation CHAOS. Do you know which of those statements is 
accurate ? 

Mr. Huston. Again, all I know about Operation CHAOS is what 
I ve read in the Rockefeller Keport, and it was my recollection that the 
Rockefeller Keport indicated that operation was set up either in 1967 
or 1968. And I have no way of knowing for sure if the President 
knew about it. But I cannot think that he knew about it. And he cer- 
tainly didn't know about it through me or through that report. 

Senator Hart of Colorado. Finally, Mr. Huston, there was a famous 
statement made by a military officer during the Vietnam conflict to the 
effect that a village had to be destroyed in order to save it. Has it ever 
occurred to you that that same danger exists with regard to freedoms 
and democracy in this country ? 

Mr. Huston. That freedom has to be destroyed to save it? No, that 
certainly never occurred to me. 

Senator Hart of Colorado. Do you think that possibility ever ex- 
isted in recent years ? 

Mr. Huston. No : I don't. 

The Chairman. I might say it will be necessary for the committee 
to examine the Nixon papers as they relate to the so-called Huston 
plan. The committee has subpenaed those papers, and an arrangement 
has been worked out which is intended to yield those papers to the 

When we examine those papers, they may or may not tell us how 
much the President may have known at any given time. But I am told 
by Counsel that the papers have been turned over to the White House 
by Mr. Herbert Miller, Nixon's attorney. 

Our understanding is that they are to come to us. Maybe it is just 
a stopover at the White House. I do not know. But we are going to try 
to determine that, and we hope to have, and expect to have, those 
papers very soon. 

I think, Senator Mathias, you are next. 

Senator Mathias. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Huston, when you received this assignment and when you eval- 
uated it in the serious way that you described to the committee very 
eloquently, did it ever occur to you to consult with Senator Eastland, 
the chairman, or Senator Hruska, for example, the ranking minority 
member of the Judiciary Committee, on such a serious threat to 
the Nation? 

Mr. Huston. Senator, because of my position on the White House 
staff, I woul d not have been in a position to do that. 

Senator Mathias. Did you ever recommend it to anybody else? 


n ^'^ VBlTas -:^ ano P ? infc ' * had recommended that consultation be 
undertaken with the ranking members of the Judiciary Committee of 
§LSS£ °* th * J ? te ™l Security Subcommittee of the Judiciary 

™- aDd the Inter / 1 ?: 1 Securifc y Committee of the House, How- 
ever, nothing ever came of that. 

Senator Mathias .The concept of coordination with the Congress, 
SSJi Ti V6 t0 £ ^ e ^t^onal plan for dealing with serious 
th a n"hat P o r nS mS ' nCTer emerged ™ y° ur consultations, other 

Mr. Huston. No, sir. 

Senator Mathias. Mr. Chairman, I am driven by that response to a 
retrospective comment. Senator Goldwater and I and several other 
Members of the Senate went down to the White House one day, to have 
what we called m those days a "candor meeting" with President Nixon, 
an ii m! ime ' I suggested that the problems that we now generally 
call Watergate would not be resolved unless the President was willing 
to discuss questions like the Huston plan. 

And he said that night, "You will get the answer. You will get the 
full disclosure." And I have to think what a tragedy it is that we did 
not try to work these problems out in a coordinated way, rather than 
come through all of the tragedy that we have been through since that 
toda ™ Ut Iiuston P lan in this setting and in this way 

I must say that I am perhaps more concerned since Mr. Huston's 
testimony this morning than I was before, because of what he has told 
us about the origins of the plan, and the way in which it was formu- 
lated and adopted. Senior officials of the Government advocated it, and 
as he describes it, formulated it. He himself, as the task force director, 
advocated it, and the President of the United States approved it. 

JNow, through all of these steps— and I would gather from your 
testimony that there were a number of steps, and a number of meet- 
ings and consultations— was the word Constitution ever used bv anv- 
body ? J 

Mr. Huston. Senator, I do not recall the details of any conversation, 
except within the context that I had earlier described of this inherent 
Executive power, a belief that I think permeated the entire intelli- 
gence community in these areas. 

Senator Mathias. Although, of course, Mr. Hoover, for example, 
m referring to implementing mail coverage, did raise the question of 

Mr. Huston. Yes, he did. 

Senator Mathias. He did use the word illegal. 

Mr. Huston. Yes ; yes, he did. 

Senator Mathias. I think the problem before this committee is a 
very real one. And I hope that as we make recommendations to the 
Congress on how to deal with the problems that have been presented 
to us. we would have in mind the role of Government in the lives of the 

The role of Government, it seems to me, is not just the use of force. 
It is the use of example, and I call to mind Justice Brandeis' opinion, 
Olmstead v. The United States, in which he said that, 

Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that Government officials shall be 
subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In a 


Government of laws, existence of the Government will be imperiled if it fails to 
observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent 
teacher, for good or for ill. It teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is 
contagious. If the Government becomes a law-breaker, it breeds contempt for 
law. It, invites every man to become a law unto himself. It invites anarchy. 

To declare that in the administration of the criminal law, the end justifies the 
means, to declare that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the 
conviction of a private citizen, would bring terrible retribution. Against that 
pernicious doctrine, this Court should resolutely set its face. 

It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that that is a philosophy that should 
guide our Government in dealing with even the most serious problems. 
Now, that opinion was written about 1928. 

Mr. Huston, you said you thought there had been a change in at- 
titude, perhaps more consciousness of, the rights of privacy today than 
25 or 30 years ago. That opinion would not, I think, support that 
view. But let me ask you this question. Is it not true that it is not so 
much a change in attitude, but the development of techniques that has 
made us very conscious of our dependence on the fourth amendment, 
that years ago — in fact, when the fourth amendment itself was writ- 
ten, the only ways to survey the citizen was through a window, or at 
his keyhole, or listening down his chimney? Today, you have taps, 
and bugs, and telescopic lenses on cameras. You have all kinds of sens- 
ing devices beyond the imagination of the citizens a generation ago. 

Do you not feel that the protection of the fourth amendment should 
be more resolutely adhered to today than ever before, because of that 
very fact? 

Mr. Huston. Yes. I think that there are numbers of threats today 
that weren't perceived. I think that a large number of those threats 
are not in the intelligence community, or even in the enforcement areas 
of the Government. 

Senator Mathias. Which places, as Justice Brandeis suggested, an 
even greater burden on Government to lead. 

Mr. Huston. On Government in all respects, Senator, from the use 
of the social security numbers as a national identifier, on down to 
credit reports, and that sort of thing. And I think that — let me say, 
for example, that I have absolutely no disagreement whatsoever 
with the opinion of the court in the U.S. district court case which 
struck down warrantless wiretaps. I agree with the conclusion 
of the court entirely in that case, and I have no hesitation in my mind 
of feeling that the Government has to run — that free people have to 
run certain risks that are inherent in a society where there are people 
who aren't going to play by the same rules. 

And when I talked about attitude, Senator, I am not trying to justify 
anything. I am simply trying to explain my impression of what the 
attitude was that I was exposed to by those people who were my 

Senator Mathias. I understand that, and I think you have done 
this committee a great service in the way you presented it this morn- 
ing. We are going to need the benefit of all the advice we can get in 
making our recommendations. 

Earlier this morning, you said that you thought that domestic intel- 
ligence should be removed from the FBI, and you did not follow that 
up. I wonder if you would like to amplify that statement? 

Mr. Huston. Well, I think that the biggest problem this committee 
has to grapple with, if I may presume to suggest to the committee, is 


the problem that on the one hand, you run the risk that the tools of the 
intelligence community, the law enforcement community, the taxing 
authority to the extent that it is immediately accountable and subject 
to the direction of the President or the White House, is subject to poli- 
tical abuse. So that it is important, in my mind, to have these authori- 
ties independent enough that they have the strength to withstand or 
resist use of the agencies for partisan or political purposes, which 
I think most of the agencies, most of the time have been successful at, 
but not all of the time. And I'm sure you are aware of many instances 
going back way beyond the Mxon administration, and in many re- 
spects, m my judgment, much more so in prior administrations where 
agencies were used for political purposes. And that is a real risk and 
a great threat that needs to be dealt with. 

On the other- hand, to the extent that these agencies are so inde : ~ 
pendent that they feel immunity, that they do not even have to tell the 
President of the United States what they are doing, that they do not 
feel any accountability to him whatsoever, that they are not directly 
accountable to the Congress, they are not directly accountable to the 

i? e< u UtlVe ' and accordin g 1 y ) the y ar e accountable to no one. And, of 
all the power that is dangerous, unaccountable power is the most dan- 
gerous in my judgment, so that the dilemma it seems to me that the 
Nation faces today is how do you establish these things that are 
necessary to protect liberties with enough independence and integrity 
to resist any perversions by the politicians, and yet make them suffi- 
ciently accountable to those people who are elected, and responsibile 
to the American people that they can be on target with the objectives 
that have been established by an elected Government. And I think 
that is the crux of the dilemma that is faced by those who want to deal 
honestly with the intelligence community today. 

Senator Mathias. This really brings us back to Senator Mondale's 
question : how can a President, feel that the law is being obeyed, and 
that Presidential policy is being adhered to? Does that not bring us in 
full circle back to the Constitution, and to the assurance, to the extent 
that we can be sure of any human undertaking, that the Constitution 
is understood, that loyalty to the Constitution is being given by every 
public service? 

Mr. Huston. Yes; I think it comes back to an assumption by all of- 
ficers of what an agreement among all people in Government, as to 
exactly what are the limits and responsibilities and obligations imposed 
by the Constitution. But I think that the problem we have had— 
and it is not just in this area, Senator. I think it is in many areas 
that over the past 30 years, you have had an accretion of little steps 
to increase the claim of Executive power, and that pretty soon, after 
a 30-year period, all of a sudden, you woke up one morning, and here 
was this creature that had been created that no one along the line 
had ever really contemplated. 

Each of these steps, I think, initially were innocent and honest steps. 
I thmk most of these— it is my belief that these people in the intel- 
ligence community were honest people, dedicated people, wanting to do 
an honest job, for what they thought was best for the country. And I 
do not think that they were out to destroy the liberties of the American 
people for any perverse political purpose. 


But what happened, in my judgment, in this area, where I got 
sucked in, when I should have known better, and where many other 
more intelligent, sophisticated people got sucked in in other areas, is the 
whole concept of some inherent Executive power that really extends 
beyond anything contemplated by those who made the incremental 
claims, as we went through the years. And I think that position has 
been reached, and now there are some hard looks at this, and some 
knocks, and perhaps we're even swinging, in my judgment, a little bit 
too much the other way. But I think that is healthy, and I think we are 
on the right track. 

Senator Mathias. But you agree if it had not come to a screeching 
halt, there would have been a national 

Mr. Huston. I think that — what I know, and as you know, Senator, 
I left the White House in June 1971. But based on what I know, from 
what happened subsequently, and other things that had happened 
in prior administrations, there is no doubt in my mind that it was 
necessary that this thing come to a screeching halt, and some heads 
be knocked down, and some people have their names attached to 
things that they would rather not be attached to, and that honest men 
look at some tough questions in the search for honest answers. And I 
hope that is where, we are headed today, not trying to put the blame 
on who was the worst guy in the lot, but what in the world got you 
guys into this thing, what was your thinking, how can you avoid it ? 
And here are some honest solutions. 

Senator Mathias. And where do we go from here ? 

Mr. Huston. Well, it looks to me like you are on the right track, and 
my only hope is that this committee and the committee on the other 
side will start on the assumption that here exists a need, an honest 
need, for intelligence-collection capability, and the analysis capability 
and the question is, how do we structure it, how do we keep it under 
control, how do we make its exercise of its powers compatible with 
the constitutionally protected rights. 

In a final analysis, it is my view, Senator, whether you are a judge 
who sits on the court, whether you are a Senator who has to cast a 
vote, whether you are the Director of the FBI, when you have power, 
in the final analysis, you have discretion, and that discretion and how 
you use it is a matter of the extent of your integrity, so the bottom line, 
in many respects, is going to be integrity. But where I think I made 
my mistake, the biggest mistake I made was, I assumed that the integ- 
rity of the people who would be involved in this intelligence-collection 
operation was such that, although conceptually you could argue that 
these recommendations were so broad that they could have encom- 
passed — you know, we could have been breaking into 250 million homes 
in 1970 — my judgment was that those types of extraordinary powers 
would be used only under the narrowest, most limited circumstances, 
and for that check, I rely upon the integrity of the person who has the 

What I have learned subsequently is what happens when the 
person who has that discretion is not Dick Helms, but he is Howard 
Hunt, and that seems to me to be the risk. So there has to be some insti- 
tutional restraint, in my judgment. 

Senator Mathias. Thank you very much, Mr. Huston. You have 
been very helpful. 


The Chairman. The Constitution, when it was written, I think, rec- 
ognized this frailty in people who were to be entrusted with power, 
and for that very reason, laid down certain prohibitions, certain re- 
strictions upon the power of Government. As you know, the first 
amendment simply denies to the Government the power to interfere 
with free speech and freedom of religion, freedom of assembly, and 
the fourth amendment undertakes to deny to the Government the power 
to conduct unreasonable searches and seizures. 

The men who wrote the Constitution did not want to entrust our 
civil liberties to the good judgment and discretion of men in govern- 
ment who may overreach themselves, and that is why these protections 
were written into the supreme law of the land. 

Now, I go back to Senator Mathias' question. He asked you that 
when the intelligence leaders were dealing with you to eliminate these 
restrictions, all of which culminated in your recommendation to the 
President that certain illegal actions be taken, he asked you whether 
anybody expressed any concern about the Constitution. And it just 
nappens, oena^or JYta^nias, vu&v our counsel, i\xr. oc^iWarz, asKeu Laa**** 
question previously in executive session, the same question that you 
put to the witness. Mr. Schwarz asked, "Was there any person who 
stated that the activity recommended, which you have previously iden- 
tified as being illegal opening of the mail and breaking and entry or 
burglary — was there any single person who stated that such activity 
should not be done because it was unconstitutional?" And you, Mr. 
Huston replied, "No." And then Mr. Schwarz asked, "Was there any 
single person who said such activity should not be done because it was 
illegal ?" And you replied, "No." Now, I take it that still remains your 
testimony ? 

Mr. Huston. Yes. But Senator, I might point out that on the con- 
stitutional question, that — you know, at the time of the OVmstead case, 
in 1927, it is my recollection that the Supreme Court at that time held 
that, in that period, held that wiretaps — I think they adopted the ex- 
clusionary rule, that didn't apply to the States. And it wasn't until 
19 — I think it was in the Warren Court, in 1960 — that the Supreme 
Court finally held that a nontrespass electronic surveillance constituted 
a violation of the fourth amendment. 

It was not until 1972 that the Supreme Court held that warrantless 
wiretaps — my only point is that in many of these areas throughout 
there have been men of honest differences of opinion who felt that the 
Constitution — I'm sure, for example, that Justice Black would have 
said from day one that the Constitution clearly prohibited this, but 
there were other men of equal intent who said that the Constitution 
did not contemplate the prohibition of that. 

The Chairman. As far as bugging is concerned, there has been an 
evolution in the courts, and this has been a gray area in the law, but I 
do not think that, as far as opening the mail was concerned, there was 
any such gray area, and you yourself referred to your recommendation 
as an illegal act. So, we are talking about the whole plan, and in the 
course of its evolution, none of these people, even the directors of these 
agencies, with such great power, ever raised the question of the consti- 
tutionality of what was being proposed. 

Mr. Huston. That's right. 

The Chairman. That is correct?' 


Mr. Huston. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Senator Schweiker. 

Senator Schweiker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Huston, one of the areas I am interested in is whether or not the 
Huston plan ever died. First you have its proposal, acceptance, and 
then its withdrawal. But 2 months later — in fact, less than 2 months 
later — John Dean wrote about the Interagency Domestic Intelligence 
Unit and said it would be established with operational and evaluational 
purposes in mind, and that it would help to determine what the re- 
straints were that could be removed. 

Then, in April of 1971, following after that, there was another meet- 
ing with Mr. Hoover, Mr. Helms, Admiral Gayler, discussing a broad- 
ening of the operations to remove restraints, and particularly of 
the very confidential type. So the idea keeps emerging, almost like a 
phoenix out of the ashes ; and then 3 months after that, the Plumbers 
was established. Do you really feel that the concept, the ideas, the pro- 
posals really died at that point ? 

Mr. Huston. Well, I can only speak, Senator, of my own knowledge. 
I was not involved in the creation or operation of the Interagency 
Evaluation Committee. I left the White House before the Plumbers 
were organized, so I do not have any personal knowledge of what hap- 
pened after that. 

My knowledge is simply that I was told by Mr. Haldeman that the 
ening of the operations to remove restraints and particularly of 
the FBI, had decided to withdraw his approval, that I was to get the 
memorandum back, and that the matter then might be reconsidered, 
if the President could meet with the Attorney General and Mr. Hoover. 
I assumed that such a meeting would be held. As far as I know, how- 
ever, no such meeting was held. 

Now, it is entirely possible that — and perhaps, based upon Mr. 
Dean's memorandum, it seems to me likely — that as a result of the 
decision of the President to terminate his authorization that he had 
given in connection with the report of the Interagency Committee, 
that they decided to go forward on a narrower basis, and, therefore, 
established the IEC. However, the IEC concept was substantially 
different from that concept which was set forth in the report of the 
Interagency Committee, in that we contemplated that the continu- 
ing group would be comparable to the U.S. Intelligence Board, that 
it would operate within the FBI, that the Director of the FBI would 
be chairman. It would be staffed by FBI people. 

And, as I understand, the IEC was set up within the Justice De- 
partment, under the direction or the chairmanship of the Assistant 
Attorney General, that it had Justice Department staffing, and that 
the Bureau, for all intents and purposes, did not cooperate with it. 
But that is all I know personally. 

Senator Schweiker. Well, as I understand it, it is true they did not 
supply a staff which was taken over by Justice Department, but they 
did attend meetings and they were part of the formal group. So 
while there was a balking up along the way, somebody was pushing, 
pushing, pushing with a concept, and even, eventually, the FBI at- 
tended that group meeting, while it did not supply staff. 

So I think you can make a pretty good case out of the fact that 
an awful lot of concepts survived intact, when you also consider 


that — and you admitted this under earlier testimony — that Operation 
CHAOS was in full blast in the CIA. There were other activities that 
even the President did not know about previously that were still 
going on, that some of the agencies did not want to talk about, and 
did not want to admit to their peers and colleagues that they were 
doing. So I think when you see the total picture, it is not quite as 
definitive as just the ending of a chapter, the closing of a door. 

Mr. Huston, you said in your previous testimony that you spoke 
about a classification program, and you said on page 96 of your 
May 23 deposition, that : 

The whole concept of intelligence operations was obviously a very sensitive 
matter. If it wouldn't have been classified in the way that it was in the agency 
and hadn't been recognized as such, if this wasn't possible, then we couldn't have 
had such a plan. _. . . . 

Isn't really one of the hearts of this issue Government classifica- 
tion of information? Many of us did not even know about these 
matters until much later than it happened, because it was highly 

Is classification not really a way that the executive branch not 
only keeps things from the legislative branch but keeps it from 
the people, because by your own testimony I think you are obviously 
saying that if it had gotten out, it probably would have self-de- 
structed ? So isn't Government secrecy and classification "top secret" 
really the means and the vehicle that the Executive accumulates this 
great power that people do not want them to have? 

Mr. Huston. I do not think, in my mind, there was ever any jus- 
tification for the existence of the committee, or, had the Interagency 
Domestic Operations Board been established, there would have been 
any justification for having the mere existence of those operations 
classified. Nor do I think that, in many respects, much of what was 
discussed or contemplated should have been classified. 

The only thing, in my mind, that should be classified would be 
that which would reveal, would disclose the identity of sources or 
otherwise jeopardize the collection of intelligence information. 

Senator Schweeker. I think an interesting footnote to what you 
are saying is that many of the documents here today were just de- 
classified yesterday. Here we have had the Huston plan kicking 
around for a long period of time; it has been fairly general press 
knowledge. And yet we would have been restrained from asking certain 
questions if we had not gotten certain documents declassified by yester- 
day. If it had not come through, we might not have been able to have 
the hearing. And I think this is a pretty good picture of the technique 
that a Government branch or agency uses to put these things into 
motion. This would not ever get off the ground if it were open to 
the light of day. 

We have had a lot of discussion about the fourth amendment, Mr. 
Huston, because I realize, that that is the heart of the issue. I have 
a little trouble, though, when I hear your answer. I know what you 
told me earlier, that you were concerned about revolutionary vio- 
lence and that you were concerned about the disturbances rocking the 
country, and that this was the lesser of two evils, and that the Con- 
stitution gave the President an inherent security power of some kind. 

62-685 O - 76 - 4 


But in reading the fourth amendment, it is pretty clear what it 
says : 

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, and papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and 
no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirma- 
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or 
things to be seized. 

I do not know that you really need the Supreme Court to say what 
that means. 

What one part of the Constitution gives the executive branch the 
rights that you saw for internal security protection? What part of 
the Constitution can you quote ? 

Mr. Huston. Well, Senator, first of all, I do not take the posi- 
tion — and I am not about to take the position here that Mr. Wilson 
took before the Ervin committee, because that is not my belief. I am 
simply trying to convey to you what the impression, unreasoned that 
it was, that existed in June of 1970. 

In my judgment, any thoughtful consideration given to the risks 
versus the benefits, the literal reading of the Constitution and the 
general concept under which we have to operate in this country sup- 
port your position. I would say, though, that the justification that 
would have been cited under the fourth amendment would be the 
question of whether the search was unreasonable. 

Senator Schweiker. Are you saying that there is or is not consti- 
tutional power to back up the ultimate right to effect the use of 

Mr. Huston. In my judgment, now, there is not. 

Senator Schweiker. As I recall from the nice chat that we had 
when I took your deposition before, Mr. Huston, I thought you felt at 
the time 

Mr. Huston. I did, at the time. Yes, I did. 

Senator Schweiker. Because I think it is really the heart of the 
issue, where that power falls and rests. And I think it is significant, 
as one of the other Senators pointed out, that they asked you to sign 
that memo. It seems to me that the White House knew they were walk- 
ing all over the fourth amendment. And it seems to me this is just 
one more thing that we have learned to call plausible denial, whereby 
if something happens, why, they can really deny it happened, except 
that some bureaucratic person gets the blame. 

And it just seems to me that the fact it became the Huston plan 
is a prettv prood indication that it was not somebody else's plan, that 
they really knew they were walking over the fourth amendment, but 
thought they could get away with it. Would you agree with that 
or not? 

Mr. Huston. No, Senator. My guess would be that they never gave 
anv thought to it. 

Senator Schweiker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Mr. Huston, when you were testifying in executive 
session before this public hearing, you were asked about your present 
view. And I think there are two portions of the deposition that ought 
to be read into the record, on which I would like any further comment 
you may want to make. 

You were asked what the risk was of setting aside the laws, even 


though the purpose seems a very compelling one as you reflect back 
upon it. And this is what you said : 

The risk was that you would get people who would be susceptible to political 
considerations as opposed to national security considerations, or would construe 
political considerations to be national security considerations, to move from the 
kid with a bomb to the kid with a picket sign, and from the kid with the picket 
sign to the kid with the bumper sticker of the opposing candidate. And you just 
keep going down the line. 

Is that not really about as good a statement — certainly, it is one 
of the best I have ever seen — of the risks that we assume once we begin 
to disregard the laws ? 

Mr. Huston. Yes, I think it is a risk. I think people start out with 
the best intentions in the world. I don't think there was anyone that 
was involved in this operation who was motivated by a desire to 
protect the President, to secure his reelection, to embarrass the Demo- 
crats, to engage in any partisan political purpose. There was no one 
who was going to get any medal put on him that said "hero," or who 
was going to be invited as a special guest to the White House Press 

But we went from this kind of sincere intention, honest intention, 
to develop a series of justifications and rationalizations based upon 
this, what I believe to be the basic issue of this distorted view of in- 
herent executive power, and from that, whether it was direct, as 
Senator Schweiker seems to think it is, or was indirect or inevitable, 
as I tend to think it is, you went down the road to where you ended 
up, with these people going into the Watergate. 

And so that has convinced me that you have just got to draw the 
line at the top of the totem pole, and that we would then have to take 
the risk — it is not a risk-free choice, but it is one that, I am afraid, 
in my judgment, that we do not have any alternative but to take. 

The Chairman. Has that not really been a lesson that has been 
learned by the historians and the scholars through the years who have 
been interested in the growth and preservation of a free society, that 
in the end our reliance must be upon the law? 

Mr. Huston. I think that is. But I think to me the interesting thing 
is that many of us who should have known better adopted a view of 
the Presidency that was comparable to the pre- Vietnam views of 
Dr. Schlesinger and others, and then proceeded to exaggerate and 
accelerate it. 

As I say, I think so much of it was incremental, but we have got, 
as you say, correctly, I think, to get back to the elemental considera- 
tions. And, as I say, in your consideration I hope you will focus on 
this really dangerous question of power without any accountability 
whatsoever, at least with respect to the Presidency, that it ultimately 
was an accountability to the people through the Congress. But it could 
be entirely conceivable that the rest of these things would have been 
going on forever, and no one, including the President, no one would 
have known about it. 

The Chairman. Of course, accountability is at the heart of this 
issue. And the thing that has not been known until today about the 
Huston nlan is that it was just a 5-day episode where the President 
was asked to confer his authority to do these various things. He asked 


for options. He authorized these things. Five days later, upon recon- 
sideration, he revoked it. And the fact of the matter is these things 
had been going on long before he was asked, and they continued long 
after he revoked his authority. 

We have found this to be the endemic problem in the intelligence 
service and in the law enforcement service of the Government. And 
you have characterized it, you have said, '^These agencies are fiefdoms." 
It is not only that they do not want the President to know what is going 
on for fear he might say you shouldn't do it, but they do not want one 
another to know what is going on. The CIA does not want the FBI 
to know what particular things it may be up to and vice versa. 

And this compartmentalization is always justified with elaborate 
arguments about secrecy, sensitivity, national security. And the end 
result of it all is such a chaos that the President himself cannot govern 
or control the very agencies that are supposed to be upholding the law 
and protecting us against the enemy. 

Now, that has to be changed. And accountability, as you have said, 
goes to the very heart of our search, and it has got to be an accounta- 
bility not only to the President; in the future, it has got to be an 
accountability to the Congress as well. And we are going to find it if 
we can, and we are going to recommend changes in the law and in the 
procedures that we hope will make these agencies accountable in the 

Senator Mondale. 

Senator Mondale. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Earlier, Mr. Huston, you indicated that one of the great needs in 
this whole field was to draw the line between what, I guess you would 
say, were legitimate functions of these agencies, and a point where they 
become involved in the political sense, so that they corrupt and under- 
mine and subvert the political process. 

Would you not agree that that line has been drawn in terms of the 
criminal law now, that that has been the basic thrust of the law from 
the beginning of American society, to give the law enforcement officers 
enough power to apprehend criminals but not so much power that 
these agencies can be turned in on the American people, in terms of 
spies and in other ways, and that, thus, the first prerequisite of ac- 
countability is an agreement that everybody has to obey the law ? 

Mr. Huston. Yes, I agree. 

Senator Mondale. All right. 

During your testimony today, you seemed to indicate that the pres- 
ent criminal law did not arm the Government with adequate tools to 
anticipate and prevent riots and violence. I find that somewhat 
disturbing, as an old law enforcement officer myself, because it is my 
impression that there is a host of laws on the books available to crimi- 
nal investigators and prosecutors, law enforcement officers, within the 
legitimate framework of the Constitution and the laws, that permit 
investigations and arrests for conspiracy to commit crimes, or con- 
spiracies to cross State lines for purposes of rioting and the rest. 

Is there anything in your background which equipped you to draw 
the judgment that the criminal law is inadequate to deal with the 
problems of violence with which you were trying to deal? 

Mr. Huston. No. I have no claim to any expertise that would qualify 
me to say that, other than the general specific impression that I had, 


the information that I had from those people who were responsible for 
handling this problem. 

Senator Mondale. Yet most of the people you were talking to were 
not in law enforcement at all. They were in counterintelligence work 
arid in an area which, as we now know, was violating the law. As it was, 
the only law enforcement principal you had there was Hoover, and 
he opposed it. 

Might it be that the whole basis for this recommendation to the 
President to relax restrictions on these police activities in order to meet 
these threats was based on a false assumption that the law did not, in 
its proper exercise, contain adequate remedies to deal with it ? 

Mr. Huston. Well, I think that the intelligence collection or analysis 
and collection process is different from the law enforcement process. 
And I think that the intelligence community can do its job without the 
necessity for extraordinary — the use of extraordinary investigative 

But I think, for example, if you take the Safe Streets Act that sets 
forth the criteria under which "^ou can have court-ordered wiretaps, it 
is my recollection that those taps can only run for like 7 days — I'm not 
sure ; it's some limited period of time — pursuant to a court order, be- 
fore they have to be disclosed to the party who is subject to being over- 
heard. And in a continuing intelligence collection process, that would 
not be as effective a way to go about it. 

But I don't think that — my judgment would be that there's nothing 
we can do today that cannot be done generally within the parameters 
of existing criminal laws. 

Senator Monday. I am glad to hear you say that, because I think 
there was an impression left here that the country that lives within the 
constitutional law is powerless to deal with violence. Within the law 
and the Constitution, good law enforcement officers know perfectly 
well how to investigate the suggestions of probable cause or the com- 
mission of crimes. There are plenty of laws to stop crime before it is 
committed, before conspiracies are developed. 

I would like to at least correct what I think is the impression here 
that somehow if you are constitutional and legal, you are also defense- 
less, that criminal law is a rough tool as practiced constitutionally, and 
it can work effectively if people have the patience to work within it. 

One final point : earlier today you said that you did not see how your 
recommended restrictions on due process in any way contributed to the 
Plumbers. I will concede that you did not want the Plumbers created. 
But if violations of the law by public officers are acceptable for your 
purposes, why are violations of the law for other purposes not equally 
justifiable ? 

Mr. Huston. My view on the Plumbers is that you had a group of 
vigilantes operating outside the framework of established, authorized 
law enforcement agencies, who were operating for what appeared to 
me to be essentially political purposes, whereas what we were talking 
about was the exercise of functions by authorized law enforcement 
agencies for internal security purposes, and not political purposes. 

Senator Mondale. Which is the more offensive to American society 
and principles, official lawlessness by persons who are public employ- 
ees, and many of them lawyers, on the one hand, or paid lawlessness 
by persons outside of the Government? 

Mr. Huston. Well, I am not sure that you can establish any qualita- 
tive distinction there, except for the risk, the propensity for such acts 
to be undertaken by the vigilantes, as opposed to the professionals. 

Senator Mondale. Do you think that those who ordered the Plumb- 
ers were not just as convinced of the righteousness of their cause as you 

Mr. Huston. I do not have any idea what they were convinced of, 
but I am convinced that the intelligence community would never have 
undertaken the Plumbers' operation. 

Senator Mondale. Well, I have some trouble accepting that. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Senator Huddleston. 

Senator Huddleston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Just one more question, Mr. Huston, on the subject of the intelli- 
gence-gathering capability of the IRS. You have testified, I believe, 
that you did not specifically make a request of the Service to gather 
intelligence on any particular group or individual. Is that correct? 

Mr. Huston. Yes, sir. 

Senator Huddleston. Were you surprised to learn, then, that the 
IRS, in fact, through its Activist Organizations Committee, and 
through the FBI, had been supplying to the White House, some 5 
months prior to the memorandum that we referred to earlier, intelli- 
gence information on at least one organization, the Students for a 
Democratic Society ? 

Mr. Huston. I do not think I ever saw, or I have no recollection of 
ever having seen any information that came to the White House from 
the IRS, Senator. 

Senator Huddleston. We have a memorandum to that effect [exhibit 
65 *] about Mr. Paul Wright, who at that time was head of the AOC, 
indicating that he was giving his permission to the FBI to relay to the 
White House, at the request of the White House, intelligence infor- 
mation that had been gathered on the SDS. 

Mr. Huston. Well, Senator, as I think I testified earlier, there had 
been, I assume — I don't know what that memorandum dealt with, but 
if it dealt with financial matters or sources of funding, there had 
been a standing request from the President, before I became involved 
in this, to the Bureau, to provide the White House with continuing 
information with respect to sources of funds that were being used by 
organizations who were engaged in violence ; and so what may have 
happened is that the Bureau was given that assignment ; they went to 
the IRS and said, "do you have any information we can use?" And 
IRS said, "Yes, you may use this information." The Bureau then sent 
it to the White House. 

But as far as I know. I never saw any memorandum from the IRS 
directly to the White House, or to anyone else to say that this infor- 
mation was derived from information secured by the IRS. 

Senator Huddleston. Well, this memorandum would certainly in- 
dicate that the IRS was supplying to the White House certain very 
sensitive intelligence information. 

The point I would like to make is that this episode, and this testi- 
mony by you, Mr. Huston, and the subsequent action of the IRS, is 
somewhat consistent with other types of information that we have 
received, where those in high authority within these agencies expressed 

1 See p. 400. 


to us that it was not their intent that any abuse occur, and it was their 
understanding that all down the line understood that no abuse occur. 
Yet, as we see in this case, where subsequent to your inquiry of the 
agency, they did increase their activity in this regard, creating the 
Special Sendee Staff. We saw this in the case of the poisons that were 
not destroyed, even though the Director of the Agency was under that 
impression, and had the understanding that they were destroyed, and 
that everyone understood. There have been other instances in a more 
serious area, which we cannot go into at this time, but relating to 
possible assassination plots. 

We see consistently that the higher authorities indicate that they 
had an understanding that these abuses would not occur, but down the 
line, the persons who were implementing the action had an under- 
standing, according to their testimony, that they were acting in ac- 
cordance with expressed authority from higher-ups. And this is the 
dilemma in which we find ourselves as we continue to try to pinpoint 
the accountability for the kind of actions that are contrary to every- 
thing we believe in, a free and open and democratic society. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. I think that sums it up, Senator. 

Senator Schweiker, do you have any further questions ? 

Are there any further questions on the part of the committee? If 
not, I want to thank you very much for your testimony today. It has 
been extremely important testimony, and the committee will stand 
adjourned until 10 tomorrow morning. 

[Whereupon, at 12 :15 p.m., the committee adjourned to reconvene 
at 10 a.m. Wednesday, September 24.] 


U.S. Sekate, 
Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations 

With Respect to Intelligence Activities, 

Washington, D.O. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 :05 a.m., in room 318, 
Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Frank Church (chairman) 

Present: Senators Church, Tower, Mondale, Huddleston, Morgan, 
Hart (Colorado), Baker, Mathias, and Schweiker. 

Also present: William G. Miller, staff director; Frederick A. O. 
Schwarz, Jr., chief counsel; and Curtis R. Smothers, council to the 

The Chairman. The hearing will please come to order. 

Yesterday the committee commenced its inquiry into the Huston 
plan, our witness being Mr. Huston. And it developed in the testimony 
that several illegal proposals had been made to the President — in this 
case, Mr. Nixon — that he had approved those proposals, and later, had 
revoked his approval. But, the very activities for which authority 
was sought, had in fact been going on for a long period of time, prior 
to the submission of the proposals to the President. 

The evidence also showed that once the President had revoked the 
proposals, about 5 days after he had first approved them, the activities, 
nevertheless, continued, and in some cases, were expanded. 

Mr. Huston testified that Mr. Nixon was not aware of these activities, 
either before or after his approval and revocation of the Huston plan. 
One of the illegal activities was the opening of the mail by the ClA, 
and this committee will look into that mail-opening program exten- 
sively. It is a very serious matter, and we have hearings scheduled a 
few weeks from now, at the end of which we will inquire in detail 
about the mail-opening program. 

We will want to know, for example, why the mail of such individuals 
and organizations in this country as the Ford Foundation, Harvard 
University, and the Rockefeller Foundation was regularly opened by 
the CIA. or why the mail coming to or from such individuals as Arthur 
Burns, Bella Abzug, Jay Rockefeller, Martin Luther King, Jr., 
Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr., Richard Nixon himself, as well as such 
Senators as Hubert Humphrey, Edward Kennedy, even the Chairman 
of this committee, whose letter to my mother is in the file, should have 
been regularly opened and scrutinized by the CIA against the laws of 
the country. 

And so today, our objective is not to look at this mail program in 
great detail, for we will do that later. But it is, rather, to examine the 
lack of accountability within the Agency and the failure to keep the 
President of the United States properly advised of such activities, a 
core issue if we are going to reform the intelligence agencies and law 



enforcement agencies of the Federal Government and make them 
properly responsible and accountable for their actions to the elected 
representatives of the people, chief among whom, of course, is the 
President himself. 

Now with that brief introduction to the general topic for the day, 
I would like to ask our witness, Mr. Angleton — who, I understand, is 
represented by counsel — to take the oath. Before I ask you to take 
the oath, Mr. Angleton, I wonder if your attorney would identify 
himself for the record. 

Mr. Brown. Yes, Mr. Chairman, my name is John T. Brown, counsel 
for Mr. Angleton in these proceedings. 

The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Brown. Mr. Angleton, would you 
please stand to take the oath? Do you solemnly swear that all the 
testimony you will give in this proceeding will be the truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing but the truth, so helpjou God? 

Mr. Angleton. I do. j 

The Chairman. Mr. Schwarz, would you please begin the 
questioning ? 


Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Angleton, were you employed by the CIA in 

Mr. Angleton. Yes ; I was. 

Mr. Schwarz. What was your job at that time? 

Mr. Angleton. I was Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff. 

Mr. Schwarz. And when did you start working for the CIA? 

Mr. Angleton. I began in 1947, having come from OSS (Office of 
Strategic Services) . 

Mr. Schwarz. You knew, Mr. Angleton, did you not, that the CIA 
was opening mail in New York City in 1970, and had been doing so for 
approximately 15 or 20 years ? 

Mr. Angleton. I did. 

Mr. Brown. Mr. Schwarz, pardon me. If I may interrupt for just a 
moment. As I indicated to the counsel for the committee, Mr. Angleton 
had a very brief opening statement which he wished to make, and I 
would like, at this time, to ask for the opportunity to have him make 
that statement, if I may. 

Mr. Schwarz. Yes ; I'm sorry. You did say that to me, and I'm very 
sorry. Would you go ahead ? 

Mr. Angleton. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, my 
name is James Angleton. I am appearing before the committee today, 
freely and without subpena. I am mindful of the serious issues facing 
the committee, and I know of your concern that they be resolved 
prudently and expeditiously. I have served in the intelligence com- 
munity of the United States for 31 years, beginning with the OSS 
during World War II. In 1954, 1 became Chief of the Counterintelli- 
gence Staff of the CIA, a position which I held until 1974. I am now 

My years of service have convinced me that the strength of the 
United States lies in its capacity to sustain perpetual yet peaceful 


revolution. It is the ultimate function of the intelligence community, 
as part of our Government, to maintain and enhance the opportunity 
for peaceful change. 

I believe most strongly that the efforts and motivations of the intel- 
ligence community have contributed to the sustaining of a Nation of 
diversity and strength. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Angleton. 

Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Angleton, you just said, did you not, that you 
knew in 1970, and had known for a substantial period of time, that the 
CIA was opening mail in New York City ? 

Mr. Angleton. That is correct. 

Mr. Schwarz. And Director Helms knew that, did he not ? 

Mr. Angleton. That is correct. 

Mr. Schwarz. And J. Edgar Hoover, head of the FBI, knew that, 
did he not ? 

Mr. Angleton. I would assume so, sir. 

Mr. Schwarz. Well, I will read to you what Mr. Helms said in his 
deposition of last week. "Mr. Hoover knew all about the mail opera- 
tions." Now, you have no reason to doubt that, do you % 

Mr. Angleton. I do not. 

Mr. Schwarz. And Mr. Sullivan of the FBI knew all about the 
CIA's mail-opening program, did he not? 

Mr. Angleton. That is correct. 

Mr. Schwarz. Now Mr. Helms, Mr. Hoover, Mr. Sullivan, and your- 
self were all involved in the process which has come to be known as 
the Huston plan, is that correct ? 

Mr. Angleton. That is correct. 

Mr. Schwarz. And Mr. Helms and Mr. Hoover signed the plan, did 
they not ? 

Mr. Angleton. They did. 

Mr. Schwarz. And Mr. Sullivan was the primary drafter, but you 
and other working persons contributed to the drafting of the report, 
did you not ? 

Mr. Angleton. Correct. 

Mr. Schwarz. All right. Would you turn, Mr. Angleton, to page 29 
of the Special Report, Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad 
Hoc) , June 1970 [exhibit 1 1 ]. 

Now that is talking about mail coverage, isn't it ? 

Mr. Angleton. That is correct. 

Mr. Schwarz. And it distinguishes between routine coverage and 
covert coverage, saying routine coverage is legal and covert coverage 
is illegal, is that correct ? 

Mr. Angleton. That is correct. 

Mr. Schwarz. And by covert coverage, they meant opening the mail, 
did they not ? 

Mr. Angleton. Exactly. 

Mr. Schwarz. Would you read into the record the first sentence 
under the heading, "Nature of Restrictions," please ? 

Mr. Angleton. "Covert coverage has been discontinued while routine 
coverage has been reduced primarily as an outgrowth of publicity 
arising from disclosure of routine mail coverage during legal pro- 

1 See p. 141. 


ceedings and publicity afforded this matter in congressional hearings 
involving accusations of governmental invasion of privacy." 

Mr. Schwarz. Now the first five words say "covert coverage has 
been discontinued," and, as you just agreed a moment ago, that states 
that the opening of mail has been discontinued, isn't that right? 

Mr. Angleton. May I seek a little clarification, please ? 

I bejieve that if you read the contribution under preliminary dis- 
cussion, we are faced with two problems. We are faced with the 
problem of domestic mail that goes from one point in the United States 
to another point in the United States. 

The CIA activity was devoted to mail to the United States from 
Communist countries, and to Communist countries from the United 
States. So there are two degrees of opening. 

In other words, the entire intent and motivation of the program, 
as conducted by CIA, involved the question of foreign entanglements, 
counterintelligence objectives. 

The domestic mail program was a program that had been conducted 
at some time or another by the FBI. 

Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Angleton, would you answer my question? 

The words "covert coverage has been discontinued," covert there 
means opening mail, isn't that right ? 

Mr. Angleton. That is correct. 

Mr. Schwarz. I will read to you from the prior paragraph, a refer- 
ence which makes perfectly clear that the committee was talking 
about both foreign and domestic mail. The sentence which says the 
following: "Covert mail coverage, also known as 'sophisticated mail 
coverage,' or 'flaps and seals,' entails surreptitious screening and may 
include opening and examination of domestic or foreign mail." Now, 
the sentence which says "covert coverage has been discontinued," 
is a lie. That is false as far as your knowledge, Mr. Hoover's knowl- 
edge, Mr. Helms' knowledge, and Mr. Sullivan's knowledge ; isn't that 

Mr. Angleton. Excuse me, I'm trying to read your preceding para- 
graph. It is still my impression, Mr. Schwarz, that this activity that 
is referred to as having been discontinued refers to the Bureau's ac- 
tivities in this field. 

Mr. Schwarz. Well, the words don't say that, first of all. Second, 
how would a reader of these words have any idea that that distinction 
is being drawn, Mr. Angleton ? 

Mr. Angleton. Well, it is certainly my impression that this was the 
gap which the Bureau was seeking to cure. In other words, that they 
had had such 

Mr. Schwarz. Let's make perfectly clear what we're talking about. 
You knew, Mr. Helms knew, Mr. Hoover knew, and Mr. Sullivan 
knew that the CIA was, in fact, opening the mail, and the sentence 
says "covert coverage" — which means mail openings — "has been 

Mr. Angleton. But I still say that the FBI, in my view, are the 
ones who made the contribution of that statement. It was covering 
the problems that thev had had in discontinuing their mail coverage. 

Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Helms signed the report, didn't he ? 

Mr. Angleton. That is correct. 

Mr. Schwarz. All right. I just want to have you read into the 


record from two or more documents which relate to the U.S. Attorney 
General's being informed about mail opening, but being informed in 
June 1971, or in other words, a year after the Huston plan. 

Would you first read into the record from exhibit 56 *, paragraph 
4 of that document. And while you were looking for it, I will identify 
it for the record that that is a CIA memorandum, for the record, dated 
May 19, 1971, subject, "DCI's Meeting Concerning HT/LINGUAL," 
which was a code name for the mail-opening program. And it refers, 
Mr. Angleton, to a meeting in Mr. Helms' office which involved a 
number of ClA officials, including yourself. 

Now, would you read into the record paragraph 4, please ? 

Mr. Angleton. Paragraph 4 : 

"The DCI," meaning the Director of Central Intelligence, "then asked, who in 
the Post Office Department knows the full extent of the operation — beyond cover 
surveillance. The Chief of Counterintelligence," meaning myself, "replied that 
only Mr. Cotter knows, for he has been witting while with CIA and the Office of 
Security. The previous Chief Postal Inspector, Mr. Montague, had never wanted to 
know the extent of examination actually done, and was thus able to deny on oath 

•^'•"V u vuugibOOll/UU! VV>uii>ll/lCl/ LUlili t,ut,J.l> DUO tii-ij L/(J.i-Ll.£st5x lii^. ilil. VuUci It VUlU 

be unable to make such a denial under oath. 

In an exchange between the Director for Central Intelligence and the Deputy 
Director for Plans, it was observed that while Mr. Cotter's loyalty to CIA could 
be assumed, his dilemma is that he owes loyalty now to the Postmaster General. 

Mr. Schwarz. All right. In other words, for the first time, someone 
was in the Post Office Department, who, for sure, knew that the mail 
was being opened. Because of that dilemma, Mr. Helms went to see 
the Attorney General, did he not ? 

Mr. Angleton. That is correct. 

Mr. Schwarz. All right. Now, would you read into the record the 
memorandum for the record, June 3, 1971, subject, "Meeting at the 
DCI's Office Concerning HT/LINGUAL" [exhibit 57 2 ] the second 
paragraph which refers to Mr. Helms' statement that he had briefed 
the Attorney General concerning the mail opening program. 

Mr. Angleton. Paragraph 2 : 

Mr. Helms stated that on Monday he had briefed Attorney General Mitchell 
on the operation. (Note. — Mr. Helms may have meant Tuesday, June 1, Monday 
having been a holiday.) Mr. Helms indicated that Mr. Mitchell fully concurred 
in the value of the operation and had no "hangups" concerning it. When discuss- 
ing the advisability of also briefing Postmaster General Blount, Mr. Mitchell 
encouraged Mr. Helms to undertake such a briefing. 

Mr. Schwarz. All right. Now, that document was dated June 3, 
1971, and the mail opening program lasted until January or Febru- 
ary 1973, when at the insistence of Mr. Colby, who said it was illegal, 
it was dropped. Is that correct ? 

Mr. Angleton. That is correct. It was actually — the Director was 
Mr. Schlesinger. 

Mr. Schwarz. And was it not Mr. Colby who was the moving force 
saying it was illegal ? 

Mr. Angleton. Precisely. 

Mr. Schwarz. All right, no further questions, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Mr. Angleton — well, first of all, Mr. Smothers, do 
you have any questions at this time ? 

1 See p. 365. 
2 See p. 368. 


Mr. Smothers. Yes; I do, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Angleton, there are 
two matters I would like to inquire into briefly. First, the process 
regarding approval for such actions as mail opening; and second, the 
nature of this working group itself. The chief counsel has just raised 
the questions regarding the statement in the report of the interagency 
group, and you indicated in response to his question that that may 
have been put in by the FBI. Is that correct ? 
Mr. Angleton. Pardon ? 

Mr. Smothers. With respect to the discontinuance of the covert op- 
eration, mail opening, as mentioned in that report, you theorized, in 
response to Mr. Schwarz's question, that that may have been a state- 
ment put in by the FBI. To the best of your knowledge, didn't the 
FBI do most of the drafting on this report? 

Mr. Angleton. The FBI, as I recall it, collected the opinions after 
each meeting of the participating agencies and appeared at the next 
meeting with minutes and a draft of the previous session. 

Mr. Smothers. All right. With respect to the question then of mail 
opening, is it your experience that this kind of operation by the CIA 
would have been discussed in interagency working group meetings 
among persons who would otherwise have been uninformed of such 

Mr. Angleton. No ; we would not raise such an operation. 
Mr. Smothers. In the normal course of things, would there have 
been an approval channel other than such interagency groups for se- 
curing Presidential advice and consent to such operations ? 
Mr. Angleton. I am not aware of any other channel. 
Mr. Smothers. Would such channels as the Special Group or the 
Intelligence Board have been a proper place for such matters to be 
raised ? 

Mr. Angleton. I do not believe that an operation of this sensitivity 
would have been raised in any body. It would have been — if there was 
going to be submission for Presidential approval, it would have been 
raised either by the Director of the FBI or the Director of Central 

Mr. Smothers. But in any event, it would not have been raised with 
this working group involved with the Huston plan? 
Mr. Angleton. That is correct. That is correct. 
Mr. Smothers. Mr. Ansrleton, if we could turn for a moment to the 
process resulting in the Huston plan itself, I would like to take you 
back to your testimony before the staff of this committee on the 12th 
of September. At that time, you were asked about the involvement of 
Mr. Tom Charles Huston in the development of this plan. I would 
like to read to you from page 16 of your transcript and ask you if it 
accurately reflects your comments at that time. 
Mr. Loch Johnson is doing the questioning, and his question to you is : 

Do you think that Tom Charles Huston viewed himself as a potential arbiter 
for domestic intelligence disagreements within the community? 

Your response : 

I think he did because his short letter of instructions to the heads of the 
intelligence community said that his role was to be what Dr. Kissinger's was in 
foreign policy. It was a very clear-cut edict, so to speak, that he was the ultimate 
authority in the Executive for domestic security. 


Mr. Angleton, is that statement still true ? Does that accurately re- 
flect your testimony on September 12 ? 

Mr. Angleton. I think it does. I could expand on it, but I think that 
is quite accurate. 

Mr. Smothers. But that response then is still true ? You still believe 
it to be true? 

Mr. Angleton. I believe it very much so and that particularly after 
listening to Mr. Huston yesterday. 

Mr. Smothers. Let me then raise with you another question regard- 
ing Mr. Huston's role. If you would, counsel, turn to page 24 of the 
same transcript. Mr. Angleton, the question is raised as to whether 
Mr. Huston was in fact the White House authority, but in addition 
as to whether he was competent to manage such a group as the one that 
was involved in the preparation of the Huston plan. 

If you would turn to the last Angleton statement on page 24, let me 
read into the record your comment at that time and ask if that still 
represents your view. 

Talking about his experience in the intelligence area, he was very know- 
ledgeable. He had obviously gone into this matter at some length prior to the 
meeting. He knew prescisely what none of us really knew, that is the depths of 
the White House concern. In fact, the most dramatic moment, I think, was at 
the beginning of one meeting. At some stage in the meetings after preliminary 
draft had been put forward, he found it totally unacceptable, and his comments 
were to the effect that the subcommittee was not being responsive to the 
President's needs. 

Does that accurately reflect your comments? 

Mr. Angleton. It does indeed. I think it is almost a direct quotation 
as it relates to his insistence, after one of the sessions. He began the 
next session with the statement to the effect that the committee was not 
responding — the drafting committee was not responding to the 
President's requests and was not responsive to it. 

Mr. Smothers. During the course of the meetings of this interagency 
intelligence group, was there any doubt in your mind that your pur- 
pose was to respond to the White House's bidding and that the 
message regarding the desires of the White House was being brought 
by Tom Charles Huston ? 

Mr. Angleton. There was no question in my mind, nor in the minds 
of others, that he represented the Commander in Chief in terms of 
bringing together this plan, and he certainly never qualified what his 
authority was. He made it very clear, and he submitted in writing that 
he was to have this role for domestic intelligence comparable to Dr. 
Kissinger's role in foreign affairs. 

Mr. Smothers. Thank you, Mr. Angleton. 

Mr. Chairman, I have nothing further. 

The Chairman. Mr. Angleton, you heard Mr. Huston's testimony 
yesterday ? 

Mr. Angleton. I heard most of it, sir. 

The Chairman. You will remember then that he represented to the 
committee that in response to the President's desire to extend intel- 
ligence coverage within this country, that he asked the various de- 
partments of the Government involved, the FBI, the CIA, the NSA, 
to come together with a plan and give the President some options, and 
that the purpose of the recommendations that were made to the 


President in the so-called Huston plan, based upon the recommenda- 
tions that had come from these departments, was to secure the 
President's authorization to eliminate restrictions that he felt were 
obstructing this gathering of intelligence. 

Now, Mr. Huston told us that he was never informed by the CIA, 
the FBI, or any agency that the mail was being opened. He made a 
recommendation to the President. The President authorized mail open- 
ings, and he testified that to his knowledge the President did not know 
that the mail was being opened either. 

Now, when we asked Mr. Helms, the Director of the CIA, if to his 
knowledge the President had been told of the mail openings, he said, 
I do not know whether he knew it or not. 

So the state of the record is that to the best of our knowledge the 
President had not been told that the mail was being opened. He gets 
a recommendation in which it is represented that covert coverage, 
which is mail openings, has been discontinued, and he is asked to 
authorize the reopening of this program. Now, you have referred to 
the President as the Commander in Chief. What possible justification 
was there to misrepresent a matter of such importance to the Com- 
mander in Chief? 

Mr. Angleton. I would say that your question is very well put, Mr. 
Chairman. I can only speculate — and I do not have any record of the 
discussions between ourselves and the FBI during the drafting stages, 
but I know we had several where matters tabled within the drafting 
committee, were matters that we never explained to the other members, 
and one of them, of course, was the mail intercept. Again, only by way 
of speculation, I believe if the President had approved, or even if 
there had been some access to the President — because, I think, this is 
probably the most difficult task of all, was to have the audience in 
which these things could be explained — I have no satisfactory answer 
to your question, except that I do not believe that a great deal of the 
mail problem centered on the Bureau's lack of coverage, not the 
Agency's. - 

The Chairman. But the CIA was the agency principally involved in 
the mail openings. 

Mr. Angleton. That is correct for all foreign mail, not for domestic. 

The Chairman. Yes ; and we will explore the whole breadth of that 
program in due course. Did not the CIA have an affirmative duty to 
inform the President about such a program ? 

Mr. Angleton. I believe so, without any question. 

The Chairman. But it apparently was not done. You did not inform 
the President. Director Helms did not inform the President, so 

Mr. Angleton. I would say, sir, not by way of any excuse, but 
those were very turbulent periods for the intelligence community and 
particularly for the FBI, and I think that all of us had enormous 
respect for Mr. Hoover and understood the problems which he had 
in sustaining the reputation of the FBI. 

The Chairman. But the fact that the times were turbulent, the fact 
that illegal operations were being conducted by the very agencies we 
entrust to uphold and enforce the law makes it all the more incumbent 
that the President be informed of what is going on; does it not? It 
is really not an excuse. 

Mr. Angleton. I do not think there was ever the forum in which 
these matters could be raised at that level. I think that has been one 


of the troubles in domestic counterintelligence and foreign counter- 
intelligence that the issues never do get beyond the parochial circle 
of those engaged in that activity. 

The Chairman. But you have said that there was an affirmative duty 
on the CIA to inform the President ? 

Mr. Angleton. I don't dispute that. 

The Chairman. And he was not informed, so that was a failure 
of duty to the Commander in Chief; is that correct? 

Mr. Angleton. Mr. Chairman, I don't think anyone would have 
hesitated to inform the President if he had at any moment asked for 
a review of intelligence operations. 

The Chairman. That is what he did do. That is the very thing he 
asked Huston to do. That is the very reason that these agencies got 
together to make recommendations to him, and when they made their 
recommendations, they misrepresented the facts. 

Mr. Angleton. I was referring, sir, to a much more restricted 

The Chairman. I am referring to the mail, and what I have said is 
solidly based upon the evidence. The President wanted to be in- 
formed. He wanted recommendations. He wanted to decide what 
should be done, and he was misinformed. 

Not only was he misinformed, but when he reconsidered authorizing 
the opening of the mail 5 days later and revoked it, the CIA did not 
pay the slightest bit of attention to him, the Commander in Chief, as 
you say. Is that so ? 

Mr. Angleton. I have no satisfactory answer for that. 

The Chairman. You have no satisfactory answer ? 

Mr. Angleton. No ; I do not. 

The Chairman. I do not think there is a satisfactory answer, because 
having revoked the authority, the CIA went ahead with the program. 
So that the Commander in Chief is not the Commander in Chief at 
all. He is just a problem. You do not want to inform him in the first 
place, because he might say no. That is the truth of it. And when he 
did say no you disregard it and then you call him the Commander in 

I have no further questions. Senator Tower ? 

Senator Tower. Mr. Angleton, the role of certain leaders within 
the intelligence community, such as that of Mr. Helms, has been of 
concern to this committee. Referring back to your transcript of Sep- 
tember 12, at page 17, you were asked about the role of the Director 
of your Agency, the role of Mr. Helms. You began by discussing the 
first meeting of the interagency committee. You were asked who at- 
tended it and your response was as follows, and I read directly from 
the transcripts: 

Mr. Helms, but he attended only for a few moments. Huston made the opening 
remarks as I recall. And since it was being held in our building, Helms made a 
brief appearance so to speak, the host, and he took off and I do not think from 
that moment he attended any other meetings. 

Now Mr. Angleton, the question is this: is this still an accurate 
characterization of Mr. Helms' participation in the decisions and 
recommendations leading up to a so-called Huston plan ? 

Mr.. Angleton. I did not mean my statement to indicate that there 
is any neglect of duty. It was simply that the working group was 

62-685 O - 76 - 5 


qualified to adhere to certain guidelines. Mr. Helms' appearance, first 
appearance, was to lend weight to the President's request and to sup- 
port Mr. Huston. 

Senator Tower. Are you saying then that Mr. Helms made no sub- 
stantial contribution to the substance of the report? 

Mr. Angleton. No; I am speaking about the — that his original 
talk was only to outline what the President required from the work- 
ing group and naturally I saw him from time to time in -terms of — I 
would telephone him to indicate where we stood on the report. 

Senator Tower. Now, Mr. Angleton, in these working group ses- 
sions, who represented the FBI ? 

Mr. Angleton. Mr. Sullivan, sir, who was also the chairman of the 
working group. 

Senator Tower. In your opinion, did Mr. Sullivan's views accurately 
represent those of Mr. Hoover? 

Mr. Angleton. No ; I do not think so. 

Senator Tower. Could you elaborate on that ? 

Mr. Angleton. Mr. Sullivan, as the chief of internal security, 
Assistant Director for Internal Security, found himself handicapped 
by lack of personnel and funding and in addition many of the aggres- 
sive operations conducted by the Bureau in the past have been system- 
atically cut out by Mr. Hoover. 

Senator Tower. What does that mean? What is the significance? 

Mr. Angleton. The significance being that the production of Inter- 
nal Security fell down considerably. 

Senator Tower. Now, Mr. Angleton, did you come to gain some 
insight into the relationship between Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Tom 
Charles Huston ? 

Mr. Angleton. Well, it was my understanding, sir, that they had 
known one another for over a year prior to the meetings. And I would 
suggest that Mr. Huston was much better educated when he embarked 
on these matters than his testimony suggests. I find him extremely 
knowledgeable. He was certainly aware of the gaps. 

Senator Tower. Would you say that Mr. Huston reflected the views 
of Mr. Sullivan? 

Mr. Angleton. Very much so, sir. 

Senator Tower [presiding]. I have no further questions. 
Mr. Mondale ? 

Senator Mondale. Thank you, Senator Tower. 

Mr. Angleton, you were in charge of the covert mail cover program 
from the beginning ; am I correct ? 

Mr. Angleton. Not from the beginning, sir, from 1955. 

Senator Mondale. All right 

Mr. Angleton. I took it on as an ongoing operation which had been 
lodged also in the Agency. 

Senator Mondale. What is your understanding as to who authorized 
the program ? 

Mr. Angleton. I would say that the operation that was first initiated 
in 1952, at some stage the authorization was from the Chief of Opera- 
tions of the Clandestine Services. 

Senator Mondale As you conducted this program, under whose 
authority was it your understanding that you were operating? 

Mr. Angleton. Within the Agency? 


Senator Mondale. Yes. 

Mr. Angleton. Under the Chief of the Clandestine Operations. 

Senator Mondale. The Deputy Director for Plans, would that be? 

Mr. Angleton. Correct. 

Senator Mondale. For your purposes, was that considered adequate 
authority or was this such that you felt authority had to flow from 
either the President or the National Security Council ? 

Mr. Angleton. I believe that I regarded that, plus the authority 
from the Director who was knowledgeable of the program, as internal 

Senator Mondale. At your level of operations, that would be the 
only authority with which you would concern yourself? 

Mr. Angleton. That is correct. 

Senator Mondale. All right. What was your understanding of the 
legality of the covert mail operation? 

Mr. Angleton. That it was illegal. 

Senator Mondale. It was illegal. Now, you are an attorney ? 

Mr. Angleton. No, I am not, sir. 

Senator Mondale. Well, that might be an asset. 

Mr. Angleton. That is my cover, Senator. 

Senator Mondale. How do you rationalize conducting a program 
which you believe to be illegal? 

Mr. Angleton. To begin with, I was taking it over as an ongoing 
operation and there was probability that the program, through lack 
of personnel and funding, would have been scrubbed at some stage. 
From the counterintelligence point of view, we believe that it was 
extremely important to know everything possible regarding contacts 
of American citizens with Communist countries. 

And second, that we believed that the security of the operation 
was such that the Soviets were unaware of such a program and there- 
fore that many of the interests that the Soviets would have in the 
United States, subversive and otherwise, would be through the open 
mails, when their own adjudication was that the mails could not be 

Senator Mondale. So that a judgment was made, with which you 
concurred, that although covert mail opening was illegal, the good 
that flowed from it, in terms of the anticipating threats to this coun- 
try through the use of this counterintelligence technique, made it 
worthwhile nevertheless. 

Mr. Angleton. That is correct. 

Senator Mondale. How do you recommend that this committee deal 
with this profound crisis between political and legal responsibility 
in government, a nation that believes in the laws, and what you regard 
to be the counterintelligence imperative of illegal activity ? What do 
we do about it? 

Mr. Angleton. My own belief has always been that high authority, 
whether it be on the Hill, the Congress, or in the Executive, needs 
to examine very closely the counterintelligence content available to 
this Government regarding its adversaries, and regarding the Soviet 
and the Soviet Bloc. 

To my knowledge, there has never been such an examination. I 
believe very much in a statement made by Director of the FBI, 
Mr. Kelley, that it is his firm view, which he expressed in Canada 


at a bar association convention, that certain individual rights have 
to be sacrificed for the national security. 

Senator Mondale. Do you believe that national security cannot be 
protected except through the sacrifice of these rights? 

Mr. Angleton. I believe that all matters dealing with counter- 
espionage require very sophisticated handling and require consider- 
able latitude. 

Senator Mondale. Who do you think should be empowered to deter- 
mine which rights should be set aside? 

Mr. Angleton. I think that, sir, not being an expert in these 
matters, that it should be a combination of the Executive and the 

Senator Mondale. How would the Congress express itself? Tradi- 
tionally, it is through the adoption of laws. 

Mr. Angleton. I am afraid I do not 

Senator Mondale. As I understand the progression of this dis- 
cussion, it is your opinion that this Nation cannot protect itself with- 
out setting aside certain personal liberties. Then I asked you, who 
would determine what liberties were to be set aside? And you have 
said it should be a combination of the Executive and the Congress. 
Of course, the Congress acts through laws. Are you saying that we 
should take another look at our laws to see whether they fully meet 
the needs of national security? 
Mr. Angleton. That is correct. 

Senator Mondale. Would it not have been better then, when these 
laws were violated in the past, to do just that? Come to the Congress 
and say, "in our opinion we cannot defend you under the present laws 
and, therefore, we make these recommendations for change." That 
was not what was done. Surreptitiously and privately and covertly, 
legal rights of the American people were violated ; in this case, mail 
was opened, without any such approval in the law. Is that correct? 
Mr. Angleton. That is correct. 

Senator Mondale. Do you think that was a correct way to proceed ? 
Mr. Angleton. I think in an ideal world dealing with intelligence, 
and I have never seen one yet, that these matters should have been 
brought up vigorously. All through the life span of the CIA, I do 
not think there was the proper forum here for the airing securely 
of these matters. 

Senator Mondale. I disagree with you on the question of national 
security. I think our Constitution provides plenty of power to protect 
this country. In any event, I see no authority for anyone in the 
executive or in the Congress or anywhere else for determining, on 
his own, that the law is not good enough and therefore taking it into 
his own hands. I see no way of conducting a civilized, democratic 
society with those kinds of rules. 

Now in your system for covert openings, there was prepared a 
watch list which set forth certain names of organizations and purposes 
and those names were the trigger for opening mail to or from them 
which was sent internationally. 
Mr. Angleton. To the Soviet Union. 

Senator Mondale. To the Soviet Union. The list included Linus 
Pauling, John Steinbeck, the author, and Victor Reuther of the Auto 
Workers. What counterintelligence objective was it you thought you 


were achieving in opening the mail of what most of us would assume 
to be very patriotic, thoughtful, decent Americans ? 

Mr. Angleton. Sir, I would prefer, if possible, to respond to that 
question in executive session. 

Senator Mondale. Well, I would like the answer. The chairman is 
not here so I think we ought to pass that request up until the chairman 
is back. 

I have several other questions along that line with other names. But, 
in any event, let us wait until the chairman returns. 

Senator Tower. What was the request of the witness? That it 
not be answered except in executive session ? 

Senator Mondale. Yes; I asked about three names that were on the 
watch list and he asked to answer that in executive session. I think we 
should await the chairman. 

Mr. Angleton. Sir, may I please modify that? 

Mr. Brown. Would the Senator please just indulge us for just a 
moment so I can confer with Mr. Angleton ? 

Senator Tower. Let us have order, please. 

Mr. Angleton, should you answer this question in open session, 
would you be disclosing classified information that has not been 
previously cleared for disclosure? 

Mr. Angleton. I would also need to have the opportunity to review 
files in the agency before making any response. 

Senator Tower. In other words, you do not know whether it would 
be disclosing classified information that has not been cleared ? 

Mr. Angleton. I would not depend on my memory, sir, at this time, 
because these are cases or matters which apparently were some time 

Senator Tower. The Chair will rule that for the time being, you 
will not be required to answer the question in open session ; but that 
the matter can be reopened, should the committee decide that they 
should be disclosed in public session. 

Mr. Angleton. Thank you. 

Senator Mondale. I have got some other names I would like to sub- 
mit to Mr. Angleton which I wish he would use in his review in prepa- 
ration for that answer, whether in public or in private. 

Senator Tower. Thank you, Senator Mondale. Senator Baker? 

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

I believe most of the information relevant to the Huston plan docu- 
ment have been covered by other members of the committee and by 
counsel. But there are two or three things of a more general nature 
that I would like to direct Mr. Angleton's attention to, and ask his 
reaction or comments on. 

Before I do, however, what was your job at the time of your retire- 
ment from the CIA? 

Mr. Angleton. I was the head of counterintelligence. 

Senator Baker. Counterintelligence, in layman's terms, implies 
something other than intelligence. I take it that it implies something 
to do with keeping up with what the other fellow's intelligence 
would be.' 

Mr. Angleton. That is correct. 


Senator Baker. Was a major part of your operation concerned with 
intelligence operations against the United States by, say, the Soviet 
Union or other countries ? 

Mr. Angleton. It was a question of all hostile intelligence services 
where we have a situation, for example, that in the Soviet bloc alone, 
there are over 27 intelligence services who would conduct activity in 
the United States and in the territories of allies. 

Senator Baker. Well, to put it in lay terms again, counterintelli- 
gence was to protect our intelligence resources ? 

Mr. Angleton. It was to penetrate and frustrate the espionage and 
subversion from outside. 

Senator Baker. How, then, was counterintelligence, your area of 
concern and expertise, important to that area to be involved with mail 
openings ? 

Mr. Angleton. Well, since the mail openings were to the Commu- 
nist countries, it meant that there was a contact, regular contact, with 
Americans and third country nationals who were here. For example, 
there are many third country nationals that were here studying, who, 
in turn, had relatives who were studying in Soviet institutions. 

Senator Baker. I can follow that. But what prompted the question 
was, why on earth would you have, for instance, Frank Church or 
Richard Nixon on that list? 

Mr. Angleton. I would say it was very much an error. 

Senator Baker. It was an error to have them on the list ? 

Mr. Angleton. That is precisely correct. 

Senator Baker. Are there other members of this committee that 
were on that list? 

Mr. Angleton. I'm not aware of it, sir. I've not gone through the 

Senator Baker. You began this operation in 1954 or thereabouts, 
I understand. 

Mr. Angleton. It was started in another part of the agency in 1952, 
and it was taken over by us — counterintelligence — in 1955. 

Senator Baker. I understand from your testimony to Senator Mon- 
dale that you think that it is of sufficient value so that it ought to be 
continued. . . 

Mr. Angleton. It is certainly my opinion, and the opinion of my 
former associates. 

Senator Baker. It should be continued even if it required the change 
of the statute law — and I am not sure that would even do it. Let us 
just assume for the moment that you have a congressional debate on 
the necessity for doing it, and thus change the nature of the postal 
system; that is, people no longer would assume that their mail was 
inviolate, that people probably were going to inspect it. That gets us 
terribly close to Big Brotherism ; the idea that when you mail a letter, 
you have got to assume that somebody may read it, at least a letter 
outside the country. Even if you assume that that would be the range 
and scale of the debate in Congress, you would favor the passage of 
such a bill ? 

Mr. Angleton. I didn't quite say that, sir. I believe I would prefer, 
if possible, to stick to what I believe to be the "approach to the prob- 
lems within the intelligence community; and that is that both the 
executive, at a high level, and the Congress examine in depth the nature 
of the threat to our national security. 


Senator Baker. If I may interrupt you for a minute, I think I ought 
to explain why I am proceeding in this way. I know, from reading 
your briefing papers, and from a general impression of your service 
to your country and to the CIA, that you have been an extraordinarily 
important figure in the intelligence and counterintelligence scheme of 
things for many, many years. I believe, based on your testimony, that 
you have a grave concern for the nature and the scope of the foreign 
threat, and the importance of the methods and techniques that are 
employed or may be employed by the CIA, by the DIA, and by other 
intelligence agencies. 

That is my general impression. But your impression of us should be 
that, while we recognize the importance of that, it gets right sticky 
when it would appear, in some cases clearly, that those methods and 
techniques violate either the statute law or the Constitution of the 
United States. What I am putting to you is whether or not this coun- 
try should engage in a debate in the congressional forum — which is 
where laws are made and changed — about a matter such as the chang- 
ing of the fundamental nature of the postal system — that is to say, to 
create a situation where people must assume that their mail is being 

Now, are the techniques for intelligence gathering — is the nature of 
the foreign threat such that we should go ahead with that debate, or 
even pass such a statute? 

Mr. Angleton. I think in the present atmosphere, it would be 

Senator Baker. That is sort of our job, too ; to guess what is possible 
and impossible in the Congress, and I am often fooled about what is 
possible and impossible. From your standpoint, what I am trying to 
drive at is whether or not you believe the scope and the extent of the 
threat to this country from abroad is sufficient to launch this Congress 
into a debate on whether there should be such a change in the postal 
laws or not. 

Mr. Angleton. Well, I must accept, sir, the fact that again, that I do 
not believe that the atmosphere would even tolerate this subject being 
the subject of debate. I think these perceptions of dangers and threats 
have changed very greatly in the last 2 years. I think the policies of 
detente and, prior to that, peaceful coexistence 

Senator Baker. What do you think of the policies of detente ? 

Mr. Angleton. Well, I would only speak to the question of detente, 
peaceful coexistence, strictly from counterintelligence observation. 

Senator Baker. That is why I asked you. You were the head man in 
that field. What do you think of it ? 

Mr. Angleton. My view is that there is complete illusion to believe 
that, on the operative, clandestine side — which is, in a sense, a secret 
war that has continued since World War II — that the Soviets or the 
Soviet bloc have changed their objectives. And I base this on counter- 
intelligence cases. 

Senator Baker. I do not mean to embarrass you, Mr. Angleton, but 
I want to ask you this question. In that respect, is your disagreement 
with detente as a national policy part of the reason why you retired 
from the CIA at the time you did ? 

Mr. Angleton. I really cannot say. Every day that passes, I discover, 
much to my amazement, certain points of view and activity in which I 


might say, neither myself nor my colleagues were in great favor. I 
cannot be specific. I do not have the facts. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Angleton, there are many questions I could ask. 
Your experience covers a turbulent time in history, and the tempta- 
tion to ask you specific details about it is almost irresistible. But 
for the moment, in view of the time restraints, I will postpone that. 

I would ask only a single thing, and that is whether or not you think 
there should be a significant national debate in a congressional forum, 
as well, on the question as to whether or not we should legalize some of 
the activities that now appear to be illegal in the intelligence-collecting 
field. Now, it is my own personal view that if you are going to do 
some of these things, the country will not accept them, and should not. 
They are intrinsically an intrusion, beyond the scope of the permissible. 

But if you are going to do some of the others, that are more closely 
held, you ought not to do them without asking. You ought to send 
them up to Congress and find out what the likelihood of the law being 
changed may be. Would you generally agree, in retrospect, that that 
ought to be the way this matter is approached ? 

Mr. Angleton. There is no question in my mind. 

Senator Baker. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Tower. Senator Huddleston? 

Senator Huddleston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Angleton, first I wonder if we might bring some of the intelli- 
gence terminology down to lay language, so that the people will have 
a complete understanding of what we are talking about here. I think 
we have pretty well covered mail coverage, but just to clarify it maybe 
somewhat further, we are discussing the actual opening of mail of cer- 
tain citizens who appear on a predetermined list. Does some individual 
actually read this mail, or is it photographed, or just how is this 
handled ? 

Mr. Angleton. Well, sir, the process was to collect mail at an inter- 
national terminal before it went abroad, and mail coming from abroad 
from Communist countries, and having the opportunity to surrepti- 
tiously open the envelopes, photograph the contents, and to dispatch 
the mail to the addressee. The photographs of the mail were brought 
through another part of our organization to us in Counterintelligence, 
where we had a group of some six people very fluent in languages, and 
also in holograph and flaps, and they were very sophisticated tech- 
nicians and analysts. They would make abstracts of the mail where it 
was important, together with internal findings and dossiers, and direct 
it to certain selected customers. 

Senator Huddleston. Customers being specific agencies of the Gov- 
ernment, either CIA 

Mr. Angleton. For all intents and purposes it was only to the FBI, 
although there was some mail that did — there were some special items 
that went to military intelligence. 

Senator Huddleston. Now, electronic surveillance — what all does 
this involve? 

Mr. Angt.eton. Pardon, sir ? 

Senator Huddleston. Electronic surveillance — what does this in- 
volve specifically ? 

Mr. Angleton. We were not involved in electronic surveillance. 

Senator Huddleston; You know what it is, do you not? 


Mr. Angle-ton. Yes, sir. It is all forms of eavesdropping. 

Senator Htjddleston. Is this tapping telephones ? 

Mr. Angleton. Telephones; 

Senator Huddleston. That is, a wiretap. 

Mr. Angleton. Bugs. 

Senator Htjddleston. Bugs in rooms, or in places where people 
might assemble? 

Mr. Angleton. Precisely. 

Senator Htjddleston. Without their knowledge? 

Mr. Angleton. Hopefully. 

Senator Htjddleston. Surreptitious entry — what is this describing? 

Mr. Angleton. That is the ability to penetrate into either a build- 
ing or mail 

Senator Htjddleston. Break it down into a simple context that we 
hear in every police court in the country on Monday morning. It is 
breaking and entering to a great degree, is it not? It might be 

Mr. Angleton. As long as there is no — I say I agree, sir. 

Senator Htjddleston. It would be breaking into someone's home 
or into his office or his apartment, and, in effect, taking what you con- 
sider to be important to the objective. 

Mr. Angleton. It is not so much taking as it is photographing. 

Senator Htjddleston. Or photographing. 

Mr. Angleton. There is not really much breakage. 

Senator Htjddleston. What do you mean by development of campus 
sources ? 

Mr. Angleton. Is that in the context, sir, of the Huston plan ? 

Senator Htjddleston. Yes, that was part of the Huston objective. 

Mr. Angleton. It simply meant the eventual recruitment of sources 
on the campus. 

Senator Htjddleston. Would that be students? 

Mr. Angleton. I believe it referred specifically to students and 
perhaps some instructors. 

Senator Htjddleston. Who would perform as informants or as 

Mr. Angleton. They would be spotters in terms of possible recruit- 
ment of people, or informants. 

Senator Htjddleston. I think it is important that the people under- 
stand what we are talking about when we talk in intelligence terms, 
Mr. Angleton, and those descriptions I think will be helpful. 

Now, prior to the development of the Huston plan, would you say 
that one of the reasons that this development occurred was that con- 
flicts had grown specifically between the CIA and the FBI ? 

Mr. Angleton. Unfortunately, yes. 

Senator Htjddleston. Would you describe what some of those con- 
flicts were, some of the things that were troubling Mr. Hoover? 

Mr. Angleton. Well, to begin with, in all fairness to Mr. Hoover, 
after World War II, he was not happy with his activities in certain 
parts of the world which he conducted during wartime, being trans- 
ferred to another agency. I do not believe that this was jealousy, as 
has often been stated. I think that he only had to look at the fact 
that during World War II. the OSS had many people who were loyal 
to General Donovan, but also had loyalties to the opposition — and I 
do not want to characterize it as many. I think it is in many records. 


And therefore, there was a very grave problem of the security stand- 
ards of the Agency coming from World War II. 

Senator Huddleston. Did this result in the concern that he had that 
there were informants within the FBI that were telling the CIA 
things that Mr. Hoover did not think they should be telling? 

Mr. Angleton. Sir, I think you are referring directly to the one 
straw that broke the camel's back. 

Senator Huddleston. Was this a single incident ? 
Mr. Angleton. A single incident in which an officer of the CIA re- 
ceived information to which he was entitled regarding a foreign na- 
tional who disappeared and he received this information from an 
unnamed FBI officer. Mr. Hoover demanded the identity of the FBI 
officer. The CIA official as a matter of personal integrity refused to 
divulge the name of his source and he also offered to the Director, 
Mr. Helms, his resignation. 

Senator Huddleston. You indicate this was a one-time incident. Are 
you suggesting that the CIA did not have other sources of informa- 
tion from within the FBI that may not have been known by the 
Director, Mr. Hoover? 

Mr. Angleton. I would never call them sources. The CIA had many 
contacts with the FBI at various levels. 

Senator Huddleston. Were there also instances where the CIA re- 
quested of the FBI and of Mr. Hoover to undertake certain wiretaps 
for domestic surveillance that Mr. Hoover declined to do? 
Mr. Angleton. That is correct. 

Senator Huddleston. Did this also create friction between the 
agencies ? 

Mr. Angleton. I do not think that that in itself necessarily created 

the friction. I think the friction came from the case I described earlier. 

Senator Huddleston. Just that one case ? Was that enough to cause 

Mr. Hoover to eliminate the liaison totally and formally between the 

two agencies? 

Mr. Angleton. That is correct. 
Senator Huddleston. And he did that, in fact ? 
Mr. Angleton. He did, indeed. 

Senator Huddleston. During the early sessions of the group that 
was setting up the Huston plan, was this friction evident to you as 
a participant of those meetings, that the CIA and the FBI were not 
getting along at the top levels as they might ? 

Mr. Angleton. Well, I do not think that the relationship at the 
top levels was ever satisfactory. I believe — and this may be somewhat 
of an exaggeration — but I believe that over a period of some 25 years 
I do not think there were probably more than three or four or five 
meetings between the Director of FBI and the Director of CIA except 
those that might have been casual, where they bumped into one an- 
other in a national securitv conference. 

Senator Huddleston. Did this adversely affect the efficiency of our 
intelligence community ? 
Mr. Angleton. It did. 

Senator Huddleston. Do you think Mr. Hoover's concern in the 
FBI's dealings with the CIA was principally due to the questionable 
legality of some of the thinsrs that the CIA was asking him to do? 
Or was it a concern for the public relations aspect of his agency ? 


Mr. Angleton. Well, I think that Mr. Hoover was conscious of all 
aspects of situations where the Bureau's interests were aftected, 
whether it be professional, whether it be public relations, he was 
without question the number one law enforcement officer m the Umtea 
States and probably the most respected individual outside the United 
States among all foreign intelligence and security services. And 1 
believe that Mr. Hoover's real concern was that during the Johnson 
administration, where the Congress was delving into matters pertain- 
ing to FBI activities, Mr. Hoover looked to the President to give him 
support in terms of conducting those operations. And when that sup- 
port was lacking, Mr. Hoover had no recourse but to gradually elimi- 
nate activities which were unfavorable to the Bureau and which m 
turn risked public confidence in the number one law enforcement 


And I think his reasoning was impeccable. 

Senator Huddleston. Well, did the CIA, on occasion, ask Mr. 
Hoover and his agency to enter into "black bag" jobs? 

Mr. Angleton. That is correct. 

Senator Htjddleston. And that is surreptitious entry or in layman s 
terms, breaking and entering. 

Mr. Angleton. It deals basically with handling couriers, the man 

who carries the bag. 

Senator Htjddleston. During the initial stages of the interagency 
committee developing the Huston plan, did it occur to you to inquire 
whether or not— since you were aware that you were suggesting or 
talking about doing things that were illegal— did it occur to you to 
inquire whether or not the Attorney General of the United States had 
been advised or questioned about this plan ? 

Mr. Angleton. Well, I did not have, as a rule, relations with many 
Attorneys General except on very special cases. 

Senator Huddleston. I am not suggesting you would have inquired 
yourself, but that his approval would have been given or at least he 
would have been consulted. 

Mr. Angleton. My approach, sir, on that 

Senator Huddleston. Did it even bother you to wonder about it? 

Mr. Angleton. No. I think I can reconstruct my attitude over many 
years on that matter, that I felt it most essential that the Attorney 
General be aware of the program in order to read the mail and to read 
the production. In other words, I think that an Attorney General 
who does not know the minutiae of the threat is a very poor Attorney 

Senator Huddleston. Were you surprised then to learn that he had 
not been consulted about the Huston plan ? 

Mr. Angleton. I was absolutely shocked. I mean it was unbelievable, 
because one believed that he had everything relating to Justice 

Senator Huddleston. Is that the reason that you testified you were 
not surprised when the President rescinded his approval after Mr. 
Hoover went to the Attorney General? 

Mr. Angleton. I must repeat that I could well understand how 
without even going into any inquiries, that the Huston plan was dead. 

Senator Huddleston. You expected that to happen ? 

Mr. Angleton. Absolutely. 


The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you very much. I want to thank 
Senator Tower for taking over and presiding for me. I had to be at 
a meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that is consider- 
ing the Sinai agreements and for that reason I had to absent myself. 

Let us see, we are now at Senator Schweiker, please. 

Senator Schweiker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Angleton, did you support the Huston plan in principle? At 
the time that this became a function of your decisionmaking process, 
your administrative responsibility, did you support the Huston plan? 

Mr. Angleton. I did. 

Senator Schweiker. After the Huston plan was shot down, I guess 
by a combination of John Mitchell and J. Edgar Hoover, there were 
some other actions taken. First of all, John Dean was moved in and 
somewhat replaced Mr. Huston in his duties and then he wrote a 
memo on September 18, 1970 [exhibit 24 *], within 2 months of the 
decision to abandon the Huston plan. And he set up a new committee 
and I quote now from his memo, "a key to the entire operation will 
be the creation of a interagency intelligence unit for both operational 
and evaluation purposes." You were a part of that new unit ; was that 
correct ? 

Mr. Angleton. I was present. 

Senator Schweiker. And as I understand it, the very first meeting 
of that unit was held in John Dean's office in the White House. Is 
that correct? 

Mr. Angleton. That is correct. 

Senator Schweiker. So in essence, by this move, did you not really 
begin to accomplish many of the objectives that Mr. Huston set out, 
but you did it in a way that Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Hoover did not 
strenuously interpose their objection. Is that correct ? 

Mr. Angleton. I do not have any evidence of that. 

Senator Schweiker. Well, on April 12, do you recall there was a 
meeting among Mr. Helms, Mr. Hoover, and Admiral Gayler to dis- 
cuss loosening up or broadening, whatever way you want to call it, the 
information gathering techniques to the point where some of the 
elements of the Huston plan were being reconsidered. Do you recall 
such a meeting ? 

Mr. Angleton. I know that that was something that was of concern 
to the intelligence community prior to and after the Huston plan. The 
Huston plan itself had no impact or did not impact on the meeting, 
the question of espionage assistance to the National Security Agency. 

Senator Schweiker. Of the seven or eight individual elements of 
the Huston plan concerning new ways of getting intelligence more 
easily, weren't some of these similar to the proposals that were dis- 
cussed at the April 12 meeting as well as at the interagency meeting? 
Certainly you did discuss them, and did they not come up for consid- 
eration in different forms ? 

Mr. Angleton. Excuse me, sir. 

Senator, I am trying to be responsive to your hypothesis. The Huston 
plan, in effect, as far as we were concerned, was dead in 5 days and 
therefore all of the other matters of enlarging procurement within 
the intelligence community were the same concerns that existed prior 

1 See p. 255. 


to the Huston plan, and subsequent to the Huston plan. The Huston 
plan had no impact whatsoever on the priorities within the intelligence 

Senator Schweiker. I understand that, Mr. Angleton. But at that 
meeting where Mr. Helms and Admiral Gayler and the others met, 
was there not a discussion to do some of the very same things that 
had been referenced in the Huston plan ? 

Mr. Angleton. That part is correct, sir. 

Senator Schweiker. That is all I am trying to establish. 

Mr. Angleton. But it had a life of its own prior to the Huston plan. 

Senator Schweiker. And then did not the Plumber's unit at a later 
time perform some of the same illegalities, such as breaking and enter- 
ing, that the Huston plan has proposed ? 

Mr. Angleton. Pardon ? 

Senator Schweiker. I realize you are not directly connected with 
the Plumbers, but did the Plumber's unit not do some of the same 
things, breaking and entry, illegal burglary, that the Huston plan 
proposed ? Is that not a fact ? 

Mr. Angleton. Yes. 

Senator Schweiker. So in essence, they went around the back door 
instead of the front door. Even though the Huston plan was dead I 
believe it had nine lives. Now, Mr. Angleton, you were head of the 
Counterintelligence Unit of the CIA and under you was a group called 
the Special Operations Group, headed by Mr. Richard Ober, who we 
will be hearing from tomorrow. But inasmuch as you were involved 
as his immediate supervisor, it is correct to say that Operation CHAOS 
was under your supervision, although not immediately ? 

Mr. Angleton. It was technically under my supervision for "rations 
and quarters." 

Senator Schweiker. And you supported and went along with Op- 
eration CHAOS as an executive of CIA, is that not correct ? 

Mr. Angleton. I was not familiar with all of the operations of 

Senator Schweiker. Did you object to it? Did you oppose it? Did 
you fight it in any way ? 

Mr. Angleton. Those operations I knew about I approved, I mean, 
I was approving of. 

Senator Schweiker. Were you aware that some of the Operation 
CHAOS agents were operating in the United States? 

Mr. Angleton. I was not. I would qualify that to say, as I have said 
before, before the Rockefeller Commission, that there was a period in 
all operations of that nature where the agent had to build cover in 
the United States. But I suggested, and I still believe, that those opera- 
tions should be examined in terms of what was Mr. Ober's motive. 
And I think that one will find, as far as I know, that his motive was 
to send these people abroad for intelligence collection. 

Senator Schweiker. Well, were you aware of the memos [exhibit 
65 *] that CIA sent to Walt Rostow, and then Henry Kessinger, which 
said the following, and I quote "you will, of course, be aware of the 
peculiar sensitivity which attaches to the fact that CIA has prepared 

1 See p. 402. 


a report on student activities, both here and abroad." Were you aware 
of either memo, number one, or number two, that you were following 
student activities here ? 

Mr. Angleton. Do we have this memorandum ? 

Senator Schweiker. I will ask the counsel whether you have it. 
This was received from the Kockefeller Commission. You might not 
have it immediately before you. 

Mr. Angleton. I do not recall it. 

Senator Schweiker. Let me ask you this way. Were you aware of 
any activities under you, or under people under your direction, that 
had to do with preparing a report on the domestic activities of stu- 
dents here in the United States of America ? 

Mr. Angleton. There were reports that I cannot identify unless 
I see them. 

Senator Schweiker. That is not my question. My question is were 
you aware of any counterintelligence activities directed against the 
students of the United States of America here at home? You were in 
charge of supervising this whole counterintelligence unit. 

Mr. Angleton. I tried to explain, sir, that I was not in charge. 

Senator Schweiker. What does being Chief of Counterintelligence 
mean? You were Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff, were you not? 

Mr. Angleton. Yes. 

Senator Schweiker. And that did not come under your purview? 

Mr. Angleton. I said that Mr. Ober's unit was in the Counter- 
intelligence staff for rations and quarters. I did not have access to 
many of his disseminations. We were not even on the carbon copies 
for dissemination. I did not know the identity of his agents. I did 
not have any knowledge or appurtenances of a case officer over these 

Senator Schweiker. Let me ask you something that you did testify 
to that we will not have a problem of communication on. On page 
109 of your September 12 testimony, in a deposition before this com- 
mittee, you were specifically asked about how the CIA might either 
ignore, or not follow, or contradict an order relating to the destruction 
of shellfish toxins and poisons, about which we held hearings last 
week. Now you are quoted in your deposition, "It is inconceivable that 
a secret intelligence arm of the government has to comply with all 
the overt orders of the government." Is that an accurate quote or not ? 

Mr. Angleton. Well, if it is accurate it should not have been said. 

The Chairman. That is right, Mr. Angleton. 

Senator Schweiker. It looks like we are on plausible denial again 
is all I can say here, Mr. Chairman. It is a direct quote and I under- 
stand the procedure is to give you an opportunity to review your 
testimony each day, in case you want to correct it. Did you not have 
that opportunity ? 

Mr. Angleton. I did not expect, sir, to be called Friday night late 
and told I would be here today. I intended in due course to see my 
testimony. I was informed that I would be present in October. 

Senator Schweiker. Well, getting back to the issue at hand, Mr. 
Angleton, do you believe that statement that you made or do you not 
believe it ? What is your belief of whether a secret intelligence agency 
has the right to contradict a direct order of a President or whether it 
does not apply ? 


Mr. Angleton. Well, I would say I had been rather imprudent in 
making those remarks. 

Senator Schweieer. Well, I think, Mr. Chairman, it raises the prob- 
lem that this committee is really confronted with. And I don't want to 
say that — unfortunately you are not the exception in this belief, Mr. 
Angleton, because I think our work, our intelligence investigation, has 
turned up an awful lot of people in the intelligence community who 
really feel this way. 

I think that is exactly how the toxin situation got to where it was. 
And, while this may not have been the biggest thing that happened, I 
think it is indicative of the problem that this committee and the Con- 
gress have to deal with. And you feel, or the intelligence community 
feels, that they are removed from even a direct order of the President. 
And I think that does come to the heart of the issue. I think you were 
honest in your statement and I think actually this is the issue before the 
committee and the Congress now. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Well I might observe that Mr. Angleton has not 
denied the statement, nor has he changed his position. He said it was 
an imprudent thing to say. That was your answer, was it not? 

Mr. Angleton. I have not pursued the question of toxins from a pro- 
fessional point of view. I did not listen to all of the hearings on it. It is 
a matter very much outside of my professional background. 

The Chairman. But your statement, Mr. Angleton, is not related to 
toxins. It is a very general statement, which I do believe represents 
your view. 

Mr. Angleton. I am sorry, sir, but it does not necessarily represent 
my views. 

The Chairman. You said it is inconceivable that a secret intelligence 
arm of the Government has to comply with all of the overt orders of 
the Government. 

Mr. Angleton. To comply with all overt 

The Chairman. Do you retract that statement now, or do you merely 
regard it as imprudent. 

Mr. Angleton. I have not studied the testimony, sir. 

The Chairman. May I call your attention to it on page 109 of your 
testimony before this committee, September 12, beginning on line 9, 
and I read, "It is inconceivable that a secret intelligence arm of the 
Government has to comply with all of the overt orders of the Govern- 

Mr. Angleton. I withdraw that statement. 

The Chairman. Do you withdraw that statement? 

Mr. Angleton. I do. 

The Chairman. Did you not mean it when you said it the first time ? 

Mr. Angleton. This was stated before the hearings, before you held 
your hearings on this matter ? 

The Chairman. Yes, but when you said it to us, did you mean it or 
did you not mean it ? 

Mr. Angleton. I do not know how to respond to that question. 

The Chairman. You do not know how to respond to the question ? 

Mr. Angleton. I said that I withdrew the statement. 

The Chairman. Very well, but you are unwilling to say whether or 
not vou meant it when you said it. 

Mr. Angleton. I would say that the entire speculation should not 
have been indulged in. 


The Chairman. I see. Senator Morgan. 

Senator Morgan. First of all, with regard to the question that the 
chairman asked you, do you know what specific order was being 
referred to in that case ? 

Mr. Brown. Excuse me. Senator, just a moment please. 

Mr. Angleton. No ; I did not know the orders. 

Senator Morgan. Then you are not talking about any particular 
order, but you were talking about orders in general ? 

Mr. Angleton. Sir, I have not reviewed this transcript. 

Senator Morgan. I understand that, Mr. Angleton. And that is why 
I was looking back at it myself. 

If I could pursue for a moment the questions of Senator Mondale 
and Senator Baker, first of all, would you again draw the distinction 
between counterintelligence and intelligence gathering? 

Mr. Angleton. In the ultimate, they are about the same thing. 
Counterintelligence is more or less all of the programs of which the 
distillate is counterespionage. In other words, the sum total of counter- 
intelligence activity includes dossiers, identification of individuals, 
travel control and a whole series of other dossier items. It forms the 
counterintelligence base. From that can be developed a product which 
is counterespionage, the dealing in confrontation with other intelli- 
gence services: as a rule, dealing with their aggressive aspects, 
whether it be subversion, whether it be espionage, and in certain 
instances in the world of double agents, dealing with their counter- 

Senator Morgan. Now, as Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff, 
how much of your work was involved in this country ? 

Mr. Angleton. Relatively little. 

Senator Morgan. "Was the mail cover part of it? 

Mr. Angleton. That is correct. 

Senator Morgan. And before the Huston plan, you were intercept- 
ing all mail going to Communist countries, photographing it, and 
intercepting all mail coming from Communist countries. 

Mr. Angleton. That is correct. But there was a limit as to the 
amount of mail which we opened and photographed. 

Senator Morgan. What limitations were placed on the amount of 

Mr. Angleton. It is where it was of no interest. 

Senator Morgan. How did you determine whether or not mail was 
of no interest if you 

Mr. Angleton. It was, as a matter of procedure, one of the cus- 
tomer agencies would indicate that it, having levied a requirement 
previously, would state that they no longer desired such coverage. 

Senator Morgan. Well, now, was it coverage of those who were 
on the watch list, or was it coverage of all mail going to and from 
Communist countries? 

Mr. Angleton. The basic thrust of the program was a watch list. 

Senator Morgan. Mr. Angleton, did you at that time consider the 
mail coverage indispensable to your job? 

Mr. Angleton. I believed it was one of the few resources, routine 
in nature, available to counterintelligence. 

Senator Morgan. Well, Senator Mondale asked you about your 
rationale behind opening the mail. How do you reconcile it with the 


rights of the individuals in this country under our Constitution ? How 
did you reconcile your action? 

Mr. Angleton. Well, Senator, I reconciled it in terms of the knowl- 
edge I had, and my colleagues had, regarding the nature of the threat. 

Senator Morgan. Well, assuming, Mr. Angleton, that you were 
justified in your actions, which I don't think you were, but assum- 
ing that, what is to prevent some other individual from deciding on 
his own that such activities are justified? And what is to prevent nim 
from carrying out such activities? 

Mr. Angleton. Senator, I don't want to quibble. But I will have 
to say the operation was in being 3 years before I entered 
the scene. It was not something of an individual initiative, it was 
a group of like-minded men who arrived at similar and the same 
conclusions that this was an indispensable means of collecting for- 
eign intelligence on the Soviets, who regard this country to be the 
main enemy, and, together with the Soviet bloc, coordinates their 
activities on their ideological basis. This is very persuasive to some- 
one who has given up 31 years of their life with certain very high 
ideals for this country. When I left the Army, as many of us did, I 
believed that we were in the dawn of a millenium. When I look at the 
map today and the weakness of power of this country, that is what 
shocks me. 

Senator Morgan. Mr. Angleton, the thing that shocks me is that 
these actions could be carried on contrary to the constitutional rights 
of the citizens of this country. Do you not believe that we can gather 
the necessary intelligence that we need for the protection and secu- 
rity of this country, and at the same time live within the Constitution ? 

Mr. Angleton. I am not a constitutional lawyer and I do not have 
at my fingertips those parts of the amendments which appear, on the 
surface, to give the President certain rights in wiretapping and elec- 
tronic surveillance. 

And if I understand it correctly, I do not believe there is too much 
of an extension to the next stage, which is the question of American 
and Soviet communications, or Soviet bloc communications. 

Senator Morgan. I would beg to differ on that, and on the analysis 
that you made, and also the one that Mr. Huston made. But for the 
purpose of the guidance of this committee, can you give us any sug- 

festion as to how the actions of that Central Intelligence Agency can 
e monitored in such a way as to protect the fundamental rights of 
the American citizens of this country? 
Mr. Angleton. You mean how it should be restructured ? 
Senator Morgan. Yes; earlier you suggested that maybe the Con- 
gress and the President should take some action. But the thing that 
bothers me, Mr. Angleton, is how can we act if we don't know the 
facts? And, if we do act, the intelligence agencies refuse to obey the 
guidelines and ordinances. In other words you were doing all of these 
things before the Huston plan was ever devised. You continued to do 
them after the President rejected the report. So, what assurancs do 
we have that an intelligence agency would follow any mandate of the 
Congress or the President ? And how can we prepare some mandates 
that would be followed ? That is what this committee is searching for. 
Mr. Angleton. I have nothing to contribute to that, sir, beyond 
what I have said already. 

62-685 O - 76 - 6 


Senator Morgan. In other words, you just don't think it can be 
done. You feel that an intelligence agency has to have unlimited 
rights to follow its own instincts in gathering intelligence? 

Mr. Angleton. No; I do not. 

Senator Morgan. What limitations would you place on it? 

Mr. Angleton. I think the mail-intercept program is probably one 
of the few exceptions that I could conceive of. 

Senator Morgan. But if the Agency will not obey the orders of the 
President, do you have any suggestions as to what we can do to assure 
obedience in the future? 

Mr. Angleton. Sir, I don't regard the submission to the President 
as being a black and white matter, because I don't know all of the 
facts surrounding that. But my reading of that language had a great 
deal to do with the question of gaps in the plan filled by the FBI in 
the question of domestically intercepting mail, rather than as we 
were doing excepting— directing it entirely to mail between the United 
States and Communist countries. And I do draw that distinction. In 
other words, our motive had nothing whatsoever to do with infringing, 
or I mean in harming, Americans. Our problem was to try to uncover 
foreign involvement in this country. 

Senator Morgan. Let me conclude by observing that I am concerned, 
from the testimony we have heard today, and also from the testimony 
we have heard in the past, about the fact that it seems from the testi- 
mony that many of these plans are devised and put into practice, and 
then at some later date, publicly, or for the record, the plans are re- 
jected. But, notwithstanding such rejection either by the President 
or some higher authority, all of the plans are carried out anyway. 
And it makes me wonder whether or not the rejection of such plans is 
for the purpose — as Senator Schweiker pointed out^-of plausible 
denial. Are they really rejections of the plans, or are they rejections 
for the purpose of the record ? If it is a real rejection, how can we 
secure compliance with it by the various agencies? 

Thank you, Mr. Angleton. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Morgan. 

I think just for purposes of clarifying the matter I ought to say that 
we have found the CIA files on mail that has been opened, and we are 
now in the process of investigating and preparing ourselves to look 
into this whole question of mail opening in a much more detailed way. 
At the beginning of this hearing this morning I mentioned such or- 
ganizations as the Ford Foundation, Harvard University, the Rocke- 
feller Foundation, and such individuals as Arthur Burns, Congress- 
woman Bella Abzug, Jay Rockefeller, President Nixon, Martin Luther 
King, and Senator Hubert Humphrey, Senator Edward Kennedy, and 
myself whose mail had been opened, and I would like to make it clear 
that these names were never on the watch list, so far as we can deter- 
mine. So that it is obvious that the opening of the mail was not re- 
stricted to any particular watch list, but may have gone very far afield, 

I am going to get that letter I wrote to my mother. I want to see 
what is in that letter that was of interest to the CIA. And I say this 
because the privacy of the mail has been one of the most honored 
practices in this country and it is protected by the statutes. The Su- 
preme Court of the United States passed on this very early in our 


history, back in 1877. I just would like to read a passage of what the 
Supreme Court said about the privacy of the mail and the rights of 
American citizens. It said : 

■ Letters and sealed packages of this kind in the .mail are as fully guarded from 
examination and inspection, except as to their outward form and weight, as if 
they were retained by the parties forwarding them in their own domiciles. 

The constitutional guaranty of the right of the people to be secure in their 
papers against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their papers, thus 
closed against inspection, wherever they may be. Whilst in the mail, they can 
only be opened and examined under like warrant * * " 

I think one of the real responsibilities of this committee is to make 
certain that in the future our intelligence agencies recognize that in the 
name of protecting freedom, they had better honor the Constitution 
and the laws, because that is what freedom is all about. 
Senator Mathias. 

Senator Mathias. Mr. Angleton, I suspect that there will be no wit- 
nesses coming before this committee who can be of more help to us than 
you in understanding the intelligence community as it developed after 
World War II, in understanding the kind of work that the intel- 
ligence community ought to be doing, and in helping us to see what 
needs to be done in the future. But in understanding exactly how you 
worked, I think we need to know some of the mundane, mechanical, 

For instance, when Mr. Helms was before the committee last week, 
we discussed the question of compartmentation, the fact that certain 
parts of the Central Intelligence Agency were totally compartmented 
from other parts, and I think it is important to understand exactly 
what that does to the execution of national policy. For example, if a 
project would come to you about which some question of legality is 
raised, was compartmentation such that you could not consult the 
General Counsel of the CIA for a ruling on its legality ? 

Mr. Angleton. I would say that the custom and usage was not to 
deal with the General Counsel as a rule until there were some troubles. 
He was not a part of the process of project approvals. 

Senator Mathias. There was no preventative practice ? 

Mr. Angleton. Not necessarily. 

Senator Mathias. So that on this question of opening mail, the ques- 
tion of whether it was legal or illegal never was discussed with the 
legal officials of the Agency ? 

Mr. Angleton. Not to my knowledge. 

Senator Mathias. What about relationships with law enforcement 
agencies outside the Central Intelligence Agency? For instance, in 
the Huston plan, Mr. Hoover appended a note to the recommenda- 
tions on mail opening in which he objected to it, and noted that it was 
illegal, and indicated that he was aware that other agencies might 
be doing it. Now, if a project of that sort were undertaken, was there 
any preclearance with an agency like the FBI, a law enforcement 
agency ? 

Mr. Angleton. As it related to this, of course, the Bureau was fully 
apprised after they were informed in 1958. The Bureau would be — 
we would coordinate any domestic activity, or even with the three 
areas with the FBI in advance. By the same token, they would coordi- 
nate with us in advance any overseas activity, and in this respect I 


was always a firm believer that when the Bureau developed certain in- 
telligence sources, they should have the operational control over 
those sources, regardless of geography, as long as there was coordina- 

Senator Mathias. You are going to lead me to my next question. 
But before I get to that, would the coordination with the FBI include 

Mr. Angleton. It would depend, sir, on the parameters of the op- 
eration. If their own interests were impinged upon, there would cer- 
tainly be coordinations in the community. 

Senator Mathias. Yes, but would your operator, who might be ap- 
prehended in the course of the operation, be understood to be immune 
from legal prosecution as a result of the coordination with the FBI ? 

Mr. Angleton. You mean for an illegal act in the United States? 

Senator Mathias. Yes. Was there any agreement that he would not 
be prosecuted, as would an ordinary citizen who was apprehended 
in the same act ? 

Mr. Angleton. Well, I must confess that until it was brought out in 
these hearings, I was unaware of the agreement between the Depart- 
ment of Justice and ourselves, even though I can well understand why 
there was such an agreement. But in the few cases I do know, I never 
saw the Agency ever interject itself on anything frivolous. In other 
words, it went to the heart of an operation or to the security of an 

Senator Mathias. In other words, you are saying that he took his 
lumps if he were apprehended in any legal difficulties? 

Mr. Angleton. If he had not been instructed by the agency, and he 
strayed, he obviously was, to my recollection — this was a subject mat- 
ter for the General Counsel to take up with the Department of Jus- 

Senator Mathias. And when the General Counsel took it up with 
the Department of Justice, would it be merely to provide representa- 
tion in a court of law, or would it be to make some arrangement by 
which immunity would be granted because of the nature of the duties 
he had been performing that resulted in the illegal act ? 

Mr. Angleton. I would assume that it would be — the purpose of this 
would be for our General Counsel to disgorge all relevant facts and 
all documents and papers, and present an Agency position, and that 
the argumentation for any special treatment would be supported by 
the facts. 

Senator Mathias. And I have been deducing from what you say 
that you made the best deal that you could at the time, under the cir- 

Mr. Angleton. Not entirely. I have known of — well, I won't go that 
far. But there have been cases which have involved, say, misuse of 
funds or whatnot, in which the Agency, as I recall, threw the party 
very much to the dogs. 

Senator Mathias. Right. But those were the cases where there was 
no relief. 

Mr. Angleton. Well, they were cases where a superior interest of 
the Government was not harmed. 

Senator Mathias. I think I understand what you are saying. Now, 
getting back to the question that you raised a minute ago, in which 


you said you thought that a source that you developed belonged to 
you, regardless of where it might happen to lodge geographically, 
it could be within the United States, could it not? 

Mr. Angleton. It could be, and I think that if I might pursue that 


Senator Mathias. Yes; I wish you would tell us how you distin- 
guish between CIA domestic activity that is prohibited by statute, and 
counterintelligence that may lead you into some domestic scene. 

Mr. Angleton. Well, I think there are many approaches to this. 
But I would-begin first with the agent-principal relationship. In other 
words, when we are dealing with agents, we are not dealing with pieces 
of merchandise. There are very tenuous psychological reaKnements be- 
tween a case officer and his agent, and therefore he is threatened even 
if you change case officers, let alone the question of jurisdiction. 

Now, assuming that an agent of ours comes to the United States, we 
are presented with a problem, therefore, of is he to be transferred to the 
jurisdiction of the FBI? The moment that the answer is yes, we are 
subjecting that individual to risk. Now, in the recruitment of that 
man, it is quite possible — and in more cases than one — that he has 
been given assurances that his identity is only known to a very limited 
number of people. And on occasions, his identity may only be known 
to the Director, so that this is a case-by -case matter. 

In other words, we are in a sense the contracting agents for the 
Government, and we do contract, and we do accept conditions of em- 
ployment. And to our way of thinking, we must abide by it. But in 
order not to jeopardize the domestic activities of the Bureau, and at 
the same time to give them the full benefits of the individual, there 
is a coordinating process with them as to this person. And I have 
never really known of many cases where there was not agreement. 
Senator Mathias. So that there was, in fact, a gray area ? 
Mr. Angleton. It is a gray area, but it is a gray area by virtue of 
the actuality of a principal-agent relationship, not because of jeal- 
ousies or internecine infighting. 

Senator Mathias. And there were clearly pragmatic solutions to 
the problems that arose in the gray area ? 
Mr. Angleton. Correct. 

Senator Mathias. One final question, Mr. Angleton. If we are to 
construct an intelligence community for the future, I think we have 
to understand what the nature of the problem is today. How would 
you assess the tensions that exist today between the United States and 
potential antagonists or enemies in the world, the kind of tensions 
that create the basic intelligence problem with which we have to cope ? 
Mr. Angleton. This would open up an extremely complicated chan- 
nel of discussion. 

Senator Mathias. I think it is important that we try to grapple with 
it, no matter how complicated it is. 

Mr. Angleton. If I may go off on a tangent for a moment, I have 
observed the hearings as printed in the press being conducted by 
Congressman Pike; and with the exception of the security leakage 
which was highlighted by a press interview and whatnot, I would say 
that he is probing the intelligence community in the most productive 
avenue of evaluation, and that is the question of estimates, as to 
whether the American public are receiving an adequate return for their 


investment. And I would suggest that if we are unable, in less sophisti- 
cated areas of the world, to arrive at accurate evaluation of the out- 
break of wars, you can then have some slide rule as to our ability to 
cover the Communist bloc, which is composed of 27 different intelli- 
gence and security organizations, which deploys hundreds of thousands 
of secret police, both by way of troops and where we have the major 
challenge in every aspect of the running of an agent : communications, 
the possibility of leakages; and I would also note that two agents of 
the Agency were most productive for a short time, but were discovered 
and executed. I call attention to the inquiry that is going there, because 
I have followed it with very, very great interest, because I think it is 
hitting the nerve of the problem, namely, are we getting the produc- 
tion, and are we having the proper estimates ? 

Now, relating this to the Soviet, our inf ormation 

Senator Mathias. I would just call your attention, I think, to the 
fact that the cost of intelligence, the cost of the product is not only 
money. It can be in risk, as was demonstrated by the Gary Powers U-2 
incident. It can be in damage to our own constitutional process, which 
is one of the elements of cost that I think we are trying to determine 

Mr. Angleton. I think that as far as the bloc is concerned, you have 
a unified approach to the United States as the main enemy. They are 
bound together by ideological ties. There has been a process of de- 
Stalinization which was concluded in 1959, which reconciled vast 
differences, and which in essence was a return to Leninism. There was 
enunciated the policy of the main enemy, and the main enemy was the 
United States. And all agents working in bloc countries who priorly 
had been working on small members of NATO were redirected against 
the main target. 

Recently in the newspaper, there was the announcement of the defec- 
tion of a Romanian intelligence officer in Oslo, and there has been a 
major flap. And one can ask oneself the question that if Romania is so 
independent of Moscow and moving away from it, why is it that their 
intelligence service, which is most effective of their Central Committee, 
is working hand in glove with the Soviets ? 

Now, this is not speculation. These are facts. There have been agents 
captured playing out these roles who are now in jail, and it has shown 
total cohesiveness within the bloc in terms of strategic questionnaires 
of no possible use to Romania. Romania, however, has received most- 
favored-nation treatment, and it also received the visit recently of the 
President, not too far distant from the arrest in Oslo of the intelligence 

So I come back again to the nature of this threat. The nature of the 
threat rests within some thousands of pages of interrogation of very- 
high-level Soviet and bloc intelligence officers who were, in turn, very 
close in their activities to the political guidance of the Central Com- 
mittees. And this cohesiveness dates from the period of 1959, when the 
intelligence services were changed from being the protectors or the 
preservers of the cult of personality of Stalin, and reverted back again 
to the days of Duchinsky and the revolution and Lenin, where every 
intelligence operation has a political objective. 

And it ties together with the entire philosophy — and I do not base 
this on reading information available at the corner drugstore; this 


comes from the interrogation of individuals who were in the system 
and had positions of high responsibilty in intelligence— and the 
underpinning of those regimes are their intelligence and security 

So, in conclusion, I would suggest that some day — and I know that 
I have proposed many things here which will never see the light of 
day— that the nature of the threat be diagnosed with a view that this 
country, having taken stock of those problems, and being faced, as I 
think Dr. Schlesinger has eloquently put it, with the possible change 
of the balance of military power ; and I hope and I believe that some 
of his speeches on these matters were gained by him — the views — 
during his short tenure as the Director of Central Intelligence, where 
he was an avid reader of the secret information that I refer to. 

The Chairman. The committee's concern in this investigation is the 
nature of the threat, to be sure. And an efficient intelligence organiza- 
tion is needed for this country ; that is not the issue here. What is at 
issue here is running it in such a way that we don't slowly become the 
kind of police state you have described. 

Mr. Angleton. I understand, Mr. Chairman. I was only responding 
to Senator Mathias. — 

The Chairman. Yes. But I just wanted to emphasize that our con- 
cern is that this country should never slide down that slippery slope 
that finally ends us up with the kind of police state you have described, 
and that is the whole reason that this investigation has been under- 
taken. Now, Senator Hart. 

Senator Hart of Colorado. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Angleton, much of the justification for domestic intelligence 
and surveillance during the sixties and early seventies was based upon 
foreign contacts. I would like to quote, first of all, a letter from Mr. 
Helms to Mr. Hoover, dated March 20, 1970—1 think at the dawn of 
the Huston era [exhibit 50 *]. 

On page 5, paragraph 8, entitled "New Left and Eacial Matters," 
Mr. Helms says, "There is already a substantial exchange of informa- 
tion in this field," and then skipping a sentence, he says, "The increas- 
ingly close connection between these forces in the United States," pres- 
sumably meaning the new left and racial groups, "and hostile ele- 
ments abroad has been well established by both of our agencies." 

Now, Mr. Angleton, in your deposition before this committee, you 
said as follows : "Within the Agency itself, there were those who took 
a very staunch stand that there was no foreign involvement." And 
then, skipping a line, "And these were fairly senior individuals, main- 
ly on the overt side of the business. This attitude was very definitely 
that there was nothing to it ; namely, foreign contact." 

Are we to believe your deposition before this committee, or Mr. 
Helm's letter to Director Hoover in March of 1970, as to the extent of 
foreign involvement in domestic groups? 

Mr. Angleton. It is not inconceivable — I mean, I cannot reconstruct 
this paragraph and put it in the time-frame that you have posed it. 
But it is not inconceivable that Mr. Helms did have disagreements 
with those senior people on the overt side, or that he had access to the 
content of mail intercept which would, of course, not be in their pos- 
session. I mean, that is one explanation. 

1 See p. 349. 


Senator Hart of Colorado. His letter leaves almost no avenue open 
for question as to the degree of contact. He said, "has been well 
established." Mr. Angleton, let me rephrase the question. Was it 
or was it not well established in the spring of 1970, that domestic 
groups, described as the new left and racial groups, had substantial 
foreign contact? 

Mr. Angleton, There were a number of people from these groups 
who traveledto Moscow and to North Korea, and traveled abroad. 

Senator Hart of Colorado. And they had contact with "hostile 

Mr. Angleton. It is my understanding, not having reviewed the 
mail intercepts, that it involved exhortations to violence, that it 
involved sending letters from the United States to Soviet institutions, 
inviting them to support the group in the United States by destroy- 
ing U.S. property in Moscow and in other countries, and keeping them 
advised of their own plans and actions. It's also come out in mail in- 
tercept that certain groups went to Moscow for political indoctrina- 
tion, and they went to North Korea for weaponry. 

Senator Hart of Colorado. Then how could senior officials in the 
CIA conclude that there was absolutely no foreign involvement ? 

Mr. Angleton. Well, I mean, there are many who believed that the 
foreign involvement matter was immaterial to the 

Senator Hart of Colorado. That is not what your deposition said. 

Mr. Angleton. Well, I thought my deposition stated that there were 
senior officials in the Agency who would not buy it. 

Senator Hart of Colorado. They didn't say it was insubstantial; 
they said it didn't exist. "There was no foreign involvement." The 
attitude is very definitely that there was nothing to it. 

Mr. Angleton. I think it could be qualified as stating that the coun- 
terintelligence data which they received — and I don't know what they 
received — did not strike them as sufficient to go on this investigation 
of leftwing groups in this country. In other words, they were opposed 
to it. 

Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. Angleton, the record before us 
strongly suggests that there was not only one Huston plan, but there 
may have been several operating almost simultaneously. I refer to your 
deposition before the committee in which you say, "What I'm trying 
to explain is that people are reading a lot into the Huston plan and, 
at the same time, are unaware that on several levels in a community 
identical" — I suppose you mean in the community — "identical bilat- 
eral discussions were going on." That is, between yourselves and the 
FBI. In other words, the Huston plan did not affect one way or the 
other the normal flow of business. 

I also refer to 

Mr. Angleton. I don't think there was any — I'm afraid I don't have 
the time sequence here. What is the question, sir ? 

Senator Hart of Colorado. Let me complete my question. 

In addition to that testimony which you have already given, I refer 
to an April 12, 1971 memorandum for the files from Director Hoover 
[exhibit 31 x ]. 

1 See p. 272. 


He says, and I quote : 

This meeting had been requested by Mr. Helms and was for the purpose of 
discussing a broadening of operations, particularly of the very confidential type 
in covering intelligence, both domestic and foreign. There was some discussion 
upon the part of Mr. Helms of further coverage of mail. 

Then I also refer to the Helms letter that I quoted in the previous 
question that was a March 1970 letter. 

What all of this suggests, Mr. Angleton— and I think the committee 
would be interested in whether the facts support thatr— that not only 
was the so-called Huston group the inter-agency task force operating 
on the question of what restraints should be lifted, but, in fact, there 
were constant contacts going on, formally and informally, between the 
CIA, the FBI, NSA and perhaps other agencies about similar ongoing 
domestic intelligence programs. Is it safe for us to conclude that not 
only are we dealing with one Huston plan, but in fact, less formally, 
with perhaps several ? 

Mr. Angleton. Since the creation of the Agency, there has been 
constant discussion of operations and improvement of collection, so 
there is nothing unusual in this happening at this time, the fact that 
this, from 1947 on, was still taking place. 

Senator Hart of Colorado. Was it possible Mr. Huston was ]ust 
being duped by the Agency into thinking that the White House was 
aware of what was going on, when, in fact, the agencies were having 
discussions of their own behind the back of the White House officials 
as to what should be done about domestic surveillance ? 

Mr. Angleton. Well I think that answer could only be had if Mr. 
Huston had been asked to explain in great detail, chronologically, his 
contacts with the FBI and the subjects of discussion. I do not believe 
that he could have met with Mr. Sullivan, and not have been exposed 
to all of these matters of operations a year prior to the Huston plan. 

I know Mr. Sullivan very well, and he doesn't usually waste his time. 

Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. Huston has testified under oath, and 
therefore subjected himself to perjury charges, that he didn't 

Mr. Angleton. I'm not suggesting that the actual language he used 
could not be also interpreted to remove any taint of perjury. I am 
simply stating that I have known for a long time that he was very 
close to Mr. Sullivan, and I do know what Mr. Sullivan's concerns 
were in terms of gaps within the community. And simply because there 
was a Huston plan, there were a number of ongoing bilateral discus- 
sions every day with other elements within the intelligence community, 
which may or may not have duplicated the broad, general plan that 
Huston brought about. 

Senator Hart of Colorado. One final question. 

Mr. Angleton, are you familiar with the name Thomas Riha, 

Mr. Angleton. I am, indeed. 

Senator Hart of Colorado. And you are aware of the fact that the 
so-called Thomas Riha cnse nlayed a key role in the breach of liaison 
between the CIA and the FBI ? 

Mr. Angleton. I am. 

Senator Hart of Colorado. Do you have any information for this 
committee as to what happened to Prof. Thomas Riha? 


Mr. Angleton. What has happened to the subject ? 

Senator Hart of Colorado. He has disappeared. 

Mr. Angleton. I haven't heard anything. I have not actually in- 
quired, but I have no knowledge. I think I heard speculation at one 
time, but it was back, more or less, in the res gestae .of this trouble, 
that he was in Czechoslovakia, but I do not know. 

Senator Hart of Colorado. In your previous deposition you stated 
that the counterintelligence information was only as good as relations 
between the FBI and the CIA. That is a paraphrase of what you 
said. And since there was a termination of relationships between Mr. 
Hoover, the FBI and the CIA in the spring of 1970 over the Riha case, 
I think the committee might look into this termination with some de- 
gree of intensity. That is all, Mr. Chairman. . 

Mr. Angleton. I would like to suggest, Senator, that it was much 
deeper than that. It was a cutting off of all liaison within the intelli- 
gence community with the exception of the White House. 

Senator Hart of Colorado. Over this one case ? 

Mr. Angleton. Over this one case. 

Gnce having established the principle with us, then it was simply 
a matter of a short period of time when the liaison office itself was 
done away within the Bureau. 

Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. Chairman, I have a matter of com- 
mittee business that I will take up at the appropriate time. 

Thank you. 

The Chairman. What is the matter you want to bring up ? 

Senator Hart of Colorado. It has to do with an additional witness 
before this committee on this subject. But if there are further ques- 
tions, you may want to go to those first. I don't know. 

The Chairman. Very well. If there are further questions let us 
take them first. Senator Tower ? 

Senator Tower. Mr. Angleton, was the mail intercept both for intel- 
ligence and counterintelligence purposes ? 

Mr. Angleton. Yes, sir. 

Senator Tower. Was there a feeling that the Soviets relied on a lack 
of authorization from the Government to open mail, and therefore, 
widely used the mail system ? 

Mr. Angleton. My assumption is that much of the mail and the con- 
tent of the mail would not have come to us if they had been aware of the 

Senator Tower. Now returning to the comment at page 29 of the 
Huston plan [exhibit 1 1 ], the report noted that "covert coverage had 
been discontinued due to publicity arising from congressional hear- 
ings on privacy." You have testified that you believe this referred 
to FBI mail openings. Is that correct? 

Mr. Angleton. I say that it is my impression that the thrust of that 
related directly to the Bureau's having abandoned the mail-intercept 
program domestically. 

Senator Tower. Is it your belief that disclosure of the CIA's contin- 
uing intercept to a working group, including representatives of other 
agencies, might lead the Soviets and others to discontinue use of the 
mails, and thus, deprive the United States of an important source of 
intelligence ? 

1 See p. 141. 


Mr. Angleton. I'm sorry, I don't quite get the thrust of this 

Senator Tower. Well, in other words, did you continue to do this 
and did not let anyone else know that the Agency was intercepting 
mail because you felt that the Soviets might get wind of it and, there- 
fore, discontinue the use of the mails, thereby denying us an important 
intelligence source? 

Mr. Angleton. I would say that does represent my analysis of the 
situation because I am quite confident — for example, we had in the 
Weathermen case, Cathy Boudin, who, in Greenwich Village, was 
a part of the Weathermen group building bombs. The bombs went up, 
and she and another person, a woman, fled from the house, and she was 
identified as one of the people fleeing from the house. And those were 
the facts — the only facts — in possession of the FBI dealing with a 
bomb-making house in Greenwich Village. 

Now, when we went back and continued — or went back into our mail- 
intercept program, we found that she had written from Moscow some 
30 to 40 letters to people in the United States, and these were the only 
leads that the FBI had that were in any way important. And to this 
day she is a fugitive from justice. It would raise in anyone's counter- 
intelligence mind as to whether she is in Moscow, but she is an active 
fugitive from justice. 

Senator Tower. During working group sessions, did anyone, at any 
time, ask you whether the CIA was conducting covert mail coverage ? 

Mr. Angleton. I don't recall, myself. I mean, I don't recall that and 
I don't recall details on how we arranged with the Bureau — or the ver- 
biage in that report — in a way that would hide our use of the mails. 

Senator Tower. Did you at any time receive instructions, or attempt 
on your own initiative, to mislead the President on the issue of covert 
mail coverage conducted by the CIA ? 

Mr. Angleton. It is very difficult for me to respond to that because 
I do not have the facts as to the — as to what we were going to do re- 
garding this question of including within the Huston project the fact 
that the FBI were recipients of our mail coverage. 

I find it, therefore, very difficult to know how to reply to your ques- 
tion. I do know — and I think that this was my conviction at all times — 
that if there was ever an audience with the President of the United 
States to go over internal security in this counterespionage matter, 
there would never be anything withheld from him. 

Senator Tower. So you were never ordered to, nor did you ever on 
your own, attempt to mislead the President in this matter? 

Mr. Angleton. I did not. 

Senator Tower. Thank you. 

The Chairman. Senator Mondale ? 

Senator Mondale. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Angleton, would 
it be fair to say that starting, say, in 1967, with the rise in antiwar 
protests, that the CIA, the FBI and the other intelligence agencies 
were placed under tremendous pressure by the White House to investi- 
gate and determine the source of these protests ? 

Mr. Angleton. That is correct. 

Senator Mondale. So that while we ask questions about what you did 
in your department, it has to be placed in the context of what you re- 
ferred to earlier as the mood and the temper and the fear of the times. 


Mr. Angleton. That is correct. 

Senator Mondale. I think that has to be understood, because I think 
it is quite obvious that the Presidents — starting with Mr. Johnson in 
the beginning of the high rise in protests — tended to interpret those 
protests as being foreign-inspired. I don't have all of the documents 
with me by any means, out here is the memorandum from Mr. Huston 
to the President on June 20, 1969 [exhibit 6 *], stating — this is to the 
Director of the FBI, but he quotes the President : 

The President has directed that a report on foreign Communist support of rev- 
olutionary protest movements in this country be prepared for his study. . . . 
"Support" should be liberally construed to include all activities by foreign Com- 
munists designed to encourage or assist revolutionary protests. . . . 

And then I have a document here [exhibit 7 2 ] which we have just 
obtained from President Nixon's files, entitled "Presidential Talking^ 
Papers," on June 5, 1970 [exhibit 63 3 ], and this is the description or 
what he apparently told Mr. Hoover, Helms, General Bennett and 
Admiral Gayler. 

He said — 

We are now confronted with a new and grave crisis in our country, one which 
we know too little about. Certainly hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Americans, 
mostly under 30, are determined to destroy our society. They find in many of the 
legitimate grievances of our citizenry opportunities for exploitation which never 
escape the attention of demagogues. They are reaching out for the support- 
ideological and otherwise — of foreign powers, and they are developing their 
own brand of indigenous revolutionary activism which is as dangerous as any- 
thing which they could import from Cuba, China or the Soviet Union. 

And then, among other things, he says, or his talking papers indi- 
cates he planned to say — 

Third, our people, perhaps as a reaction to the excesses of the McCarthy era, 
are unwilling to admit the possibility that their children could wish to destroy 
their country, and this is particularly true of the media and the academic 

In other words, this is a reflection of the President's attitude that 
there was a possibility that thousands of American youths desired to 
destroy this country. 

Do you have any doubt that that is the motivation of Presidential 
orders and the temper of orders during that time ? 

Mr. Angleton. None whatsoever. 

Senator Mondale. If that is their view, namely, that the American 
people increasingly — including the media and the parents — could not 
be trusted to perceive this threat, isn't a series of agencies, uncon- 
trolled by the law, reaching out to apprehend a threat which they 
perceived to threaten the very survival of democracy, an exceedingly 
dangerous tool indeed? 

Mr. Angleton. Would you repeat the first part of that question ? 

Senator Mondale. If I were a President, and I believed there were 
thousands of American youths wishing to destroy American society, 
and the parents couldn't see what the kids were up to, and the media 
wouldn't understand what they were up to, wouldn't I likely proceed 
to use agencies such as the CIA to move in most exaggerated and inten- 
sive ways to try and meet this threat ? 

1 See p. 204. 
3 See p. 205. 
» See p. 396. 


Mr. Angleton. I think that is correct, and that is the reason why 
earlier I referred to the strong statement made by Mr. Huston to us 
that we were not complying with the President's request. 

I do not have a record of those first meetings as to anyone raising 
problems or political differences, but I know there was — the question 
of political implications was raised and discussed and they were 
knocked down by him. 

Senator Mondale. Yes. Because I think while we probe, as we should, 
in hard and intensive ways, with persons such as yourself who have 
worked in these agencies, the truth of it is that this problem began in 
the White House with the concern on the part of the President that 
these protests came not from legitimate concerns of Americans against 
the war, but probably were inspired by foreign support and leader- 
ship. Their protests were considered to be compromised and corrupted 
expressions, rather than the good faith protests of Americans concerned 
about that war. I think that attitude shows how dangerous it is to have 
agencies which themselves do not feel that they are bound by the re- 
strictions of the law. That attitude, that fear, that distrust of the 
American people, coupled with agencies which feel they are not re- 
strained by the law, I think is a road map to disaster. 

Mr. Angleton. Senator, I would like to make just one comment. I 
believe that the depths of the President's feelings were, in part, justified 
because of the ignorance, so to speak, in the West regarding these 
matters. In other words, the quality of intelligence going to him he 
found totally unsatisfactory. 

Senator Mondale. That's right. Because it did not square with his 
paranoia that the American people were trying to destroy the country, 
and in fact, there was never any evidence of any significance that that 
paranoia was justified. That is what, I think, has been the traditional 
dispute in maintaining a democracy — whether you restrain power lest 
it be turned on the people, or whether you restrain power because you 
trust the people in the long run as the primary salvation of society. 

I think this document, expressing as it does enormous, unrestricted 
paranoic fear about the American people, is an excellent expression of 
why we have to have laws that restrain the action of the President. 
Because, really, you were an agent of the President in all of these 

Mr. Angleton. Mr. Senator, I do believe that it is difficult to judge 
the President on the basis of that document. I am certain that anyone 
who has his responsibilities, and was receiving in-depth, around the 
clock reports from all over the United States, of bombings and civil un- 
rest and murders — and I can go all the way down the long, grizzly 

Senator Mondale. Oh, yes. But- 

Mr. Angleton. You can induce that, but it was not, in my view, 

Senator Mondale. Do you think the possibility that there were 
thousands of American children under 30 determined to destroy our 
society is not paranoia ? 

Mr. Angleton. I will not take that out of context. The overall pur- 
pose of that talking paper was to address it to intelligence collectors, 
the heads of agencies. And it was to give them a hot foot of getting 
down to business and supplying facts. And those facts were very dim- 


cult to come by. Outside of the mail-intercept program, there was very 
little hard, incontrovertible evidence. There was nothing known re- 
garding Cleaver's operations, his stay in Algiers, his dealing with 
Soviet bloc countries, his going to North Korea, and other activities of 
this sort. And these were hard facts. 

Senator Mondale. But as an old law enforcement officer, Mr. Angle- 
ton, I can tell you there are ways of going after those people based on 
probable suspicions entirely consistent with the laws and the Constitu- 
tion, without undertaking efforts of the kind that were recommended 
here that were shotgun, unrestrained and unconcerned with the Con- 
stitution. We have ways of taking care of people who resort to violence 
in this country, and this way is not one of those permitted by the 

There is one other problem that bothers me, and that is this : what 
was really the problem in 1967, until the end of that war ? Was it that 
Americans were bad people and therefore had to be spied on, or was 
it that we had a bad war that needed to be stopped ? What I think 
this reflects is, instead of Presidents asking themselves, "is there some- 
thing wrong with this war that is creating these protests?" Instead of 
that, they said, "there is something wrong with the protestors. They 
are getting foreign money, foreign directions, foreign spies, and there- 
fore what we need is more counterintelligence." That may have delayed 
the day when Presidents realized the need to change and end that war. 

The Chairman. I might just say, Senator, I think your point is 
well taken and we might just remind ourselves of the constitutional 
duty of the President. It is not just to perceive threats and then think 
up ways to deal with them outside of the law. The constitutional duty 
of the President is that he shall take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed. And when he takes his oath of office as President of the 
United States, he takes the following oath : "I do solemnly swear that 
I will faithfully execute the office of President of the United States 
and will, to the best of my ability, preserve, protect and defend the 
Constitution of the United States." Those are his duties. 

Mr. Angleton. Yes ; I understand. 

The Chairman. And when Mr. Nixon approved the Huston plan, 
he forgot those duties. And when Mr. Mitchell, the Attorney General 
of the United States, was informed of the illegal opening of the mail 
a year later, as the chief law enforcement officer of the United States, 
he forgot those duties, too. Are there further questions ? 

Senator Mathias ? 

Senator Mathias. Mr. Angleton, I think you raised a very im- 
portant and useful question when you pointed to the issue of measur- 
ing the value of the intelligence you received against the cost of 
producing it, and I have always felt, from the inception of this study, 
that that would have to be one of the major elements of our considera- 
tion. I would suggest, as I did a few minutes ago, that that cost has to 
be measured in more than just dollars. It has to be measured in the 
financial cost — what it costs the taxpayers — it has to be measured in 
the kind of risks that it exposes the United States to, risks of various 
kinds. It may be loss of personnel, loss of equipment, loss of face, loss 
of prestige, various kinds of risks ; ultimately, the risk of war. And 
finally, of course, it involves the third element which you have just been 
discussing with Senator Mondale, the question of the cost in terms of 
erosion of the constitutional process. 

But for our purposes today I am wondering if you could tell us 
how you, in your career, went about assessing the cost of intelligence 
that you felt might be procured in terms of risk to the United States. 
How would you make that delicate balance between what you wanted 
to know and thought would be useful for this Government to know, 
against what we might lose in the process of getting it ? 

Mr. Angleton. Well, sir, I think those of us who were in the war 
had the advantage of having been backstopped by thousands of troops 
in the event of error. And I might add that that is a testing ground 
that younger people in intelligence have not had. In other words, when 
they embark on operations, they are apt to not have the period of trial 
and error. I would say that all of the officers I have known in my ex- 
perience in the Central Intelligence Agency, particularly in Counter- 
intelligence, have a very acute sense of making this judgment factor. 

That is, we have handled so many cases that it builds up sort of a 
body of expertise in its own right as to how much you will risk to go 
after certain targets. 

Naturally, the highest quality of intelligence that exists is in the 
field of radio signals and related matters. And then it goes in descend- 
ing order of documents and to individuals who have had great access, 
or access. Now, all of these matters have to be brought to bear on what 
the expectancy will be, what one expects from the operation. 

When the risks get very great, without exception that is taken to the 
Director. And then, if he has to seek outside guidance or consultation, 
he does so. And Mr. McCone was a great stickler for being brought in 
when anything reached a Cabinet-level decision. 

Senator Mathias. Now, when we talk about a risk being very great, 
are we talking about the chance of losing an airplane and a pilot, or 
are we talking about the chance of involving this country, in a serious 
way, with another government ? I'm trying to get some scale of values 
that would be considered. 

Mr. Angleton. Obviously, anything that sets back the prestige of 
this country is almost controlling in terms of the Director's final deci- 
sion. I mean, if the risk is one that is going to undermine the prestige 
of the United States, I don't know of any Director who would not 
take that up with Dr. Kissinger, or with the National Security Coun- 
cil, or the Forty Committee, or with the President. 

But I think there is great responsibility within the Agency. I mean, 
I make no excuses regarding going ahead on the matters of illegal 
mail coverage, but that is a very small part of our activity, and I am 
not excusing it. 

Senator Mathias. Going back into history, to pick up another ex- 
ample in which this kind of evaluation of what you might learn as 
against what you might risk is involved, do you know how that was 
weighed in the Gary Powers U-2 flight ? 

Mr. Angleton. It is purely hearsay. It is simply that a decision was 
made by the President. 

Senator Mathias. We are not bound by the hearsay rules here. 

Mr. Angleton. Well, I at least would like to so label it. But it is my 
understanding — and I know Mr. Dulles quite well in this regard, be- 
cause later on it was my man who handled Gary Powers as to his 
debriefing — and what happened, it is my understanding that the ques- 
tion of the U-2 flights — and I may be wrong on this — were cleared 
with the President in terms of his own activities — in this case, his 


travels to Paris to meet Khrushchev. And I would say the history of 
the Agency is sprinkled with cases which have gone forward and 
which have been canceled or changed because of some overriding 
political factor. 

Senator Mathias. So it is your considered judgment that the ques- 
tion of the exposure of an important national interest is consistently 
weighed when a project is undertaken? 

Mr. Angleton. Yes ; but I would like to draw attention to the recom- 
mendation of the Eockefeller Commission, of which I happen to be 
much in favor. And that is that there be two Deputy Directors who 
would be approved by the Congress, one military and one civilian. 
And I would say there is very much need to have accessible a Director 
who can take the time to go into the nuts and bolts, because his ab- 
sence means that there will be this slippage. And I think there is more 
than enough business for two Deputy Directors to be fully occupied. 

Senator Mathias. Deputies who can measure this element of cost 

Mr. Angleton. But who are looking into the Agency. Not being in 
the Agency looking out into the community. And there is a very 
proper role for the overall DCI. But I think Mr. Colby would be the 
first to- admit that the burdens which he has had since he assumed 
the directorship — that he has been able to give a very small percentage 
of his time to the actual workings of the Agency. 

The Chairman. Senator Hart ? 

Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. Chairman, the so-called Huston 
plan has been called one of the most dangerous documents in the 
history of this Republic. Mr. Huston testified that the President did 
not know that questionable surveillance techniques were being used 
prior to the development of this plan, that he thought when the order 
was given to terminate them, that they were terminated. There is 
other testimony and evidence about what the President knew or did 
not know. As I think all of us have tried to indicate to the 
people of this country, the principal part of our concern is the ques- 
tion of command and control. Who is in charge? Who gives what 
orders ? Are they carried out ? And if they are not carried out, why 

I think it comes down, in this case, to a phrase that one of our dis- 
tinguished members used in another context with regard to the same 
President. What did he know, and when did he know it? I have felt 
since the beginning, as a member of this committee, that we stand in 
constant danger of repeating a kind of perennial Government pattern 
that when something goes wrong, or when there are governmental 
abuses, the politicians and elected officials take it out on the ap- 
pointed people, the career people, in yarious departments or agencies. 
And I think we, particularly, stand in constant danger of doing that 
in this case, and in other cases that we will be looking at. 

I frankly don't find it very tasteful, and I don't think the Ameri- 
can people will. If all we accomplish is public and private thrashing 
of people like Mr. Angleton and Mr. Huston and others, whether they 
deserve it or not, that is not our particular function. 

I think the question comes down to : Who was giving what orders ? 
What people at the highest levels of government, particularly the 
elected officials, knew or did not know about this plan and other activi- 


ties? Were the causes shared equally among, or in part, by elected 
officials with appointed officials ? 

Consequently, Mr. Chairman, although I do not intend at this point 
to seek its immediate consideration, I would move to ask this com- 
mittee to consider using all methods within its authority and control to 
seek the presence of former President Nixon before this committee. 

The Chairman. I think the point is well taken, and I personally con- 
cur in the Senator's views. I think that in the Huston plan, Mr. Nixon 
was the central figure. We can get and are getting testimony as to what 
he appeared to have known, and the representations that were made to 
him, and what he appeared to authorize and then revoke. But he is the 
best witness as to what his intentions were, and he is the ultimate wit- 
ness as to what he was told and what he was not told, and for that 
reason I concur fully in the Senator's view. 

Senator Tower. Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Yes, Senator Tower. 

Senator Tower. I think this is a matter that should be taken up in 
a closed business session of the committee so it can be fully discussed 
in that context as not to engage in a discussion of it here or a resolu- 
tion of the matter here. 

The Chairman. Well, the matter has been raised. As I understood 
Senator Hart to say he is not going to press for an immediate vote. 
Senator, have you made a motion ? 

Senator Hart of Colorado. The motion is made, and I do not intend 
to press it in this session. 

The Chairman. At this time. 

Is there any further discussion that members would like to 

Senator Mathias. Well, Mr. Chairman, I can only say that I per- 
sonally asked Mr. Nixon about the Huston plan, and I hope the com- 
mittee has more luck than I have had as an individual in getting any 
information on it. 

The Chairman. Well, we have also asked for other information, and 
we have had to subpena some of it, as the Senator knows. I think that 
we will just have to find out if the former President is willing to come 
and tell us about this and his part in it, what he knew about it. 

Senator Mathias. I do think this, Mr. Chairman, if you would yield. 

The Chairman. And ultimately, of course, we have the question of 
a subpena in the event that he declines to do so. 

Senator Tower. Mr. Chairman, I do not think we should discuss that 
here and raise publicly the threat of a subpena because I think the 
matter can be resolved privately and should be. If we get into the busi- 
ness of a subpena, we are looking at a long court battle that could go 
on well beyond the life of this committee as authorized by the Congress. 
There are ways to do things and ways not to, and I think we ought to 
explore every means short of that before we even suggest that we con- 
sider a subpena. 

The Chairman. Well, I think that the Senator is not going to press 
his motion at this time, and I feel we should take it uo more fully 
and consider the proper step to take, and that then the committee 
should make its decision, and that decision will be announced pub- 
licly as soon as it is made. Is that agreeable to the committee? 

62-685 O - 76 - 7 


Senator Mathias I would just make this comment, that this of^ 
course is not the first time that the question of Mr. Nixon's testimony 
has been raised in this committee. We have talked about it on several 
occasions, and I think it was Marlowe who said, "But at my back I 
always hear Time's winged chariot hovering near." Now, this com- 
mittee has got to someday make a report. Time is moving very rapidly, 
and I would suggest to the Chair that we schedule the appropriate 
amount of time to discuss this subject and then make a decision one 
way or the other. 

The Chairman. Very well, that will be done, if there is no further 
objection. That is the decision of the Chair. As soon as the committee 
has reached its decision, an appropriate announcement will be made. 
If there are no further questions 

Senator Huddleston. Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Oh, Senator Huddleston, do you have a further 

Senator Huddleston. May I ask one further question that I did 
not get to during my allotted time ? 

Mr. Angleton, the Huston plan was an operative policy of the 
White House for some 5 days. 

Mr. Angleton. Yes, 5 days. 

Senator Huddleston. During that time were there any internal 
instructions or memoranda or direction given within the ClA relat- 
ing to implementing that plan ? 

Mr. Angleton. None to my knowledge. 

Senator Huddleston. None to your knowledge. After the Presi- 
dent rescinded his authorization, following that time were there any 
internal memoranda involving instructions or directions within the 

Mr. Angleton. No. 

Senator Huddleston. So it is accurate to say that the Huston plan 
presumably could have been implemented by the CIA without any 
further directions in addition to what they were already doing, and 
that there were in fact no directions canceling any effort that might 
have been started relative to that plan? It is almost as if the status 
quo were maintained from the beginning to the end, before and after 
without any actions being taken. 

Mr. Angleton. With one exception, Senator, and that is that the 
plan marched up the hill and then it marched back again, and this 
was one of the few times that any programs involving counterintel- 
ligence, interagency counterintelligence, were ever read by a President. 

Senator Huddleston. That was the plan itself. 

Mr. Angleton. The plan itself, but it had its own 

Senator Huddleston. The paper went up the hill and back. 

Mr. Angleton. It had certain impact. 

Senator Huddleston. The paper went up the hill and back, but the 
plan, the activities related in that plan, in fact, did continue. 

Mr. Angleton. I do not think all the activity continued. I think 
there were a number of activities of the Bureau that fitted within the 
jurisdiction of the Bureau that were not rezoned. 

Senator Huddleston. But there were mail openings. 

Mr. Angleton. The mail openings were within the Agency. 

Senator Huddleston. Wiretaps, surreptitious entries. 


Mr. Angleton. I do not think there were any surreptitious entries, 
but I am giving an unqualified answer. But I understand your point, 

Senator Htjddleston. But I think the evidence indicates there were. 
But that is all, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Yes, it is almost as though from the state of evi- 
dence to date that the President were really an irrelevancy. 

Tomorrow, we will meet again at 10 o'clock, and our witness tomor- 
row is Mr. Charles Brennan of the FBI. 

Thank you, Mr. Angleton, for your testimony. 

Mr. Angleton. Thank you, Senator. 

[Whereupon, at 1 :05 p.m., the select committee was adjourned, to 
reconvene at 10 a.m., Thursday, September 25, 1975.] 


U.S. 'Senate, 
Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations 

With Respect to Intelligence Activities, 

Washington, D.O. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 :05 a.m., in room 318, 
Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Frank Church (chairman) 

Present: Senators Church, Tower, Mondale, Huddleston, Morgan, 
Hart (Colorado) , Baker, Gold water, Mathias, and Schweiker. 

Also present: William G. Miller, staff director; Frederick A. O. 
Schwarz, Jr., chief counsel; and Curtis R. Smothers, counsel to the 

The Chairman. The hearing will please come to order. 

At the close of yesterday's hearing, Senator Hart of Colorado 
moved that former President Nixon be called as a witness in connec- 
tion with the committee's investigation of the Huston plan. That 
motion was considered in executive session of the committee yesterday 
afternoon and it was decided by the committee that Mr. Nixon was 
indeed a central witness of great importance in the matter of the 
Huston plan, but that there were also other subjects that the committee 
is now investigating, with respect to which the former President's 
testimony would be equally important. And so the committee decided 
that we should endeavor to secure Mr. Nixon's testimony with respect 
to all of the work of the committee where that testimony would be 
critical. And the counsels for the committee, Mr. Schwarz and Mr. 
Smothers, were instructed to open negotiations with Mr. Nixon's at- 
torney looking toward the arrangement that would enable the com- 
mittee to secure this testimony. 

Have you anything to add to that, Senator Tower? 

•Senator Tower. I think that about sums it up, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. This morning, we continue our examination of the 
Huston plan and the events that led up to it and the continuing opera- 
tions of the intelligence agencies, following Mr. Nixon's revocation of 
the plan itself. And our witness this morning is a representative of 
the FBI, Mr. Charles Brennan. 

Before I swear the witness, I might say that last summer I made the 
remark that there was considerable evidence that the CIA had been 
behaving like a rogue elephant on a rampage. That remark was chal- 
lenged. But I think that as we close this second week of public hearings, 
the evidence certainly bears out the fact that the CIA failed, in the case 
of the poisons, which we examined last week, to carry out the orders of 
the President. And this week, of course, as. we have examined the 
Huston plan, it again becomes clear that the CIA was not responsive to 
the President's revocation. Not only the CIA, but the other agencies 
involved, including the FBI, failed to tell the President that cer- 



tain operations like the mail openings, for which they sought Presi- 
dential approval, had in fact been going on for years before that 
authorization was sought. And when it was revoked, the mail openings 
continued for a long period of time afterwards. We will look this 
morning at the FBI's role in this particular plan. And our witness., Mr. 
Brennan, is prepared to respond to questions from the committee. 
Before we do that, would you please stand and take the oath ? Do you 
solemnly swear that all the testimony you will give in this proceeding 
will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help 
you God ? 

Mr. Brennan. I do. 

The Chairman. Mr. Schwarz, would you commence questioning 

Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Brennan, were you employed by the FBI ? 


Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Schwarz. From when to when? 

Mr. Brennan. From April 1948 until July 1974 when I retired. 

Mr. Schwarz. And in June 1970 were you the Chief of the Internal 
Security Section of the Domestic Intelligence Division of the FBI? 

Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir, I was. 

Mr. Schwarz. And Mr. Sullivan was your immediate superior? 

Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Schwarz. And did you then in July of 1970 succeed him as the 
Chief of the Domestic Intelligence Division ? 

Mr. Brennan. Specifically August 1970. 

Mr. Schwarz. And you left the FBI because of an incident in which 
Mr. Hoover and you had had a dispute about the questioning of Daniel 
Ellsberg's father. And I think some people will want to get into that 
with you, but is that the circumstance under which you left the FBI? 

Mr. Brennan. Well, no, sir. That was not the specific circumstance. 
By the time I retired from the FBI, Mr. Hoover, of course, had been 
deceased several years. 

Mr. Schwarz. All right. But there was an incident involving that 
matter in which Mr. Hoover placed you on probation. Am I correct 
about that? 

Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Schwarz. All right. Now, going back to the Huston plan itself, 
you recall, am I correct, that there was advocacy in the plan of in- 
creasing electronic surveillance, or bugs and taps, restoring, as the 
plan "said, mail opening, increasing the coverage of envelopes and 
so" forth, restoring the practice of surreptitious entry, and increasing 
the coverage of campus persons who were believed to be subjects of 
attention to the intelligence community? 

Is that in general what was sought in the Huston plan ? 

Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Schwarz. And all of those matters were opposed in the summer 
of 1970 by Mr. Hoover, is that right? 

Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir, that's right. 


Mr. Schwarz. And had Mr. Hoover been dpposing those matters 
for a few years prior to 1970 ? 

Mr. Brennan. .Yes, sir, he had. 

Mr. Schwarz. Was there an earlier time when Mr. Hoover had ap- 
proved the use of those techniques? 

Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir, previously during the earlier years of the 
Bureau's history I think most of these techniques had been in existence. 

Mr. Schwarz. Now, I am going to ask you a question that may sound 
sort of strange, but I believe it is relevant from your conversation with 
us 2 days ago. 

Mr. Hoover became 70 years old in 1965, is that in accord with your 
recollection ? Now, why is it significant that Mr. Hoover became 70 in 
1965 ? Specifically, why is that fact significant to your understanding 
of his opposition to the use of the techniques which we have been talk- 
ing about? 

Mr. Brennan. I think when Mr. Hoover reached age 70, of course, 
he came within the Government's law which required mandatory re- 
tirement at that time. And I believe that was waived by President 
Johnson, which virtually then called for the Director to be renewed 
as Director of the FBI on an annual basis. And I think that Mr. 
Hoover was very conscious of the fact that to a degree this put him 
into a somewhat vulnerable position. I think he then also became very 
conscious of the fact that any incident, which, within his understand- 
ing might prove to be an embarrassment to the Bureau, could reflect 
questionably on his leadership of the Bureau. And I think that perhaps 
he felt that such an incident could provide certain individuals with 
the capacity to not renew his continued role as Director of the FBI. 

Mr. Schwarz. In your opinion, how was it that Mr. Hoover was able 
to stay on as Director of the Bureau for so long after 1965 ? Indeed, he 
stayed on until he died in what was it, 1972 or 1973? 

Mr. Brennan. In 1972, 1 believe, he died. 

Mr. Schwarz. In your opinion, why was it that the various Presi- 
dents kept him in office ? 

Mr. Brennan. Well, this very definitely is my opinion, but I think 
that the various Presidents possibly, just for political purposes I think, 
feared possibly the loss of votes. If they were to remove Mr. Hoover, 
I think there might have been some — and again this is purely specula- 
tion — there might have been fear on their part that perhaps Mr. 
Hoover had some information that might prove embarrassing to them. 

Senator Morgan. I feel as a committee member that I must voice 
my objection or dissent from this line of questioning. This man is 
speculating about the reasons that people who are now dead acted as 
they did. 

In all fairness to the Presidents who retained Mr. Hoover and to 
Mr. Hoover, I just don't think it is proper to let somebody who ad- 
mittedly had difficulty with Mr. Hoover speculate on his motives. This 
would not be accepted in a court of law and I don't think it should be 
accepted in this committee. 

The Chairhan. Senator, I think your point is well taken. Let us 
move ahead with the questions. 

Mr. Schwarz. With respect, Mr. Brennan, to what Mr. Hoover 
actually did, let us look at what the written record reveals. And in 


connection with the point made by Senator Morgan I wish to move 
to what he actually did and not to speculation. 

Would you examine exhibit 32 1 , please? 

And I move, Mr. Chairman, the introduction of this document 
which is dated July 19, 1966. It is from Mr. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach, 
subject: "Black bag" jobs. And it contains Mr. Hoover's handwritten 
note on the third page stating, "no more such techniques must be used." 

The Chairman. Very well, without objection, the document will be 
entered into the record of the proceedings. 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 32 for 

Mr. Schwarz. Now, Mr. Brennan, you have had an opportunity to 
see this document during the course of your preparation with us. 

Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir, I have. 

Mr. Schwarz. And does it accord with your understanding of the 
procedures which previously had been employed in connection with 
so-called "black bag" jobs? 

Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir, it does. 

Mr. Schwarz. All right. Would you read into the record, please, the 
second paragraph of the document. 

Mr. Brennan. The second paragraph states, "We do not obtain au- 
thorization for 'black bag' jobs from outside the Bureau. Such a 
technique involves trespass and is clearly illegal. Therefore, it would 
be impossible to obtain any legal sanction for it. Despite this, 'black 
bag' jobs have been used because they represent an invaluable tech- 
nique in combating subversive activities of a clandestine nature and 
directly undermining and destroying our Nation." 

Mr. Schwarz. All right. Now, the document also refers to a so-called 
"do not file" procedure. 

The Chairman. I think, Mr. Brennan, it might be helpful if you 
would just explain to the committee what a "black bag" job is. 

Mr. Brennan. I think in general parlance, in the intelligence com- 
munity, Senator, the "black bag" iob refers to an operation which in- 
volves a penetration which basically is designed to obtain intelligence 
information, which basically constitutes breaking and entering. 

The Chairman. You mean what would normally be called a 
burglary ? 

Mr. Brennan. Yes ; normally, Senator, yes. 

The Chairman. Thank you. 

Mr. Schwarz. Would you turn to exhibit 33, 2 please ? 

And, Mr. Chairman, in line with what Senator Morgan indicated, 
I move the introduction of exhibit 33, which is Director Hoover's mem- 
orandum to Mr. Tolson and Mr. DeLoach, dated January 6, 1967, 
again stating his opinion with respect to the propriety of so-called 
"black-bag" techniques. 

Senator Morgan. Mr. Chairman, before we go on, so that there will 
be no misunderstanding about my position, I have no objection whatso- 
ever to Mr. Hoover's orders being put in the record. My objections were 
to allowing or asking this witness to speculate on why Mr. Hoover did 
so and so or why the President extended his term. 

The Chairman. I understand the objection and I have sustained it. 

* See p. 273. 
' See p. 276. 


Mr. Schwarz. Would you read into the record, Mr. Brennan, exhibit 
33, please? 

Mr. Brennan. It is a memorandum for Mr. Tolson and Mr. DeLoach 
from J. Edgar Hoover, and it states : 

I note that requests are still being made by Bureau officials for the use of 
"black bag" techniques. I have previously indicated that I do not Intend to ap- 
prove any such requests in the future, and consequently, no such recommendations 
should be submitted for approval of such matters. This practice, which includes 
also surreptitious entrances upon premises of any kind, will not meet with my 
approval in the future. 
Very truly yours. 

Mr. Schwarz. All right, finally, in this line of questioning, would 
you turn to exhibit 40 1 which is a memorandum dated July 27, 1970, 
from the Director of the FBI to the Attorney General, including Mr. 
Hoover's comments on the Huston plan itself. 

Have you got that, Mr. Brennan ? 

Mr. Brennan. Yes. 

Mr. Schwarz. All right, Mr. Chairman, I move the introduction into 
evidence of that document. 

The Chairman. Without objection, it is so ordered. 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 40 for identifi- 

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question on procedure ? 
I notice counsel today is moving introduction of documents. I was 
not under the impression that that was necessary in order to make it 
a part of the records of this committee. If it is, we have got a problem, 
because I assumed, then, at some point, all of the documents that have 
been used and prepared by staff would be thought of as the records of 
this committee and would be open to public inspection, except as sani- 
tization would be required. I don't want to be picayunish, but I don't 
want to end up at some future date not having access to some of the 
information which was before us at this committee table. Is it the chair- 
man's position that we must formally put documents in the record? 
My position is that we should consider all of them part of the record. 

The Chairman. I think all documents will be considered part of the 
record. I believe that the reason counsel is proceeding this way this 
morning is because he is undertaking to put these particular documents 
in the record. While, normally, we have simply been asking the witness 
to refer to passages of documents in the normal interrogation. But, 
Senator, all of the documents, in any case, will form the record of this 

Senator Baker. Thank you, sir. 

The Chairman. My view is the same as yours. 

Senator Tower. So, no formal motion is necessary ? 

The Chairman. I actually think that is so. And if the committee 
would prefer, we will 

Senator Baker. No ; I don't object, I just want to make sure that this 
questioning which was new today does not imply that at some future 
date we are going to exclude documents. I am now reassured. The 
chairman, as I understand it, has ruled all of these documents will be 
for the record of the committee. That satisfies my request. 

» See p. 313. 


The Chairman. Very well. Now, would you proceed, Mr. Schwarz. 

Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Brennan, is it fair to say that this document 
restates the objections to the lifting of the various restraints which 
Mr. Hoover had already expressed in the footnotes to the document 
submitted to the President on June 25, 1970 ? 

Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir, it does. 

Mr. Schwarz. All right, the only added part that ought to be read 
into the record, if you would, would be the final paragraph on the 
third page. Would you read that into the record. 

Mr. Brennan : 

Despite my clear-cut and specific opposition to the lifting of the various in- 
vestigative restraints referred to above and to the creation of a permanent 
interagency committee on domestic intelligence, the FBI is prepared to implement 
the instructions of the White House, at your direction. Of course, we would 
continue to seek your specific authorization, where appropriate, to utilize the 
various sensitive investigative techniques involved in individual cases. 

Mr. Schwarz. Now, is it your understanding that Mr. Mitchell 
declined to authorize, or did authorize specific techniques that were re- 
ferred to ? Or is it in between in some fashion ? 

Mr. Brennan. I don't recall that, sir. 

Mr. Schwarz. I just have one more question. After the Huston plan 
was turned down, was there a program of intensification of investiga- 
tion in the security field which was proposed by your department and 
approved eventually by the Director ? 

Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Schwarz. I have nothing further, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Mr. Smothers, do you have questions ? 

Mr. Smothers. Just a few inquiries, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Brennan, 
I think it is a fair inference from your testimony this morning, and 
certainly from your previous testimony before the committee, that you 
are of the opinion that the FBI was somehow being restricted un- 
necessarily in its domestic intelligence effort. 

Mr. Brennan. Yes sir, I was. 

Mr. Smothers. Is it your opinion that these restrictions were based 
upon the FBI's past record of inexactness or ineptness in this area? 
Could this at all have been based upon the fact that the work product 
coming out was not a good one ? 

Mr. Brennan. No, sir, I do not feel that there is a relation there at 
all. And perhaps I can clarify it for you. For example, I believe we 
have to go back to 1960. Prior to 1960 the FBI was not involved to 
any great extent in the investigations of organized crime or to any 
great extent in the investigations of civil rights matters. And following 
the advent of the Kennedy administration into office I believe particu- 
larly because of the Attorney General's interest in organized crime 
matters, specifically Robert Kennedy, the FBI quickly responded by 
establishing a new division which immediately began to emphasize and 
intensify investigations into organized crime. And at about the same 
time, I believe that there was an intensification of investigations into 
civil rights violations. And I think if you examine the record prior 
to 1960 as contrasted to after 1960, you will see there was a marked 
increase in the accomplishment of the FBI relative to these types of 


I" relate this because it also relates to the impact within the FBI, 
in other words, when you intensify in one area then you have to take 
manpower from somewhere in order to produce those intensified in- 
vestigations. Basically, that manpower began to drain away from 
security and intelligence operations. And as a result, with the reduced 
manpower, there was coincidentally a reduction in the various tech- 
niques which applied to the security and intelligence field. Subse- 
quently, as I indicated, Mr. Hoover then, by 1965, reached age 70 and 
I think then he also became very sensitive to the use of investigative 
techniques in the security intelligence field which he felt might prove 
embarrassing to the Bureau; all of which provided a drain which 
materially affected those of us who were involved in security and 
intelligence investigations. 

Mr. Smothers. Mr. Brennan, the question is raised in part because 
of a recent inquiry into this very question conducted by the General 
Accounting Office. In commenting on the effectiveness of FBI in- 
vestigations, the Comptroller General, Elmer Staats, looked at and 
reported on cases that were reviewed, cases of the domestic intelligence 
activities here, many of which covered a period of time when you 
headed that operation. Turning to page 33 of a report released by 
them on yesterday, he notes that only 16 of 676 cases, less than 3 per- 
cent of those that you investigated, were referred for prosecution. Of 
those 16 referrals, only 7 were prosecuted, obtaining 4 convictions. 
Of these same cases, only 12 of them, or less than 2 percent, resulted 
in the FBI obtaining any advance knowledge of planned activities on 
the parts of subversive or extremist groups. The report sort of con- 
cludes that the domestic intelligence effort may be largely an ineffec- 
tual one. Do you agree with that conclusion ? 

Mr. Brennan. I do not think I would agree with that conclusion. 
I think that basically intelligence investigations are designed not 
specifically for prosecutive intent, but basically to develop intelligence 
information which will be provided to officials of the U.S. Govern- 
ment to enable them to possibly consider new types of legislation 
which may be affecting the security of the country. And I have not 
had an opportunity to review that report so I am not familiar with 
those circumstances. And I feel that a response to that could only 
come from the FBI relative to its own record of accomplishments, in 
regard to security and intelligence investigations. 

Mr. Smothers. Let me be sure I understand your last comment, then 
I will conclude. Is it your contention that a primary purpose of the 
domestic intelligence investigations conducted by the FBI was to 
aid in some legislative purpose ? 

Mr. Brennan. To a great extent, yes, sir. 

Mr. Smothers. To your knowledge, has the FBI made substantial 
legislative recommendations based on these intelligence activities? 

Mr. Brennan. It is my recollection that it has, yes, sir. 

Mr. Smothers. I have nothing further, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. First of all, I would like to call your attention, Mr. 
Brennan, to exhibit 2, 1 page 3. Now do you have that reference ? 

Mr. Brennan. I believe so, Senator. 

The Chairman. And if you look to the bottom of the page, to part 
E which bears the caption, "Development of Campus Sources." Now 
the document I am referring to is generally referred to as the Huston 

1 See p. 189. 


plan. It is the recommendations that Mr. Huston made to President 
Nixon to relax restrictions and to authorize certain illegal actions. 

Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Now, with respect to the development of campus 
sources, Mr. Huston recommended to the President that "present 
restrictions should be relaxed to permit expanded coverage of vio- 
lence-prone campus and student-related groups." And then in the 
rationale for that recommendation on page 4, 1 read at the top of the 
page, the first sentence, "The FBI doe's not, currently recruit any 
campus sources among individuals below 21 years of age." 

So what Mr. Huston was recommending, backed up by the various 
agencies that had put this report together, was that the restriction that 
the FBI had imposed upon itself, that it would not use informants 
on campuses who were less than 21 years old, should be revoked. Now 
the purpose of that was to enable the FBI to recruit student 
informants, was it not? 

Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. So that information could be secured from mem- 
bers of the student body about activities, protests and demonstration 
activities on the campuses ? 

Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Now, as we know, the President accepted that 
recommendation and then 5 days later revoked his approval of the 
entire Huston plan. That was in July of 1970. 

Now I call your attention to exhibit 44, 1 please. It is the FBI's plan 
following the President's revocation of the Huston plan. It is dated 
September 2, 1970, and the purpose at the very top of the page of the 
plan is "to recommend consideration be given to returning to previous 
standards permitting the field to develop security and racial inform- 
ants among students 18 years of age and older with full individual 
justification and Bureau approval." So here, within a month or so of the 
time the President revoked the Huston plan, this recommendation is 
made to Mr. Hoover, that the restriction on 21 years of age should be 
removed and student informants should be obtained on the college 
campuses. And on the last page of that memorandum, Mr. Hoover's 
approval states that you are authorized to develop student security 
and racial informants who are 18 years of age or over. This presents 
you with a tremendous opportunitv to expand your coverage, correct — 
the last paragraph, just above Mr. Hoover's signature ? 

Mr. Brennan. The memorandum has attached to it part of what we 
call an SAC letter of instruction to the field. That is what you are 

The Chairman. Yes. And in that letter of instruction to the field, 
Mr. Hoover says in the last paragraph, "as you are aware, you have 
been previously instructed not to use campus student informants under 
the age of 21. In view of the current circumstances, you are authorized 
to develop student security and racial informants who are 18 years of 
age or older." This presents you with a tremendous opportunity to 
expand vour coverage. 

Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. All right. So within a month after the time the 
President had revoked the Huston plan, the FBI had reduced the age 

1 See p. 323. 


limit from 21 to 18 and then commenced a tremendous expansion of 
surveillance of student groups. Is that not correct ? 

Mr. Brennan. It was an expansion, Senator; yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Well, let us look at the size of it. 

Now let us turn back to exhibit 41, 1 if you please. And on page 2 
of the FBI plan, I read to you from the latter part of the third 
paragraph : 

* * * it is felt that every Black Student Union and similar group, regardless of 
their past or present involvement in disorders, should be the subject of a dis- 
crete preliminary inquiry through established sources and informants to deter- 
mine background, aims and purposes, leaders and key activists. It is estimated 
that this would cause the field to open approximately 4,000 cases involving 
organizations and the key activists and leaders connected therewith. 

That suggests to me a very broad expansion of the student surveil- 
lance activities. 

Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir, but I think the foregoing, prior to that, 
provides a justification for it. It indicates, for example, in paragraph 
2 there, that in 1967 black student unions began forming their own 
groups to project their demands, many of which indicated a commit- 
ment to black nationalism. And it also is followed by an observation 
that campus disorders involving black students increased, I believe 
that is either 23 or 28 percent of the 1969-70 school year over the 
previous year. 

The Chairman. Eight, but if we go back to the order for increasing 
the surveillance, the plan states, "It is felt that every Black Student 
Union and similar group, regardless of their past or present involve- 
ment in disorders" should be put under surveillance. So it really was a 
plan to establish general surveillance of these black student groups on 
the campuses of the country, regardless of their past or present involve- 
ment in disorders ? 

Mr. Bkennan. Yes, sir, that is correct. 

The Chairman. I think we have established on this testimony that 
the President revoked this plan which he first authorized, a plan that 
reduced the 21-year age barrier. A month or so later the Bureau comes 
along and reduces the age anyway, and establishes a broad new sur- 
veillance program on black student groups, regardless of whether or 
not they had any previous record of any sort. 

Senator Tower? 

Senator Tower. Mr. Brennan, regarding the assumption that anti- 
war activities were being financed by Communist sources externally, 
was this an assumption that was held at the highest level in both the 
Johnson and Nixon administrations? 

Mr. Brennan. I do not know whether it was an assumption, Sen- 
ator, that was held at the highest levels. I believe it was my recollec- 
tion that the FBI was continually being pressed by both the Johnson 
administration and the Nixon administration as to whether or not 
this was true — whether or not there was evidence to indicate that 
possibly there might be financing from abroad, underlying the anti- 
war protest here. And perhaps it might be that it was based on their 
assumption that it could be true. 

Senator Tower. In pursuance of this, did the FBI or the CIA 
monitor the principals involved in the matter of foreign travel, 

i See p. 317. 


attendance of international conferences, and recipt of propaganda, 
individual guidance from external sources and external finances ? Was 
there an effort made to follow all of these particular aspects of the 
activities in the principals involved ? 

Mr. Brennan. To the degree that we were capable, within the 
limitations that we had, yes sir, we were seeking to do this and in 
some instances succeeded in placing informants in groups who were 
traveling abroad or attending Communist conferences abroad, yes 

Senator Tower. Did you get any information or any hard intelli- 
gence to the fact that they were getting any individual guidance from 
these Communist sources? 

Mr. Brennan. Guidance is a difficult question to answer, Senator. 
They attended conferences, for example, in Cuba, which were attended, 
as I recall, by officials from Communist governments. They attended 
conferences in various other countries abroad which were sponsored 
by Communists. The peace movement in the United States was gen- 
erally discussed and I recall in one instance, for example, where 
several of the activists who were involved in the policy committee 
of the antiwar activities traveled abroad and attended conferences 
where these issues were the subject of discussion with many Com- 
munist representatives. And at the time, the general feeling of the 
antiwar movement here was that the next step in the stage should be 
protest demonstrations around the United States. 

It is my recollection that information at the Communist conference 
abroad led to the conclusion that there should be instead a concen- 
trated demonstration in Washington, D.C. And following the return 
of these individuals to this country, I think they served to project 
that view and indeed we did have a concentrated demonstration in 
Washington, D.C, and it is my recollection that when that demon- 
stration took place, there were also concerted demonstrations at 
American embassies in many foreign countries on the same day. 

Senator Tower. Did you get any evidence that the activities in 
this country were indeed being financed by external sources? 

Mr. Brennan. We never had any evidence to that effect, Senator. 

Senator Tower. You suspected it but you could not get any hard 
evidence ? 

Mr. Brennan. I personally did not suspect it, Senator. The question 
was continually being pushed to us by the White House as to whether 
or not there was proof of this. I personallv held the feeling that we 
were dealing with what I term "credit card revolutionaries,'' and that 
the individuals involved in this type of activity in the United States 
had ample resources of their own through which to finance these 
activities. I never saw anything to the contrary. 

Senator Tower. These international meetings that they attended — 
those were under Communist auspices, were they not, financed by Com- 
munis 1 " sources? 

Mr. Brennan. As I recall, they were, yes, sir. 

Senator Tower. So their external participation was indeed under 
Communist auspices ? 

Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, we had furnished to 
the White House in one neriod of time a renort which I recall ran 
between roughly 40 and 50 pages at the specific request of the White 


House, in which we detailed specifically the extent of the links be- 
tween Americans who were traveling abroad with the Communist 
representatives of these various conferences. 

Senator Tower. Turning to another matter, after the withdrawal 
of the Huston plan, was there any increase in electronic surveillances 
by the FBI? 

Mr. Brennan. It is my recollection, Senator, that there was no 
significant increase. 

Senator Tower. In other words, it continued at about the same 

Mr. Brennan. I believe it did, yes, sir. 

Senator Tower. What was the general level of electronic surveil- 
lances during the 1970 period? 

Mr. Brennan. If I recall correctly, Senator, in the security field, 
I believe that we had somewhere in the range of 40 to 45. 

Senator Tower. Were you aware of a covert mail program in the 
FBI prior to June of 1970 ? 

Mr. Brennan. Prior to June 1970 the only program of that nature 
of which I am aware went way back for years, and which I had no 
specific relationshipwith. 

Senator Tower, were you aware of the CIA mail program before 
June 1970? 

Mr. Brennan. No, sir, I was not. . 

Senator Tower. Did you become aware of the CIA mail program 
during the preparation of the special report that was being prepared 
for the President? 

Mr. Brennan. No, sir, I did not. 

Senator Tower. Did you ever inquire of any CIA personnel on the 
Huston plan working group if the CIA had a mail program ? Did 
you ever ask any of them ? 

Mr. Brennan. No, sir, I did not. 

Senator Tower. Did you inquire of Bureau personnel about the 
CIA mail program ? 

Mr. Brennan. No, sir, I did not 

Senator Tower. Were you ever aware that the Bureau was receiv- 
ing information obtained from any mail intercepts ? 

Mr. Brennan. Not to my knowledge, no, sir. I knew that the Bureau 
received information disseminated by the CIA, but as to the nature 
of the technique by which information was received, no, I had never 
any indication that it came from that type of a technique. 

Senator Tower. Now, Mr. Brennan, you were one of the FBI repre- 
sentatives in the interagency working group which prepared the 
Special Beport on Intelligence Assessment. Now, was it your impres- 
sion that Mr. Huston of the White House staff, who testified here the 
day before yesterday, and Mr. Sullivan, from the FBI, were in close 
communication as the report developed? 

Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir, they were. 

Senator Tower. Did Mr. Huston limit his role merely to that of 
an observer, or was he an active participant ? 

Mr. Brennan. I would define his role as an active participant. 

Senator Tower. In what way did he participate? Did he by chance, 
or by design, guide and direct the preparation of the report? 


Mr. Brennan. I don't think he guided and directed the preparation 
of the report, because it is my recollection that Mr. Huston did not have 
that sufficient in-depth background concerning intelligence matters 
to be able to give that strong direction and guidance. 

Senator Towee. So who would be the principal figure there— -Mr. 

Mr. Brennan. I would say Mr. Sullivan was, yes, sir. 

Senator Tower. Thank you, Mr. Brennan. I have no further ques- 
tions, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Tower. 

Senator Mondale. 

Senator Mondale. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Brennan, I take 
it that there was no doubt in your mind that the break-ins or the so- 
called black bag jobs were illegal ? 

Mr. Brennan. There was no doubt in my mind about that. 

Senator Mondale. And that some of the other activities such as un- 
warranted taps, some of the efforts under the COINTEL Program that 
we are going to be reviewing later, were illegal ? 

Mr. Brennan. In regard to wiretapping, Senator, the policy, as it 
prevailed within the Bureau, within my understanding, involved a 
legal one, which called for the written approval of the Attorney 
General of the United States, and which I believe was within the 
framework of legality, as the procedures existed at that time. 

In regard to the counterintelligence program, I think the policy 
called for specific instructions to the field, that they were not to en- 
gage in illegal activities. 

Senator Mondale. Well, for the purpose of my question, let us just 
stay with break-ins, then, because they, we can both agree, were clearly 
illegal. How do you justify the law enforcement arm of the government 
which itself resorts to illegal taps? You must have thought this 
through. You must have wondered about, it. How do you justify it? 

Mr. Brennan. The primary ones of which I was aware involved 
organizations which were taking their direction and control from for- 
eign powers, and that, to me, was sufficient basis for a utilization of 
that technique in order to determine the extent of the foreign direction 
or control of their activities. 

Senator Mondale. So the reason was not, in your mind, that it was 
legal, but that even though it was illegal, the purpose sought was 
sufficiently important that you felt the law could be violated ? 

Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir, I did. 

Senator Mondale. In retrospect, when we look at this whole period 
of the late sixties and the early seventies, did that foreign threat, 
the alleged foreign control and foreign funding, in fact, prove to be 
a serious cause of domestic unrest? 

Mr. Brennan. No, sir, it did not. 

Senator Mondale. And, as a matter of fact, when we were all 
through with these techniques you concluded and I quote, "It is my 
recollection that we never developed any information to indicate that 
Communist sources abroad were financing the antiwar activities of 
the United States." Would that be accurate? 

Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir, that is true. 

Senator Mondale. Further, you said, "I felt that the extremist 
groups and the others who were involved in the antiwar activities and 


the like at the time were of middle- and upper-level income, and we 
characterize them generally as credit-card revolutionaries." Is that 

Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir. 

Senator Mondale. So that, when we spent several years trying to 
find, under Presidential directive, this evidence that domestic unrest 
was directed, financed, and heavily influenced by foreign enemies, in 
fact, we found it was pretty much a domestic source of unrest. Is that 

Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir, but we were continually being asked by 
the White House as to whether or not there was foreign funding of it, 
and in response to that, then, I felt that it was necessary for us to try 
to respond to the question. 

Senator Mondale. Thank you, Mr. Brennan, because I think that is 
exactly the point. And I return to Senator Hart's point yesterday. Our 
hearings thus far have necessarily involved questioning people like 
yourself, but, in fact, you were carrying out what you thought was 
official governmental policy, were you not? 

Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir. 

Senator Mondale. And you thought you were doing what the Presi- 
dent of the United States wanted you to do ? 

Mr. Brennan. Well, yes, to a degree that when the White House 
asked a question, I felt that it was necessary for the FBI to respond 
through the utilization of the appropriate techniques, to try to ascer- 
tain the answer. 

Senator Mondale. And you were under tremendous pressure in the 
late sixties and the early seventies to find evidence that these protesters 
were being financed and directed by foreign sources. Is that not correct ? 

Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir, no question about that. 

Senator Mondale. As a result, you, following these orders, expended 
tremendous effort, money and the rest, to try to prove the existence of 
such foreign influence ? 

Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir, we did. 

Senator Mondale. And except for these meetings about which you 
testified before, you found little or none ? 

Mr. Brennan. That is true. 

Senator Mondale. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that part of the 
problem that we have uncovered here is a lack of accountability, and 
even some lawlessness on the part of these agencies, but above all, it 
seems to me what we have seen is a pattern of Presidential unaccount- 
ability to the law. It seems, if we go back to the sixties and the seven- 
ties, there was rising domestic concern and bitterness about this war, 
and those Presidents, instead of deciding there was something wrong 
with the war, decided there was something wrong with the people, and 
instead of trying to meet those arguments as though they were honest 
protests against the war, they tried to characterize them as being 
foreign-dominated-influen'ced, and in effect, the critics would be cor- 
rupted by an alien power. 

Now, maybe some were, but there is very little evidence of it. 
Our task is not only to try to restore some kind of accountability 
to these agencies, but a much more difficult one. What do we do to 
make certain that Presidents in the future do not use these secret 

62-685 O - 76 - 8 


agencies to carry out their fantasies, to try to shift the blame from 
themselves to somebody else, and if possible, to foreigners ? I think it 
is asking a lot of human nature to ask people at the second level of 
Government to disobey the orders of the President. That means you 
lose your job. It means destruction of your career, maybe more, if that 
should happen. I think it is hard to expect, nor is it likely, that those 
agencies are going to proceed with policies which they think are 
really alien to what the President wants. And I think it was interesting 
that in 1966, when Ramsey Clark was Attorney General, they did, in 
fact, stop "black bag" jobs. Atleast an order went from Hoover to that 
effect, 1 think, reflecting this as the official policy at the time. 

And our great task is to see how on earth we can address this prob- 
lem : The grant of power to the CIA and to these other agencies is, 
above all, a grant of power to the President, and a dangerous grant, 
because he can operate secretly. And that is what I think makes our 
task so very difficult. Thank you. 

Mr. Bbennan. If I may inject an observation, Senator, and hopefully 
I will not be out of line in doing so, I would suggest that perhaps the 
problem is even more complex. In other words, the requests of the 
White House were just not simply to answer that one specific question. 
I think you have to look at the social, political, and economic com- 
plexities that were related, which built tremendous pressures on the 
White House, and these, T think, stem from" the thousands of bombings, 
the arsons, the disruptions, the disorder. Our^ academic communities 
were being totally disrupted, and I think that a vast majority of the 
American people were subjecting the Representatives of Congress and 
the members of the White House staff and other people in Government 
to a great deal of pressure, as to why these things were taking place 
and why something wasn't being done about these, and I think in a 
broader context, then, the FBI was getting a tremendous amount of 
pressure from the White House, in response to the overall problem. 

Senator Mondale. The irony was that their conclusion, without any 
evidence, was that the unrest was supported by foreign money and 
direction, and you could not find any. 

Mr. Brbnnan. Well, I would say 

Senator Mondaije. But they continued to pursue that theory long 
after no one could prove it, and the whole idea behind the Huston plan 
was to criticize the FBI for failing to find what the President was sure 
existed. And they found a dollar or two here and there, and they found 
some meetings, and no doubt there were some Communists involved. I 
have no doubt about that. But the mass of the protest was indigenous. 
It was domestic. It was prompted not by disloyalty, but by a profound 
feeling on the part of millions of Americans that the war was wrong. 

Mr. Chairman, I think a very instructive memo on this Presidential 
point is dated September 18, 1970, by John Dean [exhibit 24 *]. It 
went to the Attorney General. What it says, in effect, is that now that 
we have rejected the Huston plan, we should put it, in effect, back into 
place, and remove the restraints as necessary to obtain such intelli- 
gence. In other words, they rejected the formal plan, and then they 
proceeded surreptitiously, according to this memo, to go ahead and 
do it anyway. 

The Chairman. I think that is correct. Senator. 

Constantly we have this theme raised, Mr. Brennan. You have raised 

1 See p. 255. 


it in complete good faith, I am sure. Other witnesses have raised it, 
that this was a time of turbulence. Yes, there were great pressures on 
the Agency. The White House was deeply concerned about the extent 
of the antiwar protests. 

But that is the very time, in times of turbulence and distress, when 
an even greater obligation falls not only on the agencies but on the 
President himself, to operate within the law. Stress or turbulence does 
not really excuse law enforcement agencies of the Government or the 
President himself from rising above the law and proceeding in lawless 

Mr. Brennan. Yes ; I agree with that, Senator. 

The Chairman. Well, that certainly is not the record of what hap- 
pened during this period. And I can only say that remembering those 
protests, it did not take an FBI agent to tell me that the students out in 
the campuses were upset with the war because they thought it was a 
foolish, futile war, and that is what it was. And I was upset with it, too, 
in the U.S. Senate, and I was protesting it. And I did not go to any 
Communist meetings in Cuba. It was a foolish policy for the country, 
and that was what the students were upset about, and it was an indi- 
genous movement, basically, and a lawful one — not the violence, but the 
protest was lawful. This is a free society, and students have a right to 
protest when they do not think the Government policy is sound, par- 
ticularly when they are the ones who are drafted to fight a war 
thousands of miles away in the jungles of Southeast Asia. So I just 
want to emphasize that our concern here is lawlessness. 

Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And that is all the more important in times of 

Senator Tower. Mr. Chairman, may I be indulged a comment at this 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Senator Tower. However indigenous this may have been, I am con- 
vinced there was some external influence. In 1967, 1 made a speech from 
the steps of Sproul Hall at the University of California at Berkeley. 
I was lucky to get away with my life. My speech was punctuated by 
such editorial comment consisting of four-letter words that I will not 
repeat here in mixed company, and I was called among other things, 
a Fascist pig, and I heard all of the rhetoric of the Communist anti- 
American propaganda mill. So that influence came from somewhere. 

The Chairman. Yes. We all had that experience. I recall being 
called a Commie symp, because I opposed the war, so it was a time of 
stress. My point is that that is the time when it is more important than 
any other that everybody live within the law. 

Mr. Brennan. Yes; and I agree with the Senator that certainly there 
was evidence of external Communist direction, whether that direct or 
not, the point is we were getting to the point of whether or not it was 
being funded from abroad, so there is no inconsistency in the two 

Senator Tower. Let me just reinforce what I said by reading from 
page 62 of the transcript of the testimony of Mr. Angleton in an execu- 
tive session of this committee, on September 12, 1975, "It has also come 
out in mail intercept that certain groups went to Moscow for political 
indoctrination, and they went to North Korea for weaponry." 


The Chairman. Senator Baker? 

Senator Baker. It is my turn ? 

The Chairman. I believe so. 

Senator Baker. I want my 10 minutes, plus the time to speak and a 
tune for rebuttal, Mr. Chairman. 

[General laughter.] 

Senator Baker. I will take my time in rebuttal first. 

You know, really, it is awfully easy for all of us to be morally 
righteous and indignant. But as Senator Jim Pearson from Kansas 
told me when I was a young Senator, and excited about something, 
You know, if you're in the Senate, you're only entitled to be a moral 
giant once a week." I don't propose now that we are excessively indig- 
nant about the turbulence of the times in Vietnam, but it is awful 
difficult for me to see how that relates to an inquiry into the Huston 

I think that these things ought to be kept in mind in that respect. 
Une, those folks are still out there— the people who did, in fact, dis- 
rupt this country, who demonstrated in massive numbers here in the 
Capital and tried to block the streets that led to the Capital City, to 
shut down Washington, as they said. I remember driving down 
Virginia Avenue and having oil drums thrown in the path of my car, 
and my staff man who was driving that day is a big, burly young 
fellow who managed to get us to the Capitol with his nerve and the 
assistance of about 300 horsepower. 

But those people are still there. There is no doubt that most of the 
protest was domestic, and indigenous to the American opportunity to 
express disagreement. But there also is no doubt that people who 
want to disrupt this country, and who want to change our system, 
thrive on the distrust that goes on during national upheavals. 

So we can't sit here — as I sometimes get the impression we are do- 
ing— and throw the baby out with the bath water. We can't say the 
CIA, the FBI, the DIA, and whatever else we have got, were patently 
wrong in their efforts to investigate these situations, and they are bad 
and they ought to be disbanded. If we do, we will be totally at the 
mercy of those folks who are still out there. 

The Chairman. Well, nobody is suggesting that, Senator. 

Senator Baker. I know that. But I hear the reports from time to 
time that 1976 will be the year of the resumption of the revolution. 
And I expect we are going to have a pretty good time next summer. 
This is the point that bothers me, Mr. Brennan, and I hope you under- 
stand that my energetic remarks in this respect have very little to do 
with you. 

But the great tragedy of Watergate, or the tragedy of the Johnson 
-era in its response to civil distress, or of the Nixon times — and God 
knows, the country went through a lot, and I went through a lot dur- 
ing that time politically — but the great tragedy of that time is not the 
resignation of a President, or the fact that another was killed — as bad 
as that was — or another terminated his political career under the stress 
of the war. 

The great tragedy is, under the most tumultuous civil strife we 
have ever known except during the time of the Civil War, our institu- 
tions failed us. I am terribly unhappy to hear you say, and to hear 
others say, that we knew so-and-so was illegal, therefore we thought 


the national good justified our going ahead with it. That is the greatest 
disservice that you could render this country, is to say that the con- 
stitutional protections and guarantees are not valid and relevant in 
times of great national stress. I think they are. And I think we can 
guard ourselves against those folks who are out there who would dis- 
rupt this city and this country, and burn our campuses, and destroy 
our banks and our public institutions. We can do all of those things 
and still not trample the rights under the Constitution. Our purpose 
here is to try to find out what went wrong and how we can prevent 
those events in the future. 

I have two or three questions, and then I will stop. I made my speech, 
Barry. I took my speech and my rebuttal all at the same time. 

The Chairman. You ended up in agreement with the chairman. 

Senator Baker. Well, no; the chairman had difficulty understand- 
ing why he agreed with me. 

[General laughter.] 

Senator Baker. It's just that I expressed it in a different way, Mr. 
Chairman. I want to make sure that the chairman understands — and 
everbody else understands — that it's all well and good to be concerned 
about this, but don't throw the baby out with the bath water. Those 
folks are out there, you're going to see them again next summer, and 
you might as well be prepared for it. 

Mr. Brennan, when did the "black bag" jobs start with the FBI? 
. Mr. Brennan. That I wouldn't know, Senator. 

Senator Baker. Did it start before you came to the FBI? 

Mr. Brennan. That would be very difficult for me to say. 

Senator Baker. Certainly you're in a better position to say than I 
am. Were they going on at the time that you came to the FBI ? 

Mr. Brennan. If they were, I had no knowledge of them. I gained 
no knowledge of them until the early fifties. 

Senator Baker. When did you first have knowledge of the "■black 
bag" jobs? 

Mr. Brennan. Tn the early fifties. 

Senator Baker. What was your understanding of who authorized 

Mr. Brennan. It was my understanding that they were authorized 
by the Director, Mr. Hoover. 

Senator Baker. Is that understanding based on documentary proof, 
on conversation with Mr. Hoover, on the statements of other people, 
or what? 

Mr. Brennan. Well, it was just the general knowledge that I 
gained through my investigative experience in the FBI. 

Senator Baker. When was a "black bag" job authorized ? When was 
it used? Under what circumstance for national security, or in order to 
assist a U.S. attorney in prosecuting a lawsuit? Out of curiosity, 
when was it authorized ? When did you use the "black bag" job that 
you today say is illegal ? 

Mr. Brennan. The "black bag" iobs that I knew of— which I guess 
you have to say were technically illegal — but, as I know of the tech- 
nique, for the most part through the years it involved counterespio- 
nage operations, sir. 

Senator Baker. Is that all ? 

Mr. Brennan. To my knowledge, yes sir. 


Senator Baker. Domestic espionage or international espionage? 

Mr. Brennan. I'm speaking of counterespionage. 

Senator Baker. You're speaking of counterespionage in the sense 
of a spy of a foreign country operating in this country, and you were 
trying to counter him ? Is that the counterespionage you're speaking 

Mr. Brennan. Yes sir. 

Senator Baker. And that's the only case you knew "black bag" jobs 
to be done ? 

Mr. Brennan. Subsequently, after I got to Bureau headquarters, 
I learned there were some "black bag" jobs which were directed at 
what I would have to term domestic subversive groups, and some 
domestic extremist organizations, but they were quite limited. 

Senator Baker. How many "black bag" jobs were done in the course 
of your tenure at the FBI ? 

Mr. Brennan. I would have no idea, sir. 

Senator Baker. Well, you've got to have some idea. Was it 1, or was 
it 1,000? 

Mr. Brennan. I do not think I would be capable of commenting. I 
do not have that range ; I did not work in that field where it was gen- 
erally employed as a technique, Senator. 

Senator Baker. How many do you have knowledge of ? Something 
in the range of what, 1, 10, 100, 1,000? 

Mr. Brennan. I don't think I'm in a position to be able to answer 
that, Senator. 

Senator Baker. Do you have any knowledge on that subject? 

Mr. Brennan. Yes ; in a general range. 

Senator Baker. Then I would like to have that general range. 

The Chairman. Senator Baker, we have figures. Would you like to 
have them ? We have documentary figures. 

Senator Baker. I would like that, and I would like the witness' 
impression too, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Very well. What was your impression? 

Mr. Brennan. Can we get a given time frame? 

Senator Baker. No. That you have knowledge of. 

Mr. Brennan. The overall impression on my 26 years in the FBI ? 

Senator Baker. Yes. 

Mr. Brennan. I would have to say — I would put it in a frame, 
possibly, of maybe 30, 40. 

Senator Baker. Did the FBI ever get caught ? 

Mr. Brennan. I don't think we did, Senator. 

Senator Baker. As a matter of fact, you didn't. 

Mr. Brennan. I never heard of anybody getting caught, sir. 

Senator Baker. And the techniques involved — were they with the 
cooperation of the local police? How many men did it take? What 
techniques did you employ to keep from getting caught ? 

Mr. Brennan. I never engaged in one, Senator, so again, I would 
have to speculate on that, or speak from hearsay. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, do you have some figures ? 

The Chairman. Yes. I was just going to congratulate you, Senator, 
because you have managed to get your rebuttal and a good speech and 
your questions all within 10 minutes. 

Senator Baker. I think I'm being politely told to shut up. 

[General laughter.] 


The Chairman. Now, let me just give these figures. These are fig- 
ures that have been supplied to us by the Federal Bureau of Investiga- 
tion ; they have, at our request, been declassified. And I would like to 
read them into the record. 

At least 14 domestic subversive targets were the subject of at least 
238 entries from 1942 to April 1968. In addition, at least three domes- 
tic subversive targets were the subject of numerous entries from Octo- 
ber 1952 to June 1966. Since there exists no precise record of entries, 
we are unable to retrieve an accurate accounting of their number, but 
that is tlge best figure we have. 

Senator Baker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This final question, Mr. 
Brennan, since my time apparently has expired. Was your division 
the one involved in any surveillance of political figures at the Demo- 
cratic National Convention in 1968 ? 

Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir. "We developed all of the intelligence infor- 
mation relative to the activities of the dissidents who went out to 
Chicago to disrupt the convention. However, I don't recall any time 
that any instructions were given to include surveillances of, as you 
say, political figures, Senator. 

Senator Baker. Yes. I'm talking about the allegations and the 
charges that the FBI kept surveillance /on Bobert Kennedy and 
Senator Edward Kennedy and Martin Luther King, and a number of 
other political figures, and that, in fact, there was a communications 
link— I believe a telephone — from FBI; headquarters in that city 
to the White House — even to the Oval Office. 

Mr. Brennan. I am not familiar with such surveillances. But 

Senator Baker. You're familiar with those allegations and charges? 

Mr. Brennan. No. As a matter of fact, I'm not. 

Senator Baker. You've never heard them before? 

Mr. Brennan. No. Not those specific ones. 

Senator Baker. Well, generally, maybe I'm not describing it with 
exact accuracy. . 

Mr. Brennan. I recall that there was an Earth Day affair, which I 
believe Senator Muskie made a speech, or something, and I believe an 
FBI report dealt somehow with the Senator's appearance on that 
occasion. But any information of that type was purely coincidental 
to the investigative efforts of the FBI which were basically directed 
at the activists who were involved in those types of movements. And 
anything related to political figures was actually coincidental. 

Senator Baker. I'm told I was wrong. It was not at the 1968 con- 
vention ; it was the 1964 convention that I was referring to. Does that 
alter your answer at all ? 

Mr. Brennan. I had little knowledge of the 1964 convention. That 
was not coordinated out of the Domestic Intelligence Division. It is 
my recollection that that was basically coordinated by Mr. DeLoach. 

Senator Baker. Are you aware, generally, of the situation that I 
described in reference to the 1964 Democratic National Convention? 

Mr. Brennan. I'm aware in general, because the FBI personnel that 
were there at that time were phoning in reports concerning the activi- 
ties of individuals and groups over which Domestic Intelligence Divi- 
sion had an interest. 


Senator Baker. Did they phone in reports on Martin Luther King or 
on Kobert Kennedy ? 

Mr. Brennan. I do not recall that they did that ; no, sir. 

Senator Baker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Baker. The Foreign 
Relations Committee is considering the Sinai agreement, and I have 
to stop in there this morning for a few minutes. I am trying to get the 
agreements declassified, and I'm going to ask Senator Tower to take 
over during the time I have to be away. Senator Huddleston is next. 

Senator Huddleston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I regret that I had to miss most of the session so far this morning; 
I was at another subcommittee looking into another operation in our 
system — the matter of our grain inspection program and the corruption 
that has been discovered there and all its implications for this country 
and for our dealing with countries in the other parts of the world. So 
I will be brief, and hopefully not trespass on subjects that have already 
been covered by the witness. 

Mr. Brennan, were you aware while you were with the FBI that prior 
to the development ol the Huston plan there was a growing feeling of 
conflict between the FBI and the CIA, particularly at the top levels 
involving Mr. Hoover? 

Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir. I was. 

Senator Huddleston. How do you think this conflict affected the ef- 
ficiency of the total intelligence-gathering community ? 

Mr. Brennan. Are you speaking now, Senator — you will have to 
put me within the correct time frame. Are you speaking of 

Senator Huddleston. Leading up to the formation of the Huston 
plan, 1969, 1970. 

Mr. Brennan. It is my recollection that the Director of the FBI dis- 
continued direct liason with the CIA, I believe, in February of 1969 
or 1970. 

Senator Huddleston. I think that is very close, if not the exact date. 

Mr. Brennan. And basically, I do not think that had a great deal of 
effect, relative to our participation with the CIA in the Huston plan. 

Senator Huddleston. Now, this conflict resulted primarily from a 
reluctance on the part of Mr. Hoover to participate in certain sug- 
gested intelligence-gathering activities. Is that correct? 

Mr. Brennan. The conflict between CIA and FBI ? 

Senator Huddleston. Right. 

Mr. Brennan. No. sir. That arose out of a dispute which arose from 
a set of circumstances which occurred in, I believe, Denver, Colo., in 
which an FBI agent gave some information to a CIA agent, which Mr. 
Hoover learned about. He objected to — he had Mr. Helms call the CIA 
agent back to Washington, and he insisted on knowing the identity of 
the FBI agent who had divulged the information. 

Senator Huddleston. Right. Mr. Angleton described that incident 
yesterday. He described it as the straw that broke the camel's back, I 

Mr. Brennan. Yes. 

Senator Huddleston. Which would indicate there were other in- 
stances, too, such as a request by the CIA for specific wiretaps, this 
type thing — are you aware of any of this ? 


Mr. Brennan. I'm not too much aware of those, Senator, because I 
did not assume the position as Assistant Director of the Domestic Intel- 
ligence Division until August of 1970. And I think that the incidents, 
or whatever, that may have led up to a relationship of friction between 
the two agencies, had gone on before that. And I was really not all that 
aware of the details. 

Senator Htjddleston. Were you aware that Mr. Hoover resisted the 
proposals that were included in the Huston plan? 

Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir, I was. 

Senator Httddleston. Did Mr. Hoover also resist — at least for some 
period of time — the suggestions for the intensification program that 
followed the demise of the Huston plan ? 

Mr. Brennan. Well, the intensification program was not, let us say, 
an intensification program as might be defined within the concept of a 
program, sir. 

What I am saying is, if you put all of these individual recommenda- 
tions together, it resulted in intensification, but it was not a one-pack- 
age program. 

Senator Htjddleston. Wasn't it a fact that Mr. Hoover had great 
reservations and resisted some suggested intelligence-gathering activi- 
ties during this period ? 

Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir, he very definitely did. 

Senator Htjddleston. And it was Mr. Hoover going to the Attorney 
General, and then perhaps both of them going to the President, that 
actually scuttled the Huston plan. Is that correct ? 

Mr. Brennan. That is my understanding of what happened, sir; 

Senator Htjddleston. And why, in your judgment, was Mr. Hoover 
so reluctant to participate in these suggested intensifications of the 
intelligence-gathering activity ? 

Mr. Brennan. Well, sir, I think I previously explained that I feel 
that these techniques encompass some degree of risk which might 
constitute a backlash, which Mr. Hoover was desirous of avoiding. 

Senator Htjddleston. The kind of backlash that would reflect on the 

Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir. Embarassing incidents in which agents 
might be involved. 

Senator Htjddleston. You think this was a greater concern of his 
than any abridgment of individual liberties or freedoms that might 
occur because of these activities ? 

Mr. Brennan. That is my personal feeling. He hadn't demonstrated 
a previous concern of this nature in the past. 

Senator Htjddleston. But then after some insistence, and after de- 
veloping additional activities that might be employed, on October 29, 
Mr. Hoover and the top echelons of the FBI did agree to certain types 
of activities which would, in fact, double the caseload of the FBI in 
intelligence ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir, I believe so. 

Senator Htjddleston. Upon what basis do you believe this agree- 
ment came about, or this change in position, on the part of Mr. Hoover ? 

Mr. Brennan. It is difficult for me to recall the time frame, Senator, 
but I believe that possibly it might have been motivated by possible 
budgetary considerations. 


Senator Huddleston. Are you saying, then, that Mr. Hoover and 
the other top officials of the FBI entered into this kind of a program 
which intensified its intelligence-gathering activity — and went be- 
yond what might have been legal — for the purpose of increasing the 
caseload so that the budget of the FBI could be sustained or increased ? 
Mr. Brennan. No. I don't know that — can you clarify for me which 
techniques that you are stating the Director approved which would 
have been illegal ? 

Senator Huddleston. "Well, there were a number of activities in- 
cluded. The lifting of a moratorium. on investigations of 7,000 in- 
dividuals on the Security Index — what did that mean? 

Mr. Brennan. That was involved in a procedure whereby cases 
would be opened at periodic intervals to recheck whether or not the 
individual might possibly still be employed at the same place^ and so 

Senator Huddleston. Which required agents in the field to intensify 
their surveillance of these individuals, whether or not there had been 
any indication that these individuals were,- in fact, engaging in any 
kind of wrongdoing. 

Mr. Brennan. I don't think it constituted surveillance, Senator. I 

think it merely involved reopening 

Senator Huddleston. Some kind of checking would be required. 
Mr. Brennan. A check, yes. A check. 

Senator Huddleston. Exhibit 41 * mentions opening cases on ap- 
proximately 4,000 black student activists, all members of the Black 
Student Unions, and similar groups, regardless of their past or present 
involvement in disorders. Does that constitute a check ? 
Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir. 

Senator Huddleston. Would this not, too, involve further checks, 
further investigation and surveillance, against people who had no 
record of any kind of participation in any sort of wrongdoing or 
disturbance ? 

Mr. Brennan. It was designed to try to develop information about 
the types of individuals who were activists in such groups who might 
further instigate individuals who had propensities for violence. 

Senator Huddleston. It involved the opening of cases on approxi- 
mately 6,500 New Left student activists, black and white, to determine 
whether they had a propensity for violence. Now, how do you investi- 
gate a person to find out whether or not he or she has a propensity for 
violence ? 

Mr. Brennan. You cover his activities in connection with demon- 
strations and the like, and attempt to ascertain whether he is exhorting 
other individuals to engage in violence. A number of these individuals 
publicly professed their determination to destroy or overthrow the 
Government of the United States. 

A number of them advocated means by which these efforts should be 
furthered, and Bureau investigations were broadly encompassing to 
make a determination as to whether or not they did, in fact, do cer- 
tain of these activities. 

Senator Huddleston. We're looking at 6,500 people. You're surely 
looking at a number of people who have no experience in violence, and 

1 See p. 317. 


who have no activity that would suggest that they have been involved 
in violence. 
Mr. Brennan. That is true, Senator, but I think thafc- 

Senator Huddleston. It's a dragnet, "shotgun" type of operation. 

Mr. Brennan. I think that's true. But by that time I believe that 
the leaders of the New Left movement had publicly professed their 
determination to act to overthrow the Government of the United 
States. And I felt that with them on public record as having this basic 
objective, anyone who joined in membership in their cause, possibly 
should have their names recorded for future reference in FBI files. 
And I was reminded of the circumstances of the thirties, when many 
individuals, who at that time were involved and concerned as a result 
of the economic depression, became involved with Communist 

A great deal of Communist cells developed, and many of the indi- 
viduals who at that time were in colleges, subsequently were em- 
ployed in sensitive positions of Government, and the Government had 
no record of their previous Communist involvement. I did not want to 
see a repetition of that sort of circumstances come about. 

So that when individuals did profess themselves to be in adherence 
to the concepts which aimed at or called for the overthrow of their 
Government, I did feel that the FBI had the responsibility to record 
that type of information so if they ever obtained sensitive Government 
positions that could be made known, and known to the agency for 
which they were going to go to work. 

Senator Huddleston. So it is better to go with a blanket approach 
rather than possibly miss somebody who might turn up somewhere 
down the road. 

Mr. Brennan. Well, sir, I feel that the absence of any type of ap- 
proach in the thirties indicated to me that history proves that you can 
make tragic mistakes. And I felt that this Government should not fall 
into that type of a tragic mistake again. 

Senator Huddleston. My one point on the investigations of the 
7,000 individuals on the Security Index is that it puts a person in the 
position of being locked up. So that is a rather serious position for a 
person to be in, or a category for him to be in. And this was part of this 
effort to increase the caseload, is that correct ? 

I think the total of these certainly represents a substantial intensifi- 
cation and increase in the activity of the FBI in this field of domestic 
intelligence. And I believe during this period — if it hasn't been 
pointed out already — you switched almost entirely from a counterin- 
telligence operation to a domestic intelligence operation. 

Mr. Brennan. No ; I don't think that is true, Senator. I think that 
there was a different type of balance. 

Senator Huddleston. The emphasis 

Mr. Brennan. There was more of an emphasis on the domestic, but 
I think that the emphasis stemmed from the activists in this country 
who were using explosives and the like to such a disruptive effect, 
when, to me, it was a question of putting your priorities in order, and 
I personally felt that the domestic situation had a higher priority at 
that particular given time. 

Senator Huddleston. All right. Yesterday Mr. Angleton indicated 
to this committee that the most appropriate subject for investigation 


into the intelligence-gathering community of this Nation would be to 
look at the product of what is being produced, and determine whether 
or not that was adequate. 

He suggested by that statement, I think, that it is the end, rather 
than the means, that is important And maybe the methods used — 
whether or not civil liberties might be abridged, or the Constitution 
violated — was not as important as what the final product was. Now 
Mr. Angleton, I assume, was speaking for himself and not the CIA. 
I am wondering what your concept is and whether this is the 
attitude that prevails in the FBI and in other intelUgence-gathering 

Mr. Brennan. No; I don't think so, Senator. My particular feeling 
on that score — and I feel this is possibly representative of the general 
level of feeling inside the FBI — is that the end never justifies the 
means. I believe that we are a society of law and order, and I believe 
that our intelligence agencies, or any organization acting on behalf of 
our Government, should behave within the concept of the laws that 
they are trying to uphold. And I feel that the problem that has been 
long lacking has been the fact that we have not had the legislation 
which has clearly defined for the FBI the role that it must play in 
order to enable it to fulfill its responsibilities. 

And I believe that this problem arose when the fact that we were 
operating basically out of a directive by President Roosevelt in 1939, 
which enabled the FBI to cope with problems which dealt with sub- 
versive activities, so-called because they were clearly and directly 
related to foreign interests. But I believe that once we passed 1960, 
when we got into a new era that marked a drastic social, political, and 
economic change in our society, and we saw a number of individuals in 
our country who professed themselves to be revolutionaries, dedicated 
to the overthrow of our Government, this posed new problems which 
should have brought about better denned legislation to enable the FBI 
to fulfill its responsibilities. 

And I hopefully feel that, if nothing else, something may come out 
of the hearings of this committee that will give the FBI the applicable 
legal framework to enable it to go ahead and do its job. 

Senator Huddleston. That is our objective, Mr. Brennan. I think 
your concept would conform to those of the members of this com- 
mittee. We are trying to find out how to do it, and your testimony 
will be helpful in that regard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Tower [presiding]. Senator Goldwater? 

Senator Goldwater. I have no questions. 

Senator Tower. Senator Morgan ? 

Senator Morgan. Mr. Brennan, many of the 7,000 individuals who 
were on the Security Index were on there simply because they belonged 
to a given organization or some other group that you were suspicious 
of. Is that not true ? 

Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir. 

Senator Morgan. In other words, as far back as 1950, you and others 
in the Bureau followed the doctrine of guilt by association. 

Mr. Brennan. No ; I wouldn't say that's true, Senator. 

Senator Morgan. Well, if you put a man's name on a list because he 
was a member of an organization that was not illegal, he was put on 
there because he was associated with other people who are in that 
group that you might have suspected. Jp that not true? 


Mr. Brennan. Well, that possibly would be an interpretation that 
you could put on it. 

Senator Morgan. And from that time on, right on through the anti- 
war demonstrations, you and the Bureau had followed a policy of hold- 
ing anyone else guilty, or holding others guilty by association, if they 
associated with groups that you were suspicious of. Is that not true? 

Mr. Brennan. No; I don't think that's true. And let me clarify for 
you, Senator, something relative to the Security Index. The Security 
Index was something which was in existence years before I ever ar- 
rived at FBI headquarters. And as the Senator here indicated, it also 
involved one aspect of potential emergency detention. 

I was opposed to, in general frames, the existence of a Security 
Index of that nature, and I think if you review FBI files you will find 
that I worked actively to reduce the number of individuals on the 
Security Index, and I changed the policies and procedures which 
drastically reduced those numbers. And I also changed the priorities 
which would determine the basis for which individuals might be con- 
sidered for emergency detention. 

Senator Morgan. But on through the years, during your association 
with the Bureau, you have engaged in illegal activities such as unlaw- 
fully breaking and entering, because you felt that the ends justified 
the means. 

Mr. Brennan. I never did, Senator. No. 

Senator Morgan. Well, under your direction did the Bureau not do 

Mr. Brennan. I don't recall any specific instances under my 
direction, Senator. 

Senator Morgan. Well do you not know of such incidents in the 

Mr. Brennan. I know of such-instances ; yes. 

Senator Morgan. Mr. Brennan, I ask you, as early as the sixties — 
and I believe you indicated that is when most of it commenced — if 
you didn't, for instance, unlawfully break into the Ku Klux Klan 
headquarters in Louisiana, obtain the list of the membership and the 
financial records, and then proceed to arrest those members? 

Mr. Brennan. In 1960? 

Senator Morgan. Somewhere in the sixties. I don't remember the 
exact date. 

Mr. Brennan. I was shown a document which related to a penetra- 
tion of what I would term a domestic extremist group, and I believe 
I indicated in there that I had no specific recollection of the specific 
penetration which may have been indicated. 

Senator Morgan. By penetration, you mean breaking and entering, 
and getting into the organizations, right ? 

Mr. Brennan. Yes sir. 

Senator Morgan. I ask you to look at exhibit 32 * which is a memo- 
randum dated July 19, 1966, from Mr. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach. 
Do you see that memorandum ? 

Mr. Brennan. Yes sir, I see that. 

Senator Morgan. Look on the bottom of the second page. 

1 See p. 273. 


Mr. Chairman, I am advised that an agreement would be reached 
that we would not talk about specific instances of unlawful break- 
ing and entering. Is that correct ? 

Senator Tower. I will defer that to Counsel. 

Mr. Sohwarz. Senator Morgan, they have not declassified the 
specific instances, and we are open to talking about the generalities 
at this point. We intend, I believe, to pernaps get back to specifics at 
another point. 

Senator Morgan. Mr. Brennan, it is true that you broke into these 
organization's headquarters, obtained membership rosters, financial 
information, not only with the white extremists, but, as you have 
already testified, you investigated the black extremist groups, regard- 
less of whether you had had trouble with them or not. 

That is true throughout the decade of the sixties, isn't it? 

Mr. Brennan. Yes sir. 

Senator Morgan. And you went beyond that. You not only broke in 
and obtained this information, but you then proceeded to harrass 
these people by having their income tax records checked, did you not? 

Mr. Brennan. I assume, Senator, when you say, I, that you did this, 
that you are referring to the FBI ? 

Senator Morgan. Yes ; speaking with regard to the FBI. 

Mr. Brennan. Yes sir. 

Senator Morgan. And you, as a member of the FBI and part of the 
Justice Department, had access to every income tax return filed in this 
country, didn't you, simply by the attorney for the Justice Department 
certifying that it was needed in the course of your investigation ? 

Mr. Brennan. I don't know that we had access to the tax return of 
every individual in this country, sir. 

Senator Morgan. Did you ever have any trouble getting the tax re- 
turn of anyone you wanted, whose return you wanted because you 
were investigating? 

Mr. Brennan. I'm not too familiar with the use of that technique, 

Senator Morgan. I will ask you, sir, if you don't know that the FBI 
made it a practice of harrassing, or calling for tax investigations of 
those that they thought, in good faith, were dangerous, such as black 
extremists, white extremists, war demonstrators, those who wanted to 
go to the Democratic and Republican Conventions, in order to keep 
them busy, in order to keep them occupied ? 

Mr. Brennan. I was never aware that the FBI requested the IRS 
to harrass any individual on the basis of his tax return, Senator. 

Senator Morgan. Well, did you harrass them in any way through 
your investigations in order to keep them occupied, to keep them busy ? 

Mr. Brennan. Not that I have specific recollection of — the nature of 
that incident. 

Senator Morgan. Now the Director issued an order to stop the un- 
lawful breaking and entering in 1966. 

Mr. Brennan. Yes sir. 

Senator Morgan. But it did continue some after that, did it not? 

Mr. Brennan. Not to my knowledge. 

Senator Morgan. Not to your knowledge. I believe you told Senator 
Mondale that you thought that at times, in the main interest of na- 
tional security, such break-ins and enterings were justified. 


Mr. Brennan. I think I told the Senator that I feel there is a need 
for legislation which would provide the legal framework for whatever 
action is decided the FBI should be engaged in. 

Senator Morgan. Did you not say also that you thought that there 
were times when such unlawful entry was justified and warranted ? 

Mr. Brennan. In the absence of any specific legislation, and if the 
FBI had the responsibility to develop information regarding the 
efforts of agents of a foreign power who were actively engaged in spy- 
ing on intelligence activities in this country, I would say, yes sir, it 
would be justified. 

Senator Morgan. What do you refer to as domestic counterespion- 
age ? What is that ? 

Mr. Brennan. Do you have a reference to domestic counter- 
espionage ? 

Senator Morgan. I believe you referred to it earlier as domestic 

Mr. Brennan. I do not think those two terms are coincidental or re- 
lated. I referred to counterespionage as related to the type of activity 
which would be designed to block, negate, nullify, or develop informa- 
tion for prosecutive purposes concerning the activities of individuals 
who have been sent to this country, either under the guise of diplo- 
matic cover legally, or as illegal agents, or utilizing Americans in con- 
cert with foreign agents, to engage in intelligence operations here. I 
would interpret the domestic groups to be basically related to the 
Americans who were involved in either, let us say New Left-type 
activities, Old Left activities, or extremist type activities. 

Senator Morgan: All right. But going back to domestic activities, 
and especially to the question that the chairman asked you with regard 
to your instructions, or the Bureau's instruction, to investigate every 
black student group, regardless of whether or not that group had been 
involved in any unlawful activities, was that sort of an effort to intimi- 
date the black students from belonging to those groups ? Was it not a 
type of espionage f 

Mr. Brennan. No sir. I think if you look — as I pointed out to the 
chairman, I believe — the basis for that cited the fact that there had 
been a significant increase in disruptive activities on the part of some 
Black Student Unions, and I think the instructions concerned the ini- 
tiation of investigations to determine which ones may have developed 
a propensity for violence. 

Senator Morgan. I only have a minute left, Mr. Brennan. Let me 
use that minute to say to you that I, of course, can understand the ap- 
prehensions of the Bureau, and your efforts to apprehend those who 
violated the law. But as a former chief law officer of my State, and one 
who directed a substantial law enforcement agency, I believe that there 
are adequate laws on the books today to enable any competent and 
efficient law enforcement agency to enforce the laws of this country 
without engaging in unlawful breaking and entering, without engag- 
ing in unlawful wiretaps, without using the IKS for the purpose of 
harrassing the citizens that we may suspect even though they may be 
guilty of nothing, but who, in our judgment, might be dangerous to 

I think it may take a little more effort on the part of our law en- 
forcement agencies. They may have to be better trained. But I think it 


can be done, and I don't believe that in this country that we can toler- 
ate people in Government violating laws themselves in order to appre- 
hend others'that we may suspect of violating the laws. Thank you, Mr. 
Senator Toweb. Senator Mathias ? 

Senator Mathias. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Brennan, I re- 
joiced a moment ago when I heard you say that under the pressure 
of what appeared to be a domestic threat that the proper solution 
should have been to seek legislation to deal with it. I just want to say 
to you that I think that was absolutely the right reaction, and that it 
is a tragedy that your advice in this matter was not carried out. 

The temptation is very great to say, "Well, we are in an emergency 
situation, we have to take emergency action." But, I think we ought to 
keep in mind some of the thoughtful advice we have had from great 
Americans in the past on this. 

Chief Justice Hughes, who I look upon as a very great American, 
writing in a case in 1934 said that "an emergency does not create 
power. Emergency does not increase granted power or remove or di- 
minish restrictions imposed upon the power granted or reserved. The 
Constitution was adopted in a period of grave emergency. Its grants 
and powers to the Federal Government and its limitations to the power 
of the States were determined in the light of emergency, and they are 
not altered by emergency." And I think this, in essence, is what you 
were telling us, and I think as we look to the future we want to try to 
insure that institutions, as they carry out their lawful duties, remem- 
ber that emergencies alone do not create the power that is necessary 
to cope with. But there are within the constitutional framework sources 
of power which I think are capable of meeting any emergency, so it 
is the process that is important. 

Mr. Brennan. I appreciate your observation, Senator. I agree with 
you wholeheartedly, and I think the record should show that I am 
very proud to be a member of the FBI. I think the FBI did an out- 
standing job over the years, and I think the people of the FBI repre- 
sented the finest group of individuals that I have ever had the oppor- 
tunity to associate with and I think as they stand today, they are ready 
and willing to do a further and better job for the country, and I do 
feel that there is a specific need for legislation to enable them — all 
they want to know is what are the guidelines, what do you want us to 
do, and tell us what are the limits that you do not want us to exceed, 
and I am very confident that the FBI will agree with that concept. 
Senator Mathias. It seems to me it is the work of this committee, for 
the first time in a generation, to try to provide those kinds of guidelines 
for the FBI, the CIA, the DIA, the NSA and the other intelligence 

agencies that are important to the work of Government- 

Mr. Brennan. I agree, sir. 

Senator Mathias [continuing]. And this is the long overdue dis- 
charge of responsibility for the Congress. 

I would like to look with you at the July 19, 1966, memorandum [ex- 
hibit 32 *] from Mr. DeLoach to Mr. Sullivan with reference to "black 
bag" jobs, and, without reviewing the terms of that memorandum, 
it would appear from it that it confirms your earlier testimony that 

1 See p. 273. 


the '"black bag" jobs had, in fact, been going on for some period of time 
prior co ivov, woiuu ic noes 

Mr. xjrennan. ies,sir. 

ttenator mathias. .aaid it also then confirms Mr. Huston's testimony 
of xuesuay, tnat ac least as lar as surreptitious entries are concerneu, 
they cua not Degin witn the Huston pian, wouia it not '( 

Mr. jdrennan. ino, sir. x mean re wouia connim Mr. Huston's testi- 

Senator Mathias. It would confirm it so that Mr. Huston really does 
not deserve creait as Deing an innovator, if you can call it credit; he 
was sort 01 a coditier of a practice tnat nad already existed. 

Mr. ±Srennan. ies; as a matter of iact, 1 do not know that Mr. 
Huston ever beiore, arter, or at any time between, ever nad any con- 
nection with any so-caued "black bag" job. 

Senator mathias. This gives me, x tnink, greater concern than if he 
had tnougnt it ah up. it is very simple to deal with one man. We can 
get rid 01 mm. W e, in ehect, nave gotten rid 01 mm. But ueaiing with 
institutional practices that have been in eftect for a long time is a much 
tougher job. 

Tne memorandum does say on page 2 that "Also through the use of 
this technique we nave on numerous occasions been able to obtain mate- 
rial held hignly secret and closely guarded by subversive groups and 
organizations which consisted of membership fists and mailing lists of 
these organizations." I wondered what criterion you imposed on your- 
self and your organization to decide whether the pursuit of domestic 
intelligence had crossed over the tnreshoid. It was no longer tne pursuit 
of subversive information, but actually interierence in legitimate 
domestic political activity. Did you have any sort of test tnat you 
made yourself when some investigation was undertaken as to whether 
this was a proper investigation ? How did you approach it i I am inter- 
ested in your thought process. 

Mr. Brennan. VVeil, it gets to be a little bit of a complicated ques- 
tion. You mean the basis on which investigations were initiated? 

Senator Mathias. Was there ever any point in which a red light 
flashed before you and you said "Well, 1 do not think we ought to get 
into this, I think this is getting into a constitutionally protected area" ? 

Mr. Brennan. There may have been some instances. I am sure there 
probably were some instances, Senator. Eight offhand, I cannot recol- 
lect or recall. 

Senator Mathias. But you did not even have sort of a mental check- 

Mr. Brennan. Well, you had the basic responsibility of the FBI 
within the framework of the Presidential directives that may have 
existed within the degree of legislation that might have been passed 
by Congress, and based on the instructions from the Attorney General. 
This provided a broad framework for FBI operations and there was 
no — I do not think there was a situation within the FBI where any one 
individual, in other words, would have given a green light, so I think 
we had relatively a series of checks and balances, that prior to a really 
serious investigative matter, you would have to get approval along the 
line in the chain of command. 

62-685 O • 76 -9 


Senator Mathias. But these were internal checklists, and what I 
interpret as an appeal for you for congressional guidelines would be 
applicable in this very kind of situation. 

Mr. Brennan. I feel that the possibility here, Senator, might arise 
for, let us say, a congressional legislative oversight committee, which 
would encompass agents from the FBI and which would also encom- 
pass attorneys from the Department of Justice who could, thereby, 
git down and analyze the nature of the problems that the FBI is con- 
fronted with, have the prosecutive opinions of the attorneys, and get 
the overall legislative impressions of the Members of Congress. And I 
feel, by working together in this groundwork, perhaps it can all be 
brought together so that there can be a concise framework established 
for the future operations of the FBI. 

Senator Mathias. But there was never any such consultation during 
the periods in which the "black bag" practice developed, which was a 
long period of time. 

Mr. Brennan. Not to my knowledge, Senator. 

Senator Mathias. I would like to move on to the memorandum or 
the letter written by Mr. Helms to Mr. Hoover which is exhibit 36, 1 
dated February 26, 1970, and I would refer to the notation in Mr. 
Hoover's handwriting at the bottom of page 3, which says, "This is 
not satisfactory. I want our Denver office to have absolutely no contacts 
with CIA. I want direct liaison here with CIA to be terminated and 
any contact with CIA in the future to be by letter only." Signed "H." 

Were you aware of this directive by Mr. Hoover? 

Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir. I was. 

Senator Mathias. Did this affect the operations of the FBI? 

Mr. Brennan. I very definitely believe it did because I feel the vari- 
ous members of the intelligence community must work together in 
order to fulfill everybody's basic intelligence responsibilities, and I felt 
that the decision by Mr. Hoover to cut off relationship with the CIA 
was just totally an atrocious decision and was not consistent with what 
the responsibilities of the intelligence community are. 

We rely upon and deal with ClA closely, as they do with us. in the 
interchange of matters of mutual interest to both of us, and it just did 
not square with the abilities of each to be able to carry out the re- 
sponsibilities and perform the functions by saying, "discontinue liai- 
son wth the CIA." 

Senator Mathias. So you think the best interests of our Government 
and our people were injured by the rupture between the FBI and the 
CIA in 1970. 

Mr. Brennan. It certainly did not improve things, Senator. I feel it 
certainly did hurt. 

Senator Mathias. Now, in considering the recommendations of this 
committee to govern the whole intelligence community in the future, 
do you think this kind of liaison ought to be mandated by the Congress 
so that one official, even an official as important as the Director of the 
FBI or the Director of the CIA, would not be able to cause such a total 

Mr. Brennan. Very definitely. There should have been some degree 
of objection right then and there which would have brought the mat- 

1 See p. 283. 


ter to a head and which would have resulted in calling Mr. Hoover to 
task for an explanation as to why he arbitrarily was able to discontinue 
a relationship with the CIA, and unfortunately that did not come 
a i? U v.' - fc * . a ? ree tnat tnere should be some means in the future by 
which no individual in a position of directorship of a particular Gov- 
ernment agency should be able arbitrarily just to say who he is going 
to have contact with and who he is not, especially if it comes down to a 
point where it is injurious to the functions of the intelligence com- 

Senator Mathias. To your knowledge, was there any objection to 
this from any higher authority in Government ? 

Mr. Brennan. Not that I know of. In effect, we worked around it 

Senator Mathias. And in fact, it may not even have been known to 
higher authority in Government, is that not true ? 

Mr. Brennan. I believe it must have been known, Senator. 

Senator Mathias. So that, really, the only remedy is to provide by 
law for the kind of liaison which is absolutely necessary if we are to 
have the most effective use of the intelligence agencies ? 

Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir. 

Senator Mathias. Thank you, Mr. Brennan. 

The Chairman [presiding]. Senator Hart. 

Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. Brennan, did the FBI conduct any 
surveillance of political figures at the 1972 Democratic Convention? 

Mr. Brennan. Not to my recollection, Senator. And if they— polit- 
ical figures— in other words, I was not in — which one, 1968 ? 

Senator Hart of Colorado. 1972. 

Mr. Brennan. 1972. 1 do not believe they did, Senator. 

Senator Hart of Colorado. Could you find out and let the committee 

Mr. Brennan. Senator, I am no longer in the FBI. 

Senator Hart of Colorado. All right, we will find out. Thank you. 

Mr. Brennan, how do you define the New Left, and whose definition 
was used by the FBI ? 

Mr. Brennan. The New Left was sort of an amorphous, disjointed 
collection of individuals that ranged all the way from those who were 
relatively, let us say, to put it in a nice style, were adopting a new style 
of life, and some of those who were involved in the drug scene, moving 
all the way up the ladder to those who were more legitimately con- 
cerned with—and I think this probably constitutes the overwhelming 
bulk and majority of it — several millions, clearly, of students who 
were clearly and objectively opposed to our involvement in the Viet- 
nam situation, and then a relatively small, let us say, a few thousand 
individuals who were involved in the extremist sense of feeling that 
the only way to resolve the difficulties they saw confronting us was to 
take matters into their own hands, to use violence to achieve their 

Senator Hart of Colorado. That is a pretty sweeping definition, 
is it not? 

Mr. Brennan. I think that constitutes in my framework of refer- 
ence, anyway, Senator, what I would term the New Left movement. 

Senator Hart of Colorado. A lot of the documents that we have 
before us and that are in the record refer to the need to watch and 
follow and otherwise survey the New Left. That is quite a bit of this 
country, not to mention a whole generation. 


Mr. Bkennan. I think, Senator, within the context of the reference 
to the New Left, as it is contained in FBI communications, I think we 
are basically referring more to trying to isolate out of this broad amor- 
phous-type grouping, the grouping I described for you, basically the 
individuals who advocated violent — who displayed a propensity for 
violence, individuals who publicly professed their supposed revolution- 
ary drive, and individuals who espoused Marxist-Leninist concepts, at 
the same time individuals who denounced the Communist Party as a 
moribund defunct party, and who aligned themselves in a greater 
sphere with the revolutionary leaders of Communist movements 
throughout the world. 

Senator Hart of Colorado. I do not find that qualification anywhere 
in the documents I have seen. You sent out dragnet kind of instructions 
to your special agents in charge of field agents and so forth, concerning 
the New Left, not using any of the qualifications that you have just 
stated here, which gave the agents a Droad latitude as to whom they 
could watch, follow, break in on, and any one of a variety of other 

Mr. Brennan. I do not think, if you are implying that we watched 
and followed and broke in on millions of individuals, Senator, I do 
not think that is true. I think that you have to give us some credit for 
some degree of circumspection in the handling of these matters, and I 
think ifyou — in the context of specific instructions that related to the 
investigative responsibilities of the Bureau, I think that it emerges 
that there is a framework for our investigative responsibilities. 

Senator Hart of Colorado. Well, Mr. Brennan, if that degree of 
circumspection that you were relying on had not broken down, I doubt 
that this committee would be in existence. Let me refer to a document, 
exhibit 44 1 that I think has already been brought up in this hearing, 
a memorandum from Mr. Felt to Mr. Tolson, dated September 2, 1970. 
It is a document relating to whether people of age 18 to 21 should be 
recruited as informants. 

At the bottom of the first page of that memorandum, it says, "If we 
could develop informants among these new members," talking about 
the younger people of various groups, "we could guide them to key 
positions. By the time they are 21 years of age they are almost ready to 
leave college and have been subjected to the corrosive influence and 
brainwashing: of ultra-liberal and radical professors." An observa- 
tion that follows says that "The important consideration, of course, 
is to protect the Bureau from possible embarrassment. Many of our 18-, 
19- and 20-year-old men and women are highly intelligent, mature, 
and loyal citizens." 

That is a nice observation. "This has recently been recognized by 
the Congress in lowering the voting age to 18 years. It is felt the same 
concept can-logically be applied to the revolutionary conflict at home 
and particularly on campuses." 

There follows a penciled notation or a pen notation. "I don't hold 
this view. [Signed] H," which I understand is the Director of the FBI. 
Could you tell this committee why Mr. Hoover did not like young 
people ? [General laughter.] 

Mr. Brbnnan. I think you have drawn that conclusion from that. 
I do not know whether I could agree that that was a conclusion that he 
had arrived at. I was reminded before that I should not engage in such 

'See p. 328. 


speculative conclusions as to why somebody else may have felt some- 
thing of this nature. 

Senator Hart of Colorado. You do not know why he made that 
notation ? 

Mr. Brennan. I do not know. 

Senator Hart of Colorado. There was a lot of merriment around 
this town recently when a journalist inspected the Secretary of State's 
garbage. Did the FBI ever involve itself in trash or garbage 

Mr. Brennan. I believe we had a program some years ago which in- 
volved an assessment of trash. 

Senator Hart of Colorado. What kind of things were you looking 
for in the trash ? 

Mr. Brennan. Basically, as I recall, we were looking for notes or 
materials related to individuals we suspected to be intelligence agents 
of foreign countries or engaged in espionage activities in the United 
States, and anything that might give us a clue as to types of individuals 
in the United States that they might be in contact with. 

Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. Brennan, in your many years at the 
Bureau, have you ever known a trained agent of a foreign power to 
put incriminating documents in his trash or garbage ? 

Mr. Brennan. It is conceivable. 

Senator Hart of Colorado. I did not ask the question whether it is 
conceivable. I said, did you have a specific case where that had hap- 
pened ? Colonel Abel or anyone else ? 

Mr. Brennan. Specificaily, at the moment, I cannot recall any. Per- 
haps the FBI records might provide a better indication of whether 
they had achieved through that degree of investigative technique any- 
thing that was of a positive nature. 

Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. Brennan, can you account for the 
reasons why the so-called Thomas Riha case caused the seriousness 
of the breach between the CIA and the FBI ? 

Mr. Brennan. Why it caused the breach? 

Senator Hart of Colorado. What having to do with Professor Eiha 
accounted for the seriousness of the breach between the CIA and the 

Mr. Brennan. Well, I think it was a breach which was totally out of 
proportion with the nature of the incident. Are you asking me now to 
relate back the incidents concerning the Professor? 

Senator Hart of Colorado. No. I want your judgment as to what 
was so important. 

Mr. Brennan. Well, I feel that — again, you are asking me for a sort 
of an opinion or speculative observation — but I feel I am safe in say- 
ing that over the years through my observations in the FBI, Mr. 
Hoover had no close regard for the Central Intelligence Agency, and I 
believe that this particular incident constituted just a basis on which 
he could demonstrate to them his degree of arbitrary rule relative to 
the relationships between the two agencies, and I believe he seized upon 
that as an opportunity to be able to do so. 

Senator Hart of Colorado. But, to your knowledge, it had nothing 
to do with whether Professor Eiha was an agent, double-agent, or was 
working for any asrency of our Government or any other Government? 

Mr. Brennan. No; and to my recollection, this is the sad part of it. 
It just — I mean Mr. Riha just apparently happened to pop into a 


set of circumstances where the real vital question here was the fact 
that an FBI agent disclosed some information to a CIA agent which 
disturbed Mr. Hoover. 

Senator Hart of Colorado. Without going to great lengths — it is 
fairly crucial in the case because the purported FBI agent who spoke 
to the CIA agent said, "Calm this thing down. Get out to the press 
that Riha is alive and well." Riha, as you know, disappeared and has 
never been found. 

If an unnamed FBI agent knew something about Professor Riha 
that he was not telling anyone else, I think that is fairly important. 
You do not have any information on what happened to Professor 

Mr. Brennan. My recollection is that he left this country volun- 
tarily and that there was no indication or evidence to indicate that, 
as many alleged from that section of the country, that he had been 
spirited off by Communist agents. 

As I recollect, he was possibly of Czechoslovakian background. He 
was in this country, teaching here, and he suddenly disappeared. The 
information which the FBI had available to it at that time indicated 
that he had voluntarily left, and there was no substantiation of any 
involvement in any intelligence activity or any spying. There was 
just no basis for the flap that arose, as I recall the incident, and this 
is why I say it would seem then to me to be a relatively ridiculous 
situation which blows up to the point where it then leads to a cutoff 
in relations between the two agencies. 

Senator Hart of Colorado. I am interested in the information you 
have given us, because neither the CIA nor the FBI nor the local law 
enforcement agencies had that information as to what happened to 
him. They still think he is a missing person. 

Finally, Mr. Brennan, Senator Mondale had a discussion with you 
in which you talked about the pressures on the FBI and other agen- 
cies by elected officials. I feel very strongly, as he and other members 
of this committee do, that this is certainly a factor in some of the 
things that went wrong. Can you account for the fact that when that 
pressure occurs, from the White House or from elected officials, or 
from the Congress, for the FBI to do something— why professional 
agencies such as this cave in under that pressure? Why concoct, if 
you will, information to satisfy those inquiries, rather than tell the 
President of the United States the truth ? Why dredge up and examine 
people's trash, and everything else, to try to make the kind of case 
that the President of the United States or some Member of Congress 
wants to hear? Why not tell the Director of the FBI totell the Presi- 
dent of the United States that there is no case here ? 

Mr. Brennan. I don't think the picture you have drawn quite 
applies to what prevailed in the FBI. I feel that Mr. Hoover, as 
Director of the FBI, was a very strong personality who at no time 
really hesitated to tell anybody in town what he felt, including the 
President of the United States. And I think that if he, at any time, 
had been directed to take upon himself, or on behalf of the FBI, 
activities which he personally objected to, for whatever reason, he 
would make these objections known. 

Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. Angleton testified yesterday, and 
I think the records here today indicate that high level senior officials 


in both the CIA and FBI seriously doubted, in fact never believed, 
that there was substantial foreign connection with domestic dissidents. 
Y et we have no record whatsoever that that case was ever laid before 
the President of the United States or his delegates. 

Mr. Brennan. I cannot vouch for what Mr. Angleton had to say. 
I think, on the basis of my testimony here earlier today— I think I 
made it clear that in one instance we furnished the White House with 
a 40- to 50-page report which detailed the extent to which Americans 
involved in the antiwar movement were traveling in Communist 
countries and attending Communist conferences. 

I think the only question was a continuing hammering of the fact 
of whether they were being furnished money. Are Communist funds 
subsidizing this activity ? But I don't think the theory was held within 
the FBI, that there was no foreign involvement on the part of a num- 
ber of individuals who were activists in the antiwar movement. 

Senator Hart of Colorado. I am past my time, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Senator Schweiker. 

Senator Schweiker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Brennan, I wonder if you would turn to exhibit 32. 1 I would 
like to just read a couple of paragraphs from that; then I would like 
to ask you a few questions about those paragraphs. This is a July 19, 
1966 memo of Mr. DeLoach and Mr. Sullivan, and the unusuaf cap- 
tion to the right of it says "Do Not File," in caps, underscored. And 
I am reading the third and fourth paragraphs — 

The present procedure followed in the use of this technique calls for the Special 
Agent in Charge of a field office to make his request for the use of the tech- 
nique to the appropriate Assistant Director. The Special Agent in Charge must 
completely justify the need for the use of the technique and at the same time 
assure that it can be safely used without any danger or embarrassment to the 
Bureau. The facts are incorporated in a memorandum which, in accordance 
with the Director's instructions, is sent to Mr. Tolson or to the Director for 
approval. Subsequently this memorandum is filed in the Assistant Director's 
office under a "Do Not Bile" procedure. 

In the field, the Special Agent in Charge prepares an informal memorandum 
showing that he obtained Bureau authority and this memorandum is filed in 
his safe until the next inspection by Bureau Inspectors, at which time it is 

Now, I wonder if you could tell us a little bit about this rather un- 
usual "Do Not File" procedure. How did this work, Mr. Brennan? 

Mr. Brennan. I think the memorandum speaks for itself, Senator. 
In other words, what it is saying is that the special agent in charge 
of the field office would call the Assistant Director, relay to him the 
basis for his feelings that a certain action should be taken relative 
to a "black bag" job. The Assistant Director would prepare that 
memorandum, send it to Mr. Hoover for approval. The memorandum 
was not recorded in the usual recordkeeping functions of the FBI, 
but returned to the Assistant Director of the FBI and would be filed 
in his office, under a "Do Not File." 

Senator Schweiker. Let me ask you another question this way. If 
it had been filed in the normal procedure, and then somebody subse- 
quently removed it from the normal file and destroyed it, why was it 
not done that way ! 

Mr. Brennan. There would have been a record of it. 

1 See p. 273. 


Senator Schweiker. In other words, each file of the FBI is 
serialized, and as new information is put in, a serial number is assigned. 
So is it not correct that if it had been filed in the normal procedure 
and then removed, there would have been a gap, as far as the number 
is concerned. Is that correct? 

Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir. 

Senator Schweiker. I gather this is a procedure. How did the agents 
in the field know about this procedure? Was this in the manuals or 
rules and regulations, manuals" of instructions? Or how did they 
know that this procedure was to be followed ? Was it from memoran- 
dums like this? How did the field offices know about the "Do Not 
File" procedure, and the destruct mechanism? 

Mr. Brennan. I frankly cannot answer that, Senator. I don't be- 
lieve there was any reference in any manual or the like that referred 
to "black bag" jobs. Maybe there was, but I doubt it. And I did not 
have that much of a — well, I just didn't have any participation to a 
degree that — well, frankly, I don't know how they knew. Apparently, 
it was a very highly "need-to-know" type of operation. 

Senator Schweiker. All right. They do, or course, call it a proce- 
dure. So obviously, it had been invoked and was invoked, and they 
had a quote obviously indicating that that was a signal that this proce- 
dure was to be followed. I gather that one purpose of it was that if a 
"black bag" job went afoul, and somebody got hauled before a court, 
the Bureau or someone in the Bureau or an official of the Bureau could 
make a statement to the court, or to any other person investigating, 
to the effect that we searched our files and records, and there is nothing 
to indicate we did such and such. Would that be a fair assumption, on a 
"black bag" job? 

Mr. Brennan. I think so, Senator. 

Senator Schweiker. And I think that it, of course, could apply in a 
lot of other areas as well. 

As I see it, it looks to me as if the Bureau has had a better perfected 
technique of plausible denial than the CIA had, because number one, 
the Assistant Director makes a decision to follow the "Do Not File" 
procedure. The special agent is informed. He can put a special memo 
only in his personal safe. When the FBI investigator comes around, 
the Director or his Assistant Director is assured the procedure has been 
followed, because the inspector reads it in a safe. He knows his com- 
mand and control is there, but he also knows it will be destroyed 
immediately after that. To me it is really the perfect coverup, and a 
lot more sophisticated and more refined than the plausible denial of 
the CIA. 

I think that one other point that ties in here, of course, is that it 
would permit anybody to swear in an affidavit, in such a way for 
example, "He has caused a search to be made of the records of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the United States Department of 
Justice, by the employees of the said Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
acting under his direction, and that said search discloses," and so on 
and so forth. 

Now, the point I am making here — and I realize this does not 
directly involve you, Mr. Brennan — I want to be fair and make that 
very clear — is that anyone who went to court or filed an affidavit, 
or made a sworn statement to another Government agency or to a 
commission would be technically telling the truth because of the way 


that wording is constructed. Yet, in fact, it would be nearly total 

And I think we have seen an illustration just recently in Dallas, 
where destruction of FBI documents has come to light. And I am 
not going to ask you about that, Mr. Brennan, because I understand 
there is an ongoing investigation, and it would not be appropriate. 
But I do want to say that I commend Director Kelley, because I think 
he is doing a good job. I think he is trying to get things straightened 
out, and I commend him for his approach in this area. 

But I do think it is interesting that here we look at the chief 
investigative arm of the Government, and anytime that somebody at 
the Director or sub-Director level decides that they do not want any- 
body to know about something, there is a formal procedure whereby 
the whole apparatus jumps into line and can do it, and can deny in a 
court of law that such a thing ever occurred, and supposedly, tech- 
nically be telling the truth. 

And it just seems to me this is at the heart of our investigation 
here, because how can we, in Congress, even though we are investi- 
gating, know what is going on ? We found the theory of plausible 
denial in our investigation of the CIA on the subject of assassinations. 
We find it here as a technique that the FBI used. It certainly makes 
it very difficult for bodies like the Warren Commission and Congress 
to do their jobs. And I think it is very significant, and I think the record 
should very clearly show that this procedure was used at the uppermost 
levels, and was used for certain purposes, and I think we just touched 
the tip of the iceberg as to what purposes and what motivation and 
what the situation was. 

Now, Mr. Brennan, I would like to turn my attention to one or two 
other subjects for a moment, and that is that in the mail-opening that 
was discussed earlier, we now know, of course, that the CIA did not 
discuss at the meetings about the Huston plan the mail opening proce- 
dure. And I understand from preceding testimony that the Counter- 
intelligence Program was not discussed at these same kinds of meetings. 
I wonder if you could tell us why the COINTEL Programs, or Coun- 
terintelligence Programs, were not discussed at these meetings? 

Mr. Brennan. I don't believe they were pertinent to the basic pur- 
pose of the meetings. I believe the basic — in other words, as I interpret 
what happened relative to the Huston plan, you have to go back to 
the original question again being asked consistently by the White 
House. Are foreign, Communist elements subsidizing financially the 
activists in the antiwar movement ? And part of the apparent inability 
to be responsive to that arises from what I perceive to be a degree of 
provincialism which existed among the various organizations of the 
intelligence community at that time. I think the general feeling being 
let us say, among the FBI, DIA, NSA, you know, we do our thing, you 
do yours, and let us not get involved in each other's area of operations 
here. And I think there was a feeling that possibly we could overcome 
what I would term that frame of provincialism if we could analyze 
each other's resources, techniques, and possibly broaden the scope of 
our own overall respective capacities. Perhaps we would do better 
toward being responsive to what the basic question of the White House 


Senator Schweiker. Did not the basic question also relate to radicals 
on campus and radicals domestically ? And I have a hard time drawing 
the line between the distinction you just made and what I thought the 
White House group and Mr. Huston were focusing on, because Huston 
was focusing, when he testified before us, on violent revolutionaries, on 
what they were doing to our streets and to our campuses. And certainly, 
as I would understand the program you were working on, that would 
certainly go to the heart of the same kind of thing, whether you are 
talking about using a student, as an FBI informant, or what. 

Mr. Brennan. Right. I agree, Senator. But I feel that then, stem- 
ming from that, what you have is the question of, are you utilizing 
enough wiretaps, and are you utilizing enough bag jobs, are you utiliz- 
ing enough of these sophisticated techniques that perhaps you'd used 
in the past which have since been cut back, and should there be re- 
consideration of an intensification of the use of these techniques? 

Senator Schweiker. I see my time has expired. That is all the ques- 
tions I have, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Schweiker. Senator Morgan has 
asked to be recognized for one additional question. 

Senator Morgan. Mr. Brennan, to follow Up on my line of question- 
ing earlier, would you turn to exhibit 46, 1 on the second page, a memo- 
randum from the Director of the FBI to the agent in charge in 
Albany, I believe. 

Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir. 

Senator Morgan. And on the first page, there was a memorandum 
to you, requesting that this memorandum be sent to all stations which 
I assume you approved ? 

Mr. Brennan. Apparently so, yes. 

Senator Morgan. I beg your pardon? 

Mr. Brennan. Apparently. That looks like my initials up there. 

Senator Morgan. All right. Now, Mr. Brennan, that memorandum 
included instructions as to how to keep surveillance on individuals 
that were designated as "Key Black Extremists," and "Key Black Ex- 
tremist Organizations," did it not? 

Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir. 

Senator Morgan. And among the things that were listed to be done 
was, number nine, that "the Federal income tax returns of all Key 
Black Extremists must be checked annually, in accordance with exist- 
ing instructions." Do you find that ? 

Mr. Brennan. Yes. sir. 

Senator Morgan. That was one of the policies, was it not, to use tax 
returns for such purposes of surveillance, and whatever other purpose 
that you had ? 

Mr. Brennan. There was use of some tax returns ; yes, sir. 

Senator Morgan. In other words, anyone who was designated by the 
Bureau as a person of interest would have his tax return checked an- 
nually, in accordance with instructions that were prepared 

Mr. Brennan. I don't think that's what that says, Senator. Doesn't 
it say that consideration shall be given ? 

Senator Morgan. The beginning: paragraph says: "The desirable 
coverage must include, but not be limited to, the following investiga- 

1 See p. 338. 


tion." I am reading from the top of page 2 — ."must include, but not be 
limited to." And then item number nine was "The Federal income tax 
returns of all Key Black Extremists must be checked annually in ac- 
cordance with existing instructions." 

Mr. Brennan. Yes. Apparently that would apply to checking the 
income tax returns of the Key Black Extremists, or individuals desig- 
nated as such. 

Senator Morgan. Mr. Chairman, I believe we will be following this 
up later, but I would like to comment for the record that this concerns 
me greatly, because if the Bureau decided that any given person should 
be on their list, then he could have his tax returns checked every year. 
And you know, even I might — I will put myself in there — I might be- 
long to some organization that the Bureau might decide is extremist, 
and if so, I could have my tax returns checked every year. I think this 
raises an important question. 

The Chairman. Well, indeed it does. And I have known you to op- 
pose certain policies of the Government. Does that mean that you get 
your tax returns examined every year? This business of using the tax 
returns for surveillance and law enforcement purposes unrelated to 
the question of whether or not the citizen has paid his taxes, using it 
as a form of harrassment, you know, is a very serious question, Senator 

And maybe this is the appropriate time to say that next week the 
committee is going to explore this question of what we regard as im- 
proper practices, where the IKS has begun to use surveillance tech- 
niques for purposes other than determining whether the citizen con- 
cerned has paid his taxes, for purposes of harrassment. We are going 
to examine the ways that this is done in liaison with other agencies of 
the Government like the FBI. 

Senator Tower has asked to be recognized. 

Senator Tower. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Brennan, the GAO report that was mentioned earlier today 
by Mr. Smothers raises a question which I believe is critical to our 
evaluation of the need for new tools and techniques on the domestic 
front, as apparently espoused by you today. From a law enforcement 
standpoint, a 3-percent rate of referral for prosecution of domestic 
intelligence cases is not, terribly impressive. However, the report also 
noted — and I quote — "Who is to say that the Bureau's continuous 
coverage on such groups and their leaders has not prevented them to 
date from achieving their ultimate subversive and extremist goals ?" 

I also raise the question of whether, despite the limited number 
of criminals identified to date, this Congress should recognize the 
need for FBI activity extending beyond the strict parameters associ- 
ated with law enforcement functions. Mr. Brennan, I ask your com- 
ment on the question of whether this committee should ask the Con- 
gress to clearly establish by statute a domestic surveillance role for 
the FBI. 

Mr. Brennan. Yes. I think the FBI would welcome that type of 

Senator Tower. I mean, statutorily authorize a surveillance role 
that may not now be authorized, or may be proscribed by law as it 
now stands — consistent, of course, with the Constitution, and our 
theories of law and rights. 


Mr. Brennan. I am not quite sure I understand what you mean, 

Senator Tower. We are talking right now about the FBI going 
beyond its authority. We are talking about aspects of FBI activity 
that might be considered unconstitutional. What I am trying to estab- 
lish here is, should we recommend legislation that might perhaps 
remove some of the parameters that surround the FBI at the moment, 
and give specific authorization for surveillance under certain circum- 

Mr. Brennan. Yes; I definitely feel you should. 

Senator Tower. Thank you. 

The Chairman. Any other questions from the committee? Senator 

Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. Brennan, the last question I asked 
you had to do with the degree of foreign involvement, particularly 
financing domestic disruptions. And why, if there were senior people 
in both CIA and FBI that believed that there was not substantial 
foreign involvement, that case was not made to the President? You 
said you could not speak for the CIA, but you thought the FBI 
consistently took the view that the domestic unrest had substantial 
foreign involvement. 

The reference that I was referring to was your deposition before 
the committee. The question was asked, "Is it your judgment and 
was it your judgment at the time that there must have been a great 
deal more foreign money coming in?" Mr. Brennan: "Based on my 
experience, I personally did not believe that that was true. I felt that 
the extremist groups and the others who were involved in antiwar 
activities and the like at that time were of the middle- and upper-level 
income, and we characterized them generally as credit-card revolu- 

My question is why you and people like you in the FBI and the 
CIA did not flatly tell the White House that. That case never seemed 
to get up there. It was always what the President wanted to hear. 

Mr. Brennan. I don't think that is true, Senator. As I indicated 
to you, we had ample evidence of the travel of leading activists in the 
antiwar movement to foreign countries, where they attended meetings 
of Communist groups abroad concerned with the so-called peace 
movement in the United States. We submitted a 40- to 45- or 50-page 
report dealing with the extent of this activity. 

Senator Hart of Colorado. Did that report include a statement 
such as I have just read ? That is the question. 

Mr. Brennan. We at one time were required to submit a reoort 
dealing with the extent of our knowledge of Communist funding. 
And I believe it was our observation therein that there was some 
evidence, for example, of one subversive group or one extremist group 
of individuals who were traveling to Cuba, who were thereby, let us 
say, entertained to a degree at the expense of the Cuban Government. 

Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. Brennan, that is not my question. 
My question was, did these lengthy reports ever contain an observa- 
tion such as you made to this committee that you did not believe there 
was substantial foreign funding? 

Mr. Brennan. No. I don't feel that that would be appropriate 
for inclusion within an FBI report as to the expression of a belief. 


The Bureau took the position it was a fact-finding agency, and it 
would stick to basically what it knew. But I don't think that, even 
if we had been asked, "what is your feeling about it," that the Bureau 
would have been able to respond that, "well, we happen to believe 
such and such." 

Senator Hart of Colorado. I assume your belief was not based on 
imagination, but your opinion was based upon facts. If you saw a 
set of facts that showed substantial foreign funding and then had a 
belief that there was no substantial foreign funding, I would think 
that you would be subject to dismissal. 

Mr. Brennan. Yes. But if I gave you a report dealing with 15 
separate organizations which relatively set forth the degree of infor- 
mation concerning whether or not they were receiving funds from 
foreign sources, I think that you would be able to draw the conclusion 
for yourself as to whether or not there was any extensive foreign 

Senator Hart of Colorado. Not if you did not present the other 
side of the case, and I think it is a classic example of an agency's 
being given the obligation to tell the facts to the White House, and 
instead telling the White House exactly what it wanted to hear. 

Mr. Brennan. I think you are asking, then, for interpretations, 
and the Bureau did not engage in interpretations. 

Senator Hart of Colorado. That is all, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Senator Baker? 

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, just briefly, for the sake of clarifi- 
cation, I understood Senator Hart's question to be that it was your 
conclusion that there was no foreign involvement in these demon- 
strations. Is it your testimony that there was no foreign funding? 

Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir. 

Senator Baker. Now, is there a distinction between these two? 

Mr. Brennan. I think there is. I do not know whether I have con- 
fused the members of the committee. Clearly, what I again state is 
that we had developed no evidence to indicate any substantial Com- 
munist foreign funding of the antiwar movement in the United States. 
But on the other hand, we had extensive evidence of the leading ac- 
tivists, many of the leading activists of the antiwar movement, at- 
tending Communist conferences abroad where the matter of what 
should transpire relative to demonstrations in this country was dis- 
cussed. And you may want to regard that as perhaps indirect guidance, 
or perhaps even more direct guidance, of what the antiwar movement 
should do in this country. Those, I think, are two separate and distinct 
things which led you, on the one hand, to say, "yes, there was extensive 
contact between American activists and foreign Communist ele- 
ments, but no evidence that the foreign Communist elements were 
pouring money in in support of what was taking place here." 

Senator Baker. Thank you. 

The Chairman. Senator Schweiker has a question. 

Senator Schweiker. Thank you^ Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Brennan, as I recall, a few minutes earlier you testified that 
you were not aware that any "black bag" jobs were done after the 
January 6, 1967, memorandum of Mr. Hoover's. Is that correct? 

Mr. Brennan. That is my recollection, Senator. 


Senator Schweiker. All right. Now, we have, of course, on file with 
the committee the fact that such a "black bag" job did occur in April 
of 1968, some time after that. Now, I realize you were Chief of the 
Internal Security Section at that time, in the 1968 time frame? _ 

Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir. 

Senator Schweiker. And your immediate superior would have been 
the head of the Domestic Intelligence Division. Is that the correct 
chain of command ? 

Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir. 

Senator Schweiker. And then, the next step would have been Mr. 
Hoover himself? 

Mr. Brennan. You have an intermediate step of Assistant to the 

Senator Schweiker. Let's assume that basically, to your knowledge, 
it was not approved through you. If, in fact, as the FBI report shows, 
it did occur, someone in the sequential steps above you, one, two or 
three, would pretty well have had to have approved it for a "black 
bag" job to have occurred. Is that correct. 

Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir. 

Senator Schweiker. It is really inconceivable to you that it really 
would not have occurred if one, two or three ladders above you did 
not somewhere give an OK to it? Would that be a fair assumption? 

Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir. 

Senator Schweiker. I think again this points out the clear-cut situa- 
tion where a memo says one thing, and yet one or two people at the 
top are doing something differently, whether it is setting up a "Do Not 
File" procedure, or going against a memo they issued. I think it pretty 
well gets to the heart of the problem here; and again realize, Mr. 
Brennan, I am not tying you into it. But I think it is important to put 
it into the record. That is all. 

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Schweiker. 

I have just one other matter I would like to question you about before 
we close this morning. Our figures show, based upon the reports of 
the FBI, that when the agency decided greatly to increase its campus 
surveillance, it estimated that by its surveillance of all SDS members, 
6,500 new cases would be opened. And it estimated that in its surveil- 
lance of all black groups on our campuses, 4,000 new cases would be 

Now, what does that mean, opening a case ? Does that mean that you 
establish a file on the person ? Give me a better understanding of what 
opening a case means. There is a human element here. What does it 
mean to the person on whom the case is opened ? You have agents going 
on these campuses asking questions about certain people who are within 
this new 4,000 group of black students, or within this new 6,500 group 
of SDS members, and then a case is opened with each one of them. 
What does that mean ? What are the mechanics ? 

Mr. Brennan. Well, the field office basically would have the respon- 
sibility of opening a case file on the organization. 

The Chairman. Or on the individual ? 

Mr. Brennan. Well, let me try to give it to you in sequence, Senator. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Mr. Brennan. And — the field office — through investigative proce- 
dures, would attempt to develop sources and informants who could 


give them information relative to the individuals who were the leaders 
of the organization, and through appropriate investigative techniques 
and efforts, attempt to determine who the individual members of an 
organization were; at which stage, an individual case would be opened 
on each individual member. 

They now would be investigated with sort of a preliminary back- 
ground investigation, to draw together the picture of the individual. 
But inherent in all of this, then, would be the need to make a deter- 
mination at some point in time, is this merely a rank-and-file type of 
individual, or has this individual through his activities demonstrated a 
propensity for violence, or does he occupy a strong leadership position 
in the organization, and has he or she been responsible for public 
exhortations of violence ? 

The Chairman. Once a file is opened, and the individual is placed 
under surveillance, suppose it develops— as I am sure it did in a great 
many of these cases— that the individual is found not to be engaging 
in any unlawful activities, but simply expressing his opposition to the 
war, his opposition to being drafted to fight the war, or whatever. 
Then is the file destroyed ? 

Mr. Brennan. It is closed. 

The Chairman. It is closed, Well, suppose that individual later 
wants to get a job, let us say, with the Government. He is grown up 
now, he has left the campus. He wants to get a job with the Govern- 
ment, and he applies for a job, and the FBI is asked to nm a name 
check on him. Now. would that name check turn up that file, even 
though it were closed ? 

Mr. Brennan. I am not sure, Senator. I am not too familiar now with 
the operation of the name-check function, and the degree to which they 
would include types of information pertinent to the inquirer's interest. 

The Chairman. Can you testify that such a name check would not 
turn up that name because the file had been closed ? 

Mr - Brennan. No; I don't think I could, Senator. As I say, I am 
not all that certain, and I would hate to really run around in areas 

The Chairman. Do you see what I am concerned about ? 

Mr. Brennan. Yes; I understand. 

The Chairman. Here a file is set up. The agency itself decides, after 
surveillance, that this young person has not violated any laws. The 
file is closed. Later, he tries to get a job with the Government. A name 
check is run by the FBI, and the FBI makes a little reference to the 
agency, and says, "this man's name appeared on a subversive file." 

You see, this is an intensely human thing. These people who get 
caught up in this thing can be affected for the rest of their lives. 

Well, I think today the testimony has established that the 
Huston plan called for a relaxation of restrictions that then applied 
to surveillance on the campuses, following its revocation by the Presi- 
dent. And within a month or so thereafter, the FBI greatly expanded 
that surveillance. The 21-year limitation, which was meant to avoid 
student spying on students on the campuses, was eliminated, and in- 
formants were obtained on the campuses among the student body. Also, 
all SDS members were placed under surveillance, and 6,500 new cases 
were opened. Also, all black groups were placed under surveillance, 


even though there was no previous evidence of violence or a tendency 
toward violence ; and that involved the opening of 4,000 new cases. 

My final question, Mr. Brennan, is, do you know whether this rather 
dramatic expansion of the FBI involvement on the campuses of the 
country began within a month or so after the President had revoked 
his authorization of the Huston plan, whether all of that was told to 
the President? 

Mr. Brennan. I don't believe it would have been, Senator. I believe 
that the most that would have been done would have — possibly at the 
next appropriations testimony, where Mr. Hoover would be called 
upon to spell out what the areas of investigative interest the FBI had, 
that he, at that time, would have been subject to the congressional 
inquiry which would have enabled him to draw out the scope of our 

The Chairman. Tell me this. The record shows that Hoover was 
objecting to the Huston plan, and then shortly after the President 
revokes it, he is approving a big expansion of surveillance on the cam- 
puses, reducing the age from 21 to 18 and all of the other things we 
talked about. What accounted for the change of position? Why did he 
object to it in the Huston plan and then shortly thereafter turn around 
and approve it? 

Mr. Brennan. I frankly don't know, Senator. There were incon- 
sistencies of that type that went along from year to year, and Mr. 
Hoover was not the type that would call you in and explain to you why 
he changed his mind. 

The Chairman. Then you have no explanation to give ? 

Mr. Brennan. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Senator Tower has a comment. 

Senator Tower. I just want to make one comment, Mr. Chairman, 
consistent with Senator Morgan's objection to the chief counsel, 
Mr. Schwarz's line of questioning at the beginning of the session 
today. I would like simply to say for the record that the response 
that Mr. Brennan gave to Senator Huddleston's questions concerning 
Mr. Hoover's motivations for recommending rejection of the Huston 
plan was Mr. Brennan's opinion, and was speculative entirely. 

I would like to further note — this should not be inferred as a criti- 
cism of Mr. Brennan, because he has got a perfect right to respond 
to questions as to what his opinion is — but I would point out that 
Mr. Hoover, is not around to comment on what his motivations might 
have been at the moment. I think we should note that the witness' 
answer stands as an opinion, as speculative, and not a matter of fact. 

Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Chairman, there are other FBI witnesses who 
have contrarv opinions, of course, and we have spoken to some who 
believe that Mr. Hoover did have a genuine interest in the matters 
that he was talking about. So there is a difference of opinion among 
the people of the FBI. 

Senator Baker. I might ask, Mr. Chairman, whether anybody 
really knows why everybody was scared of J. Edgar Hoover. If 
this witness knows, we ought to let him say. We stopped him a minute 
ago before he had a chance to say. 

The Chairman. Are you putting a question, Senator Baker? 

Senator Baker. Sure. Mr. Brennan. do you know? Did you ever 
discuss with Mr. Hoover why the President or anybody else had such 


a concern or respect, or even fear, of him? I assume you do not, 
-but nobody has asked that question. 

Mr. Brennan. No, I don't._ 

Senator Baker. I remember, Mr. Chairman, that this is a legend 
that has gone on for some time. But I rather suspect we may never 
find the answer. 

Mr. Brennan. Well, I think it possibly arises, Senator, from re- 
ports of certain observations perhaps made by President Kennedy, 
when he was asked whether or not he intended to reappoint Mr. 
Hoover or to get rid of him. If I recollect correctly, his observation 
wa s— you know, you don't fire God. And I believe that President 
Johnson also was posed a further question as to whether or not he 
intended to keep Mr. Hoover on. I think he made a response of similar 
content. , 

Senator Baker. Thank you. 

The Chairman. At the birth of this country, John Adams resolved 
that our society must have a government of laws and not of men. 
This was necessary, he said, because the law, in all vicissitudes of 
Government, fluctuations of the passions or flights of enthusiasm, 
will preserve a steady, undeviating course. It will not bend to the 
uncertain wishes, imaginations and wanton tempers of man." 

What we have heard this week reflects a sad change from this 
original conception, so rightly cherished by our Founding Fathers. 
Now we discover that even the mail of our citizens has been unlaw- 
fully read by secret intelligence agencies. Instead of all being equal 
before the law, we find that any number of citizens, from Presidential 
candidates on down, have had their letters opened, copied, photo- 
graphed and filed in the vast vaults of the Federal agencies. We 
learn that other unlawful intelligence operations have also been 
concealed from Congress and from the President himself. This can- 
not be allowed. For as John Locke wisely knew, whenever law ends, 
tyranny begins. 

This hearing is adjourned until 10 o'clock next Tuesday morning. 

[Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m., the select committee adjourned, to 
reconvene at 10 a.m. Thursday, October 2, 1975.] 

62-685 O - 76 - 10 



Exhibit 1 





JUNE, 1970 

1 Under criteria determined by the Committee, in consultation with the White 
House, the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, the Central 
Intelligence Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, certain mate- 
rials have been deleted from those documents, some of which were previously 
classified, to maintain the internal operating procedures of the agencies in- 
volved, and to protect intelligence sources and methods. Further deletions 
were made with respect to protecting the privacy of certain individuals and 
groups. These deletions do not change the material content of these exhibits. 


June 25, 1970 

This report, prepared for the President, 
is approved by all members of this committee 
and their signatures are affixed hereto. 

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation 
\J thairman 

)w Aa.«A»-Oi«-JLL»U-'U>a->v. 

Director, Central Intelligence Agency 


Director, Defense Intelligence Agency 

Director, National Security Agency 



The objectives of this report are to: (1) assess the current 
internal security threat; (2) evaluate current intelligence collection 
procedures; identify restraints under which U. S. intelligence services 
operate; and list the advantages and disadvantages of such restraints; 
and (?) evaluate current interagency coordination and recommend means 
to improve it. 

The Committee has attempted to set forth the essence of 
the issues and the major policy considerations involved which fall within 
the scope of its mandate. 







A. Assessment of Current Internal Security Threat 1 

1. Student Protest Groups 1 

2. Antiwar Activists 3 

3. New Left Terrorist Groups 4 

B. Assessment of Current Intelligence Collection 

Procedures 5 

1. Scope and Effectiveness of Current Coverage 5 

2. Gaps in Current Coverage 6 

3. Possible Measures to Improve Intelligence 

Collection 7 


A. Assessment of Current Internal Security Threat 9 

1. Black Panther Party 9 

2. New Left Support for BPP ,9 

3. BPP Propaganda Appearances 9 

4. Appeal to Military 10 

5. BPP Philosophy and Foreign Support 10 

6. Other Black Extremist Groups 10 

7. Black Student Extremist Influence 11 

8. Foreign Influence in the Black Extremist Movement 11 

B. Assessment of Current Intelligence Collection 

Procedures 12 

1. Other Black Extremist Organizations 13 

145 Page 


A. Assessment of Current Internal Security Threat 14 

1. Intervention in Domestic Unrest 14 

2. Intelligence Operations 15 

B. Assessment of Current Intelligence Collection 17 

1. Scope and Effectiveness 17 

2. Gaps in Current Coverage 18 


A. Assessment of Current Internal Security Threat 20 

1. Communist Party 20 

2. Socialist Workers Party and Other Trotskyist 

Groups 20 

3. Pro-Chinese Communist Groups . 21 

4. Puerto Rican Nationalist Extremist Groups 21 

B. Assessment of Current Intelligence Coverage 21 

1. Scope and Effectiveness 21 

2. Gaps in Current Coverage 22 

3. Possible Measures to Improve Intelligence 

Collection - 22 
■ / ■ 



A. Interpretive Restraint on Communications Intelligence 23 

B. Electronic Surveillances and Penetrations 26 • 

C. Mail Coverage 29 

D. Surreptitious Entry 32 

E. Development of Campus Sources 34 

F. Use of Military Undercover Agents 37 











A. Assessment of Current Internal Security Threat 


The movement of rebellious youth known as the "New Left, " 
involving and influencing a substantial number of college students, is hav- 
ing a serious im pac 1 on.conte,mjjorary_aoc;.eJy with a poJ^JiaJJ^£-a£tJflys 
dojaj^HEIiinSnyThe revolutionary aims of the New Left are apparent 
when their identification with Marxism -Leninism is examined^ They 
pointedly advertise their objective as the overthrow of our system of 
—government by force and violence. Under the guise of freedom of speech, 
they seek to coj^j^nt^Jlj^ai^isJ^^^ujjT^jt^ and PXS^SiiSJjLSS^Ii' • 
They_jntend tosnT asTTU ie^. S. .educational system, the^exoj.qSii i^/v rycture, 
a Jl^ v. [JS 3 - UY !„ ..{ fr ?.r9-Q ^ e - £flffiiffloitjSa 5i ■ New Left' groups do n ot have a large i; 
e nough number of rank-apd-filp fnllp v/p rs f nor do they have a unity of 
p urpose to carry out massive or oarab^ ins: acts df . insurrfeclkm. TJiey_jdo, 
on the Other hand, h ave the v \\) t.p carry on mors militant- efforts in local 
situations and an incfination to utilise more extreme means to attain their 
o bjecti ves. ■ i- ■ . 

1. Student Protest Groups. The Sjnj^nJsJfc^^Democjv^tic 
~§2£i§iS«,(§E§) nas > in tne Pa* 5 * y ear i 3PM& ini0 several factions, including 
.the ReY.oU UiQnar.y_ Youth , M ovemertjRy_M) . which has contro.l over30' 
'-•'Chairs; and the Worker_ Student AllianceJWSAJi, ,-which co nsists of 63 

-c hapte rs. The WJSA faTtipn"^ 

P_rjD grJess lve i Labor_ Party TPLPj^aims to_biii_ld a worker - student^mp vem ent 
in keeping with the"PLP's aim oi developing a broad worKer^based ™~ " r- "" 
- revolutionary movement in the United States. 

There are some 8 5 _ unaffiliated SDS chaptersgcaejajly 
svmnathff jc to revolutionary tactics and"goaisT"'TTe trend of increased 
radical campus organizations is noticeable at campuses where recognition 
of SDS has been refused or rescinded and SDS members have banded 
together, with or without sanction, under a new title to attract student 
support. In addition, numerous ad hoc groups have been established 
on campuses and elsewhere to exploit specific issues. 

The National St udent.gtrikejNSSl, also k nown as t he 
National Strike Information Cente r, was formedTofiowing the entry 
of the United States forces into Cambodia and the deaths of four students 
at Kent State University. NSS, which helped to coordinate the nationwide 
student strike in May, .1970, has three regional centers and includes 


among its leadership SDS members and other New Left activists. The 
NSS has ffgtabUsheda nat ion wi de comm unic ati on s s ,y s t e m.-Ql-llh aKC^ ?■ 4*° 
s l^iig.U^ on^^mpu^^^^ enrourage stud ent dem onstrations and jd ijj£p.n.tiQns . 
This communications capability" hTay'have" a significant impact on campus 
stability in the coming school year. 

The VencerornosJRr jgade.l.VB ), established to send United States 
youth to Cuba to aid in the 1970 harvests, has continually received favorable 
publicity in Cuban propaganda media. To date, over 900 members of 
the VB have visited Cuba and another group of approximately 500 members 
are expected to follow suit. While in Cuba, VB members were individually 
photographed and questioned in detail about their backgrounds. Because 
of their contacts with Cuban officials, these individuals must be considered 
as potential recruits for Cuban intellig en ce activities and sabota ge in th e 
United States. ' 

The greatest threat nosed to the security of the country by 
S tudent protesT grouns is their potential for fomenting violence and unres t 
on college campuse s. Demonstrations have triggered acts of arson by 
extremists against war-oriented research and ROTC facilities and have 
virtually paralyzed many schools. There has been a growing number of " 
noncampus, but student-related, acts of violence .which increase tensions 
between "town and gown" and which constitute a marked escalation of the 
scope and level of protest activities. Few student protests are current ly 
r elated to exclusively campus issue s; v irtually all involve political an d 
s ocial issu es. I ncreasin gly, t he battlefield is the community with the 
campus serving primarily as a staging area . ■ • 

..«e,i (* ■ ■ ■ -v- 

The efforts of the New Left aimed at fomenting unrest and 
subversion among civil servants, labor unions, and mass media have met 
with very limited success, although the V7SA and its parent, the PLP, 
have attempted through their "Summer Work-Ins" to. infiltrate and 
radicalize labor. The inability of these groups to subvert and control 
the mass media has led to the establishment of a large network of under- 
ground publications which serve the dual purpose of an internal communi- 
cation network and an external propaganda organ. 

Leaders of student protest groups have traveled extensively 
over the years to communist countries; have openly stated their sympathy 
with the international communist revolutionary movements in South Vietnam 
and Cuba; and have directed others into activities which support these 
movements. These individuals must be considered to hayepotential for 


Jg£IHUmmt.anfl,pagjjfiiBatiQBjR. foreign- Er ected .intelligence , act ivity. 

2. Antiwar Activists. The impetus and continuity for the 
antiwar movement is provided by the New Mobil ization C ommitte e to 
Endjhe War in Vietnam (NM C) and the St udenyM ob ili zaUo^omlriTttee 
t o End the War tnVietnnm (SMC) . iCThe NMC is a coalition oFnumerous 
antiwar groups and individuals including communist "old left" elements. 
The SMC is under the control of the Trotskyist Socialist Workers Party 

The NMC and SMC have announced a policy of "nonexclusion" 
which places no limitation on the type of individuals allowed to participate »; 
in demonstrations. This policy opens the door for violence-prone 
individuals who want to capitalize on the activities of these groups. 
Both groups profess to follow a policy of nonviolence; however, the . 
very nature of the protests that they sponsor sets the stage for civil 
disobedience and police confrontation by irresponsible dissident elements. 
Various individuals in NMC and SMC are calling for more milita nt 
protest activities, a subject to be discussed at national meetings by 
both groups in late June. 1970. " [ ' 

Although antiwar groups are not known to be collecting weapons, 
engaging in paramilitary training, or advocating terrorist tactics, the 
pro-Hanoi attitude of their leaders, the unstable nature of many NMC 
advocates and their policy of "nonexclusion" underscore the 'iSfe.ofJ^e 

a tL^X^^ ei^^ T - a .?i^^flB^llt.fP r i. lf '-toiJ rti TOrtfi,T- This is further 
emphasized by the NMC leadership's advocacy of civil disobedience to 
achieve desired objectives. 

There is no indication that the antiwar movement has made 
serious inroads or achieved any more. than a slight degree of influence 
among labor unions, the mass media, and civil servants. One group, 
however, the Federal Employees for a Democratic Society (FEDS), offers 
a means of protest for recent radical graduates employed by the Federal 


The aUi&£y and e*!^^Uss£tf.M!i9ap a £?.*J]&iiEAs ,s 

targets of the antiwar movement. . In addition to vandalism, arsons, and 
bombings of ROTC facilities, there has been stepped-up activity to 
spread antiwar sympathy among American servicemen from within 
through sympathetic members in the military and from without through 
such programs as "GI Coffeehouses" and the proposed National GI 
Alliance. The increasing access by members of the military to the 
underground press, the establishment of servicemen's unions, and 
organizations which facilitate desertions, have contributed significantly 
to the increasing instances of dissent in the military services. 

NMC and SMC leaders are constan tly speakjrgJ^xeJSAldent 
(Troi ^ and endeavoring to use.student r adicais_to inrJ;Iiej:_the..antiwar 
movement . They have called for an end to the ROTC and have demon- 
strated, often violently, to force universities to halt war- related research 

(The NMC maintains close contact with the 

World Council for Peace and Stockholm Conference on Vietnam] A new 
organi zation dominated by NMC leader s, t he Committe e jjf Liaison with 
Families of Servicemen Detained in North Viet nam, emerged in January, 
1970, after contacts with North Vietnamese representatives. It attempts 
to present.a favorable picture of North Vietnamese treatment of American 
prisoners of war. 

! '^ ___I_NMC leaders have frequently traveled abroad. It is therefore 
I necessary to consider these individuals as havin!^j^tR ntial j ,for - ejT£aging 
!in foreign- directed intelligence collection. 

I m i i M a m ill i ■IIII1IW IM I I'i J I I I H W""— ' i wy i 

//Th e Centr al Intelligence Agency (CIA), injts analysis of bloc 
intelligence, is of th&viewlhaf tTJe Soviet and bloc intelligence services 
are'cbnimitted at the political level to exploit all domestic, dissidents 
wKeTreyer jjos.s.iblej " This'attack is being conducted through recruited 
agents, agents ofinfluence, and the use of front groups. It is established 
bloc policy to deploy its forces against the United States as "the main 
enemy" and to direct all bloc intelligence forces toward ultimately 
political objectives which disrupt U. S. domestic and foreign policies. 

3. New Left Terrorist Groups. The Weathe rman terrorist 
group, which emerged from a factional split of SDS duringthe Summer of 
1969, is a revolutionary youth movement wh ich actively supports the 

- - ■<- -:■- >■-■•- ■'■• - 4-- 


revolutionary leadership role of the Negro in the United States. It has 
evolved into a number of small commando-type units which plan to 
utilize bombings, arsons, and assassinations as political weapons. 

There has been evidence of Weatherman involvement in 
terrorist tactics, including the accidental explosion of a "Weatherman 
bomb factory" in New York City on March 6, 1970; the discovery of two 
undetonated bombs in Detroit police facilities on the same date; and the 
blast at New York City police installations on June 9, 1970. 

While Weather man membership is not clearly defined, it is 
estimated that at least 1. 000 i ndividuals arihprp tn Wpathprm an idqolnjTV. 
In addition, groups such as the White Panther Party, Running Dog, Mad Dog, 
and the Youth International Party (Yippies) are supporters of Weatherman 
terrorism but have no clearly definable ideology of their own. 

Adherents to Weatherman ideology are also found within 
radical elements on campuses, among those living in off-campus communes-, 
among New Left movement lawyers arid doctors, and the underground press. 
Individuals who adhere to the Weatherman ideology have offered support 
and aid to hard-core Weatherman members, including 21 Weatherman 
members currently in hiding to avoid apprehension. 

They identify themselves politically with North Vietnam, 
Cuba, and North Korea and consider pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese. organi- 
zations as being aligned with imperialist powers. In adciltion/ some of t'fig' 
"Weatherman leaders and adherents have traveled to communist countries 
or have met in Western countries with communist representatives. 

Weatherman leaders and other members of terrorist groups 
are not known at this time to be involved in foreign-directed intelligence 
collection activity. The fugitive and underground status of many of these 
people, as well as their involvement in activities which would likely bring 
them to the attention of American authorities, would be a deterrent to 
contacts by foreign intelligence organizations. 

B. Assessment of Current Intelligence Collection Procedures 

1. Scope and Effectiveness of Current Coverage. Although 
New Left groups liave been responsible for widespread damage to ROTC 
facilities, for the halting of some weapons-related research, and for the 
increasing dissent .within the military services, the major threat to the 
internal security of the United States is that directed against the civilian 
sector of our society. 

» - 5 - 


Coverage of student groups is handled prima rily through 
l ive informants and it is generally effective at. the national level or 
at major meetings of these groups where .overall policy, aims, and 
objec tives of the groups are determine d. 

The antiwar m ove ment's activities are rnvprpH t-hrm -o rh ftiR f pa 
by live informants i n all organizations of interest . This is s upported by 
i nformation furnished by all members of the intelligence commun it y 
a nd otner Federal, state, and loc al agencies. Key leaders and 
activists are afforded concentrated and intensified investigative 
coverage on a continuing basis and, in situations where there are 
positive indications of violence, e lectronic surveillances have be en 
i mplemented on a selective b asis . informant and electronic coverag e 
do es no t meet present requirement s. 

Although several SDS chapters on college campuses which 
adhere to Weatherman ideology have been penetrated by live informants, -- 
there is no live informant coverage at present of underground Weatherman 
fugitives. There is electronic coverage on the residence of a Weatherman 
contact in New York City and on the residence of an alleged Weatherman 
member in San Francisco; however, no information has been developed 
concerning the whereabouts of the 21 Weatherman fugitives. 

2. Gaps in Current Co verage . Established, long-term 
coverage is not available within student protest groups due to the 
fact that the student body itself changes yearly, necessitating a constant 
turnover in the informants targeted against these groups. His idealism 
and immaturity, as well as the sensitive issues of academic freedom 
and the right to dissent, all serve to increase the risk that the student 
informant will be exposed as such. 

Generally, day-to-dav coverage of the planned activities 
of student protest groups, which are somewhat autonomous an d 
d isjointed, could be strengthen ed. (Advance notice of forpign travel c/fc 
by student militants is particularly neededTjl C ampus viole nce is ''' '' 
generall y attr ibutable to small, close-kni t""exJxejnist g roups among 
raaicai"Btnctenls. Coverage of these latter groups is minimal. . . 


The antiwar movement is comprised of a great many 
organizations and people which represent varied political, moral and 
ethnic beliefs. Current manpower commitments preclude optimum 
coverage of all antiwar activities on a day-to-day basis. 

Existing coverage of New Left extremists, the Weather man 
group in pa rti cular, is negligible. Most of the Weatherman group has 
gone underground and formed floating, commando-type units. composed of 
three to six individuals. The transitory nature of these units hinders the 
installation of electronic surveillances and their smallness and distrust 
of outsiders make penetration of these units through live informants 
extremely difficult. 

Financially, the Weatherman group appears to be without 
a centralized source of funds. Wealthy parents have furnished funds to 
some of these individuals, including those in a fugitive status. Many 
members have also been involved in the thefts of credit and identification 
cards, as well as checks, and have utilized them for obtaining operating 

3 . Possible Measures to Improve Intelligence Collection. 
To establish effective coverage of shi.iprrf prot est group s would requir e 
the exp ansion of live informant coverage of individual campus c h apters. of 
t hese organizat ions. This would entail extensive use of student informants 
t o obtain maximum utilization of their servic es for the periods of the ir 
college attendance. ■ : ■ ~~ ; 

Because of the great number of individuals and groups in the 
antiwar movement, a n increase in the manpower assigned to these inves - 
ti gations would facilitate more intensive coverag e. I n additi on,. there 
are several key leaders involved in virtually all antiwar activitie s, 
i ncluding international contacts, against whom electronic surveillance s v 
an d mail covers would be particularly effectiv e. ' ' * 

Improvement of intelligence gathering against New Left 
terrorists depends on a combination of live informant coverage among 
key leaders and selective electronic surveillances. Because of the nature 
of the Weatherman groups, live informant coverage will most likely result 
through the defection of a key leader. 

- 7 - 


Extensive efforts-have been undertaken which should 
produce a live informant capable of furnishing information as to the 
location of Weatherman fugitives and planned terrorist acts. In the 
event a commune is located, prompt installation, of electronic 
coverage should produce similar results.: Utilization of additional 
resources to expand and intensify this collection would be beneficial. 




A. Assessment of Current Internal Security Threat 

1. Black Panther Par ty. The most active and dangerous 
black extremist group in the United States is the Black Panther Party 
(BPP). Despite its relatively small number of hard-core members-- 
approximately 800 in 40 chapters nationwide— the BPP is in the forefront 

of black extremist activity today. The BPP has publicly advertised its goals 
of organizing revolution, insurrection, assassination and other terrorist- 
type activities. Moreover, a recent poll indicates that approximately 
25 per cent of the black population has a great respect for the BPP, 
including 43 per cent of blacks under 21 years of age. 

The Panther newspaper has a current circulation of 
approximately 150, 000 copies weekly. Its pages are filled with messages 
of racial hatred and call for terrorist guerrilla activity in an attempt _ 
to overthrow the Government. The BPP has been involved in a substantial" 
number of planned attacks against law enforcement officers^ and its 
leadership is composed in large part of criminally inclined, violence- 
prone individuals. 

Weapons are regularly stockpiled by the Party. During 1968 
and 1969, quantities of machine guns, shotguns, rifles, hand grenades, 
homemade bombs, and ammunition were uncovered in Panther offices. 

2. New Left Support for BPP. The BPP has received 
increasing support from radical New Left elements. During 1970, the 
BPP formed a working relationship with radical student dissenters by 
injecting the issue of Government "repression" of Panthers into the 
antiwar cause. Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) supported 
the BPP in a 1969 "united front against fascism." The probability that 
black extremists, including the BPP, will work closely with New Left 
white radical's in the future increases the threat of escalating terrorist 
activities. It would be safe to project that racial strife and student 
turmoil fomented by black extremists will definitely increase. 

3. BPP Propaganda Appearances. Despite its small member- 
ship, the BPP has scored major successes in the propaganda arena. In 

- 9 - 


1969, BPP representatives spoke at 189 colleges throughout the Nation, 
while in 1967 there were only 11 such appearances. Although no direct 
information has been received to date indicating that the BPP has initiated 
any large-scale racial disorders, the year 19.70 has seen an escalation of 
racial disorders across the Nation compared to 1969. This fact, coupled 
with an increasing amount of violent Panther activity, presents a great 
potential for racial and civil unrest for the future. 

4. Ap peal to Military. The BPP has made pointed appeals 
to black serviceTiien with racist propaganda. High priority has been 
placed on the recruitment of veterans with weapons and explosives training. 
The BPP has also called for infiltration of the Government. These 
activities, should they achieve even minimum success, present a grave 

5. BPP Ph ilosophy a nd Foreign Sup port. The BPP relies 
heavily on foreign communist ideology to shape its goals. Quotations from- 
Mao Tse-tung were the initial ideological bible of the BPP. Currently, 

the writings of North Korean Premier Kim II -sung are followed and 
extensive use of North Korgan propaganda material is made in BPP 
publications and training. /The Marxist-oriented philosophy of ihe BPP 
presents a favorable environment for support of the Panthers from other 
communist countries."": 

BPP leaders have traveled extensively abroad including visits 
to Cuba, Russia, North Korea, and Algeria. International operations of 
the BPP are directed by Eldridge Cleaver, a fugitive from United States 
courts. Cleaver has established an international staff in Algeria, from 
where communist propaganda is constantly relayed to the BPP headquarters 
in Berkeley, California. I Jfe has also established close ties with Al Fatah, 
an Arab guerrilla organization, whose leaders have reportedly extended 
nvitations to EPP members to take guerrilla training during 1970. Cleaver, 
n a recent conversation, indicated that North Koreans are conducting 
similar training for BPP members"/ Radical white students in Western 
Europe and the Scandinavian countries have organized solidarity committees 
in support of the BPP. These committees are the sources of financial 
contributions to the Party and provide outlets for the BPP newspaper. 

6. Other Black Extr emi st Grou ps. The Nation of Islam (NOI) 
is the largest single black extremist organization in the United States with 
an estimated membership of 6,000 in approximately 100 Mosques. The NOI 


62-685 O - 76 - LI 


preaches hatred of the white race and advocates separatism of the races. 
The NOJ as a group has, to date, not instigated any civil disorders; 
however, the followers of this semi-religious cult are extremely 
dedicated individuals who could be expected to perform acts of violence 
if so ordered bv the NOI head, Elijah Muhammed. When Muhammed, 
who is over 70 years of age, is replaced, a new leader could completely 
alter current nonviolent tactics of the organization. For example, ' 
Muhammed's son-in-law, Raymond Sharrieff, now among the top 
hierarchy of NOI, could rise to a leadership position. Sharrieff is 
vicious, domineering, and unpredictable. 

There are numerous other black extremist organizations, 
small in numbers, located across the country. There is also a large 
number of unaffiliated black extremists who advocate violence and 
guerrilla warfare. One particular group, the Republic of New Africa 
(RNA), headquartered in Detroit, Michigan, calls for the establishment 
of a separate black nation in the South to be protected by armed forces. *" 
These groups, although small, are dedicated to the destruction of our 
form of government and consequently present a definite potential for 
instigating civil disorder or guerrilla warfare activity. 

7. Black Student Extremist Influence. Black student extremist 
activities at colleges and secondary schools have increased alarmingly. 
Although currently there is no dominant leadership, coordination or 
specific direction between these individuals, they are in frequent contact 
with each other. Consequently, should any type of organization or 
cohesiveness develop, it would present a grave potential for future 
violent activities at United States schools. Increased informant coverage 
would be particularly productive in this area. Black student extremists 
have frequently engaged in violence and disruptive activity on campuses. 
Major universities which made concessions to nonnegotiable black 
student demands have not succeeded in calming extremist activities. 
During the school year 1969-70, there were 227 college disturbances 
having racial overtones. There were 530-such disturbances in secondary 
schools compared with only 320 during the previous school year. 

8. Foreign Influence in the Black Extremist Movement . 
Although there is no hard evidence indicating that the black extremist 
movement is substantially controlled or directed by foreign elements, 
there is a marked potential for foreign-directed intelligence or subversive 
activity among black extremist leaders and organizations. These groups 
are highly susceptible to exploitation by hostile foreign intelligence 

- 11 - 


Currently the most important foreign aspect cf the black 
extremist movement is the availability of foreign asylum, especially 
with regard to black extremists subject to criminal prosecution in the 
United States. Some foreign countries, such as Cuba, provide a temporary 
safe haven for these individuals. Qnformation has been received that , 
passports and funds for travel have also been furnished by countries 

such as Cuba, North Korea, and " ' Communist intelligence 

services do not, at present, play a major role in the black extremist 
movement; however, all such services have established contact with 
individual black militants. Thus, the penetration and manipulation cf 
black extremist groups by these intelligence services remain distinct 
possibilities . V Communist intelligence services are capaole of using tiieir 
personnel, facilities, and agent assets to work in the black extremist 
field. The Soviet and Cuban services have major capabilities available. J 

B. Assessment of Current Intelligence Collection Procedures 

There are some definite gaps in the current overall ^„ 

intelligence penetration of the black extremist movement. For example, 
although there appears to be sufficient live informant coverage of the BPP 

_ _ _ additional penetration ^_ _ _ 

'is needed. 
High echelon informant coverage could conceivably pre^snt violence, 
sabotage, or insurrection if such activity was planned by BPP leadership. 

Insufficient coverage of _ '_ ' BPP is offset 

to some extent by technical coverage ' 

Penetration of. leadership levels has been hindered' in part 
by current BPP policies which prevent rank-and-file members from 
advancing to leadership roles. 

Improvement in coverage of BPP financial activities could 
be made, particularly with regard to sources of funds and records. 
Information received to date indicates that financial support for the BPP 
has been furnished by both foreign individuals and domestic sources. Thus, 
a deeper penetration and correlation of foreign and domestic information 
received is essential to a full determination of BPP finances. Coverage of 
BPP finances has been hampered by fact that BPP leaders handle financial 
matters personally. 

In view of the increased amount of foreign travel and contacts 
by BPP leaders abroad, there is a clear-cut need for more complete _, 

Coverage of foreign involvement in BPP activities. 

- 12 - 


1. Other Black Extremist Org anizations.' Informant 
coverage of the KOI is substantial, enabling its activities to be followed 
on a current basis. Coverage of militant black student groups and 
individuals is very limited because of the .sensitive areas involved. An 
effective source of such coveragewould be reliable, former members 
of the Armed Forces presently attending college. Live informant 
coverage, particularly with respMfc&to tlfe activities and plans of 
■unaffiliated black militants, nseds to be increased. More sources both 
in the United States and abroad in a position to determine the amount of 
foreign involvement in black extremist activities need to be developed. 
Maximum use of communication interceptions would materially 
increase the current capabilities of the intelligence community to develop 
highly important data regarding black extremist activities. 




A. Assessment of Current Internal Security Threat 

The threat posed by the communist intelligence services 
must be assessed in two areas: (1) direct intervention in fomenting 
and/or influencing domestic unrest; (2) extensive espionage activities. 

Taken in complete context, these services constitute a grave 
threat to the internal security of the United States because of their size, 
capabilities, widespread spheres of influence, and targeting of the 
United States as "enemy number one. " -The largest and most skilled 
of these services is the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB) 
which has roughly 300,000 personnel of whom some 10,000 are engaged 
. in foreign operations/"/ 

1. Intervention in Domestic Unrest . There have been no 
substantial indications that the communist intelligence services have 
actively fomented domestic unrest. Their capability cannot, hcwover, 
be minimized and the likelihood of their initiating direct intervention 
would be in direct relationship to the deterioration of the political 
climate and/or imminence of hostilities. The ingredients for a first-, 
rate capability are present, including both, the personnel and the 
ingrained philosophy and know-how for using such tactics. 

Communist intelligence has shown a real capability to 
foment disorder in a number of trouble spots. The dissidence and 
violence in the United States today present adversary intelligence 
services with opportunities unparalleled for forty years. While 
fostering disorder ani rebellion through communist parties and 
fronts is a potent weapon in the communist arsenal, their past 
success has been evident in clandestine recruitment efforts on 
campuses during times of unrest. H. A. R. (Kim) Philby, Guy Burgess, 
and Donald Maclean were all students at Cambridge during the depression 
period of the 1930's and were in the vanguard of what was then the New 
Left. Their recruitment and cooperation with Soviet intelligence wreaked 
havoc on British intelligence, and also compromised U. S. security in 
those sectors where they had authorized access. 



1 For instance, about 900 
members of the. Venceremos Brigade, "a group of American youths, 
recently completed a round trip to Cuba. This travel was financed 
by the Cuban Government. While in Cuba, they were exhorted to 
actively participate in United States revolutionary activities up on 
their return to the United States.) 

A sabotage manual, prepared in' turned up in the 

hands of individuals responsible for recent bombings! _ 

. While the potential for widespread, well-organized 
incidents oi violence generated and controlled by the Cuban intelligence 
service is considered minimal, jsolated occurrences of this nature must 
be considered probable. i.TheL Services appear to have assumed the 

passive roles of observers and reporters."} 

The communist intelligence services maintain contacts 
and exert influence among a variety of individuals and organizations 
through the exploitation of ideological, cultural, and ethnic ties. 
Most of these liaisons are maintained with some degree of openness 
with individuals associated with the Communist Party, USA, various 
of its front groups, /ether pro-Soviet organizations] nationality groups, 
and foreign -language newspapers. These contacts are exploited as 
sources for and propaganda outlets of communist intelligence services. 
Regarded individually, these efforts cannot be considered a major 
threat to our internal security; however, in total, they represent a 
sizable element of our population which can be influenced in varying 
degrees by communist intelligence service operations. 

2. Inte lligen ce Ope rations . Persistent and pervasive 
intelligence operations wTiicfiliave their inspiration and direction supplied 
by communist intelligence services represent a major threat to the 
internal secu rity-}* ~] 

15 - 





B. Assessment of Current Intell igence Collection 

r.*Sg6pe fin d Eff e ctiveness" ."** The scope of overall intelligence 
efforts is encompassed in the threefold goals cf penetration, intelligence, 
and prosecution. . Domestic implementation of these goals is delimited 
by agreement among United States intelligence agencies. Intelligence 
components of the United States military services are immediately * 
concerned with protecting the integrity of their personnel and instEfl- 

Methods used in these endeavors, employed in varying 
degrees by U.S. intelligence agencies dependent upon their specific 
tasks are: penetrations; defectors; double agent operations; physical, 
technical, and photographic surveillances; examination and analysis 
of overt publications; information supplied by friendly intelligence + 
services;/and COMINT.' ' ** 

- 17 - 



2. Gaps in Current Coverage 




__ __ „ ,, y- 

A. Asse ssment of Current Internal Security Throat 

1. Communist Party. The Communist Party continues 
as a distinct threat to the internal security because of its extremely 
close ties and total commitment to the Soviet Union. There are many 

' thbuSfnds of people in the United States who adhere to a Marxist 
philosophy and agree" with the* basic objectives of the Communist *" 

■ Party although they do not identify themselves specifically with 'the" 

i : organization. The Party receives most of its finances from the Soviet 
• Union, adheres to Soviet policies explicitly, and provides a major out- 
let for Soviet propaganda. The Party will without Question continue to 
' implement whatever orders it receives from the Soviets in the future. 

! There is little likelihood that the Communist Party, U^A, 

will instigate civil disorders or use terrorist tactics in the foreseeable 
future. Its strong suit is propaganda. Through its publications and 
propaganda it will continue its efforts to intensify civil disorders, and' 
foment unrest in the Armed Forces, labor unions, and minority groups. 
The Party is on the periphery of the radical youth movement and is: 

* striving to strengthen its role in this movement and to attract new * 
members through a recently formed youth organization, but it does * 
not appear this group will achieve any substantial results for the " 

* Party in the future. 

"•"•■•2: Socialist Workers'-Party a nd Other Tr o*«tadat .Groups. ' 
These organizations have an estimated membership of] The 

major Trotskyist organization, the Socialist Workers Party, has 
attained an influential role in the antiwar movement through its 
youth affiliate, the Young Socialist Alliance, which dominates the 
Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam and which 
has more than doubled its size on college campuses in the past vear.*' 
' Trotskyist groups have participated in major confrontations with' 
authorities both on and off campuses and have consistently supported 
civil disorders. At this time they do not pose a major threat to 
instigate insurrection or to commit terrorist acts. The propaganda 
of these groups, while emphasizing student unrest, is also aimed at , 
creating dissatisfaction in labor organizations and in the Armed Forces. 
The Trotskyist organizations maintain close relations with the Fourth 
International, a foreign-based worldwide Trotskyist movement. 

- 20 


4. Pu erto Rican Nati onalis t Extremist Groups . The 
radical Puerto Rican independence movement has spawned approximately 
ten violently anti-American groups committed to Puerto Rican self- 

. ^termination. Revolutionary violence is a major aim of the estimated 
members of these groups and if sufficiently strong, they would 

"noTTTesitate to mount armed insurrection. Since July, 1967, some. 
130 bombings in Puerto Rico and in the New York City area have been 
attributed to these extremists. American-owned businesses have 
been the main targets, but there has been a recent upsurge of violence 
against U.S. defense facilities in Puerto Rico. . 

B. Assessmen t of Current Intelligence Coverage 

1. Scone and Effectiveness. Coverage of the Communist 

- 21 


Coverage of the .Trotskyist and ' "igroups 

Current live informant cover^u can furnish 
information on the general activities of these groups and it should 
serve to warn of policy changes in favor of insurrection or sabotage. 

Informant penetration of the Puerto Rican independence 
groups provides information on the objectives of most of these 
organizations as well as the identities of their members. However, 
these sources have limited ability to provide advance information 
regarding violence committed by these groups or by individual members. 

2. Gaps in Current Coverage. ' u/ 

Closer coverage at the policy-making levels of the Puerto 
Rican independence groups is needed to obtain more comprehensive 
information on persons involved in terrorist activities. The small 
memberships of many of these organizations is a major reason for 
the limited coverage. 

. 3. Possible Measures to Improve Intelligence Collection. 
The selective use of electronic sur"veillanccs~would"n"iaterially enhance 
the intelligence coverage of the policy-making levels of these organizations. 
A particular benefit of electronic surveillance in the Puerto Rican field 
could be the development of information identifying persons involved in . ,■ 
terrorist activities. ' Communications intelligence coverage and travel \ 
control measures could be improved to provide greater awareness of ', 

the travel and other activities of individuals of security interest'. Through \ 
the establishment of additional informant coverage on college campuses, 
the involvement of these organizations in the radicalization of students 
could be assessed with increased accuracy. 

- 22 - 



. The-Committee noted that the President had made it clear 
■ that he desired full consideration be given to any regulations, pplicies, 
■-.or procedures whiah tend to limit the effectiveness of domestic intelli- 
gence collection. The Committee further noted that the President wanted 
the pros and cons of such restraints clearly set forth so that the 
President will be able to decide whether or not a change in current^ 
. policies, practices, er procedures should be made. 

During meetings of the Committee, a variety of limitations 
and restraints were discussed. All of the agencies involved, Defense 
Intelligence Agency (DIA), the three military counterintelligence ^ 
services, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security 
Agency (NSA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), partici- f 
pated in these considerations. 

In the light of the directives furnished to the Committee by 
the White House, the subject matters hereinafter set forth were reviewed 
for the consideration and decision of the President. 


A. Interpretive Restraint on Communications Intelligence 
Preliminary Discussion 



Nature of Restriction 

Advantages of Maintaining Restriction 

Advantages of Relaxing Restriction 




B. Electronic Surveillances and! Penetrations 1 'y- 

Preliminary Discussion 

The limited number of electronic surveillances and 
penetrations substantially restricts the collection of valuable 
intelligence information of material importance to the entire 
intelligence community 

Nature of Restrictions 

Electronic surveillances have been used on a selective 
basis. Restrictions, initiated at the highest levels of the Executive 
Branch, arose as a result of the condemnation of these techniques 
by civil rights groups, .Congressional concern for invasion of privacy, 
and the possibility of their adverse effect on criminal prosecutions. 

Advantages of Maintaining Restrictions 

1. Disclosure and embarrassment to the using agency 
and/or the United States is always possible since such techniques 
often require that the services or advice of outside personnel be 
used in the process of installation. 

3. Certain elements of the press in the United States and 
abroad would undoubtedly seize upon disclosure of electronic coverage 
in an effort to discredit the United States. 

4. The monitoring of electronic surveillances requires 
considerable manpower and, where foreign establishments are involved, 
the language resources of the agencies could be severely taxed. 


62-685 O - 76 - 12 


Advantages of Relaxing Restrictions 

1. The U. S. Government has an overriding obligation to 
use every available scientific means to detect and neutralize forces 
which pose a direct threat to the Nation. 

2. Every major intelligence service in the world,, including 
those of the communist bloc, use such techniques as an essential part 
of their operations, and it is believed the general public would support 
their use by the United States for the same purpose. 

3. The President historically has had the authority to act 
in matters of national security. In addition, Title III of the Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 provides a statutory basis. 

4. Intelligence data from electronic coverage is not readily 
obtainable from other techniques or sources. Such data includes infor- -■•• 
mation which might assist in formulating foreign policy decisions, 
information leading to the identification of intelligence and/or espionage 
principals and could well include the first indication of intention to commit 
hostile action against the United States. 

5. Acquisition of such material from COMINT without . 
benefit of the assistance which electronic surveillance techniques can 
provide, if possible at all, would be extremely expensive. Therefore, this 
approach could result in considerable dollar savings compared to collection 

- 27 - 


DECISION:, Electronic Surveillances 
and Penetrations 

_ Present procedures on electronic coverage should 

_ Present procedures should be changed to permit 
intensification of coverage of individuals and 
groups in the United States who pose a major 
threat to the internal security. 

_ Present procedures should be changed to permit 
intensification of coverage 

More information is needed. 

NOTE : The FBI does not wish to change its present procedure of 
selective coverage on major internal security threats as 
it believes this coverage is adequate at this time. The 
FBI would not oppose other agencies seeking authority of 
the Attorney General for coverage required by them and there- 
after instituting such coverage themselves. 

- 28 - 


C. Mail Coverage 

Preliminary Discussion 

The use of mail covers can result in the collection of 
valuable information relating to contacts between U. S. nationals and 
foreign governments and intelligence services. CIA and the military 
investigative agencies have found. this information particularly helpful 
in the past. Essentially, there are two types of mail coverage: routine 
coverage is legal, while the second — covert coverage — is not. Routine 
coverage involves recording information from the face of envelopes. It 
is available, legally, to any duly authorized Federal or state investi- 
gative agency submitting a written request to the Post Office Deoartment 
and has been used frequently by the military intelligence services. 
Covert mail coverage, also known as "sophisticated mail coverage, " 
or "flaps and seals, " entails surreptitious screening and may include 
opening and examination o f domestic or foreign mail . This technique is 
based on high-level cooperation of top echelon postal officials.! 

Nature of Restrictions 

Covert coverage has been discontinued while routine 
coverage has been reduced primarily as an outgrowth of publicity 
arising from disclosure of routine mail coverage during legal 
proceedings and publicity afforded this matter in Congressional 
hearings involving accusations of governmental invasion of privacy. 

Advantages of Maintaining Restrictions 

Routine Coverage: 

1. Although this coverage is legal, charges of invasion 
of privacy, no matter how ill-founded, are possible. 

2. This coverage depends on the cooperation of rank-and-file 
postal employees and is, therefore, more susceptible to compromise. 


Covert Coverage : 

1. Coverage directed against diplomatic establishments, 
if disclosed, could have adverse diplomatic repercussions. 

2. This coverage, not having. sanction of law, runs the 
risk of any illicit act magnified by the involvement of a Government 

3. Information secured from such coverage could not be used 
for prosecutive purposes. 

Advantages of Relaxing Restrictions 

Routine Coverage : 

1. Legal mail coverage is used daily by both local and 
many Federal authorities in criminal investigations. The us/ of this 
technique should be available to permit coverage of individuals and 
groups in the United States who pose a threat to the internal security. 

Covert Coverage : 

1. High-level postal authorities have, in the past, provided 
complete cooperation and have maintained full security of this program. 

2. This technique involves negligible risk of compromise. 
Only high echelon postal authorities know of its existence, and personnel 
involved are highly trained, trustworthy, and under complete control 

of the intelligence agency. 

3. ' This coverage has been extremely successful in 
producing hard-core and authentic intelligance which is not obtainable 
from any other source. An example is a case involving the interception 
of a letter to a establishment in! . The writer offered to 
sell information to the! _ _ .nd enclosed a sample of information 
available to him. Analysis determined that the writer could have 
glven( information which might have been more damaging 



DECISION: Mail Coverage 

j Present restrictions on both types of mail 

I coverage should be continued. 

Restrictions on legal coverage should be 

\ Present restrictions on covert coverage should 

': be relaxed on selected targets of priority foreign 

intelligence and internal security interest. 

More information is needed. 


The FBI is opposed to implementing any covert mail coverage 
because it is clearly illegal and it is likely that, if done, infor- 
mation would leak out of the Post Office to the press and serious 
damage would be done to the intelligence community .j The FBI 
has no objection to legal mail coverage providing it is done on 
a carefully controlled and selective basis in both criminal and 
security matters-. 




D. Surreptitious Entry 

Preliminary Discussion 

Nature of Restrictions 

Use of surreptitious entry, also referred to as "anonymous 
sources: and "black bag jobs, " has been virtually eliminated. 

Advantages of Maintaining Restrictions 

1. The activity involves illegal entry and trespass. 

2. Information which is obtained through this technique 
could not be used for prosecutive purposes. 

3. The public disclosure of this technique would result in 
widespread publicity and embarrassment. The news media would portray 
the incident as a flagrant violation of civil rights 

Advantages of Relaxing Restrictions 

1. Operations of this type are performed by a small number 
of carefully trained and selected personnel under strict supervision. The 
technique is implemented only after full security is assured. It has been 
used in the past with highly successful results and without adverse effects. 

- 32 


2. Benefits accruing from this technique in the past have 
been innumerable | 

3. In the past this technique, when used against subversives, 
has produced valuable intelligence material. 

. DECISION: Surreptitious Entry 

Present restrictions should be continued. 

Present restrictions should be modified to permit 
procurement ! 

Presehrrestrrctions should also be modified 
" to permit selective use of this technique against other 
urgent and high priority internal security targets. 

More information is needed. 

NOTE: The FBI is opposed to surreptitious entry 

,33 - 


E. Development of Campus Sources 

Preliminary Discussion 

Public disclosure of CIA links with the National Student 
Association and the subsequent issuance of the Katzenbach Report 
have contributed to a climate adverse to intelligence-type activity 
on college campuses and with student-related groups. It should be 
noted that the Katzenbach Report itself does not specifically restrain 
CIA from developing positive or counterintelligence sources to work 
on targets abroad. 

Restrictions currently in force limit certain other elements 
of the intelligence community access to some of the most troublesome 
areas: campuses, college faculties, foreign and domestic youth groups, 
leftist journalists, and black militants. It is recognized that these are 
prime targets of communist intelligence- services and that the opportunity 
for foreign communist exploitation increases in proportion to the weakness 
of a U.S. counterintelligence effort. 

Nature of Restrictions 

The need for great circumspection in making contacts 
with students, faculty members, and employees of institutions of 
learning is widely recognized. However, the requirements of the 
intelligence community for increased information in this area is 
obvious from the concern of the White House at the absence of hard 
information about the plans and programs of campus and student- 
related militant organizations. At the present time no sources are 
developed among secondary school students and, with respect to 
colleges and universities, sources are developed only among 
individuals who have reached legal age, with few exceptions. This 
policy is designed to minimize the possibility of embarrassment 
and adverse publicity, including charges of infringement of academic 

- 34 


Advantages of Maintaining Restrictions 

1. Students, faculty members, and others connected with 
educational institutions are frequently sensitive to and hostile towards 
any Government activity which smacks of infringement on academic 
freedom. They are prone to publicize inquiries by governmental 
agencies and the resulting publicity can often be misleading in 
portraying the Government's interest. 

2. Students are frequently immature and unpredictable. 
They cannot be relied on to maintain confidences or to act with discretion 
to the same extent as adult sources. 

Advantages of Relaxing Restrictions 

1. To a substantial degree, militant New Left and antiwar 
groups in the United States are comprised of students, faculty members, 
and others connected with educational institutions. To a corresponding 
degree, effective coverage of these groups and activities depends upon 
development of knowledgeable sources in the categories named. In this 
connection, the military services have capabilities which could be of 
value to the FBI. 

2. Much of the violence and disorders which have occurred 
on college campuses have been of a hastily planned nature. Unless 
sources are available within the student bodies, it is virtually impossible 
to develop advance information concerning such violence. 

3. The development of sources among students affiliated 
with New Left elements affords a unique opportunity to cultivate informant 
prospects who may rise to positions of leadership in the revolutionary 
movement or otherwise become of great long-range value. 

4. The extraordinary and unprecedented wave of destruction 
which has swept U. S. campuses in the past several months and which 

in some respects represents a virtual effort to overthrow our system 
provides a clear justification for the development of campus informants 
in the interest of national security. 



5. Contacts with students will make it possible to 
obtain information about travel abroad by U. S. students and about 
attendance at international conferences. 

DECISION: Development of Campus Sources 

Present restrictions on development of campus * 

and student-related sources should be continued. 

Present restrictions should be relaxed to permit 

expanded coverage of violence-prone campus and 
student-related groups. 

CIA coverage of American students (and others) 

traveling abroad or living abroad should be increased. 

More information is needed. , 

NOTE : The FBI is opposed to removing any present controls and 

restrictions relating to the development of campus sources. 
To do so would severely jeopardize its investigations and 
could result in leaks to the press which would be damaging 
and which could result in charges that investigative agencies 
are interfering with academic freedom. 

36 - 


F. Use of Military Undercover Agents 

Preliminary Discussion 

The use of undercover agents by the military services to 
develop domestic intelligence is currently limited to penetration of 
organizations whose membership includes military personnel and whose 
activities pose a direct threat to the military establishment. For example, 
although the Navy has approximately 54 Naval ROTC units and numerous 
classified Government contract projects on various campuses across 
the country, the Naval Investigative Service conducts no covert collection 
on college campuses. The same is true of the other military services. 

Nature of Restrictions 

The use of undercover agents by the military investigative 
services to develop domestic intelligence among civilian ,.,_ 

targets is believed beyond the statutory intent of the Congress as 
expressed in Title 10, U. S. Code, and in current resource authoriza- 
tions. The Delimitations Agreement (1949 agreement signed by the 
FBI, Army, Navy and Air Force which delimits responsibility for 
each agency with regard to investigations of espionage, counter- 
espionage, subversion and sabotage) reflects the current missions 
of the FBI and the military services. Further, there is a lack of 
assets to undertake this mission unless essential service-related 
counterintelligence missions are reduced. There is also concern for 
morale and disciplinary reactions within the services should the 
existence of such covert operations become known. 

Advantages of Maintaining Restrictions 

1. If the utilization of military counterintelligence in this 
mission is contrary to the intent of the Congress, discovery of employ- 
ment may result in unfavorable legislation and further reductions in 

2. Lacking direct statutory authority, the use of the military 
services in this mission could result in legal action directed against the 
Executive Branch. 

3. The use of military personnel to report on civilian 
activities for the benefit of civilian agencies will reduce the ability of 

the military services to meet service-connected intelligence responsibilities 

- 37 - 


4. If expansion of the mission of the military services with 
regard to college campuses is to provide coverage of any significance, 
it will require corollary increases in resources. 

5. Prosecutions for violations of law discovered in the 
course of military penetration of civilian organizations must be tried 

in civil courts. The providing of military witnesses will require compli- 
cated interdepartmental coordination to a much greater extent than the 
present and will serve, in-the long run, to reduce security. 

6. Disclosure that military counterintelligence agencies have 
been furnishing information obtained through this technique to nonmilitary 
investigative agencies with respect to civilian activities would certainly 
result in considerable adverse publicity. The Army's recent experience 
with former military intelligence personnel confirms this estimate. 
Since obligated service officers, first enlistees and draftees are drawn 
from a peer group in which reaction is most unfavorable, morale and 
disciplinary problems can be anticipated. 

Advantages of Relaxing Restrictions 

1. Lifting these restrictions would expand the scope of 
domestic intelligence collection efforts by diverting additional manpower 
and resources for the collection of information on college campuses and 
in the vicinity of military installations. 

2. The use of undercover agents by the military counter- 
intelligence agencies could be limited to localized targets where the 
threat is great and the likelihood of exposure minimal. Moreover, 
controlled use of trusted personnel leaving the service to return to 
college could expand the collection capabilities at an acceptable risk. 

3. The military services have a certain number of personnel 
pursuing special academic courses on campuses and universities. Such 
personnel, who in many instances have already been investigated for 
security clearance, would represent a valuable pool of potential sources 
for reporting on subversive activities of campus and student- related 

- 38 


DECISION: Use of Military 

Undercover Agents 

. Present restrictions should be retained. 

The counterintelligence mission of the military 
services should be expanded to include the active 
collection of intelligence concerning student- 
related dissident activities, with provisions for 
a close coordination with the FBI. 

No change should be made in the current 
mission of the military counterintelligence 
services; however,, present restrictions 
should be relaxed to permit the use of trusted 
military personnel as FBI assets in the 
collection of intelligence regarding student- . 
related dissident activities. 

More information is needed. 

NOTE- The FBI is opposed to the use of any military undercover agents 

' to develop domestic intelligence information because this would 

be in violation of the Delimitations Agreement. The military 
services, joined by the FBI, oppose any modification of the 
Delimitations Agreement which would extend their jurisdiction 
beyond matters of interest to the Department of Defense. 




The capability of member agencies, NSA/CIA, DIA, FBI, 
and the military counterintelligence services, to collect intelligence 
data is limited by available resources, particularly in terms of budget 
and/or qualified manpower. For some agencies fiscal limitations or 
recent cutbacks have been acute. Budgetary requirements for some 
agencies, other than the FBI, are reviewed and passed upon by officials 
who, in some instances, may not be fully informed concerning intelligence 

The military services noted that cuts in budget requirements 
for counterintelligence activities have the effect of severely hampering 
the ability of these services to accomplish missions relating to coverage 
of threats to the national security. Budgetary deficiencies have occurred 
at a time when investigative work loads are increasing significantly. 

Manpower limitations constitute a major restriction on 
the FBI's capabilities in the investigation of subversive activities. 
The problem is further complicated by the fact that, even if substantial 
numbers of Agents could be recruited on a crash basis, the time required 
to conduct background investigations and to provide essential training 
would mean several months' delay in personnel being available for use 
against the rapidly escalating subversive situation. 

-40 - 


In the event, as a result of this report, additional 
collection requirements should be levied on the agencies involved, 
it would be necess ary to prov ide (or essential funding. For exampie, 

• — — ~ ' li 

DECISION: Budget and Manpower Restrictions 

Each agency should submit a detailed estimate as 
to projected manpower needs and ether costs in the 
event the various investigative restraints herein are 

Each agency must operate within its current 

budgetary or manpower limitations, irrespective 
of action required as result of this report. 

More' information is needed. 

41 - 



i. ' cuiIren^ Procedures to effect coor dination. 

There is currently no operational body or mechanism • 
specifically charged with the overall analysis, coordination, and 
continuing evaluation of practices and policies governing the acquisi- 
tion and dissemination of intelligence, the pooling of resources, and 
the correlation of operational activities in the domestic field. 

Although a substantial exchange of intelligence and research 
material between certain of the interested agencies already exists, much 
remains to be done in the following areas: (1) the preparation of coordinated 
intelligence estimates in a format useful for policy formulation; (2) the 
coordination of intelligence collection resources of the member agencies 
and the establishment of clear-cut priorities for the various agencies; 
and (3) the coordination of the operational activities of member agencies 
in developing the required intelligence. 


It is believed that an interagency group on domestic 
intelligence should be established to effect coordination between the 
various member agencies. This group would define the specific require- 
ments of the various agencies, provide regular evaluations of domestic 
intelligence, develop recommendations relative to policies governing 
operations in the field of domestic intelligence, and prepare periodic 
domestic intelligence estimates which would incorporate the results 
of the combined efforts of the entire intelligence community. 

Membership in this group should consist of appropriate 
representatives named by the Directors of the Federal Bureau of Inves- 
tigation, the Centrai Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, tlie 
Defense Intelligence Agency, and the counterintelligence agencies of the 
Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, In addition, an 


62-685 O - 76 - 13 


appropriate representative of the White House would have membership 
The committee would report periodically to the White House, and a 
White House staff representative would coordinate intelligence originating 
with this committee in the same manner as Dr. Henry Kissinger, Assistant 
to the President, coordinates foreign intelligence on behalf of the 
President. The chairman would be appointed by the President. 

This interagency group would have authority to determine 
appropriate staff requirements and to implement these requirement- 
subject to the approval of the President, in order to meet the ' 
responsibilities and objectives described above. 

DECISION: Permanent Interagency Group 

An ad h °c group consisting of the FBI, CIA, NSA, 

DIA, and the military counterintelligence agencies 
should be appointed and should serve as long as the 
President deems necessary, to provide evaluations 
of domestic intelligence, prepare periodic domestic 
intelligence estimates, and carry out the other 
objectives indicated above. The ad hoc group should 
be tasked to develop a permanent organization to 
.carry out the objectives of this report. 

A Permanent committee consisting of the FBI, CIA, 

NSA, DIA, and the military counterintelligence 
agencies should be appointed to provide evaluations of 
domestic intelligence, prepare periodic domestic 
intelligence estimates, and carry out the othe^- 
objectives indicated above. 

No further action required. 

More information is needed. 

NOTE: The FBI is opposed to the creation of a permanent committee'. 

for the purpose of providing evaluations of domestic intelligence' 
however, the FBI would approve of preparing periodic domestic ' 
intelligence estimates. 



Exhibit 2 
752 Documents 

Domestic Intelligence Gathering Plan: 
Anclys'r- and Strategy 

July, 1970 

Memc-atattni :or: H. R. Kuk'eni.v- 
From: Ton - . Charies Hu.--;on 
Subject: Domestic intelligence revii-.y 

1. Backqrcvnd 

A v-Tr^-i; ennp consisting of the top rfon-ie«:c intelligence 
cikirils if the Ffsl C!A. DIA. NAS. ana if ;' e mil:'"..-,' 
service^ ?.:•,. t roiiiLir! - - throughout June to dv^u^s the p.-obler^s out- 
lined by tru- i.esijent iiii-I tc draft the attached report. The dis- 
cus/k'r.s were f:ar.'< :ir.d the qiaii;- of vcrk firJl-raic.' Cepperat'On 
wa.; ox«-t;!-;ri. and aii were delign : ed that an opr-Trunity was 
finn.l'.y a' hand to ;. 'dress thenseives jointlv to the serious internal 
Security threat which exists. 

I partic ,-.'Ud in ail meeting:-., but re'tricd my involvement to 
keeping the committee on. the tarrei the Piesiucnt established. Niy 
impression :hat the report would be more ticci.rnte and ".he reconir 
nie::d:tt: on-, more r.elptu!,::' the agencies were allow. ?d wide lati- 
' tude in expressi:.^ their opinions and working ou: arrangements 
which thc> felt met ths President's r.oiii'-emcnts co:sistent with 
the resc'trce? .:nu u:!s,ie::s of the ntemiier agencies.. 

2. Mr. Hoover 

J went Into this exercise fearful that C.l.A. wouid refuse to 
coope-atc. in fact, D.^k Helms [Director of Central intelligence] 
was most cooperative and helpful, ar.d the only stumbling bloc': 
•was Mr. Hoover. He attempted at the first meeting to divert the 
committee from operational problems and redirect its mandate to 
the preparation ct another analysis ot existing intelligence. I de- 
clined, te i.equiesce in this approach, ar.d succeeded in getting the 
committee back on target. 

When the working g:cup completed its report, Mr. Hoover re- 
fused to go along with a single conclusion drawn or support a sin- 
gle recommendation made. His position was twofold: - 

(1) Current operations are perfectly satisfactory and (2) No 
one has any business commenting on procedures he has established 
for the collection cf intelligence by the F.B.I. He attempted to 
modify the body of the report, but 1 successfully opposed it on the 


Documents 153 

grounds that the report was the conclusion of all the agencies, -not 
merely the F.B.I. Mr. Hoover then entered his objections as 
footnotes to the report. Cumulatively, his footnotes suggest that he 
is perfectly satisfied with current procedures and is opposed to 
any changes whatsoever. As you will note from the report, his 
objections are generally inconsistent and frivolous — most express 
concern about possible embarrassment to the intelligence com- 
munity (i.e., Hoover) from public disclosure of clandestine opera- 

Admiral Gayler and General Bennett were greatly displeased 
by Mr. Hoover's attitude and his insistence on footnoting objec- 
tions. They wished to. raise a formal protest and sign the report 
only with the understanding that they opposed the footnotes. I 
prevailed upon them not to do so since it would only aggravate 
Mr. Hoover and further complicate our efforts. They graciously 
agreed to go along with my suggestion in order to avoid a nasty 
scene and jeopardize the possibility of positive action resulting 
from the leport. I assured them that their opinion would be 
brought so : l :e attention of the President. 

3. Threat Assessment 

The fir?;; 23 pages of the report con.-titute an assessment of the 
existing internal security threat, our current intelligence coverage 
of triis threai, and areas where our coverage is inadequate. All 
agencies concurred in thii assessment, and it serves to explain the 
importance of expanded intelligence collection efforts. 

4. Restraints on Intelligence Collection 

Part Two of the report discusses specific operational restraints 
■which currently restrict the capability of the intelligence com- 
munity to collect the types of information necessary to deal effec- 
tively with the internal security threat. The report explains the 
nature of the restraints and sets out the arguments for and against 
modifying them. My concern was to afford the President the 
strongest arguments on both sides of the question so that he could 
make an informed decision as to the future course of action to be 
followed by the intelligence community. 

I might point out that of all the individuals involved in the 
preparation and consideration of this report, only Mr. Hoover is 
satisfied with existing procedures. 

Those individuals within the F.B.I, who have day-to-day re- 
sponsibilities for domestic intelligence operations privately dis- 
agree with Mr. Hoover and believe that it is imperative that 
changes in operating procedures be initiated at once. 

1 am attaching to this memorandum my recommendations 
on the decision the President should make with regard to these 
operational restraints. Although the report sets forth the pros and 
cons on each issue, it may be helpful to add my specific recom- 


754 Documents 

mendations and the reasons therefore in the event the President 
has some doubts on a specific course of action. 

5. Improvement in Interagency Coordination 

All members of the committee and its working group, with ths 
exception of Mr. Hoover, believe that it is imperative that a con- 
tinuing mechanism be established to effectuate the coordination 
of domestic intelligence efforts and the evaluation of domestic in- 
telligence data. In the past there has been no systematic erfort to 
mobilize the full resources of the intelligence community in the 
internal security area and there has been no mechanism for prepar- 
ing community-wide domestic intelligence estimates such as is dona 
in the foreign intelligence area by the United, States Intelligence 
Board. Domestic intelligence information coming into the White 
House has been fragmentary and unevaluated. We have not had for 
example, a community-wide estimate of what we might expect 
short- or long-term in the cities or on the campuses cr within thd 
military establishment. 

Unlike most of the bureaucracy, the intelligence community 
welcomes direction and leadership fror.: the White House. There 
appears to be agreement, with the exception of Mr. Hoover, 
that effective coordination within the community is possible only if 
there is direction from the White House. Moreover, the community 
is pleased that the Wnite House is finally showing interest in 
their activities and an awareness of the threat which they so 
acutely recognize. 

1 believe that we 'vil!. be making a major contribution to the 
security of the country if we can work out an arrangement 
which provides f° r institutionalized coordination within '.he in- 
telligence coirur.ucity and effective leadership from the White 

6. Implementation of the President's Decisions 

If the President should decide to lift some of the current re- 
strictions and if he should decide to authorize a formalized do- 
mestic intelligence struct:ire, 1 would recommend the following 

(A) Mr. Hoover should be called in privately for a stroking 
session at which the President explains the decision he has made, 
thanks Mr. Hoover for his candid advice and past cooperation, and 
indicates he is counting on Edgar's cooperation in implementing 
the new decisions. 

(B) Following this Hoover session, the same individuals who 
were present at the initial session in the Oval Office should be 
invited back to meet with the President. At that time, the Presi- 
dent should thank them for the report, announce his decisions, in- 
dicate his desires for future activity, and present each with an 


Documents -. 755 

autographed copy of the photo of the first meeting which Ollie 

(C) An official memorandum setting forth the precise decisions 
of the President should be prepared so that there can be no 
misunderstanding. We should also incorporate a review procedure 
which v iil enable us to ensure that the decisions are fully im- 

I hate to suggest a further imposition on the President's time, 
but think these steps will be necessary to pave over some of the 
obvious problems which may arise if the President decides, as I 
hope he will, to overrule Mr. Hoover's objections to many of the 
proposals made in this report. Kf-.vir.g seen the President in action 
with Mr. Hoover, I am confident that he can handle this situation 
in such a way that we can get what we want without putting 
Edgar's nose out of joint. At the same time, we can capitalize on 
the goodwill the President has built up with the other principals 
end minimize the risk that they may feel they are being forced 
to take a back seat to Mr. Hoover. 

7. Conclusion 

. I am delighted with the substance of this rcrort and relieve it is 
a first-rate job. I have great respect for the integrity, loyalty, and 
competence of the men who are operationally responsible for 
internal security matters and believe hat we are on the threshold 
of an unexcelled opportunity ;o cope with a very serious problem 
in its germinal stages when we can avoid the necessity for harsh 
measures by acting swift, discreetly, and decisively to deflect the 
threat before it reaches alarming proportions. • 

1 might add, in conclusion, that it is my personal opinion that 
Mr. Hoover will not hesitate to accede to any decision which 
the President makes, and the President should not, therefore, be 
reluctant to overrule Mr. Hoover's objections. Mr. Hoover is set in 
his ways and can be bull-headed as he!!, but he is a loyal trooper. 
Twenty years ago he would never have raised the type of .objec- 
tions he has here, but he's getting old and worried about his 
legend. He makes life tough in ;his a~ea. but no: impossible — for 
he'll respond to direction by the President and ;hat is all we 
need to set the domestic intelligence house in order. 


22.1 Tom Hustom memorandum 

OPERATIONAL R£SV :1 A;>:~"S ON .. .'.•" CO..;..~C". .'. .V. 

A. Inter:) rctivv ?.'j:i':r.i'.".- ■'■■:-. C."r: : .--r icatlons Intelligence, (pp. 2j-?.i', 


Prcscr.t interpretation should be broadened to per.' 
and program for covu.-ajc by NSA of the- commui-.icat.o.. 
of U. S. citizens using ir.ier.-.ationai facilities. 


The FBI doc-s r.ot have the capability to rnonito.- 
intcr national communications. NSA is current. y 
doing so or. a restricted basis, and tiie informa- 
tion it has provided has been most helpful. Muc. • 
of this information is particularly useful to the 
White House and it would be to our disadvantage 
to allow the FBI to determine what NSA should, co 
in this area without regard to our own require- 
ments. No appreciable risk is involved in this 
course of actio:-.. 

B. Electr onic Surveillances and Penetrations, (pp. 26-28) 


■ ' Present procedure's should be changed to permit 

intensification of coverage of individuals and 
groups in the United States who pose a major 
threat to the internal security. 

ALSO, present procedures should be changed to 
* intensification 0: coverage o. foreign 
nationals and diplomatic ustau.*s:..-;.ents i.-. tae 
United States of interest to ::\c intelligence 


At the pros- ... t'.r.-.e, le&s than of. eii.-ctro.v.c 
penetrations operative. ir.clv.Gos 
cover, . e of the fi^'u'oA ; organized crime v-'iii; o... . a .cw :.ui:".on;-..:c. a;:ai:'.^t 
■ subjects of pre-.- .ig .'.-.'..: r.cturity ir.Lcreit. 

■'." i I 
- /'/ 


Page 2 

Mr. Hoover's statement that the FBI would not oppose 
other agencies seeking approval for and operating 
electronic surveillances is gratutious since no other 
agencies have the capability. 

Everyone kr.ov/lcdgable in the field, with the exception 
of Mr. Hoover, concurs that existing coverage is grossly 
inadequate. CIA ^nd NSA note that this is particularly 
true of diplomatic establishments, and we have learned at 
the White Mouse that it is also true of New Left groups. 

C. Mail Coverag e (pp. ^29-31) 
' . Recommendation: 

Restrictions on legal coverage should be removed. 

ALSO, present restrictions on cove'r t coverage 
should be relaxed on selected targets of priority- 
foreign intelligence and internal security interest. 


There is no valid argument against, use of legal mail 
covers except Mr 4 . Koover : s concern that the civil 
liberties people may become upset. This risk is surely 
an acceptable one and hardly serious enough to justify 
denying ourselves a valuable and legal intelligence tool. 

Covert' coverage is illegal and there arc serious risks 
involved. However^The advantages to be derived from 
its vise outweigh the risks. This technique is particularly 
valuable in identifying espionage agents and other contacts 
of foreign intelligence services. • [ 

D. Surreptitious Entry (pp. 32-33) 

Present restrictions should be modified to permit pro- 
curement of vitally needed foreign cryptographic marerial. 

ALSO, present restrictions should be modified to permit 
selective use of vhis technique agairst other urgent and 
high priority inte :"Kii security targets. v '.~// -'-T/ . 



le^ai: ■ Jt amoun-s 
r.d could resulc 

Use of this toc'..r.:cuc is c. 

to. burglary. It is also 

in great embarrassment if exposed. However, it 

is also the most fruitful tool ar.d car. produce the 

type of intelligence which cannot be obtained in any 

other fashion.- 

The FBI, in • 


conduct such operations wiJ 

no exposure. xne 

Hoover's younger days-, used to 
sat success and with 

information secured was invaluable. 

Page i 

KSA has a particular interest since it is possible by 
this technique to secure materials with which NSA car. 
. break foreign cryptographic codes. We spend millions 
of dollars attempting 'to break these .codes by machine. 
One successful surreptitious entry can do the job 
.successfully at no dollar cost. ■ 

Surreptitious entry of facilities occupied by subversive 
. elements can turn up information about identities, 
methods of operation, and other invaluable investigative 
information which is not otherwise obtainable. Tnis 
technique would be-particularly helpful if used against 
the Weathermen and 31ack Panthers. 

The deployment of the Executive Protector Force has 
increased the risk of surreptitious entry of diplomatic 
establishments. However, it is the belief of all except 
Mr. Hoover that the technique can. still be successfully 
used on a selective basis. 

E. Development of Campus Sources (pp. 34-36) 


Present restrictions should be relaxed to expanded 
coverage o: violence-prone campus and student- related 

ALSO, CIA cc\vr,.:;e of American students (a:-.d others, 
travciir.g or livhi:' abror-i: shouic: be increased. , 

^y/^/ / -< 



The FISI docs not currently recruit any campus sources 
among individuals beiou- 21 years of age. This dramaticaUy 
reduces the pool from which sources may be drawn. Mr. Hoov 
is afraid of a young student surfacing in i'r.c press as an FBI 
source, although the reaction in the past to such events has 
been minimal. After all, everyone assumes the FSI has 
such sources. . 

The campus is the battle-ground of the revolutiohary 
protest movement. It is impossible to gather effective 
intelligence about the movement unless we have campus 
sources. The risk of exposure is minimal, and where 
exposure occurs the adverse publicity is moderate and 
short-lived. It is a price we must be willing to pay for • 
effective coverage of the campus scene. The intelligence 
community, with the exception of Mr. Hoover, feels 
strongly that it is imperative the we increase' the number 
of campus sources this fall in order to forestall widespread 

CIA claims there are no existing restraints on its coverage 
of over-seas activities o£ US nationals. However, this 
■ coverage has been grossly inadequate since 1965 and an 
■explicit directive to increase coverage is required. 

, F. Use of Military Undercover Agents (pp. 37-39) 
. .. Rcjcommcndation: 

Present restrictions should be retained. 

Rationale: . • ■ . 

The intcllu' community is agreed that the risks 
of li'ftin;; these restraints arc greater than the value 
of any po::.;i':,lo ir.toili^ which .ccuid he ac-.y.:: rod 
by doin ' =.o. ' ,- — / ■ - -/ 




BUDGET AN'D M AX P O V»' ':'- T-L 'X ■- 5 T RI C T IP N" 5 

(pp. 40--U) . 

Recommendation : 

Each agency should submit a detailed estimate as to 
projected manpower needs and other costs ir. the event 
the various investigative restraints herein are lifted. 

Rationale: ..'•:■'. 

"In tile event that the above recommendations arc concurred 
.. in', it will be necessary to modify existing budgets to provide 

' the money and manpower necessary for their implemcr.tatior.. 

The intelligence community has been badly hit in the budget 
squeeze (I suspect the foreign intelligence operations are in 
the same shape) and it rr.ay fei will be necessary to make 
some modifications. The projected figures should be . 
reasonable, but will be subject to individual review if this 
. , recommendation is accepted. ' - . < 

~~~ (pp. 42-43) " ' ■ ■ : T 

■ Reconim.cndci.ion: ' 

•" ". A permanent committee consisting of. thc-F31, CiA, NSA, 
DIA, and the. military agencies should 
be appointee! to provide evaluations of dorr.esv:c intelligence, 
• - prepare periodic domestic estimates, anc carry 

out the other objectives specified in the report. 


The need for increased coortiinr.tior., joint estimates, and 
responsiveness to the V/hite Mouse is obvious zo i:\c-. 
intelligence community, There are a number of operational 
problems which need to be worked out htr. rioovov i.~- 
fearful o: any mechanism which rni:;ht jeopardise his <":v.v^:.o:.~.;.'. 
CIA would pvrfcr'an ad hoc committee to see ho v.* tne isysiem 
"worhs, but Qj.h*:v mombe :'s behev..- vn.z v.:: r. v:<>\..u .:.:: :'•'■<■'; v.e--. 
iKt: esi abli .-hnien: o*.' c.";Vc-.ive coordinat:*:-. ar.u ..cmj cpov ..».:•'■£• 
The valr-i- o; l:u.;n.j; i;;i::i^e;icc co.n'C:'.o:\ v::-;u rair.vA :.. 

proportional to the availability oi joir.: operation: - , ar.c. .v- - ■■•■ 

and tin- eo-ab! i:;hmem: o: ibis ir.h,* r -agency p;;v«'.ip \u cs.-.. ■■ ■. ■•'-■ 



Exhibit 3 

Jujy 14, 1970 


SUBJECT! Dorocctic Intellige nce Review 

• - , c.y.-n'- ' ; — 

The recommendations you have proposed as a result of tho review 
have been approved by tha President. 

Ho does not, however, want to follow "the procedure you outlined ' ' 
on page 4 of your memorandum regarding implementation. Ha 
would prefer that the thing simply be put into motion on the 
"basis of this approval. ■ ' ' 

The formal official memorandum should, of course, bo prepared, 
and that should be the device by which to carry it out. 

I realize this is contrary to your feeling as to;' the best way to get 
. this done. If you feel very strongly that this procedure won't work 
you had better let me know and we'll take another stab at it. 
Otherwise let's go ahead. 



Exhibit 4 

Retyped from indistinct original 23.7 Tom Huston 




July 23, 1970 




The President has carefully studied the Special Report 
of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc) and made 
the following decisions: 

1 Interpretive Restraint on Communications I ntelligence. 
National Security Council Into Lligence Directive Kutnber 6 (NSC1D-6) 

2. Electronic Surveillances and Penetrations . 

Also, coverage of foreign nationals and 
diplomatic establishments in the United States of interest to the 
intelligence community is to be. intensified. 

3 Mail Coverage . Restrictions on legal coverage arc to 
be removed.' Restrictions on covert coverage arc to be relaxed to 
permit use of this technique on selected targets of priority foreign 
intelligence and internal security interest. 

U Surreptitious Entry . Restraints on the use of surreptitious 
entry are to be removed. Ihe technique is to be used to permit 
proc.r2r.ient of vitally needed foreign crytographic material and 
against other urgent and high priority internal security targets. 

(fSC 06875-70 


Retyped from indistinct original 


5. Development of Campus Sources . Coverage of violence- 
prone campus and student-related groups is to be increased. All 
restraints which limit this coverage are to be removed. Also, CIA 
coverage of American students (and others) traveling or living 
abroad is to be increased. 

6. Use of Military Undercover Agents . Present 
restrictions are to be retained. 

7. Budget and Manpower . Each agency is to submit a detailed 
estimate as to projected manpower needs and other costs required to 
implement the above decisions. 

8. Domestic Intelligence Operations. A committee 
consisting of the Directors or other appropriate representatives" 
appointed by the Di rectors , of the FBI, CIA, NSA, DIA, and the 
military counter-intelligence agencies is to be constituted effective 
Augvist 1, 1970, to provide evaluations of domestic intelligence, 
prepare periodic domestic intelligence estimates, .carry out the 
other objectives specified in the report, and perform such other 
duties as the President shall, from time to time, assign. The 
Director of the FBI shall serve as chairman of the committee. 
Further details on the organization and operations of this committee 
are set forth in an attached memorandum. 

The President has directed that each addressee submit 
a detailed report, due on September 1, 1970, or the steps taken 
to implement these decisions. ^Further such periodic reports will 
be requested as circumstances merit. 

The President is aware that procedural problems may 
arise in the course of implementing these decisions. However, he is 
anxious that such problems be resolved with maximum speed and 
minimum misunderstanding. Any difficulties which may arise should 
be brought to my immediate attention in order that an appropriate 
solution may be found and the President's directives implemented in 
a manner consistent with his objectives. 


cc; The President 
H.R. Haldeman 


Retyped from indlnstinct original 


1. Membership . The membership shall consist of 
representatives of the FBI, CIA, DIA, MSA, and the counter- 
intelligence agencies of the Deportments of the Army, Navy, and 
Air Force. To insure the high level consideration of issues and 
problems which the President expects to be before the group, the 
Directors of the respective agencies should serve personally. 
However, if necessary and appropriate, the Director of a member 
agency may designate another individual to serve in his place. 

2. Chairman . The Director of the FBI shall serve as 
chairman. He may designate another individual from his agency to 
servo as the FBI representative on the group. 

3. Observers . The purpose of the group is to effectuate 
community-wide coordination and secure the benefits of community- 
wide analysis and estimating, '..'hen problems arise which involve 
areas of interest to agencies or departments not members of the 

group, they shall be invited, at the discretion of the group, to join the 
group as observers and participants in those discussions of interest 
tc them.. Such agencies and departments include the Departments of 
State (I & R, Passport); Treasury (IRS, Customs); Justice (BM)D, 
Community Relations Service), and such other agencies which may have 
investigative or law enf orcetnenj; responsibilities touching on 
. domestic intelligence or internal security matters. 

t,, white House Liaison . The President has assigned to Tom 
Charles Huston staff responsibility for domestic intelligence and 
internal security affairs. He will participate in all activities of the 
group as the personal representative of the President. 

' 5 Staffing . The group will establish such sub-committees 
or working groups as it deems appropriate. .It will' also determine and 
implement such staffing requirements as it may deem necessary to 
enable it to carry out its responsibilities, subject to the approval ot 
the President. 


. -Retyped from Indistinct original 


**• Duties . The group will have the following duties: 

(a) Define the specific requirements of member agencies 
of the Intelligence community. 

(b) Effect close, direct coordination between member agencies. 

(c) Provide regular evaluations of domestic intelligence. 

(d) Review policies governing operations in the field of 
domestic intelligence and develop recommendations. 

(e) Prepare periodic domestic intelligence estimates which 
incorporate the results of the combined efforts of the intelligence 
community . 

(f) Perform such other duties as the President may from 
time to time assign. 

'• Meetings . The group shall meet at the call of the Chairman 
a member agency, or the White House representative. 

8. Security . Knowledge of the existence and purpose of 

the group shall be limited on a strict "need to know" basis. Operations 
of, and_papers originating with, the group shall be classified "Top 
Secret-Handle Via Comint Channels Only." 

9. Other Procedures . „ The group shall establish such 

other procedures as it believes, appropriate to the implementation of the 
duties set forth above. 

Retyped from indistinct original- 


Exhibit 5 



"o Mr. C. D. DeLoach/j ' date: Jrritcr^O, 1969 

from W. C. Sullivan 

<;/ ■ 

subject: MR. TOM CHAIiLES .'.HUSTON 


Keference is made to the enclosed memorandum from W. C. Sullivan 
to Mr. DeLoach dated June 18, 1969. 

Mr. Huston did come in yesterday. The first thine: he said was 
that he had made a mistake in going to Mr. J. Walter Ycagley as 
Yeagley did not seem to know anything about the Hew Left. Mr. Huston 
then went on to say that President Nixon called him in and discussed 
with him in some detail the need for the President to know in greater 
depth the details concerning the. revolutionary activities stemming 
from the Hew Left. In particular, said Mr. Huston, President Ni.voii 
is Tntovc-c'o>i in ill infnrmt ion possible relating to foreig n 
xnnue nces and me iiiiaucin^ of the Kt;w Lui'L. iie ej*hu hu mis 
requested by the President to also go to otner members oi the 
•intelligence community to develop whatever materials they may have 
,ithin their jurisdiction. 

Mr. Huston said that on completing his work, it will be 
presented to the President for his use. 

I told Mr . Huston t'hat I was not in any position to make 
commitments in this matter, that if he had such a request to make 
it would be necessary for him to put it in writing and address his 
letter to the Director who made- the decisions in such areas. 
Mr._H'U3tca snicl t' hewculd do this. 


• — ._— =-Por-the - information of "tKo^nivcetor . 
WCS:lml/ (5) _ ( 

'}■ v 

Tli;s rlr:.:unvi)t ir. :;; •:■}■( t<:J. i.> rr:--y.---.-.--'- !r. •<<,•■< • >■.":.-.•;.' .,:<' ,■.-: v,t for'rifcscmi- 
i ji^'j$ ration o .;'<■■; ''.'•*• ?;'->•"»' <Vi>;*.< «-;?»*'< ?.. .'"- -•...-.■ /■■ '> ■/ in ttiiivlvi r ,occa\inf)a by 

£iS& * ' _ yr.ii- C'>r.imittnii a\'<'' Hie cur. I- ;.' ;;.:■•;.' ■•-■■ !> : il-^do^td io uuuuthvracd jjcrsost- 

iicl without the expi'CoS approval of Uio i-'iJl . 


62-685 O - 76 - 14 


Exhibit 6 
the white house" ,\ 


June 20, 1969 


FROM: Tom Charles Huston j 

Staff Assistant to the President i 

The President has directed that a report on foreign 
Communist support of revolutionary protect movements in this 
country be prepared for his study. He has specifically requested 
that the report draw upon all the resources available to the 
intelligence community and that it be as detailed as possible. 

"Support" should be liberally construed to include 
all activities by. foreign Communists designed to encourage or 
assist revolutionary protest movements in the Unitud Statei 

On the basis of earlier reports submitted to. the President 
on a more limited aspect of this problem, it appears that our 
prescnu intelligence cuiltiutiun *j..i;.iabiii.Lic:£, xn l!il.^ ai^a .~>ay 
be inadequate. The President would like to knew v:-iiat resources 
we presently have targeted toward monitoring foreign Communist 
support of revolutionary youth activities in this country, he-/ 
effective they are, what gaps in our intelligence exist, because 
of either inadequate resources or a low priority of attention, 
and what steps could be taken, if he directed, to provide 
the maximum possible coverage of these activities. 

I have asked CIA, NSA, and DIA to submit their contributions 

to me by Monday, June 30th. I would appreciate it if the Bureau 

would provide their response to the President's request by that 
date- _ 

Since the Bureau has primary responsibility in this 
[area, I would like to discuss the matter further with your staff 
iafter I have had an opportunity to evaluate the initial 

I- ■contributions. The i'rosident hac assigned a high [jiicrity to 
this project, and I want to insure that he receives the most 
complete report that it is possible to assemble . 

- "~ ._ - "i-;'~ ■**" " Tom Charles Huston 

iriir\o0/vinli Pii-.t. 

rti'i '•> ' iin 



Exhibit 7 



to :Mr. Vi. C. Sullivan dati.: June 30, 1S69 

from :C. D. Brcr.nanC 

i/irnr.iaon support it>r'ivcvowjtio:iaky potest . 
'movement;-; hi 'j-iiiJ uhj.tjjo "states . 


Tiio Director approved lay inoGorandua of G/23/09 
which advised wo were preparing a report for Ijr. Tom Charier; 
Huston, Staff A:;:jictnnt to the President , at his vcqucsjt 
rccardinn oi'.r coverage of foreign coaumiirjt support of 
revolutionary youth aotiviticy in. the United States to reach 
hiu by CAO/eS. l.'o advised Mr. Huston ei-.cli t. report weald 
bo f!in;; . 

Our report acts forth the traditional. ciianr.-::3. 
for'.:nint suy-pori of revolutionary activity in this 
coa.ntry by the established basic rcvol'.'.tionary [;i'oiu<= ui:der 
foreign domination snoh as the Cci.umnist Party, VSh., and. the 
Socialist V,' or ho :•..■•; Tarty. V,'o alio cover the cap: I.j.J.J \.U:- of 
Uc:-tilc intoll'w'.' operation:-; directed at the United yt:::t:.?: 
"' by the Soviet Union, Cuba and Co:.:VH'.i>ist Ci/ii.a. 

Ilc::t v;c shew the newer, bolder arenr.^y of rj'.'i:.;.-::t 
an'' cb'rcction b::in;; utilised by revolutionaries; often 
vithoat any attei.:j>L to conceal their purpose . Ti.^se > noli-r'.e 
international, co.nfort.acer; which in this paric:! of I::Sstvvy 
arc ostensibly ?&■•■ p".ac:o in Viotnai; but \.'!iich v.jr.o have tb.u 
usual ui:'.V:.;."J.yii'.; real of ctestroyia.;; United OtaUs pre. ••!.:■ ;;.-.• 
in va.-rld affairs. The case of internal::! coal fc.":V.). :'.',.• 
cc:".:i".:ii'-.:'-;.it:> with revolutionary intent !•./ lie,' J-'-ft a>\:" b'"-' : ' 
c;,-;.n...i::/:;: ; d)'< "o;,'i :: fro:.i t!:o United Ctatos ana abroad, is ti" ;t 

The- scotio'i deal? a:; '..'lib ear c>ve>.a; ; :.: of. tl.a abo.o 
throats to our jiito; )■'• J soonrity «:".'•">.• .ly sbi...... (•.•■;• s::;.oa;; 

rcliaaoo ir.-C:: fi".; I'si of J ive ii>fc-:i. ' r •.•:,. -J :"-'.-.0 l"-;.. : >''-' ! :".i-.iill- 
tecbairi -:: oOifrSsvec' by t h: !'.;;biy so;;.cU.- a a.!:.} I- ;: It.-:" ie 
of c .- i.i . c; ' - ■' »'i' : ocva., ; ;,o,. 

V.r-.O '.:■.,.:.:■•!■. <?•)• 

:■.■ .■•,>,5:iOSA ■ f .: 

...i ■ ■' (r.,i r.i. ,..■:■• :•• - c. ..■ 

Tto rf« fll >«.'../ ••■= !»'";««•! !.", ••''•'•'7,':'':,.!,? 4 "i',,;/,'i /•• ^/V.^ ,"•„,■■ -.;;,a/« '>.</ 
ftdwitlwut tlic cxi»™» m»oval of t/ic, * M • 


Memorandum. to Mr. 17. C. Sullivan 

Our report shows that the FBI has boon aware from 
the inception of tlio New Left and bine!: extremist movements 
that they pose new and unique throats to our internal security. 
It shows we have readjusted our investicativo intollicenco 
efforts to cope with the new problems created. It stresses 
the fact that those movements arc developing increasingly 
into hard-core revolutionary cleiiieuts which v;ill c'lOiraml 
still creator attention in the form of increased covcracc 
as it appears there will be increasingly closer lini:s between ; 
these movements and foreign communists in. the future. 

Wo have prepared a transmittal lot tor to !.'.r. Huston 
subuittinj or.r report. Inasmuch as this doeunent is not (;oin^ 
directly to the President, no copy is Ueinr; forwarded to the 
Attorney General at this tii::e. 


With your approval, the attached report and letter 
will bo forwarded to Ilr. line ton. 

■; ) 



Exhibit 8 



' Memorandum 

Mr. DeLoach' :• date: June 5, 1970 

from : w.C. Sullivan-? I ^7 



This memorandum is for the record and for possible 
reference use by the Director. 

Following his conference with the President this N 
morning, the Director advised me that the President had 
appointed him Chairman of a special Intelligence Committee 
for the purpose of c oordinating a more effective intelligcricc- 
gathering function as ^ jolTrr-^f^r»rtrqn-'ttie^a'ft~'bI~tiic~'Eirv'b'a~u. 
Uentral intelligence Agency (CIA)~ ::atfonar~cr{.'Cii'i T lt':/':icy 
(NSA) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) ta^psjire_rhat 
compr ehensive information_is being pbtainec! for the President's 
use Wiiich~yiT T~ provide " iiim'wi th "a world- wide pic cure "of - t.'ow Left 
and other subversive activities. *" ~. " 

The Director advised ne that among those present at 
the meeting with the President were Richard Helms, Director 
of the CIA; Admiral Noel A. M. Gayler. head of the NSA ; 
General Donald V. Bennett, head of the DIA; and Mr. T. C. 
Huston, White Staff ..Assistant , all of whom the President had 
designated to serve on the Committee under the direction of 
the Director. Additionally, there were present Assistant to 
the President H. R. Haldeman; John D. Ehrlichman, Assistant 
to the President for Domestic Affairs; and Robert II. Finch, 
. Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. 

The Director stated he wanted immediate action on 
this. He advised me that he wanted all of the men on the 
Committee contacted and instructed to be in his office for a 
Committee meeting at 11:00 a.m. Monday morning, 6/S/70. This 
has been arranged and has been made the subject of a sepffcite 

,c/\/rr) prom 

This document is prepared in response to ymir request and is not (or ilisscmi- 
»Ub - jqjc nation out. title yonr Committee. Its vxr in iimitni !o oifiriul pmcccdinns by 
your Committee and the content man ""' •*'■ diulusid t.o it.-iatdhorizid person- 
( __ . - nel ,witttout the express approval of the FDI . 

r 13 1 


Memorandum to .Mr. DeLoach 



The Director also instructed that a working committee 
meeting comprising the same individuals should be scheduled 
for Tuesday, June 9, and he instructed me to serve in his place 
at that meeting to insure that the instructions he issues to 
the Committee on Monday are carried through in specific detail 
by members of the Committee on Tuesday. Arrangements have also 
been made for this meeting to be held Tuesday afternoon at 
3:30 p.m. utilizing the facilities of the United States Intelligence 
Board conference rooms. 

The Director further instructed that this working 
[ committee should henceforth meet each Tuesday and Friday for 

the purpose of implementing his instructions with the aim of 
I completing a draft paper by June 22, 1970, which the Director 
land others may review for approval aRd sign prior to its 
(presentation to the President on July 1, 1970. Arrangements 
Ifor this will be implemented at the working committee meeting 
Ion Tuesday, June 9, 1970. The Director will be promptly 

Ifurnished with a report on each meeting. 


For the information of the Director and for the record. 

/•Jib ;.:. Mi$ 

FBI * 


Exhibit 9 




Mr. DeLoach- 

from : if. cVsullivan 

date: jvine 5 ( 1970 



Pursuant to the Director's instructions and relative 
to his role as head of the above-captioned Committee, I have set 
up a meeting to take place in the Director's office at 11 am 
Monday, 6/8/70. 

I talked personally to the following individuals who 
will be there: Mr. Richard Helms, Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency, General Donald V. Dennett, Director of the 
Defense Intelligence Agency; Admiral Noel Gaylor, Director of the 
National Security Agency; and Mr. Tom Huston, Staff Assistant to 
the President at the White House. 

The first three mentioned indicated they would like to 
take one of their assistants with them;' however, they had not 
decided which one, therefore, the names are not available. As soon 
as they make the decision, I will submit the names of these assist- 
ants in a separate memorandum. 

The details for the meeting of the working groug are being 

worked out. At this point it is expected it" will be held at 

3:30 pm on Tuesday afternoon. This also will be the subject of 
■Separate memorandum. 


Fc/r the information of the Director. 

17CS:clu/ J (5) 


^This'documatt is prepared in response to 

"nr™"™ 1 .™- " vrcpnrea ,n response to V ovr rrqur.-.t and i, not for disscmi- 

nd ic-.lhoitt me cT'm-ss approval of the I-'L't . i-uson 







Mr. C. D. DcLoach 
WaC- Sulllvaji 


DATE: 6/6/70 

(Established By The President June 5, 1970) 

Reference is made to ray memorandum to you dated 
June 5, 1970, captioned as above which indicated that the 
Director will meet with the heads of the Central Intelligence 
Agency, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence 
Agency and a representative of the White House staff in the 
Director's office, at 11:00 a.m. 6-8-70. In accordance 
with the Director's instructions I will be present. Unless 
there is an objection I will have with me Mr. C. D. Brennan, 
Chief of the Internal Security Section which will have the 
responsibility of preparing our portion of the report on 
the New Left and related matters. I believe Mr . Brennan 
should hear and will benefit from the Director's remarks. 

I have been advised that as of this date the heads 
\of the other agencies do not now plan to have any of their 
assistants with them. exceDt Admiral Gaylor of NSA who will bring 
I an assistant, Benson Buffi-am. 

It occurred to me that in addition to the remarks 
the Director has in mind he may wish to give consideration 
to some of the major points in the enclosed statement prepared 
for him. - ■ 


That this memorandum and the enclosed statement be 
furnished to the Director. »' * 




FBI ' 


This document is prepared hi response to 'jour request and. is vnt for tli$s< 
nation onisidc ?/»«>• C»nnni!Ur. If* v*c. h b'w'tnl in offivhl proceed in gi 


7 ««* u «- —.".<■<, .- ;/ proceedings by 

your Committee and the context mtvj not !>c disclosed to unauthorized person- 
nel without ths express approved of the FiJI . 



I am sure you gentlemen will all agree with me 
that our meeting with the President on Friday was of very 
special significance. The President clearly recognizes 
that we are confronted today with uniaue and complex problems 
arising from subversive activities on an international scale. 
There is a distinct relationship between these activities and 
much of the disorder and violence which increasingly 
threatens our internal security. The President made it. 
abundantly clear that he expects us, as members of the 
intelligence community, to do more than we have been doing 
to bring the worldwide picture of these problems into better 
perspective for him. 

Having been designated by -the President as Chairman 
of the Committee to meet this challenge, I feel a special 
responsibility. First, I would like to state that I agree 
completely with the President's view of the situation. Con- 
sider what has transpired in the 1960s. We have witnessed 
the emergence of widespread racial unrest which threatens 
to grow much worse before it gets better. Wo have also seen 
the emergence of a new left militancy which has consituted 
./massive mob rule in action. From what we have learned to date 
//it is apparent these are not solely domestic problems. There 
/ are definite foreign links to our domestic disorders. 

\ Yet, the foreign aspect of the problem is different 

than that which we experienced in the past. Prior to the 
1960s, foreign-directed intelligence and espionage activities 
constituted the main threat to our security. We in the 
intelligence community geared ourselves accordingly and met 
that problem successfully. We coordinated our activities in 
doing so. But the nature of the problem -jas such that it 
left us to a marked degree free to operate independently in 
regard to our respective problem areas. 

Today, it is mandatory that we recognize the changed 
nature of the problem -confronting us. Unless we do so, we 
■ will be incapable of fulfilling the responsibility levied 
. upon us by the President. 

The Plain fact is that there currently are thousands 
of individuals inside this country who want to see our form of 
, r-i>„-, B °v? rnment destr °y ed - They have in fact pledged themselves 
'-/LlVEl? | ilffi] t0 achievin e this goal. They have put their words 

JUG 5 13/5 " 
r n i 


into actions constituting revolutionary terrorism ,. and the ' 
total effect of their actions to date has boon disasterous. 

In addition, they are reaching out seeking support 
from this nation's enemies abroad to further their objectives. 
Thus the links to Cuba, China, and Iron Curtain countries 
already have been established and promise to grow because of 
the equal determination of various international communist 
elements to destroy our form of government. 

In contrast to the rigidly structured subversive 
organizations of past experience, the current subversive 
forces threatening us constitute widespread, disjointed, and 
varied autonomous elements, the destructive potential of which, 
is manifold. 

Individually, those of us in the intelligence 
community are relatively small and lioited. Unified, our 
own combined potential is magnified and limitless. It is 
through unity of action that we can tremendously increase our 
intelligence-gathering potential and, I am certain, obtain 
the answers the President wants. 

I am establishing a working committee to insure 
that we achieve the desired unity. It will be the job of the 
committee to (1) assess the overall nature of the problem as 
we know it today, (2) examine individually and together the 
respective resources of each Agency to insure full utilization 
of them for the benefit of all, and (3) devise coordinated 
procedures designed to penetrate the current nebulous areas 
of subversive activities here and abroad as they relate to 
our domestic. problems. 

The first meeting is set for tomorrow afternoon, 
Tuesday, June 9th, and you have been furnished the details 
as to the time and place. 

The working committee will hereafter meet each 
Tuesday and Friday for the purpose of preparing a comprehensive 
study to be completed in rough draft form by June 22, 1970, 
for presentation to the President on July 1, 1970, in final 
form. This should serve as the foundation of our committee's 
existence and purpose and as the basis for a coordinated 
intelligence effort best suited to serve the country's 
interest at this time of crisis. 


1 AUG 5 IWJ - . 


Exhibit 10 

OTROHU »©■■■ "O. "• 



r. DeLoacn 

to , : Mr. DeLoacn DATE: June 8. 1970 

i ' •.-, V-" ' 

I ' ■ •■■.'.•' 
from W. C. Sullivan 

./• - 


This memorandum is to record meeting of captioned Committee 
in the Director's Office 11 am, Monday, 6/8/70, which was chaired by 
the Director with the following persons present: Mr. Richard Holms, 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) ; General Donald V. 
Bennett, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) ; Admiral 
Noel Gaylor, Director of the National Security Agency (NSA) ; and his 
Assistant Mr. Benson K. Buffham; Mr. Tom Isuston, Staff Assistant to 
the President at the White House; as well as Racial Intelligence 
Section Chief George C. Moore and myself. 

The Director pointed out to the Committee that the 
President, in establishing this special intelligence Committee, 
recognized definite problems arising from subversive activities on 
the international scale and expected the Committee to coordinate and 
plan so that the world-wide picture could be better brought into 
perspective for the President. The Director stated that he well 
recognized t<ie importance of the work of this Committee and he states 
that along with organized crime this is equally important. 

The Director further commented concerning the foreign aspe 
of today's subversive domestic problem aid stated that prior to the • 
1960's, the main threat to our security nas foreign-directed intelli 
gence espionage activities but today we lave a different problem 
marked by highly organized, dissident groups seeking to destroy our 
form of Government. 

In_outHning the work of the Committee, the Director poin'. 
I out: (1) The situation should be thoroughly explored to determine! 
I exactly what the problem is. (2) Each agency must explore the , 
' facilities which must and can be used iai order to develop tacts 

for a true intelligence picture. The Director noted the President 

7" r hY'- ""''mentioned restrictions which were"' hampering our intelligence opera ^ 
•'' u, ~ ' and- accordingly we should list for the President in detail such 

' m 6 -WCS:chstfe)' NATIO&USvn'-.T.-YU. 

"inai Sanctions 


0»» w -~r. -,.. "'■ • a-ii.-.;:i!i...- ■.• i r 


Memorandum to Mr. DeLoach 



restraints and restrictions together with tix- pros and cons involved 
so that the President can make a decision as to which ones should be 
utilized. (3) The Director stated it was rncst important that the 
foreign connections of domestic problems be determined pointing out 
that we know Cuba, Red China and the Soviet-bloc are deeply in the 
picture. The Director also commented the importance of ascertaining 
what is happening in foreign countries concerning this same subversive 
problem and how it has been dealt with by those countries; for 
example, the Director mentioned that the water cannon had been used 
most effectively against the hippies in Paris, as well as elsewhere 
and maybe the application of this tactic should receive consideration. 
In this regard, the Director commented the - " picture of what goes on 
abroad would more appropriately come within the purview of the CIA, 
DIA and NSA. 

The D irector stated he was establishing a worjiing. sub- 
committee headecF'Dy - Assistant Director. WilliaraCr." Sullivan and 
composed'-Of" designated representatives of the other agencies present 
i"TKrtTio~first"meoting- would" be at 3:30 pm; G/9/70 at the U. S. 
IrfCBTltgc-'nce 'Board Meeting Room and subsequent thereto a meeting 
would -be held; c.very Tuesday and Friday in order to draw together the 
raw material in order to' present a final report to captioned Committee 
for-scrutiny and' evaluation on 6/22/70."* The submission of the final 
rep"ort~tb i'the President will be on 6/30 or 7/1/70. The Director 
emphasized it was most vital that all agencies give this matter top 

Following the Director's initial remarks, those officials 

present commented that the aims and goals presented by the Director 

were realistic and that all present would cooperate in the fullest 

in getting organized and getting on with the highly important task 
which faces the special Committee. 

During the discussion all agreed that the initial primary 
problem facing the Committee was to concentrate upon methodology in 
intelligence collection. The Director stated although brevity is the 
Key" - a detailed listing of all the items which are currently 
obstructing the FBI and other intelligence agencies in attaining their 
goals must be set out clearly with pros and cons so that the President 
is able to make a determination as to what he is willing to let us do. 
Some of the matters to be considered in this regard mentioned by the 

."AUG 5 l-.ji'j' ._ 2 - CONTINUED - OVER 



Memorandum to Mr. DeLoach 



_Di rec tor _we.r.c_ : 

_(2) ljunitatipns on telephone surveillances 

It was agreed that the President is extremely anxious 
for the utmost degree of cooperation among all the agencies in 
coordination of this matter and the Director pointed out that 
I there is certainly no problem with respect to coordination and 
the Director wanted it understood that the President expects 
*5?_ S£oup_jto work _together__as_a team. ' 

At the close of the meeting, the Director again emphasized 
that the importance of this matter dictated that each agency put Us 
top experts to work on this matter and that it be given the highest 
priority in order that this deadline is met as expected by the 


You will be advised as to the results of the mooting 
of the working committee which takes place tomorrow. 6/9/70 
at 3:30 pm. 


!l U 

- 3 - 


6*1t0wit >QI* 




DE /t ; ACHp^" P ATE: 6/8/70 





My memorandum 6/5/70 advised that the details for 
the meeting of the working group of captioned committee are 
being worked out. Arrangements have been made for the 
working group to meet in the United States Intelligence Board 
Conference Room at 3:30 p.m., Tuesday afternoon, 6/9/70. 
"As of this time, the following members have Deen designated: 

FBI - Mr. William C. Sullivan Acting for the Director 

CIA - Mr. Richard Helms, Director of CIA 

Mr. James Angleton, Chief, Counterintelligence Staff, CIA 

DIA - The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) member has not 
yet been designated. In addition to the DIA member, 
there will be representatives from each of the three 
military services - Army^,_Navy , and Air Force, , . ._ . .' ___ 
HSA - M r... Benson K. Bu ffham . ." 

White House - Mr. Tom C. Huston, Staff Assistant to the 
President . 

Arrangements have been made for use of the Conference 
Room and all of the above members have confirmed their 
attendance. When the DIA representatives are designated, 
you will be advised. 


■ ,.1, 

:R?H : hke 
I ' (6) 

For information. 


: .Thin document is prepared, iu response, to a our mutest and is not for diascmi- 
1 'nation outside inr-i.r ComhiiHcr. Its rxr <"» iiwital to offiewl proceedings by 
AUb b i'V your Comoiill' ■•: n,id the <f l-r-l ;,>trt not If disclosed to unauthorized. pcrsorL- 
. * nel without the express c^roi-al of the FiSl . 









from : K. C. SULLIVAN 

DATE: 6/9/70 



My memorandum 6/8/70 sot forth the members of the 
working group of captioned committee, which will hold its 
first meeting in the United States Intelligence Board Conference 
Room at 3:30 p.m., Tuesday, 6/9/70, with the exception of the 
Defense Intelligence Agency members. 

Set forth below are the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) 
working group member and the member from each of the three military 
services. The additional names listed ace the alternates for 
each of the agencies. 

DIA - Hr. James E. Stilwell, 

Deputy Chief, Office of Counterintelligence and 
Security, DIA 

(_- Lieutenant Colonel Donald F. Philbrick 

Array - Colonel John IT. Dov/nie, 

Director of Security, Assistant Chief of Staff 
. for Intelligence, Department of the Army 

Mr. Elihu Braunstein 

Navy - Captain Edward G. Ttifenburgh, 

Director, Naval Investigative Service, 
Naval Intelligence Command 

Mr. Harry Warren 

Air Force - Colonel .Rudolch C. Roller, Jr., 

Commander, 1127 U.S. Field Activities Grouo, 
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Air Force 

Colonel D. E. Walker 



This docimmU i'.s prepared in rcrpnuar In >tour ova! is v>£ fnr (lissnni- 
nation oi;Ui t! "- yr.:;r Vomi) , i , 'cc. lir, r*r h; i'^i't--! to offkiu 1 n:Q»%Hii*a.-i t>y' 
your C'«jiiW(7*-\' «;.*•'/ tits (<•.':'. ni uay «:<».' .'.■' iiischiivd to u;;a>;ih0iiwd person- 
nel without the express approval of the Fiil , 


T 11 

_e.M 01- lie i 



J --J ■ Mr. C. D. DeLoaJcj) DATE: J"»e 10, 1" G 

I : 

; .1 - 

.'.om Mr. IV. C. Sullivan - 




This memorandum records the results of the Working 
Subcommittee meetinir on June 9. 1970. 

of the Pre 

Mr. Tom C." Huston, White 'House, spoiled" out the "desires 
President, furnishing members with a "Top Secret" outline 
(copy attached). This outline addresses itself to the Purpose, 
Membership, Procedures, and Objectives of'the Committee's Review. 
In his oral presentation, Huston emphasized the President was not 
interested in being told what the current problem is, but rather 
what the future problems will be and what must be dnnp *n ,-™.nf?r 
them. Ho stressed the Committee should provide the President with 
the pros and cons of any restraints so that ho can decide what 
action is to be taken. 

It was agreed that all papers and reports prepared by 
the Committee will be classified "Top Secret - Handle Via' Comint 
Channels Onlv" because of the President's desire that the existence 
and work of the Committee be tightly controlled. (The 1 reference to 
Comint Channels refers to communications intelligence and insures 
that this matter will be handled in a secure manner.) . 

At the meeting various members discussed the restraints' 
currently in effect which limit the community's ability to develop 
the necessary intelligence. In accordance with the President's 
instructions, the next meeting of the Working Subcommittee will 
consider all restraints restricting intelligence collection efforts 
across the board, as well as submissions on defining and assessing 
the existing internal security threat, both domestic and foreign; 

It was agreed that the Working Subcommittee would next 

Imeet at 1:30 p.m., June 12, 1970, in the Conference Room of the 
U. S. Intelligence Board. Results of this meeting will be promptly 
furnished the Director. 


■ . . : FqrVinforraation. r 

' /'V ' >">?•■; ; ■ • 

n6i'osurei. r y4 ! , / 



mrenACsxsr c=aisK3 as iNTtLxiGaicj; 

(Aa of 10 b.b. , Jftm« 9, 1P7:; 


/ Dr. tflUl.-ui C. &nl.Uv=n 

Ur. Bol-.tIu 15. J'coro • . . 

Hr. Gaorgc C. ilotrrs 

dr. tUlliam 0. Crcjar ' 

Hr. Frod J. Cacoidy — — <, ' ' 

Ceati-sl Tntplll^ctco £~^ay (C&A) 

U-. Rlehanl EaXj^a 

•''Jlr, .Saoca Acglotoa 

( Oofone-3 Intolllr-^sso /Sr^crjy O&A) 
- Ui-. Jaoca E. StilVJOll 

Llc-jtsnant Colonel Docnld 7. Philbrick 

Dapartg-'rat of tha Armr "" ' 

■^ Colonol Jolui S. Downio 

Hr. Elitm Bra una tola 

Papa rtc.CTt of th.3 Eayy 
i(/|~p •'j CBJTt^ 10 Bdrard Q. Rlfcabarijh 

''■"» 5 J9/:Hr. Carry uarrea 


i-y wtmnit is ;)rc/)nm/ jm rr.::pnr-!-'> ro ffn'tr rcv-'fst ami ;■? uo/, /or (li-nrim'- 
\„ 0'itnitlr your OoPViHn <-. .'/.; ('■■<- i\* ii ; .:;Ud t<> rrijivkd iirorr.niira-: hij 
ytfr Comv.iilfcr o,ul tin: co.:i»;:il ;>.-..■;/ ,':.-. .V iihcloscd to itiifiatliorizcjQ^^^Q^^ _ ^VtH 
el without the express ui>ijrovul of the FHI . * "" 

-685 O - 76 - IS 

. 220 

Dopart^aut of tt»a Air forca 

'Colonel thidolph C. Zallcr, Jr 

Coluocl 0, £. WaUJcar 

i . " 

national yeourlty A,-;t>n<:r 

"Mr. 'Uanaon K. Euffhaa • 

Hr. J«uaes Q*a«rlerr 

Br. Leonard J. Sunco 

tthlto llouaa 

' Kr, Too C. Huston 

Phone: Code 143, Extension 

FBI '. 


1CI -1 

June 10, 1070 


. , Minutes of 

First Ueotlng 

Room 7E-26 , CIA Headquarters Building 

June 9, 1970, 3:30 to 4 p.m. 

Wllllau C. Sullivan 

Assistant Director, federal Bureau of Investigation 




Mr. Richard Hellas, DO 

Mr. Jihi Angleton , CIA 

Mr. Janes Stlltroll, D1A 

Col. John Do-yule, Amy 

Col. Rudolph Roller, Air Force 

Mr. Toe C. Huston, Shite House 

Capt . Edward Rlfenburgh, Havy 

Br. Booson K. Buffhaa, NSA 

Mr. George C. Moore, FBI 

Mr. Donald E. Moore, rBI 

Mr. Wllll*» 0. Cregar. FBI, Secrotary 


Mr. Charles Slther, OSI 

Lt. Col. Donaid ?. Phl'.brlck, D1A 

Mr. Ellbu Braunsteln, Ansy _ 

Mr. Harry Barren, Nav7 ~* ' 

Col. D. K. Talker. Air Forco 

Mr. Jaaes Gengler, NSA 

Mr. Loonard J. Nunno, HSA 

Mr. Fred J. Caseldy, FBI 

hCv.LlV uJ IKOIVl Excluded froa nutomtlc 
» downgrading and 


. . Unauthorized Disclosure 

/ Subject to . Criminal Sanctions 





June 10, 1970 

1. Prefatory Ream-lea ' • 

.Prefatory renirkd of Vllllaja C. Sullivan circulated 
to all nenbcrs at the aoetlng. 

2 . Background to the Crostlon of Conalttec 

' • Hr. Ton C. Huston of the White House briefed the 
Coaualttee on the President '*s concern over the energence of 
the threat fron sporadic vlolonce and anarchism .'row the New 
Loft, as well as the President's concern as to whether the 
Intelligence conaurilty is doing everything possible to cope 
with the problen. Ur . Huston enphaslzed that an effort nust 
be nade for coanunl ty-wlde analysis and assessnent of Infor- 
mation so as to be In a position to advice the President an 
to what is going to happen In the future and what position 
the Intelligence community will be In to be aware of those' 
dovolopoento . An outline defining the purpose and ■eabersblp 
of the Couisittee, as well as procedures and objectives of 
the CoBBlttec's review, <u distributed at the nee ting by 
Ur. Huston. 

3 . Classification Batters 

The Chalrnan asked for coEnents regarding the lovel 
of classification for papers or reports prepared by tbe 
Coimlttee. Ur. Buffhaa of NSA suggested the adoption of a 
code word. AfVer some discussion, Mr. Helns, Director of CIA, 
reconaendod the classification "Top Secret - Handle Via Comnt 
Channels Only." In addition, Ur . Helns suggested the nainte- 
oance of a "Bigot List" reflecting the nanes of all personn 
in each noaber agency or department who will work on or have 
knowledge of the work of the Couittee. The Coimlttee 
unanlnously concurred In adopting both suggestions.* 

•Moabers are requested to furnish their "Bigot List" to the 
Secretary at the neotlng of June 12, 1970. 



Aua 5 im _ 2 

• FBI 


4 . Requlroaealo for ftext Kaotlns 

It ma agreed that at the sen iseetlnft aenbera will 
table ■ Hat of tbone restraints which they consider haapor 
their Intel 1 igence-col lection activities. The list should 
Include the pros And coos of these restraints. 

<Hr. Buffhaa noted that In the outline dlatrlbutod 
b)r Mr." Huston the Conalttee was called upon to define nod 
assess. the exlnttcj internal security threat. ar . Ouffnaa 
felt thin was Bonfltutn". that should bo ^.-orlnd on maodlatelr 
by the experts tro-v. thy rionbor agencies or departments. 
Mr. Huston suggested that the FBI prepare such a paper froa 
the donestlc standpoint and CIA froa the foreign standpoint. 
All Benbora concurred, and It was agreed CIA and FBI sill 
distribute these papers for the Costaittee's consideration at 
the next neetlng. 

5. Security of Connlttee'a "orlc 

Uenbers took cognisance of the necessity for tight 
security to insure the existence and work of the Connlttee 
not becoue known to unauthorlxed pornona. As a result, it 
vu agreed that the Cosaittoe would continue to aeet in the 
CIA Headquarters Building, 

6. ■ Next Meeting 

The next ooeting vlll be at 1:30 p.m., June 12, 
1970, Roob 7D-64, CIA Headquarters Building.' 

•Menbera please note <:hange in roo» nunber. 


AUG' b 1916 . . 7 3 - ~ 


Exhibit 12 
top secrl. .• 

us1b sub-committee on domes elltgence 

I. - Purpose 

f' (A) To define and assess the existing internal security threat. 

(B) To evaluate the collection procedures and techniques 
/ presently employed and to assess their effectiveness. 

.' (C) To identify gaps in our present collection efforts and 

i recommend steps to close these gaps. 


" * (D) To review current procedures for inter-community 

coordination and cooperation and to recommend steps 

to improve these procedures. 

(E) To evaluate the timeliness of current intelligence data 
and to recommend procedures to increascboth its 
timeliness and usefulness. 


(F) To assess the priorities presently attached to domestic 
intelligence collection efforts and to recommend new 
priorities where appropriate. 


(A) FBI, Chairman 

(B) CIA 

(C) NSA 

(D) DIA 

(E) Military Services 

(F) The White House 


-'- ■ • t>.*.; i 
m .-> 131-5 


; EB1- 

Subjed. to Criminal Sanctions 



III. • Procedures 

(A) Although the sub-committcc will be officially constituted 
within the framework of USIB, it 'will in fact be. an 
independent, ad hoc, inler-agcncy working group with 

a limited mandate. 

(B) Operational details will be the responsibility of the ^_ 
chairman. However, the scope and direction of the ', 
review will be determined by the White House member.^. 

(C) The sub-committee will submit its reports to the White 
House and not to USIB. Report will be due by July 1, 1970. 

(D) To insure that the President has all the options available 
for consideration, the WH member may direct detailed 
interrogatories to individual agencies in order to ascertain 
facts relevant to policy evaluation by. the President. 
Information resulting from such interrogatories will, 

if the contributing agency requests, be treated on a 
confidential basis and not be considered by the sub- 
committee as a whole. 

IV. Objectives of the Review 

(A) Maximum coordination and cooperation within the 
intelligence community. The sub-committee may wish 
to consider the creation of a permanent Domestic 
Intelligence Operations Board, or some other appropriate 
mechanism to insure community-wide evaluation of 
intelligence data. 

(B) Higher priority by all intelligence agencies on internal 
. security collection efforts. 

'"CFiV'f' ' i 'RDf/h ^ Maximum use of all special investigative techniques, 

' ' ' 7/ including increased agent and informant penetration by 

«JU o 1975 I / both the FBI and CIA . 



(D) Clarification of NSA's role in targeting against 
communication traffic involving U.S. revolutionary 
leaders and organizations. 

(E) Maximum coverage of the overseas activities of 
revolutionary leaders and of foreign support of U.S. 
revolutionary activities. 

(F) Maximum coverage of campus and student- related 
activities of revolutionary leaders and groups. 

(G) More detailed information about the sources and 

extent of financial support o£ revolutionary organizations. 

(H) Clarification of the proper domestic intelligence 
role of the Armed Services. 

(I) Development of procedures for translating analyzed 
intelligence information into a format useful for 
policy formulation. 

itf.Ci.r-..- ;i?nr/i 

AUG S i'jjf, 



Exhibit 1.3 

0((-.i-il W -O. 10 



10 : Hr. C. D. DeLoach .date: June IS, 1970 

Mr. W. C. Sullivan- 



(ESTADLIc!i::.U UY T.'E PFSSIDr.;T JU".:"- 5. 1?70) 

This memorandum records the results of the Working 

At the meeting of June 12, 1970, the Committee agreed 
I on an outline for the report to be furnished to the President 
' by July 1, 1970. This report will cover three specific areas 
1 of__interest: (a) an assessment of thff current internal security 
threat along with the likelihood of future violence; (b) a 
listing of the current restraints which deter the development 
of the type of information the President desires; (c) an 
evaluation of interagency coordination. 

With regard to an assessment of the current Internal 

security, threat, the Committee agreed the President does not 

desire a recitation of history but rather desires information 

as, to what the problem JLs and a n est imate of what the future 
problen^will be. 

The White House representative advised the restraints 
portion of the Committee report to the President should include, 
In addition to identifying the restraints and a listing of the 

IP.5P.S _and_cons of removing or modifying the restraints, a brief 
paragraph allowing the President to indicate what action ho 
desires be taken. Specifically, this would provide the President 
the opportunity to indicate whether he desired the restraints 
to bo continued, relaxed, or that he needed additional infor- 
nation upon which to make a decision. It was the sense of the 
Committee regarding the third portion of the report that a 
permanent operations committee was needed to coordinate operations, 
prepare estimates of potential violence during future demonstra- 
tions, and to develop new policies. The creation of such a 
committee was endorsed by the White House representative who 
. indicated such a committee would probably be desired by the 

7 &F$m • 

This document is prepared in response In i/onr request, and is not fur dissemi- 
nation outside your Committer. I!:: use is limited In official proceedings bu 

Mia r % (7) VOi'.r Committee and the cnulaii men t:i.t lie disposed to unauthorized persoii- 

' " " ' m net without ilic express oppror.ul of the Fill . 




Memorandum Sullivan to DeLoach 


The next meeting is scheduled for June 17, 1970, 
at which time the Conraittee will consider the first draft 
of the report. • 

ACTIO:) : '■■.... ,^- . .. 

For information. 


- 2 - 



"truttt ', of 

r>,--.:.)r. i : ':•■£". I ■ •': 

Coilffl'fnri.' \\<iu:\ 7V'- 1 '!' 

CIA i:n;ici<-..!->ricr<- V. ::;•••.■■ 

. June IV., li!70. 1:30 to " .: 

William C. S'.-l liv.m 
Assistant Dtrcct'or, l-.-.leral \:-iv: '■■» of I:.w,ti[..-.t ion 
' 1'rcsiiliiiK 


•r. i"i.:; C. Ilurvton, Kliitc I!ou:;e 
T.r . .' ■.-"■" .'irtftoa, CI." 
lir. .!:•. •■■■ jt ilv;..'ll , Di.\ 
Col. .!'..;..! Uu-..nlo, Arir.y 
IT. Ci.-.vios. aitlior . Air Force 
Capt.'i. -f'i i'.lfiMihuv a, Navy 

i:r". r.-ir-.'ir. \i. !<-jf r:-..-.:j. :..-;/. 

Mr. G-.'ori-.c ( -. Ignore. rr.I 
Mr. 'ioi:.-- . fi K. .'.'■ooro, l'. l I 
Ur. William 0. Cronar, FP.I , Secretary 

Observer'-. : "* 

Col. I':u(!ol;>'.i Koller, Air Forr6 
Lt. Co). ConalU f. l'liil!>rlck. DIA 
Mr. r.lilm nr.-.iis-Mtfin, Army 
!,:r. Hr.rry Y.'arrvn, i.'.-.vy 
Mr. Jnat's Gentler, Ii.-!A 
Vr. Leonard .1 . ■J'.inr.o, NSA 
lir. Ilic'i.irU Oii-.T, CIA 
Mr.. Fred J . C:.:.:;iuy, FIJI 


,.,.. , Grmni 1 

( w ""-^ • ^ , '. J "'i"'.! '.'."•:, :', ut " r,!: "- National security infokmatio 


• do-:. '•:-:• in." .•■ml 
clcel; ■•■ i l'n::.l >oi> 

Unauthorised Disclosure 
Subject to Criminal Sanctions 


-v. ; n f "i i". i;.qr. of tl: 
Tl?.> siinutcu of the first uoc:' ■ •:■■• ;>rovc-1 

•»lth po clia 

2 • D i ■' t- '• t N'. t :. o : i of FT) I .'"uh-ii/'.i-icin l\nt i I > -i. ".'•■!• !:ini» a.^d 

An.-u.-SKii-- : til'.' j.'xistiii.- Internal ':" ■'.::■ VI:"" "..- •. r."t~'T :?rii.' «; 1 1 c " 

Tlic mi contribution was clr«.-.'.*':rii-. to nil cusMiPi'fl . 
It was pi.'ircHntcd by Mr. Huston of the '...hitc I'.o-.isr : ■;•; 
report ho l-iblcd to porr.iit an in-depth i\vuj.i — l,y all L;(: .,!, ers 
and that tho contents of the submission bn r,i ..-.:■ : ..<( at. the 
next sicc-tin?. In this regard, .Mr. Huston rei Loin led that the 
ar.sossr.cnt p.-.;: or should not be lengthy; :::-.;, uld .-."..'iess the 
current threat and estimate what the future threat v/ill bo. 

J - CIA' s Subm i ssion Entitled "Doflnlng an d As : -,cfisin5 the 
r.:-:i:'.ti: ■■; .:-ti-r::.-.l .Security 'inroat ■• :.Tiv:if ;;~ 

The CIA representative advised his Agency's submission 
, would bo circulated to all members in vine for an in-depth 
discussion at the next Committee taoetinu. 

4. Distribution and Discussion of "I .irt of restraints 
Inhibitiii-; IntcllirrcMice-CoUectToT T Kllortr." 

The restraints papers submitted were read by all 
ncmbers. Mr. Huston indicated that tho Mil nub.aission was in 
the form he desired; Ho suRRested the restraints nortion of 
the report be patterned after tho Fill subnission with a .-<>n- 
cludinr: paracraph after each individual restraint providin- 
the President with the option of continuing or nodi fyin-; the 
restraint or asking for additional iiuora.-.lion on which to 
b.i-se" a decision. 

5. Preparation of Report 

A sorrcested outline distributed to all r:ev.herc was 
R?Sf IWD^ROft? ' " W3S aBrfcod tl>at tl,e m would Prepare 
AUb ii BIS . 


- 2 - 


■; : '%# 

'tho lir: -r. Hv.-ft to be circulated to :• ; '. 
1070, foil;;'.'*.*);: .*:uu,jiKssion of inputs i-.i ... 
liter ilna 10 a.m., June 15, 1970. 

Co:r.r!ttteo cenbern discussed t!v 
T'ccoimcnuir.rr «'l lie es-.tnbliahaent of n nor.:: !>• :t 
operr.ii-r.r'. co:,:aittce. V.r. Huston ct.'"l';: i <-•.; 
Itself to -this mid Include (1) her? th>: cr.— • 
constituted, (2) to r.'i:o™ it vould reoort , (:. 
natters, nnd (1) the connittea'n area cf n . 
Include opcrntlons, preparation of e.":tlnnt«:s 
of policy reconmondations. 

6. Kext Meeting 

The next mcctlm? will bo held on Wednesday , Juno 17, 
1970, in the U. S. Intelligence Board Conference Room 7E-26.0 

•• •: o: 

1 Juv:»: 

> 1G, 



f ; ■■■. : i 

■ liiy 


: i Ml • 



^: •• r< 



■. . !! V 



i 1 roc 



• to 

, and 



*Ueoboro please note change In room number. 


, 0> ti lii/5 



Exhibit 14 

i;-:Ti:i:-"iv '•:.'.•(.•" i.VT-iri'K!-: <)■: r" i. i ■ i .: 
Vi'ohk i •■■•."• sur.cor.Mrrv;-.!. 

T'.i'.rd J'.ei't'.ir.': 
' - l-SI'"; ( -inforcncc K«»-> -. VI".--:'. 

on v.odni'.-;d iv , Jur..- 17., l'l'/O, at !:.. . i. 

1... 1070 

1. Api-rnval of '• i riiityi; of r.lUi.-iC. Sull iv.-.n 
Second '.I'.'t-f. :n',{ 

2. ni^e-iasion cl Docusi'Mirs by . All Hcj-I'.ns 
Li} 1 . • ? J2 : l_.'- :i _i < - '-■> , «-_i_t i"»-"i' ■'•? 

.'"^ nn ti A. isrs* i n.; i !m V. .:i. -; t. ; nrj 

• Inter n al .Secu rity iM.-:;nl" 

3.. Diric ui.sicn of- Docuunn ;.s Su!>- All >[i-,:i '..-•.• r>; 

ti_U_tr'J_by Ai : /. -.TfT.'i"- -C.i iliiti t K-d 
"I.i :>r _of_ I'o'iMMml ^ i 'lii l>i i. int 
Int el ) JEanec-Col !>-— ■■ .en t:f;o rt.-" 


i - Wc^vlnty of Pro ft o_f . Will lao C. SulUvnn 

Cocni • u-i.: i:.;;><-rt '■ • : <..i !.;i :.<v.i 
to""A'fi'~k r:: niTyi ; f:'"jC:^' "■'■./,"" Hi? ;i 

6. Date ac! Place of ;«■*{. M«etinn 

Unauthorized Disclosure 
Subject to Criminal Sanctions 

eElVEDI!^-...-. " 




ici- ,: -:i 

.Inn.- I 'J. !?'7() 

J NTK.n.AG >...-<;. .' ! fiHlTTK': •"•'< INI!'.::. !:: ' 11 

vv{' ! .;-.:'sg SDMX);.i , .itT!'K. . 

.-I', uu*. a-- 01 

''*■'» . v i't t l i :>;." 

Conff:; i.n("7 jiC'O!.-. '/(.'■-'.'•J 

Ct/> .'fi'.'.'iou.irl erf "!'.. L'dii). 

Juno -U-. 10 70. 2- ti. r.s'. 

T-H • ' : - C. M;li ■ van 
Arsistaot 'irrucW- . • '■ U-.-j-r i i;.'n:*-; -f ! n; • *. ii;:it ion 

A'K« : i-.KilS ?Ki;<IKT 

Mr. Too C. llustor. . Whit-- i!i>o:ic 
llr. J«'W An? i' '.on , CI-'. 
-r. J::- -i; Stll^-li , Di!> 
Wol. Jn:\n [.ioviui;, Arnw 
•* Mr. Charl»."s -'iit::;T, A l '■ Vf-r.i; 
Caoc. ':iir..--l :'. ; ;'.:'-.. -.mi- r. I- , ;-',-.v* - 
Mr. Benson K . ': il f.hani , : '■*! 
Mr. C'iinrlos n , i:\-i-.'.i).-ii-, , ri;, 
llr. G'.'orrTP C. i'o'iro, FT-; 
Ur. William C. C.r;c«i , :!!, Secretary 

Otiservri s : "* 

Col. ij. K. '-fa i ice", AJr :'--:-i-o ' 

Ur. Klihn iirsi'.inst-ein,' ■' •'■ 

Kr. Iljrry Cj-rea, Navy 

Ur. B. (.. Wilir..-(l. !!;:'.•• 

Mr James Cj-Mii'.it.'r , NS* 

Hr. Leonard •>' . I.'.mrio, *-■■■' 

Mr. Ilichcrd ' i..T, CIA 

Mr. Frcl J. i.'»s»"tUy, >T; 


■$B.r> r.n'5 . 

I 1 Ft I _ 

Six.:-.. -.! frr-n a i. ■•.:.*=. h, NATIONAL SECURITY JN'FORMA' 1 
^r,""":..''.'--"^?'"!., ^Unauthorized Disclosure 

■'--" --'■• Suojcct to Criminal Sanctions 



Juno 19, 1970 

1. Approval of Minutes of Second Meetlm ; 

The minutes of the second meeting were approved 
with, no changes. 

2. Items Tap nnd Three on the Ag enda 

The Chairman suggested that Items two and three 
appearing .on the agenda for the third meeting not be discussed 
Inasmuch as the Information contained had been In- 
corporated into the draft report. The Committee concurred In 
tills suggestion. 

3. flevlcw of First Draft of Committee neport 

Detailed discussion developed regarding the draft. 
All neitbers contributed valuable suggestions in ways to Improve 
the report. It was agreed that the FBI would attempt to Incorporate 
suggested changes Into a second draft. This draft is to be 
circulated to all members as soon as possible, after which the 
recipients will attempt to obtain appropriate hir;ii-levoi Cott- 
le rrencc within their respective agencies or departments. 

4. Date and Place of Next Meeting 

Tho next meeting will be held on Tuesday, June 23, 
1970, In the U. S. Intelligence. Board Conference Koom 7E-26. 

62-686 689 

- FBI - 

- 2 


Exhibit 15 



■ Mr. C. D. DeLoach\_> 

date: j un e 19, 1970 

FROM : ff . C> Su ll iwa £> 



In two previous meetings of the above-captioned committee 
general discussions took place and the ground work was prepared for 
dealing with the substance of the report. Yesterday, a third 
aeeting was. held which extended throughout the afternoon and into 
the early evening. Memoranda has been prepared and submitted to 
the Director on the previous two meetings. Yesterday, the members 
of the four intelligence organizations worked _out_the report. I 
received the impression that Admiral Noel Gayior'of" National Security 
Agency may have been_a_moving force behind the creation of this 

/committee. The Program which we discontinued a few 
years ago was raised immediately and figured prominently in the 

Idiscussion. : , • V ' 

v . ' At the very beginning, tho -White House reDresentative 

made it very clear to all members that the report had to be 

working subcommittee report andany ODinions, observations, con 
£i" s -. io il s . o r _recommendations..of..jLnaividual ."agencies "should not ; 

^ul'd not be~set" forth with one exception., 
President did want aj definitive"" 


He said that the, 
recommendation relative to creating 
la group, or committee which could deal. _with operational problems and" 
|objectives_of the member agencies and present estimates, evaluations 

and interpretations on the-current. security threats and or obi ems 
("suiting -from the student-professorial revolutionary activities, 
Iblack extremism and related security matters^. He said the President 

is of the opinion that all government agencies involved in intelli- 
gence activities would have something to contribute and that through 

such a group or board authority ,would be exercised to better . . / 
(coordinate the collection of iiJ&iligeMe.jj, 

The men representing the Army, Air For ce,-*«vy— Rational 1 
Security Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency went into great 
detail concerning intelligence operations, techniques ,,1'ftroceaures, 
^FPFIV:!: eS and et cetera - following a detailed discussion concernin- 
'■VLULIVthe nature/of the security threat to the United Sta l g s t gaay 1 . '"" 
;«;;.!'• :o|i; 

""ne aii present were very friendly and cooperative to 
.each other, jiBxer.t.heless, the_fac.t._remains that in such a_comp.lex 
f%re^jis_int.elli5ence operations, difficult and serious issues are 
v.. Pound 1 tq__come up concerning which, there will be disagreements. 

^u-otiLc 2-; \'T ""'"■ /"":' /;"- ;V;.;" st '""-'' "> ">^Mo>,wi^tinsD - over 

62-685 O - 76 - 16 


Memorandum to Mr. DeLoach 



In view of this it is probably fortunate that no member was 
permitted to make any decisions, recommendations, or conclusions, 
et cetera, in that the President reserves this rirjht for hiraself 
only. Each_coritr'Jver3ip.I iE::ue p hits been so set up in writing 
that the President may quickly and simply indicate whether he 
wants or does not want any changes made. 


Contingent uppn_what the President decides, it is 
Clear that there couid be. problems i nvolved for .the . Bureau . 
For exam ple, the reactivation of the , Program, et cetera. 

I We are completing the first draft of this report now. 

As soon as this is done, the report wijh a cover memorandum 
explaining the various issues involved will be furnished to 

I the Director either late today or early tomorrow morning. 


For the information of the Director. 


ms r. Bis 

. FBI- 

- 2 


Exhibit 16 

0*4 MM. 1>C no. »» ^^^ ^^» 



. TO : Mr. C. A. Tolson date: 6/20/70 

from :W. C. Sullivan 



Attached for the Director's consideration is a copy 
of a first draft of the report prepared by the working committee 
in connection with captioned matter. 

The first 36 pages of this draft present an assessment 
of the present internal security threat under appropriate 
captions. This is material with which the Director is 
thfirou£hl_y_farailAar and it is not believed he need spend too 
much time reviewing it unless he so desires. There is nothing' 
I controversial in this portion of the report. 

Material relating to investigative restraints and 
limitations discussed by the working committee is set forth in' 
Section V (pages 37-59). This material is set forth in 

•accordance with the President's request, with the pros and cons 
outlined and with no recommendations of any kind made by the 
committee. It is clear that in this portion we have controversial 

.issues affecting.the Bureau as well as the other agencies on the 


The final section of the report (pages 60-65) sums uo, 
in accordance with the President's request, the committee's 
observations concerning- current procedures to effect interagency 
coordination and suggested measures to improve coordination' of 
intelligence collection through the establishment of a nermanent 
interagency committee chaired by_the Director or a person 
(designated to act for him. - - - - 

Jr? 9 ."?* a ? re ?. with . th e scope of tnls proposed committee 


■nor do I feel that an effort should be made at this time to engage 
in any combined preparation of intelligence estimates. I can 

*"* a committee could be helpful if it was limited to meeting 
RrTTIUnS^ftilSl y t0 deterrain e how to bettor coordinate operational 
Uh\StlVr_13CtitfiJjy£s against particular targets in the intelligence fieldr 

AW? i' laib ^ The working committer is scheduled to meet again at' 
j.?... = ., Tuesday, June 23^ in order "to reacri agreement on a 
|nal dra ft of^this report. : : — 

TdiJdiJPS-bsf ..■,.:,,. , • 

»r C«»»-at« «-'rf % '"r.7: ,.':* T", 7 '-•■";'■' "> «//■•'-•■'•' .v-^'TIIItJED - OVER 
; t, *" W'M. the t / ?w approval of the FUl^t^ '" "'"""'"""'^ virsai- 


Memorandum to Mr. C. A. Tolson 



"''" '- . If committee agreement is .not_r.eAChed at Tuesday s 
meeting on the controversial points involved, it would appear 
we have four possible courses of ac tion: 

(1) We can offer no objection to the report and 
wait to see what the President decides (I think this would 
be unwise ) 

(2) The Director can voice his objections to the . 
President verbally 

(3) The Bureau can take a. position in writing in the 
report opposing any relaxation of the investigative restraints 
discussed on the grounds that the arguments supporting these 
restraints outweigh the arguments opposed . 

(4) The Bureau can take a position in writing in the 
report that it is opposed to the extensive scope and ramifi- 
cations of the proposed new committee, while at the same. time 
noting that we would have no objection to a committee which 
would be limited to meeting periodically in order to effect a 
better operational coordination among member agencies with 
regard to particular targets in the intelligence field. 


(1) That approval be given for the Bureau to include 
in the final committee report a statement opposing the 
relaxation of investigative restraints which affect the Bureau. 

(2) That the Bureau take a position at Tuesday s 
meeting of the working committee that it is opposed to a new 
committee of the scope described in the attached draft, but 
that we would not object to a committee limited to better 
coordination specific intelligence operations or problems- 

^ EBJ 

- 2 - 


Memorandum to Mr. C. A. Tolson 



(3) That, In addition, the Director give 
consideration to expressing his objections verbally to the 

(4) That, if the Director's schedule permits, final 
meeting of Director'3 committee take place in his office at 
11_ a.m., Thursday, June 25_. At that time the Director can 
inquire' if other committee members have any further comments 
and, if not, he can present them with, a copy of the final 
report. (If the Director does not wish to* present this 
report personally to the President, we will prepare 
ajpproprlate_transiaittal letter for liaison to handle.) 

' . FBI 

3 - 


Exhibit 17 


Juno ID, 1970 


Fourth Keotlu;; " 
03IU Conforonco Room 7E-26 
'on Tuesday, Juno 23, 1970, at 2 p.m. 

1. Approval of Minutes of Wiman C. Sullivan 

Third Hoot loR 

2. Bovlow of Socond Draft of Wllllaa C. Sullivan 

) Cocralttce Report to ba 
^ Circulated to All Uenooro 

3. Onto and PI nee of Xei>t Hoetlng -y PaA } Msm-yi oSa'-n '.- 


AUti ft W5 , 

)FBIi . 

Group 1 
Exoludud from autoaatlc 
dcrogradlnf; and 


■UnauthorizGit Disclosure 
' ■• Subject to Criminal Sanctions 



( Memorandum 

to : Mr. Tolson DATE; June 24> 19?0 

from : Mr. IV. C. Sullivan 


The final meeting of the working committee was 
held on 6-23-70 and there is attached a proposed final draft 
of a report for the Director's review. 

During the final working committee session, a 
number of changes were made in the prior draft which the 
Director has seen. Significant change s include the following: 

1. Two of the investigative restraints previously 
listed have nowbeen compJ.ete.l_y__cJ,irai.nated. _. 

<^ ■ 

2. The FBI's objections to the six remaining 
restraints have been snelled_out specifically, in. appropriate 
footnotes which include the basis for our nosition. " In 

addition, some of the key wording in the marrative has been ' 

msdiijed in accordance with the observations the Director 

made to me Monday. For instance, the term ''restrictions" 

in the decisions section relating to electronic surveillances '„ 

(page 28) has been changed to "procedures." In the same 

write-up (page 26) , reference to electronic surveillances 

haying been "substantially reduced in recent years" has been 

taken out. 

3. In the section dealing with Evaluation of 
interagency coordination (pages 42-43), tha_reierence to I 

.restrictions on FBI and CIA Headquarters liaison contacts has ['■ 
been removed and the specific reference to. the Director as 

/•rin.--!!- P ro P° sed chairman of an interagency committee has been ,' 

i.H\ / !-! <, ?- 1 3*, e &3| Instead, the report merely indicates that the ' ' V 

•-' • chairman!] would be named by the President. *•' 

osure c ';' - B' 

Tht3 document it v.rrwrr,! ,-,. * _ ^ m 

nation okIsMc ynh.r roiii'i:iiiir'c"'"r '■"„'■" •""!'•'' TT'7' '""' '* vnt fnr ''''"" '" 
WCS:mea- 1 iz fT> ?'"'"* Cmamitlc.c (:::<! /'/,. cm-l.-ut »■';",', V„» L '•'■', '? /"■"■'""' P'Mccdii::,.; > 




Memorandum Tf. C. Sullivan to Mr. Tolson 


4. The prior draft contained a number of — 
proposals relative to a permanent interagency committee 
including a full-time working group staffed by the various 
intelligence agencies. In the proposed final draft, these 
proposals hnve been toned down, sor.cwhat and the proposed 
full-tine;; ^roup is mentioned only. .ill. passing, as 

a possible future eventuality.* In fact, after QpjiHider.a_ble 
d iscussi on" the wording of this whole section was framed 
with a view of eliminating any suggestion that the 
proposed interagency committee would interfere with the 
internal operations of any individual agency. In addition, 
a footnote was added expressing the Bureau's specific 
views concerning any such committee or group. 

5. The section on budg et ajid manpower 
restrictions (pages 40-41) was revised to make it clear 
that the FBI does not haveany. problem_with regard 

to review and approval 'of Its budgetary requests. 

Copies of this proposed final draft are being 
furnished to the member agencies for their review so 
that all interested parties will be fully cognizant of its 
contents in advance of the final meeting of the 
Director's Committee in his office at 3 p.m., Thursday, 
June 25, 1970. Those present will be Mr. Richard Helms, 
CIA; Lt. General D. V. Bennett, DIA; and Vice Admiral Noel Gaylor, 
NSA. Each man will ho doubt be accompanied by an aide. 

ACTION: " ■ 


Upon approval, this report will be printed and 
assembled and then delivered to the Director's Office with 
a transmittal letter to the President in time for the 
Director's meeting. Due to the extremely sensitive_n.a_ture 
of the report, each copy is being numbered and a record 
will be kept of each recipient. The Director will note that 
at the beginning of the President's copy there will be a 
form to be signed by each agency's head indicatine. approval 
of the report. 

♦Since the concept of a full-time working staff' was all 

but eliminated, a footnote was not taken regarding this item. 

AUG b IP* 

IUI -2- 


Exhibit 18 

' , M 6i. «a -* •' 



■ Mr. Tolson 


date: June 26, 1970 

rROM :Mr. W. C. Sullivaf 



The Director, as Chairman of captioned committee, 
held the final committee meeting in his office on the 
afternoon of 6/25/70. Present were the other committee 
members; namely, Mr. Richard Helms, Director of Central 
Intelligence Agency; Lieutenant General D. V. Bennett, 
Director of Defense Intelligence Agency; and Vice Admiral 
Noel Gayler, Director of National Security Agency. Also 
present were Mr. Tom C. Huston, White House Presidential 
Assistant who had served in a liaison capacity with the 
committee; Assistant Director designate C. D. Brennan of 
the Domestic Intelligence Division; and the writer, H. C. 

, _ The purpose of the meeting was to review in final 

form which the President had instructed the committee to 
prepare to assess the current internal security threat to the 
a>untry and evaluate the capacity of the intelligence community 
to deal with that threat. 

:"?-> The Director opened the meeting by. commending the 
committee members for the outstanding effort and cooperative 
spirit they had displayed "in working together to compile the 
comprehensive report. 

The Director then furnished each committee member a 
copy of the report and carefully covered in a concise manner 
all of the items dealt with in the report. On each and every 
point the Director solicited observations by each committee 
member to insure that they fully understood every issue analyzed 
and were in complete agreement with the contents of the report. 
In this connection, lir. Helms and Admiral Gayler suggested three 
minor additions be made. After securing the concurrence of all 
committee members, the Director instructed that this be done 
immediately, ■ j / 



Tialio-n' o,;MJr „„„,■ Cm,,,,.;-:-,- ';■■ . . . j!, ■ .,':. C ; / " ■' • ,'"" for !" MC! t~- 



Memorandum to Mr. Tolson 


With that, all committee members signified their 
full and unqualified approval of the full report and so 
indicated by affixing their signatures thereto along with 
the Director's as Chairman of the committee. The Director 
stated that he would arrange for the transmittal of the report 
to the White House promptly on 6/26/70. 

The Director instructed each committee member to 
insure that all working copies of the report at the agencies 
involved should be destroyed and fixed this responsibility 
on the agency heads who were members of the committee along 
with the responsibility of insuring that copies of the final 
report retained by them for reference should be afforded the 
utmost security. 

The Director then concluded the meeting by thanking 
the respective members of the committee and so dismissed the 


For information./ 

r?r.f:riV| : FROM 

AUG 5 id/5 

FBI .' 

2 - 


June 25, 1970 

The President ' 

The White House i . 

Washington, D. C. 

Dear Mr. President: 


The Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc), 
which you established on June 5, i970, nab completed its assessment 
of the current internal security threat and related matters. A 
special report setting forth tho findings of the Committee is attached. 

This report is divided into throe parts. Part One 
sets forth a 6ummary of the current internal security threat. 
Part Two summarizes various operational restraints on intelligence 
collection and lists both the advantages of maintaining these 
restrictions and the. advantages of relaxing them. Part Three 
provides an evaluation of interagency coordination, including 
suggested measures to improve the coordination of domestic 
intelligence collection. 


This report has been approved by all of the members 
of the Committee representing tho Central Intelligence Agency, the 
Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation. . — > 

Sincerely yours, 

Enclosure , . •••■■. 


l \ WCS/mea •-*• 

w / ■ 

if'ifT . ,MM 

'„„o, S ,o'r" . NATI °^ n r ; n^ 1 ^ ""NATION- 

^ J Unauthorised Disci.-mn-c 

-' p [J | ■/. Subjoet t0 Criminal Sanctions 


Exhibit 19 

thz v/.hits mous 


July 9. 1970 

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Richard Helms 

Director, Central Intelligence Agency 

SUBJECT: Domestic Intelligence and Internal Security Affairs 

In the future, I would appreciate it if your agency 
would address all material relating to matters of domestic 
intelligence or internal security interest to my exclusive 

The President is anxious to centralize the- 
coordination at the White House of all information of this 
type, and your cooperation in this regard would be appreciated. 

Dr. Kissinger is aware of this new procedure. 


Z.-CLL.. kU 


Exhibit 20 

24.3 Richard Helms memorandum 

. - : ' . SECHET/SSN'SITiVE . 

'.' 2o .7'juL/ 1>'V0 

i- . 

sS>Z?.:.:<5SX "OR T.-3 ?ZCC?.D • . . • • : 

S T J5J:.Cr: Discussion vit'i Attorney General Mitchell on 
Do.-estic Intelligence ' . 

1. ' TMrin; a private meeting vith the Alr.orr.37 General on ' 
27 July 1970, it becar.e clear, to -./ great surcrise, that he 

• .had heard nothing whatever about the president's instructions 

■ en "Domestic intelligence" until thai 73r7r.orrJ.n3.. In other ."' ; 
words, the Attorney General had not been told of the r.seting at ' 

• the White House on 5 June 1?70 or- of the ad hoc committee ir.eet- ' ■" 

■ i"g3 chaired '07 the F3I which had followed or about the report- 
-which was sent to the president around 1 July,, setting forth : 
..constraints on do.-estic intelligence collection. As I understand 

it, the Attorney General first heard about these natters when the 
. Director of the P3I to hin about a r 1 sao,ranc''jr. fro.- 

• .'!r. T0.-1 Charlo.i Huston which r.ust "ce ■essentially the s?_~e tey.t 
A3, tho j>R3 I received under date of 23 July V3T0 (£5C -OoS/S-'/O) . 

2. I told the Attorney General that ve had -cut our backs 
into this exercise j because we. had thought that hi knew all about 
it and 'fas behind it. The Attorney General vas frank with r.e. 
In addition, he said that he-had told Mr. Hoover to "sit tiVj-.t" 

.until he_(th^Attomey General) had an opportunity to discuss . ' '. 
•„ni 3 v.-.oie vita the President upon his return to V.'ashinjtj-n 

.front San Cle-ente ne:ct «isl(, . • 

"3. In cor.n.ection with the p.-ohle-s involved in acrostic 
intelligence collection, I again suggested to the' Attorney General 
tnat he hive 1 talk with y.r. San J. Pacich who, I sointed out. has 
no:,- lull/ retired frc.n the ?2I . The Attorney General nrain -..rote 
do'.-vi Mr. Fapich's nane. 

. ." ':.' . ■.-.'.' h'eLns - ■ 

■■■.•'. .. .-. ■'■■-.'■.■■■ .'.''•• ' ' ■'• Director • , . 

Distributive: •."'"'■ .'• ' ..•.'■■•- '"•.'.. ' •' ' 

Oric - CCt's file • ■ '•■".'"''''■.'■•. '. 

U: - S?. w/SO Ci'J7< -70 ' 


Exhibit 21 

25.3 Richard Helms memorandum 


!••-. "icMaiu-S 

-as K£l.-ssrss,»>*- ■■- ■■■■ 

D07.e3t!.c >•■ 


Exhibit 22 

__ 25.7 Tom Huston memorandum 


August 5, 1970 

EYES ONLY .'■•"• 


In anticipation of your meeting with Mr. Hoover and the 
Attorney General, I would like to pass on these thoughts: 

. .. . . . /JT 

•I.- More than the FBI is involved in 'this operation. K5A, ' 
DIA, CIA, and the military services all have a groat stake and a 

■ -great interest. All of these agencies supported the options 
selected by the President. For your private information, so did 
all the members of Mr. Hoover's staff who worked on the report 

.. (he'd fire them if he knew this. ) '■ 



. ■ • . r - .. ■ 

3. We arc not getting the type of hard intelligence we need' 
at the "White House. W.e v/ill not get it until greater effort is made 
through cormr*up.ity --.vide -coordination to dig out the information. 

.by using ail the resources potentially available. It is, of cou;*:e, 
.a matter of balancing the obvious risks against the desired 

results. I thought we balanced these risks rather objectively 
■in tli e report, and Hoover is escalating the risks in order to 

cloak I lis. determination to continue to do business as usual. . 

4. At some point. Hoover has to be told who is President. 
He has become totally unreasonable and his conduct is detrimental 

.to our'domestic intellig-ence operations. In the past two weeks, 
he has terminated all FBI liaison with NSA, DIA, the military 
cer-vices, Secret Service -- everyone except the White. House.. He 
terminated liaison with CIA in \lay. This is bound to have a 
crippling effect upon the -entire community and is contrary to 
his public assurance to, the President at the meeting that there 
v/as close and effective coordination and cooperation, within, the 

■ int-elligcnce community. It is important to remember that the 
entire intelligence community knows that the President mace a - 
positive decision to go a+icad and Hoover has nov/ succeeded in. 
forcing a review! It" he gets his v/ay it is going to lock like ha 
is more powerful than the President. He had his say ir. the -. ; 
footnotes and RM decided against him.. That should close the 
matter and I can't understand why the AG is a party to reopening it. 
All of us arc going to look damn silly in the eyes of Helms, C-ayior, 
Bennett, and the military chiefs if Hoover can unilaterally reverse 
a Presidential decision based on a report that .many people worked 
their asses off to prepare and which, on its merits, v/a.o a fireg- 
rate, objective job. . * ■ ■ 

5. The: biggest risk we could take, in my opinion, is to ccr.r 
to rc:jard the violence en the c art \ •." : ■; and in the c*:ios as a tcrr.r ;rr.r 
phe.-iomcrv.v.i which vill sim^'iy go av. a-/ c-.s.coz-n a:- the Scvar.'::.:*. 


General was kidding himself when he said the campuses would be . 
quiet this fall. Davis predicted that at least 30 would be closed-. ' 
dbwn in September. I don't like to make predictions, but I am 
not at all convinced, on the basis of the I have seen, 
th^t'v/e are anwway near over the hemp on this problem, ar.e I 
am- convinced that the potential for even greater violence ;s 
present, and we have a positive obligation to take every step . 
within cur power to prevent it. ■". . 

6. Hoover can be expected to raise the following points 
• in your meeting: • . . ..■■•'■'■.'■■'.'' 

. .' (a) "Our present efforts are adequate." Ths answer 

is. bullshit I. This is particularly true v/ith regard to FBI campus 
. coverage. ' " . ..'..'' ;••- 

(b) "The risks are too great; these folks are going to ' 
' get the President into trouble and RM had better listen to me." 

The answer is that we have considered'the risks, we believe they 
' are accontr-.ble and justified under the circumstances. V'a are 

willing to weigh each exceptionally sensitive operation on its .: > 
-merits, but the Director of the FBI is paid to take risks where 
■'■ the security of the country is at stake. Nothing wo propose to .. 
do has 'net been clone in the past -- and in the past it was always ^ 
done 'successfully. ~ *' 

(c)' "I don't have the personnel to do the job the 
.President wants done." The answer is (1) he has the people and/or 
(2) he can get them. ' . . 

(d) "I don't object to KSA conducting surreptitious entry 
if they want. to. " The answer is that NSA doesr.'t h?.ve th= people, 
can't get therri, has no authority to get them, and c.hov.ldn'i have -.; 
to «ot them. It is an FBI job. 

62-685 O - 76 - 17 


(c) "It v/e do these things the 'jackels of the press' an^I th 
-ACLU will find out; v/e cz.n't avoid leaks." Answer: V. r e can avoid 
leaks by using trained, trusted agents and restricting knowledge of- 
sensitive operations on a strict need to know basis. V/e do this 
on. Other sensitive operations every day. 

(f) "if I have to do these things, the Attorney General 
will have to approve thorn in writing." This is up to the AG, out 
I would tell Hoover that he has been instructed to do them by 
the President and he is to do them on that authority. He needn't . -v 
lock, for a scape goat. He has his authority from the President 
" and he doesn't need a v/ritten memo from the AG. To maintain 
security, v/e should avoid written communications in this area. 

; • (g) "We don't need an Inter-Agency Committee on 

Intelligence Operations because (1) we're doing fine right r.ov/ -- 

.good coordination, etc. -- and (2) there are other existing groups 
which czn. handle this assignment. " The answer is that we are " , '• 
f»o"tng" lousy right now and there aren't other groups which can ;'■ ■ 
do the job v/e have .in. mind became : (1) they don't meet; (2) they 
don't have the people on them we waist or have some people v/e 
don't war^t; (3) they don't have the author ifcv. to do what we want •- 

done; .(4) ultimately this new operation will replace them; and 

(5) 'they aren't linked to the White House staff. ■ . . • . 

There are doubtless* another dozen or so specious arguments 
that Hoover will raise, but they will be of similar quality. I hope 
that you will be able to convince the AG of the importance and 
necessity of setting Hoover to go along.- V.'c have worked for 
nearly a year to roach this point; other 3 have worked far longer 
■ and .had abandoned hope. I believe we arc talking aV.eut the zutura 
of this country, icy surely oo'.v.estic violence ana disorder 
thz'c.r.i'jp. the ver"' fabric c: o'.. ; :' society. ■Ir-.velU^once ir. r.cfc the 
curs, hv.t ii: can provide tho.cia-.i"" 1 - 5 ^ t ' n: '- n -"-''' 33 iX c " l '~ possible. 
?.t:»'7-'i*Jr:\'3Dv-ant , .v, it r.z..\ pvovi.j vs 'vi : :h t'r-s mean? to prevent t'-vj 



deterioration of the situation. Perhaps lowered voices ar.d noace 
in Vietnam will defuse the tense situation, v/o face, but Iv/oui-i-': 
■ v/ant to rely on it exclusively. : ' 

There is this final point. For eighteen months v/c have 
■watched peoole in this government ignore the .President's orders, 
take actions to embarrass him, promote themselves^at his 
expense, and generally make his" job more difficult. It m?.Ues 
' mc fighting mad, and what Hoover is doing hero is putting 
himself above the President. If he thought the Attorney General's 
advice should be solicited, he should have dene so before the 
report was sent to the President. After all. Hoover was chairman 
of the committee ana he could have asked the AG for his comments 
But no, ho didn't do so for it never occurred to him that the 
.'President would not agree with his footnoted objections. He 
thought all he had to do was put in a footnote and the matter was 
settled. He had absolutely no interest in the views of NSA, 
CIA, DIA, and the military services,, and obviously he has 
...little interest in our views, or apparently even in the decisions 
'of the President. I don't see how we car. tolerate this, but ■ . 
beinn- a fatalist, if not a realist, I am prepared to accept the 
fact that we may have to co so. '. . w . •. 




Exhibit 23 



August 1, 19T0 

r '."':-';:V' 


MEMORANDUM FOR H. R. HALDEMAN ..,'--. ■', "*. • **: >■&*, 

,'••■ "SUBJECT: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE REVIEW. "'"■*." " "V :'..'- *y-~-5W$f, 

"Mr; Hoover has departed for the West Coast where he plana to vacation* *'. ?~\-; 
for three weeks. If you wait until his return to clear up the problems • v„.f ,.»•'': 

v .....' ■] .• * .■ VI* 

.:.. surrounding our Domestic Intelligence operations, we will be into the new .•■•;. 

'.school year without any preparation. . ■ ' .:.*-.'v 

The situation in Portland is beginning to look very tense — the American ft'.' 

' ! Legion Convention could become the first battleground for a new wave 'qf youthful', 

; -violence. Coming ju6t as the school year begins, it could serve aB a catalyst;;", . 

■; V for widespread campus disorders. . ' '. ■",.■ i V ••'■■ .";'.'' 

I recommend that you meet with the Attorney General and secure his; support";'- 

~ for the President's decisions, that the Director be informed that the decisions,. 

will-stand, and that all intelligence agencies are to proceed to implement them '; 

at once. . ....,' 

" loW\ 


Exhibit 24 




September 18, 1970 «.' 


Pursuant to our conversation yesterday, September 17, 1970, I 
suggest the following procedures to commence our domestic , . -. . 
intelligence operation as quickly as possible. ' 

I-. Interagency Domestic Intelligence Unit . A key to the 
entire operation will be the creation of a interagency intelligence 
unit for both operational and evaluation purposes. .Obviously, 
the ' selection of persons to this unit will be of vital importance 
to the success of the mission. As we discussed, the selection 
of the personnel for this unit is an appropriate first step 
for several reasons. First, effective coordination of the 
different agencies must be developed at an early stage through the . 
establishment of the unit. Second, Hoover has indicated a strong 
opposition to the creation of such a unit and, to bring the FBI 
fully on board, this seems an appropriate first step to guarantee '. 
their proper and full participation in the program. Third, the 
unit can serve to make .appropriate recommendations for the type .- 
of intelligence that should be immediately pursued by the various • 
agencies.. In regard to this third point, I believe we agreed •-.'-■ 
that it would be Inappropriate to have any blanket removal of 
restrictions; rather, the most appropriate procedure would be 
to decide on the type of intelligence we need, based on an 
assessment of the recommendations of this unit, and then to ■ • . . 
proceed to remove the restraints as necessary to obtain such 
intelligence. •' • 

To proceed to create the interagency intelligence unit, 
particularly the evaluation group or committee, I recommend that 
we request the names of four nominees from each of the intelligence 
agencies involved. While the precise composition of the unit " : 
may vary as we gain experience, I think thats^wo members should 
be appointed initially from each agency in addition to your 
personal representative who should also be involved^in the 
•proceedings. Because of the interagency aspects of this^request, . 
it would probably be best if the request came from the White^ - 
House. If you agree, I will make such a request of the agency- .; 



heads; however, I feel that it is essential that you work this • 
out with Hoover before I have an jr. dealings with him directly. 

2. Housing . We discussed the appropriate housing of 
this operation and, upon reflection, I believe that rather 
than a White House staffer looking for suitable space, that 
a professional intelligence person should be assigned the task 
of locating such space. Accordingly, I would suggest that 
a request be made that Mr. Hoover assign an agent to this 
task. In connection with the housing problem, I think serious 
consideration must be given to the appropriate Justice Depart- 
ment cover for the domestic intelligence operation. We 
discussed yesterday using IDIU as a cover and as I indicated 
I believe that that is a most appropriate cover. I believe 
that it is generally felt that IDIU is already a far more ex- 
tensive intelligence operation than has been mentioned publicly, 
and that the 1D1U operation cover would eliminate the problem • 
of discovering a new intelligence operation in the Department 
of Justice. However, I have reservations about the personnel 
in IDIU and its present operation activities and would suggest 
that they either be given a minor function within the new 
intelligence operation or that the staff be completely removed. 
I have had only incidental dealings with the personnel, other 
than Jim Devine, and cannot speak to their discretion and 
loyalty for such an operation. I do not believe that Jim 
Devine is capable of any major position within the new 
intelligence operation. However, I do believe that he could 
help perpetuate the cover and he has evidenced a loyalty to you,' 
the Deputy and other key people in the Department of Justice, 
despite his strong -links with the prior Administration. I 
would defer to your Judgement, of course, on any recommendation 
regarding Jim Devine' s continued presence in such an intelligence' 

3- Assistant to Attorney General . We also discussed the 
need for you to have a right hand man to assist in running this 
operation. It would seem that what is needed is a man with 
administrative skills, a sensitivity to the Implications of the 
current radical and subversive movements within the United 
States, and preferably, some background in intelligence work. 
To maintain the cover, I would think it appropriate for the man 
to have a law degree in that he wi' ". be a part of the Department 
of Justice. You suggested the pc- bility of using a prosecutor 
who had had experience with cases >. . this type. Accordingly, I 
have spoken with Harlington Wood to ask him to submit the names . 
Of five Assistant U. S. Attorneys who have had experience in 
dealing with demonstrations or riot type cases and who are 
mature individuals that might be appropriately given a sensitive 



assignraent in the Department of Justice. I aid not discuss the 
matter in any further detail with Wood other than to request the 
submission of some nominees. I would also like to suggest that 
ve request names from the various intelligence agencies involved 
for personnel that might be appropriately involved in this activity 
or vho might serve as your assistant.- 

In summary, I recommend the following immediate action: 

(i) You meet with Hoover, explain what must be done, and. 
request his nominees for the interagency unit. 

(2) You request that Hoover assign an agent to the task 
of locating appropriate housing for the operations.. • 

(3) I request that other involved intelligence agencies 
submit' nominees for' the interagency unit. 

• (U) I request from the agencies names of appropriate 
personnel for assignment fo the operation. 

Finally, I would suggest that you call weekly meetings to 

monitor- the problems as they emerge and to make certain that we ... 

are moving this program into implementation as quickly as possible i 

H.B. Bob Haldeman has suggested to me that. if you would like 

him to join you in a meeting with Hoover he will be happy 
-to do so. 


Exhibit 25 
-jnited states govhivxmext . department of justice 

Memorandum ■• \ [.,/.,. 

to : The Attorney- General , date: Dec 4, 1970 

from : Robert C. Mardiah 

Assistant Attorney General 
Internal Security Division 

subject: Intelligence Evaluation Committee Status Report 

As a result of my discussions with Director Hoover of the FBI 
and Director Helms of the CIA and in consultation with Justice 
Sharpe and John Dean, it was decided to limit the first'meeting 
of the Evaluation Committee to representatives of the CIA, the 
FBI, Justice Sharpe, John Dean and myself. John Doherty, Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, also 
attended. Director Helms designated James Angleton, Chief of 
.the Counter-Espionage Section of the CIA as his representative 
and Director Hoover designated Inspector George C. Moore, Branch. 
Ch'*'?* 1 nf **i<= Tnf-prnsl ^pruriti/ Division as his reoresentative- 

Our" first meetir.g was held in 'John Dean's office on Thursday, 
December 3, between the hours of 9 AM and 12 Noon. I indicated 
that the purposes of the meeting weiB (1) to reach an agreement 
as to the goal sought to be attained by the Committee, (2) to 
identify the membership of the Committee, and (3) to define the 
role Justice Sharpe was to play, and to reach .agreement with 
respect to his housing .and staff needs. 

After considerable discussion, it was the unanimous opinion of 
those present that the goal sought was to provide for access by 
one authority to all of the intelligence in the possession of the 
United States Government respecting revolutionary terrorist acti- 
vities in the United States and to evaluate this intelligence to 
determine (a) the severity of the problem and (b) what form the 
Federal response to the problem identified should take. We also 
agreed that this evaluation would, of necessity, disclose the 
sufficiency of our present intelligence resources, as well as the 
priorities which the government should attach to the problem. 


"' We also reached unanimous agreement with respect to the question 
of the composition, initially at least, of the Committee.' Al- - 
/though we could identify approximately thirteen separate intelli- 
gence units within the government, it was concluded that partici- 
' pation by all of them would be. cumbersome and counter-productive. 
Recognizing that we would need to bring in other intelligence 
units at a subsequent date,' we agreed that the Committee would be 
limited for the present to the following: 

1. Central Intelligence Agency , 

2. Federal Bureau of Investigation 

3. National Security Agency 

4. Department of Defense 

" 5. Treasury Department (Secret Service) 

Both the CIA and FBI representatives were in agreement that 
Colonel Downey of the Army would be' the most effective person to 

1. --^»-*- f-~— the Dc"-rtn , .ent of n^fpncp nrovided he would be . „ 

permitted to report directly to the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense rather than through the chain of command in the Army. No 
recommendations with respect to the representatives of the National 
Security Agency or the Secret Service were made. 

The group agreed that the Attorney General should speak personally 
to Secretary Laird, Secretary Kennedy, and Admiral Gayler and 
request that they designate their representatives to the Committee 
and that a specific request be made for Colonel Downey as the 
representative of the Secretary's office rather than of the Army. 
) I informed you of this request orally after the meeting yesterday 
and am awaiting your reply. 

We agreed that it was absolutely imperative that there be no dis- 
cussion or communication of our activities except between the 
participants and the heads of their respective agencies and between 
the Committee and you and the White House designees. 

f~~We also agreed that in the event of a leak the governmental responr: 
•' would simply be that the activities of the Committee were an attemi 


• to upgrade the intelligence-gathering activities of the IDIU 
which had heretofore been made public and that Justice Sha"rpe I 
had been employed as a consultant by the Attorney General to- /' . 
assist in this endeavor. '■ " < — 

The Committee determined that Justice Sharpe would be housed in 
FOB #7 for convenience and that he would be furnished secretarial 
support from the. Department of Justice and technical advice as 
needed from the Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Internal 
Security Division, John Doherty. 

The meeting concluded with the further agreement to meet again 
as soon as possible after designation of the representatives by 
Defense, NSA, and Treasury. 

cc: _Mr. Ehrlichman 
Mr. Haldeman 


Exhibit 26 


:•' ^Memorandum 


:Assistant Attorney General .'-, IS 7 DATEiFebruary 3, 1971 
Internal Security Division ? ' -V . * .;<_ . 


Director, FBI 

subject: .INTELL IGE;;CE EVALUATION CCB-IMITTES :•'■ : . ■ t ■ ' 


Reference is made to your letter dated February 2, 
1971, -which consisted of a draft of a "proposed charter" of 
the captioned organization which has been provided to this 
Bureau for review and comments. 

In this regard it is requested that an appropriate 
change be made in the wording of paragraph IV entitled "Staff" 
to clearly show that the FBI will not provide personnel for 
fha proposed permanent intelligence estimation staff. The 
' wording" would then be consistent with our position as seated 
in my letter dated January 27, 1971, prompted by manpower 
and budgetary problems. 

Although we are unable to provide any personnel 
support,' you may be assured of our continuing full cooperation 
in providing all relevant intelligence which might be of 
assistance to the Coeomittee in fulfilling its responsibilities. 

'62-113887 ■ • 

ms- m 

wrewMt SEcaffifr omsm 



DEPARTMFU 7 •''•" "■-::rr 


FEB 5 1971 

R.A.O. (_ 

Listen & Policy 

Terra Dj-t^o 




Memorandum v 

.to : See Addressees Below ".'. V DATE:February 10, 197] 

from : Robert C. MardianV' * 

Assistant Attorney General 
Internal Security Division 


Intelligence Evaluation Committee 


_Interdepartmental Action Plan for Civil Disturbances. ! 

II. MISSION ; ■'-■■'._. 

To provide intelligence estimates to the responsible 
:. Government departments and agencies on a need-to-Jcndw 
basis "in order, to effectively evaluate and anticipate 
' — problems to appropriately respond to civil disorders. 
In carrying out this mission, the Committee shall have 
access to all pertinent intelligence in the possession 
of the United States Government. 

III. MEMBERSHIP ; : '■ • • 

Members of the Committee shall consist of representatives 
of the following departments and agencies: Department of 
Defense; Department of Justice; Central Intelligence 
Agency; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Secret Service; 
National Security Agency, and, when necessary, representa- 
tives of other departments or agencies designated by the 
Committee. . ^ 


The Committee will be supported by a permanent intelligem 
estimation staff* consisting of representatives from merabc 

The Federal Bureau of Investigation advised it would not proy 
personnel for this staff. 


departments and agencies and headed by an executive 
director appointed toy the Committee. : 

• •:.•' i '.•'"* 


The permanent staff will perform the following functions: 

::: .r 1. when requested by the Committee, the Departments 
or Agencies represented shall furnish to the Committee 
" staff all pertinent information relevant to the stated 
request of the Committee. Such requests for intelligence 
data shall first be approved by the Committee. The 
Executive Director of the permanent staff may initiate 
requests for information from member agencies subject to 
review and approval by the committee. . 

2. Prepare estimates from time to time as directed by 
- the Committee. 

3. Report, information gaps to the Committee as such 
gaps are identified. , 

4. Recommend to the Committee no less often than 
monthly subjects for intelligence estimation. 

5. Prepare other relevant studies and reports as 
directed by the Committee. 

6. Provide for the security of information received 
and the protection of all sources of information— 


The 'Department of Justice shall provide necessary office 
space, supplies, and incidental administrative support. \ 


' '.'■ ' ■ -3- : 
. ■ • ■* ■ ' .' < ■ ■ 

ADDRESSEES: - ' . .%:;.. 

Inspector George C. Moore 
Mr. Benson Buffham 
Mr. Thomas J. Kelley 
Colonel John W. Downey 
Mr. Richard Ober 


Exhibit 27 

(Ed. <-:isi| 


, Memorandum ■ r "*■■■"'"_ ^ 

'•»-' to : THE ATTORNEY GENERAL . <■"'< . DATE: February 12, 1971 

subje . Tntelligence Evaluation Committee 

'• Robert C. Mardian 
Assistant Attorney General 
Internal Security Division. 

Attached is the final draft of the charter of the Intelligence 
Evaluation Committee which has the approval of the entire IEC 
staff, other than the representative of the Federal Bureau of. 
Investigation. The Bureau advises, as you will note from tne 
attached memorandum, that they will riot provide personnel to 
work with the Committee staff for the purposes stated in the 
charter Also attached are two memoranda from the Director to 
me, dated January 27, 1971 and February 3, 1971, in which he 
e^ate? h's r<? = = "">" = fnr >"»i"g unwilling to participate. 

Although it might be possible to continue the work' of the 
Committee without the FBI evaluator, in-, view of the fact that 
most of the intelligence information available is Bureau inror- 
mation,- I do not think that the quality of the intelligence 
estimates 'would be sufficiently improved to warrant continuing 
our effort without their cooperation. I think all of the 
present members of the Committee other than the FBI member agree 
with the above assessment. 

"pending your further advice, however, we will continue to operate 
on the basis of the exception noted with reference to Bureau 

cc: Honorable John Ehrlichman 
Honorable H.R. Haldeman 

^ OF 77^, 
/ ° RECEIVED \^ 

Forney &t 


Exhibit 28 



June 11, 1973 

To: Colonel Werner E. Michel, Chief, Counterintelligence and 
Security Division, The Pentagon 

From: Henry E. Petersen, Assistant Attorney General, 
Criminal Division 

Subject: Intelligence Evaluation Committee (IEC) 

The IEC has been engaged in evaluating the potential for violence 
during various domestic situations. Now that the war in Vietnam has 
ended demonstrations carrying a potential for violence have virtually 
ended; therefore, I feel that the IEC function is no longer necessary. 

Accordingly, effective immediately, the IEC is no longer in exist- 
ence. If, in the future, estimates are needed concerning' the potential 
for violence in a given situation, such estimates can be handled by 
ad hoc groups set up for that purpose. 

From: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights 
of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate 
93rd Congress, Second Session on S. 2318, April 9 and 10, 
1974, issue on Military Surveillance pg. 221. 

Exhibit 29 

me-iorakdum for mitchell, ehrlichman, haldeman 

Unsigned on Justice Department Stationary 
Dated January 19, 1971 

"All those vho have been involved in the project firmly 
"believe that the starting point for- an effective domestic intelligence 
operation should be the implementation of the Special Report of the , 
Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc Committee Report of June 3/ 
1970). - 

■ "Since the inception of this current project the general 
climate of public reaction, the 

has been significantly altered by the "incidents which have confronted the 
Army in its intelligence operation. According, the current activities of 
the working group would be subject to extreme adverse public media and 
congressional reaction if discovered. ..-'-' 

..."As noted above, there is considerable doubt as to how 
significant a contribution the proposed committee vould make to 
existing domestic intelligence operations without Implementation of the 
Ad Hoc Committee Report.. . . 

"Based on these observations, we have concluded and strongly 
recomment that the existing plan for establishing a physical office with 
a committee chairman and staff be rescinded and future meetings of the 
working group be called on an Ad Hoc basis in John Dean's office; that 
any deficiencies in intelligence should be called to the attention of 
the existing agencies and corrections should be made through the normal 
structure. If this fails to produce the requisite intelligence, it Is 
then recommend that the questions raised by the Ad Hoc Committee Report 
be re-examined to determine how either partial or full implementation of 
the recommendations in that report might be accomplished." 

It was further recommended that the group adopt the problem-solving 
approack whereby appropriate* agencies develop intelligence estimates of 
problems the group anticipates the government must fact in the near future. 

There was also a discussion of "cover" for Justice Morrell Sharp 
and Doherty since they were both recognized in the EOB. 

62-685 O - 76 - 18 





Exhibit 30 



-i .r » i , v . ,-.-,. 1 -Mr. Sullivan 

Memorandum -.m^l i-Mr. Mohr 

C- D. Brennan dati:: March 25, 1971 


,,..-£ 1 - Mr. ltosen 

1 - Mr. Brennan 
DIRECTOR'S MEETING 3/31/71 WITH 1 - Mr. Wannall 




II,,™;,... (II. 
C B ll.,l",. ... 


C ■' 



Tclr. lt„..m . -' 


G^dy - 

We have "had no indication from any source as to the reason why 
j Attorney General asked the Director to meet with him, Mr. Helms and 
I Admiral Gayler on 3/31/71. Since Mr. Helms is Director of Central Intelligence 
/ Agency (CIA) and Admiral Gayler is Director of National Security Agency (NSA), 
I both of which agencies arc deeply involved in production of foreign intelligence, . 
1 it would appear tiiat the meeting will probably cover this subject matter. 

One of the most pressing problems of the Administration relates to 
the control of activities of criminal subversives, such as the Weatherman 
grouu, the East Coast conspiracy and the Blactf Panthers. Production of 
intelligence relating to the proposed activities of such groups has ramifications 
both in the domestic field and the foreign field, the latter because of indications 
of possible foreign direction and control of these radical militants. 


Memorandum for Mr. Brennan 



While Bureau has primary responsibility for internal security matters 
which includes production of domestic intelligence, recognizing the possible 
foreign ramifications of the present problem relating to criminal subversives, it 
is felt we should take advantage of any resources of MSA and CIA which can be 
tapped for the purpose of contributing to the solution of this problem. 

• Our principal sources for production of intelligence in Oris area are 

/electronic surveillances and live informants. We have telephone 

! surveillances and jmicrpphone surveillance targeted specifically for the 

jorgjuijzatipns. In addition, wo have approximately potentfal informants' aid 

sources in various stages of develppment for this same purpose, many of whom 
are currently providing significant intelligence data. . In various ghetto areas 
where criminal subversives are. concentrated we have over 6200 ghetto informants, 
parsons residing in the areas or having contacts therein, who have agreed to 
provide us with any information of interest to the FBI which comes to their attention 

As noted above, we feel that the foregoing matter is the one most 
likely for discussion during the 3/31/71 meeting; however, any matter in the 
foreign intelligence coUection field would appear to be a possible subject for 
discussion, in view of the presence of Mr. Helms and Admiral Gayler and 
considering their primary missions. 


Foregoing is submitted for the information of the Director. 



to : Mr . C . D . Drennan 

from :W. R. Wannall OjV- JUNE 
ijj y ■ 

subject, DIRECTOR'S MEETING 3/31/71 WITH 

1 - Miss Holmes 

1 - Mr. Sullivan 

1 - Mr. Mohr 

.1 - Mr. Dalbey 

DATE: 3/29/71 

1 - Mr. Rosen 

1 - Mr. CD. Brennan 

1 - Mr. W.R. Wannall 

1 - Mr. W.J. McDonnell 

Memorandum 3/25/71 in captioned matter reported that 
we have 13 telephone surveillances and one microphone surveil- 
lance targeted specifically for the production of intelligence 
relating to activities of domestic criminal subversive 
individuals and organizations. The Director has asked that 
these electronic surveillances be identified. 

The microphone surveillance covers the residence in 
San Francisco of Huey P. Newton, Supreme Commander, Black Panther 
Party . 

j The 13 telephone surveillances are: 

1. Black Panther Party Headquarters, Chicago, Illinois. 

2. Black Panther Party Headquarters, Los Angeles, 

Black Panther Party Headquarters, San Francisco, 
Black Panther Party Headquarters, Oakland, 




5. Black Panther Party Headquarters, New Haven, 

- 6. Black Panther Party Headquarters, Bronx, New York. 

7. Junta of Military Organizations, Tampa, Florida 
(a black extremist organization). 

8 Huey P. Newton's residence, San Francisco, 
California. (He is Supreme Commander of the Black Panther Party). 

9. communist Party USA Headquarters, New York City. 

WRW/YJ JM : dgo A :Aj 



Memorandum, W.R. Wannall to Mr. CD. Brennan 

10. Jewish Defense League Headquarters, New York City. 

11. Worker Student Alliance Headquarters, Chicago, 
Illinois (affiliate of Students for a Democratic Society, a 
New Left extremist group). 

12. Nancy Sarah Kurshan's residence, Cleveland, 
Ohio (the New Left extremist activist) . 

13. Nancy Barrett Frappier's residence, 

San Francisco, California (contact point of the underground 
Weatherman, New Left extremist, violence-prone terrorist group). 


The above is submitted in compliance with the 
Director's request. 


Exhibit 31 





April 12, 1971 


ci-.!-.- ' v ''o'n': 


Mr. FclfT- | 

5!r . c.v, ; 

! Mr. F.oscn I ! 

Mr. Tav-'l 
■ ; Mr. Walura— — 
' ;-lr. t ■■■' ■■ 
Tele, ltoom..- 

M.,i ii^>;»=-(/ 


i' March 2% 1971, I attended a meeting with the Attorney I mi» 
General, Mr. Richardltelfrrs, Director of the Central Intelligence AgeiqjF 
(CIA), and Admiral Noel A. Gayfer, Director of the National Security 

This meeting had been requested by Mr. Helms and was for the 
purpose of discussing a broadening of operations, particularly of the very 
confidential type in covering-intelligence both domestic and foreign. 

1 ■ ' ' There was some discussion upon the 

part of Mr . Helms of further coverage of mail. C ■'» " ■'■ • 

I stated to the Attorney General, Mr. Helms, and Admiral Gayior 
' that I was not at all enthusiastic about such an extension of operations insofar 
as the FBI was concerned in view of the hazards involved. The Attorney 
General stated that he thought before he could make any final decision in 
this matter, Mr. Helms should make an in-depth examination of exactly what 
he and Admiral Gayior desired and then submit to the Attorney General and 
myself the results of this examination, and he, the Attorney General, would 
call another meeting of this particular group and make the decision as to what 
could or could not be done. 

Mr. Helms said he would take care of this very promptly. 



. '-V.»s, 

•\ jbhn Edgar Hoover 
V' Director 

JEH:EDM (1) 

Exhibit 32 

Jf :,-.,-,,STA,-i,SC i OVKKNN,K^0UTE IN EN S^LOPE^ ^ ^ 


Mr. C. D. PeLoach ' i: : July 19, 1966 

V.'. C. Sullivan ,' t ,\) r DO f.'OT FIIJS 

"3LAgi< BAG" JOBSi/ 



— — > 



The following is set forth in regard to your 
request concerning what .authority we have for "blacl: baft" 
•jobs and for the background of our'polioy and procedure:; 
in such matters. 

■ !S— 5l° 1\PJ- phi-zip- authorization for "bj.nck._b.-.'*," 
J .^.?...^£°H-."MJ;i ii " d «.jrhc\.nu{>;ai!~'"'"Sucli a~t'o'cb'niquo involves 
trespass and is clearly illegal; therefore, it would bo 
impossible to obtain any. legal sanction for it.- Despite 
this, "black ba;c" jobs have been used becnus:.- they represent 
an invaluabl e- techniq ue in combat in?; subversive activities - " 
of a clandestine nature aimed directly at ujiderminin;,' and 
df<5TT*nyi n^ niir nation. 

-* The present procedure followed :i.n the use of this 

technique calls for the Special Agent in Charge of a field 
office to make his request for the use of the technique 
to the appropriate Assistant Director. The Special Af;cnt 
in Charge :.n>st completely justify the need for the use of 
the tcchr.i.-.uc and at the same tins assure that it can be 
safely usee without any danger or e.-r.barrass.c.ent to the 
Bureau. The facts arc incorporate i:i a r...-::;iorr.iiOim which, 
in accordance with the Director's instructio.--i , is sent to 
Mr. Tolson or to the Director for approval. Subsequently 
this ncir.oranciur.; is filed in the assistant Director's office 
under a "Do Not File" procedure. 

In the field the Special /-seat ia Charge prepares 
an informal memorandum showing that l-.o obtaiuc :; ouroau 
authority and this nccoi-mdua is filed in his safe until 
the next inspection by bureau Inspectors, at which tine - it 
is destroyed. 


Meir.orar.ium to iir . C. D. DcLoach 

V/c used this tcck'.i icp.c or, r. highly selective 
basis, but with wide-range effect j ,vi-ness , :.:i our opera lions. 
V.'c have several cases in the espionage lie id, 

Also through the use of this technique we have on 
numerous occasions been able to obtain material hold highly 
secret and closely guarded by subversive (croups and organisa- 
tions which consisted of membership lists and mailing lists 
of these organizations. 

This applies even to our investigation of the 
You may recall that recent: y through a 
"black bag" job v/e obtained the records in the possession of 
thrcc_higli-r.-.n!:in(; officials of a organization in 

. These records gave us the c.o:;ipi e to membership 
and financial information concerning the operation 
which we have been using r.iost effectively to disrupt the 
organization and, in fact, to bring about its near disintegratioi 

275 :.:::■ \:- to Mr. C. D. DoLoach 
: "f!. : ..\C:-: I3AG" JOV3S 

In short, it is n vc:ry valuable v;c::ipon which wo have 
\;:;r:d to coi.i'ial tho highly clandestine: oL'jort.*; o f :iubvor:uve 
elements scGl:infc to undermine our Nation. 

il' iC.OMJ.n-.'MIA'i'IOM : 

Vov your infornatioii . 

No more such techniques 
must be used. 


Exhibit 33 

J;iiii.i:i.ry (>. i'.;>J7 

f.ii^JUrtANDUM 'J'OK ;v')i{. TOL;-JCN 

V-'.u. iji" LUAC'l 

.'. ;;.;t? chat rsisue^ta are .»tlU being insula by iiursau 
,;:.iic:a!s lor the use oi "SlbicijKHj ,,: i-icHnli'Tues. ijiayM previously 
i;v.i.i.:ateo '.hat I uo not isitsari co approve any ^uth rsfqaauts ia i.".a 
i'-iiur-;, :jm, 'jonsoqueniiy, no such recoiK&jonii'.ilion;] ;.:huu:J :io 
.-su'ui-niUao ior approval oi such ii>attnrs. T!)is practice, whiiva 
hwiuicB uloo uurra;;iitlcus -jntrances upon ;)rej!j!Kcs vl any '.;i)W, 
'i/iii ijct ;:!soi ,vit:i zny approval in ilio iutur-i. 

vary truly your 3, 

John l^d.j.ix "or.ytr 


Exhibit 34 


WASHINGTON. DC. 20530 V I I - ft " "S" bl^ 1 /^""^ 




Honorable Frank Church, Chairman 
United States Senate Select Committee 

on Intelligence Activities 
Washington, D. C. 20510 

Dear Senator Church: 

By letter of September 22, 1975, from Mr. John 
Elliff of your Committee staff, Mr. Elliff requested 
certain information with respect to surreptitious 
entries conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investi- 
gation against domestic targets. Attached and 
transmitted herewith is a memorandum prepared by the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation in response to that 



Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination 





(IS-3) 62-X16395 

September 23, 1975 




Reference is made to SSC letter dated September 22, 
1975, from Mr. John T. Elliff, Director, Domestic Intelligence 
Task Force, to Mr. Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Special Counsel 
for Intelligence Coordination, Office of the Deputy Attorney 
General, wherein Mr. Elliff made the following request with 
respect to domestic targets of surreptitious entries con- 
ducted by the FBI: 

1. Statistics on the volume of such surreptitious 
entries in inclusive categories such as "subversive," 
"white hate," organized crime," or "miscellaneous." These 
statistics should be cleared for public disclosure. 

2. Committee access at FBI Headquarters to a 
complete list of specific targets, represented by the 
statistics in Item 1, above. 

3. Delivery to the Chairman and Vice Chairman 
of the list of specific targets requested for access in 
Item 2 , above . * — 

With respect to this request, from 1942 to April, 
1968, surreptitious entry was utilized by the FBI on a highly 
selective basis in the conduct of certain investigations. 
Available records and recollection of Special Agents at FBI 
Headquarters (FBIHQ) , who have knowledge of such activities , 
identify the targets of surreptitious entries as domestic 
subversive and white hate groups. Surreptitious entry was 
used to obtain secret and closely guarded organizational and 
financial information, and membership lists and monthly 
reports of target organizations. 


Re: Surreptitious Entries - Domestic Targets 

When a Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of a field 
office considered surreptitious entry necessary to the 
conduct of an investigation, he would make his request to 
the appropriate Assistant Director at FBIHQ, justifying 
the need for an entry and assuring it could be accom- 
plished safely with full security. In accordance with 
instructions of Director J. Edgar Hoover, a memorandum 
outlining the facts of the request was prepared for 
approval of Mr. Hoover, or Mr. Tolson, the Associate 
Director. Subsequently, the memorandum was filed in 
the Assistant Director's office under a "Do Not File" 
procedure, and thereafter destroyed. In the field 
office, the SAC maintained a record of approval as a 
control device in his office safe. At the next yearly 
field office inspection, a review of these records would 
be made by the Inspector to insure that the SAC was not 
acting without prior FBIHQ approval in conducting 
surreptitious entries. Upon completion of this review, . 
these records were destroyed. 

There is no central index, file, or document 
listing surreptitious entries conducted against domestic 
targets. To reconstruct these activities, it is necessary 
to rely upon recollections of Special Agents who have 
knowledge of such activities, and review of those files 
identified by recollection as being targets of surreptitious 
entries. Since policies and procedures followed in reporting 
of information resulting from a surreptitious entry were 
designed to conceal the activity from persons not having a 
need to know, information contained in FBI files relating 
to entries is in most instances incomplete and difficult 
to identify. 

Reconstruction of instances of surreptitious entry 
through review of files and recollections of Special Agent 
personnel at FBIHQ who have knowledge of such activities, 
show the following categories of targets and the approximate 
number of entries conducted against each: 

1. At least fourteen domestic subversive targets 
were the subject of at least 238 entries from 1942 to April, 
1968. In addition, at least three domestic subversive targets 
were the subject of numerous entries from October, 1952, to 
June, 1966. Since there exists no precise record of entries, 
we are unable to retrieve an accurate accounting of their 
number . 

- 2 - 


Re: Surreptitious Entries - Domestic Targets 

2 . One white hate group was the target of an 
entry in March, 1966. 

A recent survey of policies and procedures of the 
General Investigative and Special Investigative Divisions 
at FBIHQ with respect to surreptitious entries, disclosed 
that with the exception of entries made for the purpose oi 
installation- of authorized electronic surveillances, the 
technique of surreptitious entry has not been used m criminal 

A list of specific targets has been prepared for 
review by Senators Church and Tower , and appropriate FBIHQ 
officials are available for a discussion of this list. 

Exhibit 35 

Hay 9. 1975 

Honorable Hugh E. Kline 


United States Court of Appeals for 

the District of Colombia Circuit 
United State3 Court House 
Washington, D. C. 2C001 


•United States v. Ehrlichraan 
(D.C. Cir. NQ.74-1G82) 

Dear Mr. Kline: 

This letter states the views of the. Department of 
Justice concerning an issue raised in this case: the . 
legality of forms of in the United States 
without a warrant in cases involving foreign espionage or 
intelligence. Copie3 are enclosed for distribution to 
the Court. 

It is the position of the Department that such 
activities must be very carefully controlled. There must 
bo solid reason to believe that foreign espionage or 
intelligence is involved. In addition, the intrusion 
into any zone of expected privacy must he kept to the 
c.ininum and there must be personal authorisation by the 
President or the Attorney General. The Copartr.'.cr.t believes, 
that activities so controlled are lawful under the Fourth 

In regard to warrantless searches related to 
foreign espionage or intelligence, the Department does not 
believe there is a constitutional difference "between 
searches^ conducted_by_wirctapping and those involving 
physical entries into private presides. Cne lorn of search 
Is no less serious than another. It i3 and ha3 long been 
the Department's view that warrantless searches involving 
physical entries into private premises are justified 


under the proper circumstances when related to foreign 
espionage or intelligence (See Brief, p. 45, n. 39) . 

The discussion by the Special Prosecutor (Brief, 
Part IB) raises questions which, in our view, are not 
presented by this case. The physical entry here wa3 
plainly unlawful, as the Special Prosecutor, argues, 
because the search was not controlled as we have sug- 
gested it must be, there was no proper authorization, 
there was no delegation to a proper officer, and there 
was no sufficient predicate for the choice of the particu- 
lar premises invaded. For these reasons, we fully 
support' the Special Prosecutor in concluding that the 
entry and search here were unlawful. 

■ Respectfully submitted. 

Acting Assistant Attorney General 


Exhibit 36 



ofncf of int uiRCCioa 

2C February Vl'IO 

Personal and Confidentia l 

The Honorable J. Fd;;ar Hoover 
Director " • '" 

J'cihi.i I I'.uriMM of Investigation 
Washington, ).'. C. " 

Dear Mr. 1 [oovcr: 

Mr. ha:; orally informed me that you wish to have the 

idcnlily of llic: Fill' ;i|;cnt who was the source of co-lain i nfor mai.ionr 

coiiununi rated to an employee of this Agency, Mr. 

Till:; information rri:a r :liiv: the disappearance ui inn: 'l'iiwn'i::::_ lUji.> was 

in t uiei_j^a_s :nvd_le _. . .... 

Jo view of your personal interest in lliis matter, 1 instructed 
Mrj. to report to me in person. 

1 have reviewed this complicated east: in detail with Mr: 
and have requested him to reveal the identity of his source. A:; a point 
of honor and personal integrity, Mr.' j.vas adamant that he 

could not disclose the identity- of hi s source. Under further pressure 
from me, Mr. " 'maintained his position, slating that in de- 

fense of it lie was prepared to submit his resignation immediately. 

• it; 



Mr! explained that the . l ' eases 

■had been j^iven extensive news coverage," niuch of it bein;: sensational 
in nature. He stressed that there was umbar lassini; public speculation 
as io tin: possible involvement of the CIA and the Fl'.I in Itiha's 
' disappearance. 

:; I:-; 1 :, . . 


62-685 O - 76 - 19 


The purpose of conference with the District 

Attorney of Denver was to solicit his i;opd offices to nMimvi: pre s- 
sures ami (he ]ii)ssilik serving of a subpoena on, 

lie .lino sought to orient llu: District Attorney properly so Mint In: 
would not continue 1o have an or ronoous impression of flu: ntli-s of 
the CIA ami the L r l',l, thereby eliminating further adverse publicity. 

Mr. affirms th at b efore i:oinL- to District Atto.rncy 

McKcv iU he called upon the FBl' ■ _ 'Mr. 

and sought to. coordinate with him our respective interests, 
lie also "solicited Mr. to accompany him to Hie District 


Mr, 'states that Mr; j_cfusod absolutely t... - 

;-. I |! cooperate in this mailer. Instead, Mr. i:n<:ai;<:d in an oral 

'..i-i'i 1 |i ,:xcn:,n K« durinj! which he remarked thai; our representative in 
u. c^i, :' lloul der was "lyin ;:" and then proceeded lo challen ge tin: ver.-ic:ily of 
Mr. .Subsequently, Mr. • 'conferred wilii 

the District Allorney alone. lie was successful in .persuading (In: 
District 'Attorney t„ m .-,k c a favorable p ublic state ment which i',.id 
the effect of pulling tiiis issue f C;:ardiii;; and oilier rumors 

lo rest as as the public was concerned. - 

1 have carefully reviewed the statements of Mr. 1 - . -. 

1 feel llin.t p oor judgmen t was employed in passing the information in 

qucslioh'i'o 'and later to Hie District Attorney. This should 

only have been done with specific Fill approval. 1 wish (o assuro'you 
that 1 do not condone violations of the third agency rule, and I am 
taking steps to impress once ayain this elementary fact upon ail Agency 

With regard to Mr. ' .1 have no reason to doubt liiat 
he has acted honcsllv. 1 believe that hollas reported to me in coed, 
faith, lie is sincerely' interested in preserving a sound workin;: 
relationship between the CIA and the Kill. ' Nevertheless, because a 
situalior of this sort adversely affects tiie relationship between the two 
a|;enci e; J 1 am taj'.inn administrative action in this mattei v/ilh re:;ard 
to Mr. 

AUG ii'l 

'i:---V\..:F.. J- -i^-./j •?!"•■.-■•.■- :•■■■ 

■-~~> *■*'■ .-:->•<■ 


I hope sincerely that this recent incident will not impair our 
mutual efforts in makim; certain that wc have not overlooked factors 
possibly ha vim; a significant bearing uii U.S. intelligence and internal 
security interests. 1 shall pursue this matter through our respective 
liaison offices. 


]n closin;;, Mr. Hoover, 1 wish to state that tlii:; At;rncy can only 
fully perform itr. duties in the furtherance of the national security when 
it iia:; llw: closest com re! inalion and teamwork with the Kctii-ra I I'.urea-.: of 
Investigation. Furlhcnnon:, it is necessary that v/e continue to eon- 
duct our business in an atmosphere of mutual respect. I I rust that we 
can coordinate closely :.ny future developments or action:; in these ease:; 
in order to prevent the airing in public of conflict:: or <ii J I '• rettces helwce 
the two agencies. 1 feel stroni;ly that there are representative;-. .||' the 
news media who are eae,er to exploit alleged difference:; on a national 
scale. Disturbi nj; as this experience has been, 1 wish i.o thank you in 
the interests of our common cause lor bavin;; communicated with me 
in such a -forthright and candid maimer, 

> ■!■:- - ■..•"' '.-'\ ' ■; - ""■ - ■ ; : 

I Sincerely, 

r . n . • '■ f A, -r*'-''-' +~ 'Kich.-u-d Jlolms 

_J\ . /i.i-.i.,-.- ,, j*'c.--.v> ■■'■■•'-<■ '■I't-y -V'.-v <-—l s\ 

AlUi:lirti>!iil!i - :i/s :• H ')' , 1 '..~ V J 

\:\\r. ... in'''; ,.., , ,;\ . '.... .i-v .-■•; • •.--->••• ■•'•■■■•'•• ^ 

WJG'iiuii .*-, ,..-... v .;..:."v. ,..V- '- - ^--^ r- - 

• FBI. •;^::'-~ -•"^■•;-; ;/■■•-■" 


Followim; arc typewritten clarifications of the 
handwritten comments of J. Edgar Hoover on the at.tached 

Page 2, lol'L margin -| acted properly. II" 

Page 2, liottom of page - "1 do not; agree, .violated the 

third agency rule &■ refused to identify 
tlie alloyed FBI agent who was the source 
of the information. II" 

Page 3, end of 3rd paragraph - "Helms forgot:; it jr. a two way 

street. II" 

Page 3j IjoLLoiii of page - "This is not; sal J st'ac: lory . J i-.'aiil: our 
. Denver Office to have absolutely no 
contacts with CIA. 1 want direct liaison 
hero with CIA to ho lennj nal.ed ■'>. any 
contact witli CIA in the future to be by 
letter only. II" 

Exhibit 37 

February 26, 1970 

QVCL, */ 

Honorable Egil Krosb, Jr. 'l-fit/ f 

Deputy Assistant to tho President jl 

for Domestic Affairs 
The Whits HOU3C c .-\- Q L- ; f ~ flApy- ■mi- ; . ," - ■ " I i ) -', i x. ,- • 
Washington, D. C. """ ~~~ ' 

Dear Ur. Krogh: 

Pursuant to your request of February 23, 1970, /]— > 
there nre enclosed 13 memoranda concerning source3 of f undB./ i\ I j 
utilized by revolutionary groups. jl I I 

Sincerely yours, 

Enclosures (13)^C* 

RLS:mst -*" 
(9) -.v*V ■■•^ 

* iL 

/Oo - L i 1 l ' ''';/'■ '/' i -/77 

9 -H6-27 1970 

V.f 6/>">7. 7n /_>. _ 


^ '- '•?=»- zz\ 

r? MAR 1,2 ,1970 v^ 

: <__ n 





February 26, 1970 


The Progressiva Lr,'oer Party (PLP) is an active 

comnunlst party is tho : United States pliich adheres to tha 
revolutionary dnr.: ; -..; n'f -;:,.- Cci.rv.jiist Party and 
its leader !;to Tsc-'::^, !■«'.•.'■;.• ior tho PL? are obtained 
fron duos paid by ussbers of tU= organization. 

The PLP also derives incone from the sale of its 
naKazice •Vrosres-r.ive Lr..:-...-," r..:d its monthly nousoapor 
"Challenge. " FLr >:s Jojrsf'iv-j bulls nailing of these 
publications dirc:::lv to i-ctir-. China, in the uast. The 
PLP in January, 10VO, prj ».t.-;i .:u,000 copies of "Challenge," 
and in February, 1SV0, I-s.OOO issues of "Progressive Labor.' 

EJS:mst < 
(8) v^T" 


February 26, 1970 


The Republic of Hew Africa (RKA), a black extremist, 
separatist organization, ?as formed in Detroit, Michigan, 
in March, 19G3. 

RKA activity has been curtailed from Its inception 
by lack of funds. 




rebruary 26, 1970 

snmn.-T national ccorj>n:tTiNG cmmirrBK 

The Student National Coordinating Connittee Is a 
black extrenist nor^r.rrcrsbip orr.-.-.isation which was founded 
in 12C0 and lrhich until July, 1:~GD, mas known as the Student 
nonviolent Coordinntir.j Coi.:iti;CG. Tiic group is currently • 
led by li. Hap Iirc-.-n v;:o serve:; as rational Cuairnan. 

The organization is currently active in Atlanta, 
Georgia; Cincinnati, C.:io; cud text ior& City. The 
organization's national ofiicl is located in New York City 
where it maintains en cii ice orovic-d by the Saint Peter s 
Episcopal Church at i^o. Viji >..';th Lireet. The group operates 
nationally uith lees ti;an 50 rjecbors and is consistently reported 
to be in dire financial condition. 

Additional revenue is ohtnined through the psyoont of 
dues by Student ICationr.l Cocruinntir.!;. Corsittce affiliates and 
recently efforts have been r.u-Jo by t:io iJcw Hots, organization to 
publish a news bulletin entitled "National £::CC" which it is 
intended would cell fov3E« a cow. Publication of this ne-ss 
letter has not net with success tna to date only one issue is 
knosn to have appeared. 

A) eff' 




RC?:pab, ,-iP 


February 26, 1970 

craonraisT partt, dsa 


February 26, 1970 


Tho •; votskyist Socialist Workers Party (StfP) is 
hoi'.ciqu;..-.-'. •.•;:«'.! ^ Saw York City and is the largest, and most 
active :-i i:.;. o: .:. .lunist splinter groups. Through its youth 
oi'fili:,::: . ■■:■::. ':=::ip.3 Socialist (YC.) , the ST.? 
c::'.-vt£i .■•'■::..■■■ . :'vcr the Student Mobilization Coaraittee to 
End the i .':•.:.• : : • " : .otnan (SMC), a broad-based student antitjar 
group. ■>;•..-• ST...' -clso naintain3 fraternal ties with the 
Fourth C.-:-':c.i-.'.'-.-:^,. a European Trotskyist organization. 

T.t:j ;-.--inary source of funds is the monthly 
Bu^tniii::': ■■;.' J: : :.'*oen dollars extracted from each member. 
In nddiv..:.---:, >...■ -.los are also realized fron the sale of 
publicum:'..-:.:.. • Elections in support of ST, : P political 
candid;. ■■■::.. •■: ,-t. collections at large public rallies, and 
through •'.■.■. c-T'.'-rol of front orcanizations 



February 26, 1970 


The Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) Is the youth 
organization of the Socialist Workers Party (SEP) and has 
been described by the ST.P as the naln recruiting ground 
for the SV.'P. 

A YSA publication in an article outlining the 
organizational concepts of the YSA states that the 
nenbership and each local chapter are responsible for 
financial support to the organization through 6uch activities 
as payncnt of ninlaal dues based on ability to pay, literature 
sales and fund raising projects. 

The YSA is subsidized by the SWP which furnishes 
varying nnounts of money to the YSA on a continuing basis. 

(8) ,'J£ 



February 26, 1970 


The Student Mobilization Coruaittee to End the War 
in Vietnam (SL'.C) is controlled and dominated b? the Your.i;; 
Socialist Alliance- (YSA) T:hich is the youth organization 
of the Socialist Workers Party (SOT). The S"C has local 
chapters in all sections of the United States and nitords 
the YSA a broad base organization for popular support. 

The SMC local activity is financed by the 
individual chapter concerned and in turn these local groupjj 
contribute toward the expenses of any national action 
sponsored or supportod by the SHC. The local chapter^ 
organizo their ora fund raisinn projects and are assisted 
by°contributions froa their neabors and supporters. 



February 26, 1970 


The Vencerer-c-s Erigade (VB) rcas organized in 
June, 19G9, for t!ie purpose of supporting the Cuban revolution 
by assisting in the current sugar' cane harvest. It is head- 
quartered in Kcw Yori: city and is conposed of the National 
Executive Co;.:;.:ittci, r:~ic::?.l recruiters and the brigade nenbers 
who travel to Cub:-.. T^e Evocative Comittco is conposed of 
individuals representing a variety of Kew Left groups, which 
groups have also provic'.od organizational support. To date a 
total of 702 indiviiiuaia have been identified as having 
traveled to Cuba undor VB auspices. 

With regard to finances, the V3 Executive Cocnittee 
instructed the regional recruiters that each region could be 
responsible for raisi::-; travel funds for transportation of 
participants to at vhicb points 

the Cuban Government <roiild assuce financial responsibility. 
All excess funds were to be sent to the national office. 

L'oney to support travel expenses was obtained through 
various fund raising affairs sponsored by the organizations 
lending cuppcrt to i'.)- YE. These projects included bazaars, 
fila showings, and coiiees. In addition, infornation has been 
developed disclosing- that each traveler provided his own fund3 
for transportation and incidental expenses, and in sone instances 
they were arbitrarily assessed a proportionate amount to cover 
the travel expenses for those without funds. 

; / 



February 26, 1970 


Beathernan Faction 

Weatuernan national leaders, such as William Ayers, 
liar': Hudd, and Jeffrey Joacs, since their election as 
StuOcnts ior a Democratic Society (ErJ) national secretary:: 
in June, 19G0, have appeared as speakers on a nuober of ccile;;e 
campuses throughout the country. • They have received honorariums 
froa these colleges ranging iron §200 to $750 for their speaking 

This faction is and lias been in severe financial 
crisis since Into Pall of 19G9. Because of its violent and 
nilitant activities, forner sources .of funds are no longer 
available, _ . » 

• nenbers live in residences called "collectives," 
and the rent they pay usually i3 very noninal, Ueathernr.n 
necbers, because they are in severe financial straits, often 
ireceive nonoy froa their parents to help defray expensec. Lost 
o; the ti;-;3, however, nenbers of the collectives cove ii'eousntlv 
liroa one place to another to avoid payin-j rent. The individual.: 
in the various collectives take alnost daily trips to "liberate" 
(steal) iriiatover they need, such as food, clothing, »nd house- 
wares,, at local supenaarkots and other stores. 






Students for a Democratic Society 

Worker Student Alliance Faction 

This faction of SDS has obtained operating funds through 
the sale of literature and requests for donations tfirouf-,ii its 
■mblication, "Uev Left IiOtes." Donations amounting to iron 
:,il to $50 have been received fron many Worker Student Alliance 
(l.'oA) Bcubers located throughout tho United States. 


Students lor a Denocratlc Society 

The '""A faction recently has held National Council 
meetinrr; i;j :;■:.-./ iisven, Connecticut, and Los AnGele3, California. 
The ):>>:: ;;-.! iccj for the auditoriucs where the nootinns were 
ls'.-}.ii i:;.- v'vo'i c'.onation3 iron delegates, trho paid sues ranging 
ii-on vS ,.-. •+*■*. It v?.3 stressed at both neetings by WSA 
leadcrr -*:iui: thia faction 1b in dire need of funds with which 
to operate. 

r.evolutio;:ury Youth Hovenent Faction 

This friction of SDS has no operating funds on a 
natloi.M loci at this tine. Local revolutionary Youth 
L'ovemcy s.l'iVi.) chapters operate on their ova, and any funds 
they r.'.i.: covin iron local necbers. During the Tall of 1969, 
i:icha£A . r ic;.c::y, considered to be one of tho top leaders of 
V:':s ;.....■/■., r.ado a nucbor of speeches on college canpuses 
\.\;-jv<! I- : >.i---\c.: jarorariufca Kvej-i^i^j; -"". : ? 'for each cngageri-aa'S. 

Cacbriu^c Iron and Steel Conpany 

The Cambridge Iron and Steel Company, Canbrldgo, 
liassr.c^scT7;.:, vas created in early 1969 to support eucb 
org^'j r.j SC3 in the Cambridge and boston areas. 

62-685 O - 76 - 20 


February 26, 1970 


The '.lev Left relics heavily on printed propaganda. 
The Hen Loft his an enormous propaganda mill churning out 
publications the "Establishment" and glamorizing 
the "rebels." There arc over 200 New Loft underground 
newspapers published on a regular basis in the United States. 

Ti:o central thene which pervades these papers is a 
criticisr. oC tlv.-. "llr-tablishncnt" in general and law enforce- 
ment, the drali, and the Vietnan War in particular. Featured 
articles are nip.ed primarily at the "beatnik typos" and 
morbidly curici-n v.iio nay be intrigued by the activities of the 
New Left. Al: o featured are obscene photographs and 
psychedelic drr.vir.rT5i .as well as announcements of interest to 
sex deviates a:i:i hallucinatory drug users. Youth, particularly 
students, are '.he nain target of these publications, which are 
effective vehicles for agitation and recruitment in that they 
reach a large ' <:3i*tion of the student population. 

For the nost part, the underground papers are in 
poor financial condition and often niss publication dates due 
to a lack of iuncis. Papers circulated in large urban areas 
are usually sol'- - 'Tit, while those in university communities 
are str::; : : o seep in business. Generally, funds are 
receiver, ^'ror; :v:;v Ttising, subscriptions, donations, and 
benefits. Volunteer labor is used in most instances. 

AttoL'.pts by Hew Left leaders to unite these 
underground ;;;:v.'-s into some type of network have been unsuccess- 
ful to oa'ic, r:r.--j there are no concrete political philosophies 
[agreeable to -c'j.\ . Vhile the editors share similar goals, they 
diverge cicely arj to the means. However, over 100 underground 
papers arc nii'ilintod with the radical Liberation Hews Service 
■bich provides i)c;s packets concerning New Left activities. 

{ In a for; instances, authorities have prosecuted 

publishers for printing obscene material . However, ninor fines 
'or probation ueen the general result and have been 
offset bv an increase in the paper's circulation. * 



February 26, 1970 

Approxlcatoly 100 Tsolos or llcsques of this 
fp.naticnl eXl-;:o~ro cult c::ict in tho Unites! State3 today 
vie a a total r.=: :.->"-'.:l , i in o-kce-3 of Vi:o Eonbershlp 

Biipr-ortn thin organisation. Principal incooe is derived 
fr'oa coriorohin 'dues', sjjecinl cenbership ttsoessnonta and 
iroa oale of its official publication "l iahnnnn d Speaka." 

(8) . 7 

^4/ ' 


February 26, 1970 


The sources of income for the Black Panther Party 
(BPP) are many and varied. In the initial years of its 
existence froa 19uo to 19C9, one of its chief sources of 
income the proceeds frc.-a criminal acts perpetrated by 
individual members t,Uo split T;itli the Pr.rty. Uore recently, 
the chief sourco of funds for the D?P has been numerous and 
regular contributions froa individuals, radical groups and 
syapathizcrs in the United States and overseas. These 
individual contributions have increased greatly since 
December, 19G9. 

ABF:ek» , ,,. 

(8) ~«-#--,h—' 



Sizable donations are known to have been mado to 
thA npp hv several prominent individuals and personalities. 

The BPP also roooivo.i incocie from the regular sale 
of its weekly nov :oapcr and fro.s the sale of revolutionary 
paraphernalia such as p-nphlcts, posters, buttons, and nreetinq 

Another source of iiicor.o for the BPP is fees received 
for public smooches anl appearances !.;ado by its representatives, 
particularly at institution:: oi* learning. The fees received 
by its representatives for thoro appearances vary but have 
ranged as liich as 51,E0C) for a single appearance of BPP Chairman 
Bobby Scale. D-.irinrr :■..-' ID re-fiv-^oiitativos oi the EPP nade a total 
of 13D appearances at various institutions of learning. 

Another source of ineone for the BPP is proceeds 
received from various public benefits and rallies held 
specifically for the purpose of raisins tionoy for. the 
regular defense funds of the B."? established to pay legal 

TThile no firm evidence has been developed to date, 
it Is noted that there has been an increasing- nunber of 
articles of a pro-Arab nature appearing in the BPP nevfspaper 



and every effort ia bein;; cindo to determine whether the 
Arabs arc supporting t:io Dine!: Panthers from a monetary 
standpoint . It is noted that i.:ldrid;;e Clo.-.vor, the 
E?P Minister oi' ?!niorr.:r.tion .-nd a fugitive fron justice, 
is presently re:-;.:, din;; in Arab territory and is supported 
by them. 


February 26, 1970 


The Hew Mobilization Conaittee to End tho War 
in Vietnam <1"C) maintains its liaadouarters at 1029 Yoreuat 
Avenue, Quito 900, Korth-cst, Vr.rjhinfiton, D. C. It also 
maintains an at 17 Ea3t Seventeenth Street, 
Hew York City. . 

The K!C is not an individual menbership organization. 
It is a coalition of man? organizations v.nioh are locate:! 
throughout tbe United States. These organizations include 
the Coixzunis't Party, Socialist Y.orUcrs Party, V.onon Stri?:a 
for Peace, Chicaco Peace Council, Los Angeles Peace Action 
Council, Student .Mobilization Conaitteo to End tho T/ar in 
Vietnam, and the American Friends Service Coonitteo. 

HMC's prinary function at the present tine is to 
protest the United States intervention in Vietnam. 

The H!!C receives financial support in the forr* 
of donations from sympathetic individuals and organizations. 

In September, 1969, it was reported that tho 
following individuals were described as beinr: acoug tao 
principal individual financial donors to the i-.lX: 




SSC:pab yt"^ 



Exhibit 38 
unitki) statkn (.. .cknmkxt 

Memorandum \ - » r - ° cL ° ac ,» 

1 - Mr. J. P. Mohr 
1 - Mr. Felt 
Mr. V/. C. Sullivan ' dam:. March 12, 1970 


. . / 1 - Mr. Casper 

V ■ 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan 

Al : CD. Brcnnan'. j/ 1 - Mr. C. D. )3ronnan 

X V 1 - Mr. Shackelford < 

snijhtrr: lirw Li;FT j.;ovEUEHT - FINANCES 



To obtain authority for the attached airtel to the 
field requesting financial information concerning New Left 


By memorandum C. D. Brcnnan to Y7. C. Sullivan, dated 
11/7/G9, the Director approved a letter to all offices pointing 
out the recurring allegations that various tax exempt charitable 
foundations have contributed large sums of money, directly or 
indirectly, to the Movement. It was also pointed out similar 
allegations recur concerning financial "angels." The field was 
instructed to bo particularly alert to such allegations and any 
information developed along such lines should be promptly reported 
to the Bureau with recommendations as to whether additional i/ 
investigation is warranted. "mi~ 

By letter dated 2/26/70, in response to a specific 
request, we furnished the White House with material concerning 
income sources of revolutionary groups. Such an inquiry is 
indicative of the high-level interest in the financial aspects 
of revolutionary activity. 

Because of the sensitive nature of any direct intensive 
financial investigation of large foundations or funds, prominent 
wealthy individuals who limit their activities to financial 
support, or politically oriented groups such as the Vietnam 
Moratorium Committee, embarrassment to the Bureau would likely 
result. It must also be noted such financial support is so 
diverse as- to frequently be in the form of ^furnishing bail money 

^ _-_:.-'■ 16 

446997-70 -» ,,, f l1A f| IV tgyV 

to persons jailed during disturbances, purchase of equipment, 
Enclosure - - •• ■ /- '' / ->' /..' SF C- $J 'fvv^ 


'7RLS:mst ZX-ll*] 

IV(8) m'\ CONTINUED-*- OVER - 


Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan 

and underwriting costs of large rallies or meetings. Such 
aid rarely would be picked up in our review of bank records 
of the organizations involved. 


In order to put these recurring allegations into 
perspective and be in position to be responsive to future 
high-level inquiries along this line, it would bo desirable 
to obtain from the field, a comprehensive survey of known 
instances of financial aid by foundations or funds, prominent 
or wealthy individuals, or politically oriented groups, at 
the same time it would be a propitious instance to reiterate 
the Bureau's interest in these matters on a continuing basis. 


The attached airtol to the field be forwarded 
containing instructions along the above lines. f , 

*k> , 1 <& 



Exhibit 39 


To: SAC, Albany 

From: Director, FBI (100-446097-70) 

CUDED 4/1/70 

1 - llr. DeLoach 


1 - Mr. J. P. Hour 

1 - Ur. Felt 

1 - Llr. Car.per 

1 - llr. \7. C. Sullivan 

1 - Ur. C. D. Brennan 

1 - Ur. Shackelford 


S-' g 

<£ B 

ReJ-.Su let dated 11/10/69. 

The abovo referenced lottor directod your attention 
to tlio n?ad to develop information indicative of support of 
tlio How Left Movement by ta:;-05:oapt clicritcblo fouptiations 
or financial "angels." Allegations of thin type of support, 
as v:o3.1 uu support by politically oriented croups audi us the 
VietDas Moratorium Counittoo . to End tho War in Vietnam 
continue to circulate. 

Because of interest in tho sources of funds of \ 
subversive and revolutionary croups OKhibitod by lii(jli officials^] 
of thn (iover:ii:3nt it is essential to got tho above allegations 
into ^proper .perspective. 

You nro instructed to ourvoy your files to determine 
any instances chore financial cupport, including gifts of 
equipment or facilities, has been furnished to Hew Left croups 
or individuals by 1) t ai;-cxon:pt charitable foundations or 
funds; 2) prominont or wealthy Individuals, or other individuals 
who have contributed over $1,000 in a single contribution; 
3) politically oriented croups including; unions. Such support 
would include nnd not be limited to, furnishing ball money to ' 
arrested demonstrators, furnishing printing equipment or office 
space, nnd under -./riting the cost of conventions or rallies. 
Individuals end organizations listed should be documented 
whore possible. REC . gg y' _u£.- 

2 - All Offices (PERSONAL ATTENTION) \ " 

EX-UTJ ■ " K 








f5 u.r.:u 137? 
-— .:ot:T wigs: tvo ; U 







Airtol to a/iC, Albany 

100-4 <lU9<)7-70 

Thin survey is expected to be cxhsiustive and thorough. 
The results- should bo prepared in a letterhead memorandum under 
the caption of this communication. The deadline of -i/l/VO must 
be complied with. 

Tiie Bureau's continuing interest in the financial 
aspects of Hew Left Movement investigations, both orcanizations 
and individuals, is beinj; reiterated. You should remain 
continually alert for information of this type and insure it 
is promptly reported to the Bureau under the above caption. 


See memorandum C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, dated 
3/12/70, captioned as above, prepared by RL3:inst. 


Exhibit 40 

The Attorney General July 27, 1370 

Director, FIJI — 


There 1:; enclosed :i copy c.l ;\. letter o:\tcil .Inly '.'■'•, 
1970, v.l 111 : •- 1 1 :» i: I : i ; i r- 1 i i L , athiressea to ir.c from Mr. -Tom Charles 
Huston, While i;ousc Presidential Assistant. 

l r or your lr.fcrr."'lion, 6:1 .Ju.-io '■>, 1070, the President 
established :i:i :;■:! ioc intevayency euni;viUae on Jhte ; !:"cnre cliaireJ 
by me an:! :;i:o ir.c.hKihvv Ills' J.'ireclors cl tix- Ccidral !::;el!;-."!;re 
Agency, II::: !>fem:o r«lolii ,; .u»co Agency, aud {•.■■'.: .'ia.'vii-aal i^-curiiy 
,?.j:i.':u:y. ?■:•. iii.iMou scrve'l in a Ji:ii:joii capncilv '..'i:h l.i'.i' com; .iUco. 
This ccn:u'iltee v::is rC'iuosteu by the i ; roskieni It) .fi'ilnsil n report 
jisspBiiiii;; the current internal .security tnreat. |)" an «.'v;-.:'.i;it io;i 
of iutel' coilaeiion procedures, kie:Ui!'yi:v. an:u; n\ our present 
collodion c-ii'ui'ls with rceorair.eiKled measures to caiae :;ncii ':..:'•:;, 
and reviftwir.!.' current procedures lor interagency couruinniioa v.uli 
recommended slops to improve such procedures. 

The finnl report of till;; comniiitcc v.:ir; coivploled on 
June 20, 1370, and delivcrc.i to the President. Thin report sol forth 
ciylit speciiie areas (corrcsponjim; to the oi;'.iit" nu;r.:;cTi:-.i p.iv;r;;:j;:!3 
In the attached letter from .V.'r. i.iistnn) which had been reviewed i;y 
the conir.-.illoe. The iirst six related to current rosanints on ime:- 
llsrcncc collection oroceauros; the t-evciuii was concerned wili; bndyol 
and manpower ueeas in the event the various reslrahas wore related; 
and liio eiyhlh area dealt wit 11 the iwssibie o:il :•! j|i:_;hi:o.iL ul a jv.:r.: .aneiit 
Interagency'.ee on doiroscic intelli.;ence. In caen arc:; the 
report of the coi-rutteo v;:is presep.teu to shov: the :i:.vauin:;c:; and nl ::ny chnir-.cs in current policies ami also to ailow 
the President to inuicatc his desires. 

, iffvt j Enclosures - 2 
•.LI/!.!' -*" • i-.'';'-iJ 

All;, HIK.':sfv.-/c!kii •> 
_' 15) 


The Attorney General 

A;; .-;.'■ I out In lb:: :•;':•.-■'•! ■•'. 1 d'er fro:- ' 'r. iee "- 
!t 1 3 ii!i!"f.l tli-it. lha :-'re:;h'en! Iris e>reeled In? )•-•! emiem of !■'■::.' 
lnve.Mticalivo restraints ciiractly ufleciliii: the responeibilitie;) 0: 
iho'Tljl. ''These include: 

1. Intensified use of electronic servn: lllnrices a erf 
penetration:', to effect coverne.0 of individuals :iti.i i:roaps In the. 
United : laics '.'.'no pose a major threat lo l!>.- ; le.Pu' seoijruv; 

clear the Idli's ooposltion lo the relaxation of our present eedce 
of selected roveraae on n:a;or internal security threads throe si 
the use of Isiis trchnleue. 1 pointed out that Hi" :' II 'n-"l ir.'e^:: 
electronic surveillance coverage is ndeouai.o ril t h Lr; li-n.v but 
that v.'e would not obiecf to other agencies S'-osiny Ihe aelhorif-' oF 
the Attorney c'oaorai lor any covcreeo rcejircd by them and tl'.cre- 
n.fter lnstitutim; such covera'.ve themselves. 

?.. Hemoval of Instructions on Irstl eov:ra" : 
and relaxation of covert mail coveraee lo normli use of tills bees. 
on r.eleclcd tro-pots of priority forciyyi inlclii ;:ace and ini.::rns: e 
interest. Tn this connection. In le.e report of dune ?..}, l'.i'i'l;, I :e. ■■. 
clear the IT'I's strops: objection lo iainlae.ioe.lins any covert ;■;■:;■ 
It Is the Fbl's oosilion that if covert mail coveraee is i-epicae-a. 
It Is 11!: e I y ihat iniorvselion v.ould lea!: out of the cost oiiice i.-> '".■ 
press ant! that serious oar.iae:e \vouid be cone to the intelliaeasa 
community because of the very nature of this coveraee. V. o have * 
objection to lo.eil mail coveraee, provided it i!i need on a car. -pis 
controlled and .selective baj;is in Loth eriniined and .security in:.".;. 

3. The removal of restraints on the use. of surry 


entry. I 

andlarsalnst other urgent and hi^h priority targets. 

!/rn i-!<0ivr . . • 


The Attorney General 

i. An Increase In coverage of vio!eiicc-.ftroiu> campus 
p.nd r.tudent-rf.'i.ateu ('.roups ami Use removal of nil ic:::t i-:tint;: which 
liniil rnica covcraae. in li-.o report of .'nine :\'.i, iU'i'U, the tl.U specifically 
objected k: ro:r.i.".i;v: any of flic present controls anil resti-ie'.i"ns 
relating to the development oi campus sources, it was pointed out 
Hint to re!:::-: I lie:; o restriction:} weuld scvereiv .:crc-.>:»i-ui:-.'j our iiivos- 
llpations and could result in Scales 10 liic press which would bo . 
clamacjn:: anil which could lean to char:',es lhai. iiivesii;>,ativc agencies 
arc iritorfcrint; with acauemic freedom. 

In connection with the proposed establishment of a 
permanent Interagency 'committee on domestic hnoills.ence, in the 
rc])0i-l of .kme :•::">, i'JVO, I specifically ir.neu clear niv optxi'silioii Cu 
Euch a committee wiuie poinliiin out that tin; L-J.I would approve of 
preparing periodic domestic intelligence estimate:-;. 

Denplte my clear-cut and specific opposition to the 
llftlnp of the various. investigative rcstrainls referred to neovo and 
to the creation of a oermaucnt interagency coir.n-.illce on domestic 
lnlelll''e:ice, flic ri.'I lr. prepared to implemeni the iiislrucuens oi 
the White House at your direction. Of coarse, we would continue 10 
cec'r. your specific authorization, where appropriate, to uiiiiac i.iie 
various ircusitivc-iiivesdlgalivc teehmqucu involved ln.indiviuual eases. 

• 3 

62-685 O - 76 - 21 


Tlio Attorney Ccnural 

I would .r.poraclalu :•. r-Vos:v>t c::oi-c.*::;i'.in nf yruiy v!'.:-.vs 
ccvicoii'.i" : i I:; i^aiior, noli-r: C.:-: o/efaw.'jc ei-'l iuvl'.x In i.'ii: iii^Um';: 
letter that an iiitoi-aissncy aunnnUco he cuiLSiiliilcd by Au<ui::.l 1. 1'JVO. 
V.'c are taking no action to Implement Ilia instructions contained In 
Mr. lluaton'u letter pending your reply. 


Exhibit 41 

Llr. Toi:;on 10/20/70 


The Kxocutives Conference 

rxixirrivj;:; coi:rEr.i:::cE - 10/20/70 

Thor;o in attendance at the Conference? today Included 
V-.i: :.r.v:: . Vo'.xv , t".:lliv:i» , i'.ifjhop, !:i'on:ian , Ca llaln-.n , Ca:;per, 
Conrad, Felt, Gale, Kuucn, Tr.vci, V.'a!tcr:j and Heaver. 

The Conference examined tko ciiicciicjn of ..v.'licthor tlio 
carront situation demand.-, inten:;ific tiua <;.? certain .'jocurity- 
iype investigation:; . In particular , reference wan undo to 
(1/ llfi:i;:r; of the" c::i:: !: .L * t ; T j.. orator U" t on report v:rii:i:!:; ;md 
invent i ;.;:t ion :Ln V'rio?.'iiy XI and L'riori ty III, Liccur.i. i:y Index 
car.*.:: , CO '.he iiitcnnj fica 1:1 on and cxpaneien of <:;:>: .Ircatlon.'i 
01" bind:, v.iu. co am i ethnic [:-'tu'.;> oxtre;.:!:: t:; nndf.^ 

. ' . . . '_ .Iriicyt. 

lie:.):.; are Ijeinc individually considered below. 

I.Lftin:; of exl:; tin;; r.:oi-r. fcorium on report v.-ri tin;; and i.nVw-fci — ""' 
Cation in Priority II ::nCi Priority III, Security Inde;: cane:;. 

Tliovo are approximately 10,050 individual:; currently 
ine/.r.dod in Priority II and I'riori iy III of tlio Security Index. 
Virtually no inve:;t.Lf'ntion Up.:; bee;: eo:uU;c U:d rc;\ardin;*: 
appro::i;;nteiy G /.I'.'A of tn.o:",o individual:; :;iuoc the. i).:po:3itlon 
of tin; noratoriu;.i in Kebr'.-nry, 10G:'. ).:any of tbr:;o individual:; 
lii'.vo cuanp.c-'l residence and/or e-.'.pioyi.'.ei:.'; a.;::! iiiol.r vdioroabout:; 
arc; . i'o fuifi 11 our cuvro-i i rc.;po:i:;ibiIitiou , v.o 

nliould knev: whore they are. /. / ';,'.'/ \ "")' •/:'■">■ 

\'y \0 •'• '.:■ -> / -/.•'•/ •■';-'W ' f) ...'. :__... 

1 -• i:-jhr ■.. ■, ■■■ - > . 

1 - "r. Sullivan (.:'•■■■'■■'• \ ( f \ •>> '' '■'(.'.' f .' !!70 

1 - .".v. Pourer " '£'■/ " ~~ 

I - j' n.\;: ; :l.':i:int Director ■'•-•'• 

cu:: :.',!v.;/ . , ' , """ ' • - . .->..(-.> 
■ C.u.) /' ,,. — co::tii:u!;o - Q'.tm 


liciiioi'.-iniii.'in to l!r. Tolnon 

r.ii: ).aI;cuti.v;;l; cohimucr: - io/2o/7o 

IX tha i-.ioj ! :itoi-iii:a ia roaei ndo/I , thu field will 
jiio required Lc r'.-opan npp;.\->::;.;::a Leiy I:,"1j l'rio.- i. t y II cases 
j.'X.-ji- report:: and approximately ys,7G!.i Priority III case:: to 
j'.vurjj'y voaidencq and cinloymoni: . Cpcnin;: of tkeao c.mcs 
j.wouJil be r. i.iiiii.'orot! oj tli a proportionate mar.bc-r opened o;icli 
1 month to inatn.-o all arc reopened by Juno JO, l'.;'/l. 

UXacI: Student Union;; and rjlr.iilar ftroup::: on college cni:puaca. 

In -J.!!;;?, black ntudon'c:.; h.-.(;an i'o 

.!.'-Hij tiioir ov.'n 

;:roupa to pro.jcoi; their c!cir.:iml:.; , i::::ny oX which indicate a 
cor.Mi.tiiont to b.lac:.': nsticnnJisaj.. Theao ;;roura arc an toiio:.:oiia 
and have a r.ixvu;: acnao oX coaou purpose.. The ];laci: li.iuther 
Party Jin:-: made open otiori;;.; to j.;.'.o tlio l'.iaok .M.miont 
Union;; nationally . and other black e::trci!l:;t !; roup:: have iiaod 
thoao o;-!;ani.i;ai:i.onu to pro/leol thoir c:-.tror.u:.-,;vi and :.:ep:irnti;;m. 

Canon:; disorder:-, involvini; black .-.tudenta liv-roancd 
'.'■'.'• per cent In the !.C(,:)-','l: aohoo 1 year over the pi-Ci'l.f.n:j year 
indioalii::; that thaao i;ioupa j-cprcaont a real potential lor 
violence and <■ i.. ; ;iu t;t:i.ou . In the print, v.c have opened oaaoa on 
theao orfani ant ions following evidence oi' bind; o:;tre:.i: a i 
activities; ho.vcvor, in view oX tho vast .tnoroa.-.o in violence 
on eollc;;o enrapusc::,' it li; Xolt that every BJ.iif:!: :;tuclciit Uiiion 
and aiwl.iar croup, regardless oi.' their or present 
j lnvolvraicnt in >i.i r.oaTR:. : . snoiu.d bo the sulne,--.}. of n"l['.-.e:vi-r<i- 
/preliminary Inquiry tbrou;;h established scarce:.; and iniorr.innts 
Ito determine brieiau'ound, aiir,:'; an<l purpose:;, loaders and koy 
.activists. It is estimated that this •vculd cause tho Xiold 
/to open approximately 4,000 cnsc.c involving organization;; and 
/tlio l:oy activists and lenders connected therewith. 

Students Cor a ocr.ncratic Society (SDS) and militant Nov; I^i't 
Cannes oi(; ions . 

At tho end of-t.ho ].f!C0-70 acadcn'.lc year , the various 
faction;: oi: tho r,»V., excludi.!!;* tho Wc:r[:hcri;:nn laotiou, wliicli h:o; 
bccor.o aii or:;a.n1:'.;:tion in it:: can vi.[:ht, oon:::!:: led of a 
rarailiov.-Jliip.oJ: a|ajvoai;,iatcly 2,ii()!i individual;-,. In addition 
to the ;.•:!';.': ;:vor.p:;, ihcro arc about '.>.:',:! tolally independent 
rti'oup'i oil i.'olt<"'" can'oiaic:: wlilcli r.rn pr--oo:i)-.iV:i'.l at ilcv.' I.-. , :.'t- 
tyr-.i: -ami :.r:, Iip.i,v.;cr.; ol tlio !.;■': ideology. ~<A 1-: t;:;!'. i.:.ia tad 

Co:ri.'T.i."JK!) - ovra 


i.'ei.ioi :uiuUi.i J.u i.'.r. 'x'olr.uA 

it;:: i:>:;:ciiJ.'ivj'.:; coi:r - r:ia:i;c 


that' the i.!t:r.ibc:r:iliip cf thnr:o ori;ani:'.a 1: iocrj cturaiatn oi 
.-.bout -;,0()0 i..oial>.'. - r.'.!i- At tha present tiiii:, v/o :',;■(! con:ir.ct.ln;; 
investigation:) oil nil o-" ther.o oi'^::ui.'.'.:;ti.c:iii: but linvc :!Ot, 
In t : '.o p:i.-.t, initiated : nvc.;;t j (;:•• t L'-iii:: oL' the i.i'.div Ldua 1 
i:<(.-ii'i!jui:.': oi ::iu;li or;;an i -.'.:'. tion:j , with the exception of the 
hay .''.ctiviuir. and individual:; who are kr.ov.n to bo violence 
prone . 

Majoi' cav;:pur;o:i ucro:;rj tho nation have been completely 
disrupted by violent ticno'.int'vr.'C jcn.'j , boi'i;.;ln;-.:j , nr:.on:; and 
other terroristic actr.: perpetrated by thc:;e oi't:a:i.U:.n ttour; . 
It i :; , thoroioro, j)rLpi:o:;cMi that cn:;er. bo on.-. ued on a ll 
J 11M1 v?nn:: .(:: iK.'J.onrMnfr to r.uch u r;:ani:'.at j.o n:; <.o de J .:or;.) 
whether they have ;i propensi ty ior vjo.le .ice . 'ft i;h.'-:; 
I proposal v.cro ii.ipiciuor.iod , it x:; e.:; i.?.i,.a J i.T':..i that the Xield 
f v.'ould bo required to open approximately £;,. r jQO nov; caoo::;. 

Jewish Defense I/ea^ie (JI)L) 

The JDL 19 an anil -Paw I..o.ft and bind: nnti.onall£iin 
ornnnlr.atiou, tlio violent nature of which !ia:i boon illustrated 
by its direction of attack::; against dinlov.utj c establishments 
in the llc.v York area and alleged j implication .In bombing; oi 
offices of foreign countries. ].'e«ibors have participated in an 

ei,.!n;nir.!> - c fu 


Mci'.ioran'.iun to !':i'. Tolaon 

kk: ]j:ixu-i'iv;;j C0kI''i::ii;kci-: - 10/20/70 

1 ;l 1 1 i ' 

oi.'' V, 







I roan! 

ptcil !>i.;:hj:)c!:ii;n £ ar, ■ international. riJijht. Till:; 
ant ;r-'o>p o.C Je'.'.'i:;h youth clai::;:; a n:; tl.ona.l member: 
(10(1 v.'iih chapter:; in :\]>pvo:-:li.::itcJ.y "0 oi' the ua.jru' 

cully have n 

a:; boini; in 

oi' violence 

oi' the vio'io 

t that invo:; 

oi' individuals should alr.o include thy lower lo 

j.p o::c.l,u:jivo of? tlio:;o '..'ho npiK.-ar a:.; i,:e;;iberri onl 

of j'lnauoiaj. ;u;::j.:; ianco they ai'iord . This vnuL 

n the opening oi' approximately U00 additional c; 

■o .1 

v.'iih chapter:; in appvo.:li.:a tely 
i.tan area:; oi the country . \<0 p.ver; 
itxun thcr.r: j'DL li'.ei.ihor:; identified 
i.|) position:; , participant:; in acts 
1 organisational a'/'iair:;. In vio'.v 
Sure oi' -the oi'fpnir-.ation, it it; fol 



y . 


^ • • r 

Memorandum to Hr; Tolcon 

KK: Einrill'IVES CONFERENCE -10/29/70 


If the Director approves, appropriate instructions 
'will be issued to the fioid to implement the above ^rograws 
Idesitp.ed to expand our security investigative covoraso of 
extremis i' elements. 


Exhibit 42 


Memorc ndum 


ROM : MR . G . C . MOOR 

■i r 




date: November 3, 1970 

To recommend that attached airtel to all offices be 
sent regarding discreet preliminary inquiries on all Black Student 
Unions (BSU) and similar groups on college campuses. 

On 10/29/70 the Executive Conference approved a program 
to conduct discreet preliminary inquiries, limited to established 
sources, on BSUs and similar groups, their leaders, and key 
activists to determine if the activities of these groups and 
individuals warrant further active investigations. 


If approved, the attached airtel w ill be sent to 
all offices regarding the above cases. ' 



1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan 

1 - Mr. J. P. Mohr 

1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan 

1 - Mr,. Casper 

1 - Mr. G. c'. Moore • 

1 - Mr. Glass 

ill! /./ 

■dl mow „^',r,Yn.. 









SAC, Albany 
Director, FBI 


. RACIAL yj-.mxs 
BUD£D: 12/4/70 

November 4, 1970 

1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan 
1 - Mr. J. P. ttohr 
1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan 
1 - Mr. Casper 
"1""- Mr. G. C. Moore 
1 - Mr. Glass 


3 E 


L Increased campus disorders. involving black students 
^oo n definite threat to the Nation's stability and security 
and indicate need for increase in both quality and quantity of , 
intelligence information on Black Student Unions (BSU) and / 
§ similar groups which are targets for influence and control by 
° /iolence-prone Black Panther Party (BPP) and other extremists. _ 

7he distribution of the BP? newspaper on college campuses and 
—speakers of the BPP and other black extremist groups on campuses 
clearly indicate that campuses are targets of extremists. Advance 
information on disorders and violence is of prime importance. Ue 
must target informants and sources to develop information regarding 
these groups on a continuing basis to fulfill our responsibilities 
and to develop such coverage where none exists. , i ft 

^\\X\ REC-84 / -' '/--•-'' •'' /'.:-■ ■ / P 

Effective imra; liately, all BiUs and similar organizations 
organized to project the demands of black students, '..-hich are not 
presently under investigation, are to be subjects of dircreet, 
preliminary inquiries, limited to established sources and care- 
fully conducted to avoid criticism, to determine the size, aims, 
purposes, activities, leadership, key activists, and extremist 


1/ 1$ 



*bv ro 1S70" ~ 



Airtel' to SAC, Albany et al 


interest or. influence in these groups. Open individual cases 
on officers and key activists in each group to determine back- 
ground and if their activities warrant active investigation. 
Submit results -of preliminary inquiries in form suitable for 
dissemination with. recommendations regarding active investi- 
gations of organization, its leaders, and key activists. These 
investigations, to be conducted in accordance "ith instructions 
in Section' 87D of the Manual of Instructions regarding investi- 
gations of organizations connected with institutions of learning. 

Each office submit by airtel to reach Bureau by 
12/4/70, a list of BSUs and similar groups by name and school 
which are or will be subjects of preliminary inquiries. This 
program will include junior colleges and two-year colleges as 
well as four-year colleges. In connection with this program, 
there is a need for increased source coverage and we must 
develop network of discreet quality sources in a position 
to furnish required information. Bear in mind that absence 
of information regarding these groups in any area might be 
the fault of inadequate source coverage and efforts should be _ 
undertaken immediately to improve this coverage. 

A prior inquiry or investigation of a group or individual 
is no bar to current inquiries and inquiries should not be post- 
poned until submission of airtel due 12/4/70. Initiate inquiries 

I cannot overemphasize the importance of expeditious, 
thorough, and discreet handling of these case;;. The violence, 
destruction, confrontations, and disruptions on campures make 
it mandatory that we utilize to its capacity our intelligence- 
gathering capabilities. 

Above instructions supersede instructions in Bureau 
letter to all offices 1/31/69, same caption. 

NOTE: See memorandum G. C. Moore to Mr. C. D. Brennan, dated 
11/3/70, captioned "Black Student Groups on College Campuses. 
Racial Matters," prepared by Ci£G:ekw. 


Exhibit 43 




UMI ED states COYl-.K.NMENT 


1 - Mr. W. C. Sul.liv 
1 - Mr. J. P. Molir. ' 
1 - Mr. J . J • Casper 


Ur. C. D. Brennan 


DATE: 11/3/70 

K. L. Shackelford. 


i - 

i - 
i - 


Mr. W. 

Mr. C. 

Mr. H. 
1 - 
1 - 
1 - 






IV. N. 

W. II. 

D. P. 

Mr. R. J 

n ;,■;. " 

lford ." 


'u-: , 



To obtain apnroval of attached airtel to all office 
which instructs the field to initiate investigation of all 
members of the Students For a Democratic Society (SDS) and 
proeommunist New Left-type campus organizations. 


Memorandum dated 10/29/70 from the Executives > 
/Conference to Mr. Tolson recommended that investigation be 
initiated of individual members of the SDS and members of 
proeommunist New Left campus organizations who follow SDS 
ideology. The recommendation was approved by the Director. 

At the end of the 19GU-70 academic year the 
f actionalizcd SDS, with the exclusion of the Weatherman . 
faction, had a membership of about 2 , 500 individuals. The 
proeommunist New Left-type campus organizations have a 
membership of about <\ ,000. The purpose of the investigations 
of these. individuals is to determine the propensity for violence 
by members of the above organizations. Attached is an airtel 
to all offices advising of investigation of all members of 
the SDS and militant New Left campus organizations. 

In order that the Bureau remain aware of t 
of such cases handled by the field, the field is bei 
instructed to include figures as to cases opened and 
closed on the "administrative pages of the quarterly 
reports. No handbook or manual changes arc necessar 



lf\ \ That attached approve 

ic number 

New Lof t .-- 

y ' ?,.■ / 

-.■'j>r ' 


Enclosure '-'"■* < -:i 
Q\100 r; 1^900a i j 

RJS:jlm t\\'' i 


i - P.r. V,'. C. Cnmvan 

] - V.v. J. P. :!••■!!•■ 

1 - Hi-. J.J. C:\::]:ue 

1 " VL/'l/hi}'- 1 - < <■-!■- 


To: SAC, Albany 

From: Director, 1 ? ;>I (100-<!3L:;K3) 

.vico'.'.iL': i.i'."rxir.3 a' t.!:: siltc:;::?::; I'oit a 
D''iC ;:"c;.".iv /.;:.•:• ; i .ilitai.t iuiw •■ 

L';j.i ; V C.'.-U'J.'i Oj.GAI;I«jA'i'I01:3 

1 -Mr. C. D. 3ronnr,n 

1 - llr. II. L. .'Jiir»c ! :oiIo 

1 ■- Ur. 17. II: Ptx-ursse 

1 - Hr. W. Jl. Floyd 

1 - Hr. D. p. l.'lij.ta 

1 - Ur. R. J.. Stillinr; 


KXfnotiva i(::,;:odlr:toly , tl:o field is i:::':tructt:d to 
initiate i!ivi!r.i:i:c'atit>:i of nil i.ioi.'.ljov:; oi' tlia f/iv'iaat:; I'or :i 
Dc:.v;'j.v.'iti<: Knc tot;' iCC>) mid M'raucri; oi !::'i)C;'«.;.:ani:;; , i.';iit 
Haw LjiS-tyi'a or;'.:ini::a'iior.3 \:',:o follow iiK :iUvi)cacy 


~'-|of revolution and violence. _ ,,^,, j^Q./JJ, ;?,/ 

.1 Mor.bovn of the Ks'to'bs',ti:;-.!tad r;!nulcl iivVlada 

J .'. 

] 1 i".o::i'jovr; oi t/:a i ;,v;.:.o'l!.j i'retior.n o 
Iliirc:in i:; nv:i;:o ta:it i.i-:.;jy i3';o ois.'i'.vlfvs 
fori.::.:l ua;.!!>a.v::i'.ij) iu not a. rcu'.'isiio .I' 1 
activity. A r - you arc :;.v;ara, :i0.'] ai:;l o 
m:y -oriei.ta'J i;.voun:; aro-cicarJ 

siwiiar :".i iivir,: j.yi 
nooiic oi v.v,' i j. .co and 

i:;i-.-:i.';t-Lc)iini".t revolution o:i t':io Nation 1 :" c:';:oa:;aa. At: 
tliuir intent i;:-. l-. oryr-taiii-.ieu , the :ii:;:-.:ra:)C-j to tin:: > aiXe-oal'y 
of revolution a:Kl violence isj, of ■.:u-ac:;." , .ity , ;;im**c : ; _ i -. : ' m *-. - cj i i "•; 
i-.:.!:n!r: i.ia:'iiu'- :'.■■■:, folla.vjar" . Tiiar.e r.'iYen:.:.: riicl-jui^todly arc 
the breeding ;:voa;u! for i.-cvoiutiouar.'. :•.:, o::tv.ii:'..i.::t:i :■.;.: 
t.orvoi-j ■; t:i. La;:io and good ;ii;r.l;;:.'.ciit .':■:. >:dd bo U::cd U; tw.;:.;j 
investigations, :.< aurin:;' in Luiui taa objective -.:". to idont/.:iy 
potential and nutiial o::ti"Ci.\i:;ts, revolutionaries aa:= _ '■'■ .vr ''.'.' 
and to :-.:-.:;oc3 tiicir . throat to 'ilia internal Gconrj.t./ oi' !.".'." ~ Q |., ov 10 ]3?n 

K:\cli office should includo on the "^•■ii''i^tv:;t ;.i'j.- i?/jo; 
of future quarterly ila.v Lai i .'Joveria;' t i'f.Movtrj info:': ;: .::.o : :•';' 
to tho iu'.:'i!)'ji' of individual c:ir.UR •.lpoiJC'l r::;u ti:o iv.:i.r;or '-•:■'■ 
iiioivith::'.!. car.: 1 :.: c'J.o.'.:ad j..: thi.'j cata':or.i' ciur.'.ij,'; th-:: portiiiont j 
[lorioJ of the iu:v; Left Movc;:'.ant roj;ort:i. M j- 

?. - All Of. fiocr; (i-EHoOIIAL AT'i'aiTlUi!) ..' 

\r, ; 

%iuoV v a£:j's7o : ..' - •■ ,';■■■ 

i ■ 


zy. v;m: tv;d • ■ 


Airtcl to Albany 

lie: Security Investigations of Individuals 
Who arc Members of the Students for a 
Democratic Society and Militant Hew 
Left Canpus Organizations 


Each individual investigated should bo considered 
for inclusion on the Security Index. In the event your 
investigation establishes that the subject meets the criteria., 
his name should bo recommended for inclusion on the 
Security Inde;:. 


Sec m.-;aornndui3 Mr. 11. L. Shacl:clf ord to Mr. C. D. 
Brcnnau, dated 11/3/70, captioned as above, prepared by !:JS:jlin. 


Exhibit 44 



Memorandum 0/-'''-^^™- 

MR. TOLSON dati:: September 2, 1970 

w. m. feltj^-^v \:Fj2&%h- 


i #lt'/-'l|- 


" £? . 

•;: To recommend consideration be given to returning to previousstandards 

'p permitting field 10 develop security and racial informants amongWudi'iits 18 years 

~ of age and older witli full individual justification and Bureau approval. ,[ , / v 

i'~~— ' . : :-<\..:::...:::: ■— -■ • ■ rf, , JjMA 

'■ BACKGROUND: • "" ■^■■■"XY v 

■';, Our current rule is that "Students under age 21 years" are not to be ^ > '^., 

~i developed eidier as security informants or racial informants except under highly 
•'^unusual circumstances. Former rule of "under 18" was modified when two student - 
r Informants went sour. / ^~. / / ) ?- 

' i '-'- — \'C \Xl' jJ ' ' '■', 

■'..C URRENT DEVELOPMENTS: V^I'l" .'' ' ■ (l 

j Never in our history have we been confronted with as critical a need for 

^informant coverage. Tgrnorisi violence is all around its and more lias been -i 

C Sthreatcned. Even our own doors are being threatened by Weatherman fanatics. 
■: . assassination of police officers, kidnapping and torture murder are all • 
•■■ hpart of the picture. Tiiese violence -oriented black and wliitc savages are at war 
•j "Witu the Government and the American people. , .-. ,.< , - '■ 

^« Careful surveys havv.-'been made during inspections conducted in New Left, 

| Jand Racial fields, hi every instance Inspector left strong instructions Willi SACs to ■ 
Jigdevelop more and better informants. These offices have informally indicated, *""• .. 
| ^however, that their productivity would be greatly enhanced Jj.yut-lower ^ig o L the 
f f age requirements cited above. - ^ 

'BEEP 21 1970 ^, 

, Particularly critical is the need for reliable information about the - 

j ,' activities of violence -oriented groups on campuses. We kho'w'tho "Ncv/~Le!t and 8 

j j the Black Panthers are currently recruiting 18-year-old freshmen students. The. c 

', . Students for a Democratic Society have actually reserved for recruiting purposes >- 

■ a room in die Student Union Building at near-by University of Maryland. If we O 
( I could develop informants among Uiese new members we could guide them to key 

WMF:wmj (SJ^f/...- // j c\>» '' § 

. \ - Messrsr-Splliv^;'. "Mohr, Brennan CONTINUED - OVER li/kP ^ ?, 



" Memo (or Mr. Tolson t 

Re: Security Informants 
Racial Informants 

positions. By the time they are 2L years of aye they are almost ready to leave 
college and have been subjected to the corrosive influence and brainwashing of_ullxa- 
•' liberal and radical professors. 


The important consideration, of course, is to protect the Bureau from 
'•. possible embarrassment. Many of our 18, 19 and 20-year-old men and women are 
'• highly intelligent, mature, and loyal citizens. This has recently been recognized 
, by" the Congress in lowering the voting age to 18 years. It is felt the same concept 

can logically be applied to the revolutionary conflict at home and particularly on 
jeampuses^ ^ ^ . _._,. _..^^/ ;j ,,..;..., ,.*. ^ t don > t hold this view. 

Development of all security and racial informants, regardless of age, is 
i ■ very closely supervised at the Seat of Government. It is felt that selective use of 
; • the 'lij through 20-year-old age bracket on specific SAC recommendation and Willi 
' ; close scrutiny at the Seat of Government can be of tremendous benefit. These 
'■ realtors will continue to be very carefully looked into during all field inspections. 


■That Ihe appropriate Manual citations be changed to read "Students 
iiiid.-r ageT8. ..." If approved, to be implemented by Domestic Intelligence 




.\E:vr::r>i.i.\: (9/3 /70) , hcs-.csh - \/\jd^ 

— I strongTy urge the approval of this recommendation. As tho 

monoiv.ii'ium states, these are indced_critical.._tincs. No one can predict 
will- accuracy tho outcome of the revolutionary struggle going on in 
this country at this time. Those under 20 years oi age are playing a 
predj<:inant role in campus violence. Two of the subjects in the 
University of Wisconsin case are under 20. Logic dictates that wo 
concentrate on the actual participants and where tho ac tion actual lj^ls. 

— ■ w.c. suiirvnrsi - • *^ 

, i_ -2- ^ A 
^H o.K but I want^ 

any between 18 & 21 yrs 
,to be approved by 
fJSoyers also. 


Jl.'Y'-'^".'? f f. u i: ii a i. of investigation 

nA9UINCT(iK, U.C. 2 Ti 3 r. 

In Rrplr, /'fm.r /.V/rr 

September 15, 1970 



The follow-in:: significant decisions reported in Aiunisi. 1070, 
should 1)0 read by all Local Instructors: U.S. v. I'ivh a. 312 F. Supp. 4l>6 
(1070) (D.C.) (Civil Aeronautics Board regulation peniiiuin:; airline per- 
sonncl to open suspicious package is constitutional; an airline official's 
position makes him a credible and reliable informant.); U.S. v. Dnnniivrs. 
425 F2d 030 (10(19) (2d Cir.) (example of strong affidavit lor searc.n 
warrant, based principally on information from confidential informant: 
permissible to delav execution of searcii warrant (within ten-riav limit) 
until suspect is in premises;: U.S. v. Mitchell . -125 F2d 1353 (1070) (3c ii 
Cir.) (example nf finding prohaofe cause lor arrest from combination oi 
Spinel I i and Dr.-i^r circumstances); U.S. v. Rob ertson. 425 F2d 1330 (1370) 
(5th Cir.) (no i. iiranria warnings required lor street interrogation of suscect 
concerning automoouc tact and title registration with defect indicating car 
possibly stolen): U.S. v. Goad . 462 F2d 80 (1070) (10th Cir.) (arrest~oi 
suspect standing, in ooorwav io home, by officers standi ng outside v.ili not 
support incidental search of home); U. S. v. Main . 312 F. Simp. 73G (1S70) 
(D.C. , Del.) (affidavit for search warrant .stated probable cause but con- 
tained much of what court labeled "excess verbiage"); U.S. v. Avers. -120 • 
F2d 524 (1070) (2d Cir.) (lineun requires warning of rirjn to counsel 
separate and distinct from Miranda warnings given lor interro::ation): 
U.S. v. Campbell . '120 F2d 547 (iu70) (2d Cir.) (recording of telephone 
conversation made by consent of one nariv thercio is admissible in 
U.S. v. Bednarski . 312 F. Supp. 013 (1070) (D.C. Mass.) (no Miranda 
warnings required for use in evidence of books and records volu'niaiuv given 
to officer by suspect during noncustodial interview): Dess v. Montana. 312 
F. Supp. 1325 (1070) (D.C, Mont.) (illustrative discussion oi slamirng lo 
protest unreasonable search and seizure!; U.S. v. McK innon. 420 F2d 345 
(1970) (5lh Cir.) (search of vehicle at tow-in garage 3U minutes after arrest 
of accused on highway could not be justified as incident to arrest): Caninb 

v. Wainwritdit , 420 F2d 300 (1070) (5th Cir.) (seizure of package tlTFo^H 

from vehicle lawfully pursued by police was proper as taking of thins' 
abandoned); Woodbury v. Belo . 426 F2d 023 (1070) (51h Cir.) (officers 
searching suspect's home under search warrant for narcotics taken in 
armed robbery properly seized gun, not mentioned' in warrant, as instru- 


mentality of rubbery): U.S. v. Krosla ck. 420 K2cl 1120 (11170) (7th Cir.) 
(defendant's riiiht against self-incrimination i.s violated when officer testifies 
thai defendant, on interview, refused lo talk): Bosley v. U.S. . '120 F2d 1257 
(1970) (D.C.) (M iranda requires officers lo warn an arrested suspect of his 
rights as soon as practicable after arrest); U .S. .v. Con/ale? ,- I'ere?,. 426 
F2d 12U3 (1070) (fith Cir.) (search of arrestee is incident In arrest when 
made shortly 'after at jail or place of detention rather than at actual time 
and place of arrest; search of woman's pockctuook sitting on colfee table 
in room in which she was arrested on narcotics charges was proper). 

(Security Letters on attached pages) 


SAC LETTER 70- 48 - 2 - 

62-685 O - 76 - 22 


COVERAGE -- You have Iwnn advised in the p; nl' the growing incidents 
of terroristic acts by Ihe Mew Left and black extremists and the need . 
for intcnsilicntion of our invstigntions and development of new sources 
to combat these escalating problems. 

However, a review of the New Left Movement - Violence 
airtels submitted monthly by each field office indicalcs generally that 
your informant coverage ol terrorist organizations and individuals is 
grossly inadequate. 

You are. therefore, instructed to immediately institute 
an aggressive policy of developing new productive informants who can 
infiltrate the ranks of terrorist organizations, their collectives, 
communes and staffs of their underground newspapers. The Bureau 
fully recognizes that ihe development of sources lo penetrate these 
groups is made extremely difficult because of their immoral conduct 
and use of drugs. It calls for initiative and new approaches to develop 
the needed intelligence information. 

Concerning black extremists, it is essential that quality 
informants arc developed at a regular rate. These informants snouid 
bo the type who can obtain advance information concerning planned 
acts of violence or who arc in a position to furnish information. concern- 
ing contemplated acts of violence. 

You should include in Item 4 of your monthly airlel on 
"New Left - Violence: Internal Security - Miscellaneous (Weatherman) ." 
as outlined in Bureau airtel to all offices May 13, 11170. constructive 
plans to implement the program outlined above concerning New Left 
terrorist organizations through informant development. Recommendations 
relating to the development of a specific source or plan of action should 
be submitted to the Bureau by separate communication. 


SAC LETTER 70-48 - 3 


(C) SECURITY AND RACIAL INFORMANTS --^ Never in our liislory linve 
we been coni'rtinLed with as critical a need lor informant coverage. Ter- 
roristic violence surrounds us and more has been threatened: Bombings, 
assassination tit police officers, kidnapping. and murder arc all part of 
the picture. Fanatics are at large who are at war with the Government 
and the American people. Particularly critical is the need for reliable 
information about the activities of violence-oriented youthful groups o'n 

As you are aware, you have been previously instructed not 
to use campus student informants under the ape of 21. In view of cur- 
rent circumstances, you are authorized to develop student security and 
racial informants who are 18 years of ai;e or' older.' This presents you 
with a tremendous opportunity to expand your coverage, which is 
expected. However., in- no way are your obligations lo exercise 
selectivity and tight control lessened in this most sensitive area. 

Appropriate manual and handbook changes are forthcoming. 

. Very truly yours, 

John Edgar Hoover 



SAC LETTER 70-48 - 4 - 


Exhibit 45 





1/ I 

: tIK. G. C. 



1 - Mr. .). I'. tlolu- ' ,' •■• 
1 - Mr. C. I). Brennan' : : . . 
1 - Mu. A. Rosen ','•,' 
da n. November 2, 1970 j;'- 
1 - Mr. J. J. Casper ;;;. 
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore. 
1 - Mr. R.l. lihackclford.M 
Mr. J.C.ilichola 

.UIljtClj;-prir CO; .;;;r;!| JA n.O;! TO 

— \;>'kco:<uikc;s oi" buck aiid hew 


i ■ 



OCTOBER 22-23. 1970, 



To obtain authority to send attached airtel to all field 
offices concernin;'. the recording of public appearance:; of black and 
New left extremists.' ... • 

Memorandum G. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan !i/?l/ft'J obtain- 
ed authority to instruct the field to expand the u.-.e of concealed 
recording devices In covering such appearances. Since that time, the 
field has reported a large number of .such appearances and Special / 
Agents in Charge (SAC:;) have always demonstrated .sound judgment in/ 
affording, such coverage under secure conditions. On a number uf /' 
occasions, because of extremely short notice concerning appearances , 
there has been insufficient time to obtain iiureau authority. Because 
of this, valuable evidentiary material has been lost. Recordings are 
the 'host possible evidence of extremist statement.', actually made in 
the event of prosecutive action. This matter vas discussed in depth 
at captioned conference with field supervi sors. It vas the unanimous 
recommendation of those supervisors that present instructions con- 
cerning such recordings should be modified in on-:; respect to allow 
SACs to arrange on their own initiative for recordings. i .■ """"; 

. ,-.,„,. .(ten / ■ - . -. x|< .o 

i ho. rcconcr^ritliiiion has merit;. SAC;; have uniformly demon- 
strated excellent judgment in making such record) n;;.s to date and 
should Ijc >*,iven authority to record public appearances b\* black and 
New Left extremists whenever full security can he a:;:;urcd ex te nt when , 
S ?££JL— -P"'' ;u "- 'hu-'e r, a rc_afc_ .educational institutions. When at educational j 
institutions, the iicld must still obtain prior Iiureau authority. \ 
This will j;ive the field necessary '6lcxihi.lL ty to record public 
appearances even when advance notice is extremely shout. The modi- 
fication will in no way supersede or conflict villi authority to re- '• 
O-Vcord statements $;ivcn in individual cases under invest ij/al.' ion such 



the Antiriot law investigations which arose out of violence at the 
.j> '< 8/GSJ Democratic National Convention on subjects known-ar, -.ihd- -Chicago 
■ v\. 7" and their defense attorneys William 1-1. Kunstler and Leonard I.- 
* V^ Ueingla-ssi ' o ULC S i<-'.'0 

' JCM:ekv:-.Cy) 




Koiiiornndiiiii Co Mr. (.'. I). Ilremian 
UK: RACIAL COr!FE:<»!CE, OCTOBER 22-23, l'J70, 


If approved, attached airtcl will be sent to 
all field offices in accordance with tlie above. No Manual 
changes are nc-ees.:ary. 



\0\ )Ks 

l/l'"v- ; "- % 





SAC, Albany 
Director, FBI 

1 - Mr. W. 

. CY Sullivan ■ 

1 - Mr! J. 

P. Kohr 

1 - Mr. C. 

D. Prcr.nan 

1 - Mr. A. 


1 - Mr. J. 

J. Caspar 



1 - Mr.' G. 

C. Hoo're, .*., -. 

1 - Mr. R. 

L. Shac'.-.eifcr 

■I-'- Mr. J. 

C. Mi chela. 


I. „.i: - r . . " ' ' • "■ ■■ , 

' ' ' •' ReBulet to nil offices 5/22/69 ',:hich set forth', 
instructions to expand the. use of concealed recording devices- 
by a Special Agent or proven source in covering public ^ ;. 
speaking, engagenents by black and Hew Left e.\trcr,iists.^ Thovc 
instructions required j'.ureau authority prior to use of such . 
concealed recording devices. 


Effective upon receipt of this connur.ico.tion/ . ... • 
Special Agents in Charge (SACsj nay, en their ovi: initiative, 

a»i:-i^rize the use of concealed recording devices by a :;pocia! ■ 

^■j^'iger't or proven source in .covering public appearances by Mr.c!: 
■ -iqvnd jew Left extremists except i;hcn such appearances at . 
' eauctional institutions.' All other ir^tructions set forth in 
"'"rolei remain in effect. RB, 1 &* / " .- ?,-'. 

■ " ._-*'•-■■ 

:!;'>';<■'..-,,, J n t he event-'d)p3ippcarances at educational 
institutions, prior r>ureau authority nust still. b»-obtained 
before utilizing concealed recording devices. / 

;■-:.-• f) !'j/0 ^ 

•It is reiterated that such recording devices are 
to be utilized only viien full security-can be assured. 
Information developed as a result of such coverage must be 
promptly furnished to the Bureau in forn suitable for 
dissemination in accordance with instructions sijt forth in relet. 

2 - All Offices 

■•" (127) 

L5 ■•-■iUnw.M'J 






Airtel. to SAC, Albany 


it! coviciuiir, public apfearal-ces by 


Ench SAC must, personally insure that maximum 
possible use. is made of this extremely valuable investigative 

The fore;?,oin,<x way supersedes or conflicts 
with instructions to record statements "by subjects of 
ir.-.ii vidua! cases ur.der investigation. J.ii thai: ror;nrd, 
recipients should refer to Chicago airtel .to all continental 
offices and San Juan dated 5/29/69 captioned "David T. 
Uclli nger, aka, et al (Travel of Defendants), ARE - Conspiracy. 

See memorandum C. C. Moore to Mr. C. D. lineman 
dated- 11/2/70, captioned "Racial Conference, October 22-23, 
1970,. -Recommendation to Modify Instructions r* 
Record) n.".s of lUaek and tew Left Public Appearances,"' 
prepared by JCM:ckw. 


Exhibit 46 


UNI'I l.l) S'I'A'I I'.S COVI-.I .1KNT 

r> C- >■■■ , 

|^ :).Ut. C. D. UltKNNA^ 

|o.\l : MH. C. C. MOOHKf; \ ■ 

' KACnAI.-aiVlTliNS 

I. - Mr. 17. C Sullivan 

1 -"Mr. J. P. Mohr 

1 - Mi". C. IK llrcnii.iii 

1 - Mr. Casper I.: December 21!, 107(1 

1 - Mr. Conrad 

). - Mr. I!. I). Cotter 

1 - Mr. 0. C. Moore 

1 - Mr. Class 


To recommend that the attached-., alrtel be sent [0.J1J 1 
r'-'oifices setting up n Key Hindi I-kctroniist /'(KBK) - Pro:;rnm to I ntensi fy 
our coverage on certain black extremists. ^V 

Because of the" -.violence potential of a I 1 -black extre; 
o required that the field yivc priority at tent ion to the 


we hav 

investi;cat ions of nil black extremists 

by -the field indicates that there is a 

on a jv roup of black extremists who are 

activists and are particularly extreme 

and vocal in their calls for terrorism 

the violence -pro no PJ.aek Panther Party 

"rcvo lu t ion " is en terin.", the bei^inninc; 

strui;;cle and our investigations indicate thoie ai 

more likely to resort to or to order terrorism ji 

therefore require particular attention . 

The in Jo nan I: ion sub;n 
need for intensified cov 
either key leaders 

a;;it.iti ve , an ti-Governi: 
and violence. Lender; 
have indicated thnt the 
phases of netuaJ armed 

e r t a i u e x t r cm i s t s 
tactic and 

i I: tod 

nont , 

Intensified coverage to brini; to hear the tola 1 ..eaoaljil- 
il^.CrL •!_ t.h'- Uurea.u.. on inves t ifa trons of these mdu lciunU 1^ 
warranted. V/e should coyer .eycr.y. facet _oi" their current nativities, ' 
future plans, weaknesses, strengths, and personal Jives l.n m-utraj i;'.e 
the e L'j oe't.Lvonosr; ol each iCif. JJ . The finances, travel, u tternni.'-.'S , ""' i" 
*allll""pnr.;KlTi1.o violation of*"VuUb'rnl and local law ul those individuals 1 
should receive the closest investigative and supervisory attention.. 

I'ol lowin;; the receipt of an investi!',nf ive summary report, 
reports on these individuals should be submitted every ;)() days, 
with interim letterhead memoranda, in order that our intensitied 
coverage can be better to 11 owed and dissemination made on a timely 
basis. A.bou.i arc involved in thitv intensified coverage. 

KKCOMMKND A'nON: 1 tlC'S - . / 

' "That the attached airtel be sent to oach.Iiold office. 

Enclosure . .t ; ' v/"- l -0-? ""* " "\ 

, /. 


/ <',' 

"r' ( / \\f * 








From : 

KEY n 


GAC, Albany 
Director, FBI 

1 - Hr. W. C. Sullivan 

■' 1 - Hr. J. P. I'.ohr 

■"' f-.'iX - l!r. C. D. Drcnnan 

'S> "'j\jY - Hr. Casper 

1 - Mr. Conrad 

jack r;:iT.i;i.;isT pucgrah 
l i.Lvrrijr.s 

1 - Hr. 
1 - Hr. 
1 - Hr . 

R. D. Cotcer 
G. C. Hoore. 

Dnr-J.iv; your investigations or black c;:trc:r.iist orr.ani- 
zntions and individuals, yon tinva A"ur:\:L:;iied indorsation in:li- 
catin;; that certain individuals are c;;tre.:iely aotjvo a.'id r'.ost 
vocal in their an ti-i'lovcrn..:ont statcneivts and their caljs lor 
terrorism and violent. Although the violence potential in all 
black o::trc:.iist:: necessitates continued priority attention by 
nil oriices, there aro certain individual leader;: and activist* 
_wlio can bo considered ns Key Black Extremist:; (k;!i~) . -. 

| At this tii-.-o, ilio. Bureau is dor. iania tin;; those on the 
\-ntt.ackcd list a:; V.r.L::. The toivi K'.Jfi doe;; not recuire an 
I'indiyiduai a.: ,a;a.lly hold an oificiai position in "an c:,-,';-.atio;i 
.-.but i;; to include others o.f equal importance because ox their 
^influence as black extremists . 

2 - All Ol-ficos (Enclosure) /* [ 

■C.:C:ckw .' 
(123) . 


mail iiikimI ... I ri:i.i: i-vi-i: i-:ar|; | 

;:iE, hot.-: tiia.ju 

•■-. a . f ) \\r,..^ I / 



Airt'>] to SAC, Albany 


informant coverage on the subjects. All avenues .of invosti- 
• uativi: attention mist bo explored and necessary recommendations 
.' to the Bureau must be made promptly. 

The desirable coverage must include, but not bo 
limited to, the fol lowin:: investigation ; Ther;c investi'sitions 
must be conduo ted with initiative and imagination in order that 
tlie desired results arc achieved. Bach of these eases will 
receive close scrutiny at the Bureau. 

(1) All KBEs must be included in Priority I of 
the Security Inde;:. IX not already so included, promptly 
submit I'D- 1122, 

(2) All KBBs must bo included in the Black 
Nationalist Photograph Album (BHIVi) . Promptly submit 
photograph and rcuujred background on each nBB not 
presently in the BilPA and when a subject is designated 
a KBB. 

•(.';) All aspects of the finances of a KBB must 
be determined. Ban!: accounts must be Monitored. Safe 
deposit hoses, investments . and hidden assets most be 
located and available information re^ardin;v them must be 

(1) Continued consideration must be pivon by 
each office to develop means to neutralise the effectiveness 
of each KBK. Any counterintelligence proposal must be approved 
by the Bureau prior to implementation. 

(o) Obtain suitable handwriting specimens of each 
KBB to be placed in the national security Tile 'in the 
Laboratory. When possible, obtain specimens from public 
records, law enforcement agencies, and similar sources, 
fiend specimens to the Bureau under separate cover letter 
by registered mail for the attention of fit? I'BI Laboratory . 
V.'hen they arc of value as evidence;, so state in the transmittal 
letter and request their return after copies have been made. 
Specimens should be sufficient to permit future comparisons by 
the Bal.ioraT.ory. 


Airtel to- SAC, Allinny 


(G) Particular efforts should ho made to obtain records 
of and/or reliable witnesses to, Inflammatory statements made 
which may subsequent ly become subject to criminal proceedings. 
Promptly record all such information in interview report .form. 

(7) Vi'liero there appears to be a possible violation 
of a statute within the investigative jurisdiction oi the 
Bureau, the substantive violation character should be included 
in subsequent .communications and the possible violation 
vigorously investigated in accordance with existing instructions. 

(8) Particular attention mrst be' paid IfO 'ravel -by 
a K11E and every effort made to determine financial arraivc- 
racnts for such travel ~" "" " 

.. fravel in fori.', at ion must be submitted to 
the Bureau and interested offices by impropriate! 40flMunication 
to permit coverage of the Klin. It vV'iJ I t>t the. responsibility 
of the office of origin to insure that ^Jae activities of the 
KUD are covered by auxiliary offices. 

(9) The Fodci'al income ta>: returns of all I.T.Ms must 
be checked annually in accordance with existing instructions. 

If no invest inativo summary rcoort lias been submitted 
in each case, such a report must be submitted to the l.ureau by 
2/lf)/71. Thereafter, an investigative report should be sub- 
mitted at least every 'JO days. 1'urthcrmore , • appro'iriate 
communications suitable for dissemination should be promptly 
submitted in the interim to hoop the I'.ureau fully advised of 
the activities of each liTJE. The words (Hey lilac!: l.l-tremist ) 
should be included in the character of each cctimunj cation 
submitted except those communications (including reports) 
■ which are prepared for dissemination. 

KOTE: Sec memorandum C. C. Moore to & I), nrennan, dated 
12722/70, captioned as above, prepared by CEG:eliw. 


Exhibit 47 






26 February 1970 

Personal and Confidential 

The Honorable J. Edgar Hoover 


Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Washington, D. C. 

Dear Mr. Hoover: 

Mr.| .lias orally informed mc that you wish to have the 

identity of the" FBI agent who was the source of certain information _ 

communicated to ah employee of this Agency, Mr.; 

This information rc^arding^ the disappearance of ojiol'immas Riha was 
in turn passed ttj -. ' 


In view of your personal interest in this matter, 1 instructed 
to report to mc in person. 

I have reviewed this complicated case in detail with Mr.' 
and have requested him to reveal the identity of. his source. As a point 
of lienor and personal integrity, Mr,[ f.vas adamant that he • 

could not disclose the identity of his source. Under further pressure 
from mc, Mr. 'maintained his position, stating that in de- 
fense of it he was prepared to submit his resignation immediately. 


^explained that the 


had been given extensive news coverage," much of it being sensational 
in nature. He stressed that there was embarrassing public speculation 
as to the possible involvement of the CIA and'thc FBI in Kiha's 

' disappearance. 

5 W;i . f 

,FBI . 



The purpose of Mr. _J._ ; - ^ conference with the District 

Attorney of Denver was to solicit his good offices to remove pres- 
sures and tho possible serving of a subpoena bnj ■, 
He also sought to orient the District Attorney properly so that he 
would not continue to have an erroneous impression of the roles of 
the CIA and the FBI, thereby eliminating further adverse publicity. 


/affirms that be fore goin g to_Di.strict Attorney 
McKcvitt he called upon the FBIj_ ^ _ t . _ r -. ; -- lJ - Mr/ . .. ~ 

and sought to c oordin ate with him our respective interests. 
Tic also~solicitcd Mr.: 'to accompany him to the District 

Attorney. ' 

Mr. | ista1;cs that Mr. v .,, . '.re fused absolutely to 

cooperate in this matter. Instead, Mr.j ^ ibngaged in an oral 

exchange during which he remarked that our representative' in 
Bou lder was " lying" and then procee ddd to, challeng e the veracity of 

Mr. . Subsequently, Mr.[ . conferred with. 

the District Attorney alone. He was successful in .persuading the 
District Attorney to make a favorable' public statement which had 
tiie effect of putting this issjg^ifjjgardi'ng'i "" rand other rumors 

to rest as far as the public was concerned. 

I have carefully reviewed the statements of Mr. L , j 

I feel tha^.poor ^adsincnt was employed in passing the information, in 
questiorft'oi ^^^..^...and later to the District Attorney. This should 
only have been done with specific FBI approval. I wish to assure '^ou 
that I do not condone violations of the third agency rule, and I am 
taking steps to impress once again this elementary fact upon all Agency- 

*'* rt E ai| i '» Mr., I have no reason to doubt that 

he has acted honcstly_. 1 believe that he has reported to me in good, 
faith. He is sincerely- interested in preserving a sound working 
relationship between the CIA and the FBI. Nevertheless, because a 
situatior of this sort adversely affects the relationship between the two 
agcncic_£U_ I_amjtaking administrative action in this matter with regard 
toMr. L ■ ' """ ;"".//" "" - 





. „ i 



. -. 



-o . 



I hope sincerely that this recent incident will not impair our 
mutual efforts in making certain that we have not overlooked factors 
possibly having a significant bearing on U.S. intelligence and internal 
security interests. 1 shall pursue this matter through our respective 
liaison -offices. 

In closing, Mr. Hoover, I wish to state that this Agency can only 
fully perform its duties in the furtherance -of the national security when 
it has the closest coordination and teamwork with the l-'odern] Bureau of 
Investigation. Furthermore, it is necessary that we continue to con- 
i duct our business in an atmosphere of mutual respect. I trust that we 
can coordinate closely any future developments or actions in these cases, 
in order to prevent the airing in public of conflicts or differences between 
the two agencies. I feel strongly that there arc representatives of the 
news media who arc eager to exploit alleged differences on a national 
scale. Disturbing as- this experience has been, I wish to thank you in 
the interests of our common cause for having communicated with me 
in such a forthright and candid manner. 

).;., - -.■'*■ A' > --..-■■■■!. 







Attachments - a/s' '■_ ^ : j \- !\ , ,AAA 

, ,:^l-.^ --**-■■■- 

I. ... V. ' 3 

"T- Richard Helms 

,vo".-v • 

v .. \ Director 

■ ,- _> ..' / ■ 




. Following are typewritten clarifications of the 
handwritten comments of J. Edgar Hoover on the attached 
document : 

Pdge 2, left margin - 
Page 2, bottom of page 

'acted properl y. 11" 

"I do not agree. .violated the 

third agency rule & refused to identify 
the alleged FBI agent who was the source 
of the information. H" 

Page 3 i end of 3rd paragraph 

"Helms forgets it is a two way 
street. II" 

Page 3, bottom of page 

"This is not satisfactory. .1 want our 
Denver Office to have absolutely no 
contacts with CIA. I want direct liaison 
here with CIA to be terminated & any 
contact with CIA in the future to be by 
letter only. H" 

. UNI'I'KI) S'l'A'l I'-S Cl .NMKNT 



Exhibit 48 

y\ :Mr. C. D. DeLoach UATt: 3/6/70 

irom :Mr. W. C. Sullivan 



.Item, Number 37 in the material subm i tted to the • 

Director' " ' | _.. .[,. 

discusses CIA cri rrcisi:f~which c bu 1 d~g c~n era t e"f roiii ~'Ag o ri c y" be l'i c f : 
that Bureau has railed to cooperate and oiler necessary assistance 
in collection oi positive intelligence in the United .slates 
Memorandum is to deal with specific cases believed, !)/'_/ ' i 
to evidence lac): of cooperation and. to briefly comment on "policy 
of cooperation we have adopted with CIA. 


Mentioned Item j points out CIA belief that 

more aggressive action should have been taken in field of ! 

collecting posi I i \ o intelligence in the United States. " " 
notes Bureau's; ac,:ion in this field, for the most part , HKs been "" 
restricted to coi-in.1 ianee with requests by State Department when 
political crises occur in some country. lie points out CM belief 
that acquiring needed data would mean inc rease d technical surveil- 
lance covera;;e, de\-elt )j)inejit_o£. informants [■ 

... - ,, -- • ... ...,,._ ..,._J cit . es tw ° specific cases occurring 

in 1969 where bureau dcclincS CIA's request for technical coverage 
suggesting to Agency that it make its request directly to the 
Attorney General. Review of specific cases mentioned set forth 
with Director's comments relative thereto being noted. Our 

bv SAC ?ol-r"r P rT i, m°ynV ith C ™ m0St recontl y delisted to field 

•. „»'■'? " C ° Py ntta «"'<"l. SAC letter calls for 
wi?h CIA 3 u «"«'iction but shows our willingness to cooperate 



Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DcLoach 


CIA has repeatedly raised the issue in the past cf 
our coverage in the. positive intelligence collection area and 
wo can reasonably expect similar issues to be raised in the 


That we prepare a carefully worded letter to CIA 
outlining policy and the basic elements of intelligence and 
counterintelligence work affecting the United States and 
forthrigiitly ask CIA if it is satisfied with the status quo 
and if not what do they have to suggest as changes. 

2 - 

62-685 O - 76 - 23 

Exhibit 49 



>.± J : Mr. C. D. DcLoach 

i«Jm : W. C. Sullivan 



uatu: March 7, 1970 

1 - Mr. DcLoach 
1 - Mr. Sullivan 
1 - Liaison 
1 - Mr. Hayncs 

^ Director! - | 

. disc'usses~a dispute wo had 'with CIA in-May, 19G3, as a" result 
of a communication the Bureau sent to the President's Foreign 
Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB). It was pointed out that 
in our communication to PFIAB we attributed certain information 
to McCone, then l ""^'-"|- nf nH i\i»fiOT"P"i n l Ji rc M 1 Vl'.p. iffl n,f "^ of 
X increasing wire taps on| . . McCono '■" 

charged that the information, attributed to hi'm was not so 
becauso ho had- never mado any such statement and he could 
prove it. The fact was that the information relating to 
McCono had been given us by one of his subordinates who had 
-• indicated the information originated with McCono. McCono 
_J maintained that wo should have checked .with him before going 
on record that any information had originated with him. 

A rn-1 hy tnHimhl-iniwifiiiiiliriMAn— tMrr-Tiutlrr , fH -rl n-r 1 tlint 
^X in April, 19G3.I . . . ..;_■_ . had discussed 
with Richard Holms apd James Arigleton of CIA "McCone 's alleged 
position with tlio "'■'""; tfiat JtfWliaf".ln .fnw-nf •"•!•"— 7 tho ■. 

•v board telephone taps on . ^ -The '- '■' 

' Bureau, of course, was Opposed to this and advisccTllelm.s that 
wo would request to make our position known before the board. 
At tho conclusion of tho meeting in April, 1963, Helms. . - - .j. 
V' specifically asked what he should tell McCone apd," [?*"""' 
told him lie. should toll McCone exactly what had- occTirrdd at ' 
tho meeting; that the Bureau was opposed to across tho board 
wire taps and tho Bureau intended to do adviso PFIAB. 


None. We do not believe, in light of tho' facts sot 
forth, that CIA will mako an issuo of tlfis mattor. 

RHII:wmk/sof i ^ \ 1 / 

(5) pi y Al y 





Exhibit 50 

20 March 1970 

The Honorable J. Edgar Hoover 

D ir c c to r 

Federal Bureau of Investigation j 

V/ashin-jton, D. C. '• 


Dear Mr. Hccver: . 

We have completed our review of domestic positive. intelligence 
collection engendered by your letter of 11 March 1970. Y/e warmly 
welcome periodic reexamination by our two agencies of the imblenicn- 
tation of the 19i>6 agreement and the collection of positive intelligence 
which you proponed. I concur also v/iih your' comments that there is 
a need for cluse coordination of our efforts In the field of ;-;ositivo and 
counterintelligence collection. To be most effective, I a;;rtc that it 
is essential for this Agency, together with your Bureau, to conduct a 
continuing analysis of clandestine collection activity. The product is 
of "rowing importance to the national security and to the United Status 
Intelligence Community. Therefore we endorse your proposal for a 
reexamination and bespeak your decirec as to how this might be ' \ 
conducted. \ 

With regard to the 1966 oct of ground ruler., which you sent to 
the then Director, Vice .Admiral William F. Habere, Jr. , the compe- 
tent work of our respective representatives did, in fact, produce an' 
cifective and realistic agreement, I welcome your statement that no 
major problems have been encountered since its adoution. 

1 feel strongly that there are other related subjects,- of similar 
Importance to Lac national security, which "warrant periodic ree::amma- 
tlon since- they have a direct bearing- on domescic-clande jtine collection 
of positive intelligence. i 



Ac ;\ result of oar review,- c:i ^OiiiorcJ by your lelicr, I believe 
that the following eu'ojcct:j arc csscrvi:i;j,oi your p~r;c.r-.;l cer.siucratio 

r - - - . 

(1) /-.r.^io e- .vor.i-.nj 

For several years your Bureau cud boon reecp- 
llvo So requirements and lea-Jo v.'hlch. reruiUed Ja valuuMs 
covcrire. ' 
--■•■-■■■ "1 ' 


On Z October I960, two related request!) for audio 
coverage were submitted by tiiio Agency psrtainia.'. to 

poaltivc intelligence tar .gets; 

Your llurcau repliod tl-.r.t- henceforth ti:c 

Agency should refer ill such esses 
General for aoaroval. 

directly to the .Attorney . 

It is aureate! that tee queaiion of «v.idio covers 
Le rcopcaei between representatives of your bureau .-.nd 
this Agency. I v/onid v.'elcorr.o your thoughts and obscrva 
Uoao on this subject. 


{Z) :.' ~.\l Cove r.- '?. Another much uccuud ir.tciH- 
£oncc tool i-j rr.ail covc7.'.;;c, lta iiv.norLancv r.aa busr. 
prsvcn in Iht past. I l'.;vc f:.e in-.-,rcts;c;i ;;:.U it i:a:: 
bcca vlinc.;r.;ir.'ji--J. ar.i I v/oald su-jjcct La;-.t our rearcsdn- 
tstlvcs saouM cuifcr and e^ai.aicc ta^atiicr v.-i:cti:cr .t;.ip 

tosct r:iij'..t bD deployed D. gainst co.-i-.iv.unicatioan of 

tho New J-cft, a-.d identified foreign areata. 

(3) CI,'. Ti-c :-.;: cM. 5-crvlcc a. A significant cxucndl- 
ture of thli; /-.^oncy'a money a^d r-ci-conncl ;-:a5 been com- 
mitted to research and development for taa i:v.provtmc::t 
of tec^rjical .-lids. Thi.i Agency bar. T.-rovido:! y:-;;r jjur'j.iu 
v/lth an appreciation of our rcscurccc and cr.p.i-.uiiHics, and 
has offerer! you at esse or gratis car nioet sophisticated 
acuipfnent. :" 

Altiioa;ja. v/e wiLl cordin-ae t:;oaa e-ervicc^. \vc would .v/eienmo 
any eiu^^cc-tio^-j from your Jjur-jau for i'.;Tprov.:x = r.; in ir.o 
technical fi-.ild includi:,.; proposal!: ;:ot/ t'ueae Ai^act-j caa be 
bolter ern^i^yc-J. ; " • 


P.iriorlir . .•. ii;r.;c I'-i^r cot: cc lion »i:m vc ->ortj :: .; ;)i :>r:-jitive 
foreign iulelH:;cace ic. as you a&y, only i.ici-Ju.-ital to -/our 
main c^curitv csd count cri^tv. ill rjcnco rcoon-Mbili- 
ttec, J realise your -cci-sonnd crc <:t c dia- 
»Uvcnti-;e in cirryin^ out t.-.c cvAliiAVijrj wij-d repeating 
prcceascs nccc:c<.\r\* for Lhc conduct i>f positive i:;t::l!l-? 
At our 19^6 co-ifercuce^v/c o:\fer-ed to' inotit-.itc jyjoiiivc 
ll^csco trainiu3 cour&cc* iucludixi^ reports wrltiKg caj. 


f.ialjzii, f-ir :£! personnel. h\ celicitin ; yuur views on 
t'.ic iiusircbiiity o'i t:.i.? I;.-;::: ei irAi:::.". -, I v.i;h_l.> rclter.Ue 
cur v.-ilii::fUoca to -rrsvii: :uc.-. in:tr-.:cf;'jn. 


(5) f, : c- -.lnr.vj on Q-,:va;iti-?n :>.Tvico3. Given fee^ aop^iaiicilion mi incro.-3->-i i;i--;.-;ilitis:j cl hostile 
iutelli ;crico ocrvi-c*;;;, it 13 su^octea t:-.C;t CIA Jr.J I\UI ;' 
c:<pcrta i:-. this fictt! meet £D required .".t. our Tcs-,tctivc 
ICe>iJo'i».rtora,. the \.'.-.ohi'.i;iori ani *'.V./ Ysric i ; "ic-l-:i Oiitccs, 
*ia cr-'-r'to i:co--) .-ibrcar.t o£ ncv.* cev::!o:i:n.:' .•.'.o-.-i'; , ^_ 
. o:"rr.'.'.i.!i ( opc-ru-ciou-l t."r.if.3, «r.d viivoriv :i:inoi'.j:^ oi 
o.-;poi;:io:i services. i know that you'r/ili ^ jrec v/itli :v.c ; n-> opportunities for shsuUi bn over- 
looked whic:: c\i^i:i hcl;< to r.c -j^tc t':o. clhi'orts 01 i.cstilo '. 
sci-vicea wi-o :rc cUsr,;o.i wit:-. u-.d-.-rr.ii:i: = -i tro security _ 
oi the 'Jr-.itcJ states-. Tissue should .il:-o provide 
c.n.urr-^c-r to c:-:;>lorc f.tii v.^viso r.-j\v ::i^nj to pene- 
trate r.nd :icu'ci'aii£-j t.iosc i^in:lc*l iorcea. 


(2) ' ?.'av: ?.cit --■n:' 1 r..-.c:-l /^ttrrr. T^cre is already 
n :.ubstsr.tial c:;cU.-_n,:c c* iruo:vruilioa i:*. this :.ckU !.:::*.:- 
tetior.s 01 tr.enpowcr r^isc a. aoricus cuc:.t:o:i:o'tJ v.Liaihcr 
b-oti: z/.cr.cicr, c^rv Iv^cp v-itl> iV-tur^ u::-rci:c:.-.blc 
•Jcv\:lci-,:n.:r.t3. The incrocrjiujly clock cr>;:tisr. bct-.vceu 
these io-cco ia tr.e 'unite! Ctatus aaJ "csotilv ui=i*r.ciits 
cbi'OAu has v.-cli cst-'iblisiricd by. iotii o; cr.r s: ; r.r.c!i-3. 
IXici it*..ould be in our mutual interest to vUl^r^ini; ;:o-.v 
\vc Ci.i bes; cn'-io:/ rorc wisc-iy our ii:vi:U:d r.i-fo jv.ct, 
knov/;~' v ' t/..-.t tb:;: ".r;.-oI-irii,» v.hieb'."-.::! cj/.-ibii-.-.n. 
hijs.cV:i:'.";, assASsis-iisa. and the dc:.^-anip ; oi i.:v cniorcc- 
nuat c. r iico;s, ii ir.'.drn^ior;;:! :,-. scope 

(9) Kgi-ftor.3 •■•■■■ t.\ Domestic Field Or.icc- ?.r ; :! !.; ■-.I 

^y.-2Siii£' '■' ~° ! ' :Jt "'•' 1 t; '"' it S--T- - ri; •*«/" aori^'-is cj.-iiicts 
in t!:is ayca-tut.ti'.cro .-.»"/ be r':oin for ir.v.-.roviR^ s;-.e c.:iz\iiy 
ofli.-iis&u ir. arJtr to rr^.ani positive> ;unco cslicctioi:. 
Given the c'.'.j-.g -jinj situations both i'.cro ;:n-i csror.d, ooriodlc 
2"e-o:c:miruitiori o; iicld rcls.ticns could assist both ajciiciec 
to rrtii;e mutualiy-aijrc-ed idjuslnicr.ts. 




Mr. Hoover, I via:; to accuvo you tii.'.i I vr.iuo hijhiy ysv.r r.-c-rj r.onal 
:«r.t in Siiiii-.-; b.:^rir.j on the nitiaiv.l uocurity. . I :;.-.jv/ that your 
rioucc 13 durivsd iro;-.-. a. unique liu;::.:-.,-! oi .■ service to oar 
.ry. In t/.io spirit, I \. - olco»no ni^csrciy 711:7 oiiscrv.r.:ioa.T on the 
oiaj ajer.d,-. :•.;;. i solicit your '.'.:ou;hts n: ;ardir.;; ,:r.y cl.-.c- item 
i you deern v.'O-t.-.y oi the r.itustUm ci your Bureau s.-.d t::is A;;cacy. 

Fa i it 1; '.illy yourn 

Ii.icr.ird ilcinis 


Exhibit 51 


March 31, 1970 

Honorable Richard Helms 
Director ■ - 

Central Intelligence Agency 
Washington, D. C. 

Dear Mr. Helms: 

I have carefully reviewed your letter of March 20 setting 
out your observations with respect to various matters ol mutual interest. 
I certainly appreciate your kind comments concerning me and i siiare 
your convictions as 10 the need for close coordination of our intelligence 
collection activities in behalf of the national security. 

Your letter suggested nine particular areas which might be 
the subject of further discussions aimed at improving the coordination of 
our operations. A number of these topics are highly sensitive and complex 
and I will therefore mxte no effort here to set forth my views in detail. 
However, in response to your letter and as a prelude to any direct discus- 
sions on these matters, certain observations on my part may be appropriate. 

With regard to electronic surveillance and mail coverage, 
there Is no question as to the frequent value of such operations in- develop- 
ing needed intelligence. Cn the other hand, the use of these measures in 
domestic investigations poses a number of problems which may not be 
encountered in similar operations abroad. There is widespread concern 
by the American public regarding the possible misuse of this type coverage. 
Moreover, various legal considerations must be borne in mind, including 
the impact such coverage may have on our numerous prosecutive responsi- 
bilities. The FBI's effectiveness has.always depended in iarge measure on 
our capacity to retain the full. confidence of the American people. The use 
of any investigative measures which infringe on-traciitional rights of privacy 
must therefore be scrutinized most carefully. Within this framework, .ho^ev^r, 
I would be willing to consider any proposals your Agency mayuiUket 



Your oiler to make available certain technical equipment 
developed bv the Acenc'y is most welcome and I iully reciprocate your 
v/lllingness to cooperate in the exchango of r.elevant scientific data. 
I am prepared to designate appropriate representatives of the FBI 
Laboratory to meet with CIA technical personnel at any mutually 
convenient time. - 

With respect to the inclusion of positive intelligence courses 
In our training curricula, I am sure you will recognize that our training 
programs must be designed primarily to fulfill our own widespread and 
demanding"responslbilitics. While I appreciate) your offer, I do'not 
feel It would be feasible at this time to include the proposed courses 
In our training schedules. I would certainly have no objection to the 
holding of seminars between specialists of our two agencies in selective 
areas of interest when justified by specific circumstances. 


There Is already a considerable exchango of Information 
between our agencies concerning New Left and racial extremist matters. 
Frequently, as you have pointed out, there have been substantial connections 
between subversive and extremist elements in the United States and their 
counterparts abroad. We will continue to furnish your Agency information 
being developed by the Bureau which might have a bearing on your 
intelligence requirements. At the same time, we aro definitely in need of 
additional Information from your Agency as to the foreign aspects of the 
extremist movement in the United States, including foreign funding and 
support of local extremist organizations, while I do not believe there is 
any need for detailed discussions on this point, if you have any specific 
suggestions to make we would be pleased to consider them. 



. Similarly, I am not awaro of any major problems which exist 
at this time "in connection with the coordination of our Held liaison 
operations. It has been my long-standing policy that acriou3 questions 
affecting the coordination of our activities with other Government 
agencies should be handled and controlled at a headquarters level in 
order to avoid administrative confusion and misunderstanding. 

In line with my letter of March 11 and the obrarvatlons 
contained in your letter of March 20, I will In the immediato future 
• designate appropriate officials of the Bureau to meet with your representatives 
lor detailed discussions of these matters. It is my earnest hope tliat such 
conferences will lead to a sharpened understanding of the responsibilities 
and objectives of our respective agencies and v/ill servo to promote more 
effective cooperation in our joint commitment to the national Intelligence 
need3. - 

Otnccroly yours, 
J. Edgar Hoover 


Exhibit 52 

i-~Mr. DcLoac. 
1 - Mr. Sullivan 
1 - Mr. Conrad 

date: April 14, 1970 

■J^ : \ 

. LU* 

... • UNMKD ST. VI ES GOV E' M£M\_ 

^/ Memorandum 

■ < : ' Mr. C. b. v DeLoachpV 
r> ' •■ ■ 

om ':. W. 0. Sulliyajj 



Reference my memorandum 3/30/70 summarizing proposals of 
CIA Director Helms regarding FBI-CIA coordination in intelligence collection 
activities. Director approved' meetings between CIA and Bureau representa- 
tives to further explore these matters. \f\r\r\y 

On afternoon of 4/13/70, Inspector D. E. Moore and myself met 
briefly with Mr. J ames. Angleton, Chief, Counterintelligence Staff, CIA, 
X and Mr.j~ = " "*'" r *]&f his staff. This session was strictly exploratory 
• in nature and was aimed at defining the scope and limitations of our 
.. ■ . discussions with CIA on the points in question. Angleton noted that CIA 

iJirec.ror Hejms wiii be closely fuiluwiug ilic outcome of those discuccicr.c 
and is personally interested in resolving any current proDlems in tms area. 


Mr. Angleton indicated that a A would like to direct initial attention 
I to two of the items cited by Helms, namely, the question of audio (electr onic 

1 surve illance) cov erage and the suggestion that FBI and CIA specialists^ 

V, f ^ jhold periodic seminars to coordinate our information. 

I The Bureau's position regarding electronic surveillance coverage, as 
outlined in the Director's letter to Helms of -.3/31/70, was reitereated with 
emphasis upon the problems such coverage often pose with regard to • 
prosecution as well as adverse public reaction to this type coverage. 

I made the point that the Bureau has not received the necessary 
support in this area from responsible quarters; that in the past the Bureau 
had a substantial amount of coverage of this type in the interest of both our 
own counterintelligence responsibilities as well as the national securicy 
interest but that we have had to retrench in recent years largely as a result 
of the "lack of support for such operations, i ~""'~ ~~ " -~r~- ■- 



1." Anglptnn nntpri that in rp snonftp. t o CIA 's "request ibr" electronic 
coverage of two^ ' . , f _- in the Fall 

of 1969, the Bureau had requested that they ta ke thi sjchatteiuic with the 

Classified by /X - - . !" . ^ 

WCS:mea fv«.m,.t 1™,,, cds. ours,-* i>7yeONTIN.UE£ft-:£>.V.ER 
(4) " 


57APR24 197Q 

|b/tc ol Dccl;i>si/icalion InJcti 


. 'Memorandum for Mr. DeLoach' 

•RE:. RELATIONS WITH CIA.. ... ....■; .* . .; .■■ :._, ■..,.. : .... ... 

Attorney General. • He said that CIA has been giving the question of 
approaching the Attorney General considerable thought but this would 
involve a whole new.set of procedures and policy-considerations which.... 
would have to be carefully considered. Angleton said that his staff was in 
the process of drawing up a proposal on this point for Mr. Helms to' 
consider and that they would probably have something specific for the 
Bureau to consider at a subsequent meeting. 

Concerning the proposed seminar,' in line' with the Director's 
letter to Helms 3/31/70, I pointed out that we would certainly have, no 
objection to such conferences where the occasion justified them. From 
Angleton's r emarks, it appears that CIA is primarily interested here in the 

y ,-_ ._._ pnd would like to furnish the Bureau with details of an extensive 

research project CIA lias und ertaken in recent years to correlat e all available 

^ source information regardingF^ ' : ~ ~ " This 

(apparently would not involve any commitment by the Bureau and would represent 
essentially an opportunity for us to see what CIA has done in this field and 
i how ii iniiiiil lie in wiui iiiy current bureau interest, \vher. CIA ™iw™ any 
jfirm proposals in this regard, we will submit specific recommendations. 

Angleton said that CIA would be in touch with us when they have 
firmed up various proposals and at that time Inspector Moore and myself 
will meet with .them again as required. The Director, of course, will be 
kept fully informed and no commitments will be made without his prior 


For information. 








••' I 


MEMOSAOTUM FOR: Chief of Operations 

1.-" ■ Tlic HTJL1NGUAI, proj^ct_out!inr. is attached. It; in self- 
explanatory as a project with t'ac excepcion. that having been awai-e^ 
of tlic previous operation, you undoubted).'/ will have certaiu questions 
which we hope to answer in this cover memorandum, 

2. . The personnel required for the project on the part of the 
Security Office is approximately the same as the number and grades 
of those currently used with the exception that Security is running 
the project through full-time use of sonic employees ?rid part-time 
of 6th"ers"v/n~6~HnoiiIa. B"s on ocner regular Security jobs. Their total 
time is between seven and eight people full -time-. WiLli the personnel 
freeze and the mounting backlog, Security cannot continue the present- 
operation without a sta.ff increase as indicated.' . - 

3. ' - The only added function that will be performed by Security 
in the new project is that more letters will be opened. They are -jres- 
ently able to open only a very limited nuinbe r. Under the new set-u*j 
with fid i- time craploj-ces, Security" will "be ableTto^bbtain toe addr'essor 
and addressee on the total correspondence as against approximately 
75 percent at the present time. 

4. The added space is necessary to enable the opening of 
more letters. Presently letters are opened without the knowledge ■' 
of the Post Office Department on a completely surreptitious basis, 
namely, swiping a 1 etter.prooo.ssin^ it at ui^ht and returning it the 
next day. The processing is after hours .in the Security Office's New 
York office. This not only involves overtime but is impossible to 
handle on any increased scale. It will be necessary to get an added 
room for this processing with .permanent equipment. The cost for 


page two - 

tliis added room is included; however, it is not known whether added 
space may be obtained without cost, la order to acquire more letters 
for processing, added room may be necessary at the airport- in New 
York. This cost is included; 'however, again it may not be necessary 
to expend any money since the Post Office may be able to handle the 
matter for us. In other words, it is necessary to get the mail de- 
livered to a separate room where no other Post Office cmoloyees are 
present. At the present time, an unwitting Post Office employee is 
working with our people. The item for space in "Washington, while 
possible, is not probable, since this space does not need to be at any 
particular point in. the Y/ ashing ton area. 

5. Oux Security people arc documented as Id en 27 

So far there 
-has been no suspicion in the rrrJn post office in New York or at the air- 
port that they are other than u\tm 27 • The cover story is 
■ that they are doing certain research work on foreign mail for the 
~Iden 28 • , » , ' 

' 6» The Table of Organization within the CI Staff is not an 

estimate—it is based upon actual work production for, similar work 
in Registry. '.^-* 

v 7. The courier cost attributed to this project is not solely a 

project expense since the same courier can also handle Security pouches 
from New York. The cost of the courier at the present time is borne 
by the Security Office, 

8, The equipment cost will not be a recurring item v--ith the ex- 
ception of "Miscellaneous", which covers large amounts of film for 
microfilming the letters. t \ 

9. The scope of this project could be greatly expanded, since 
it docs not cover a substantial amount of mail which cpmes into other 
post offices and since it i-, envisioned that only a relatively small n':r- 


■ page three - 

project as currently envisioned, a detailed analysis can. be made to 
determine whether it should be abandoned, expanded, or maint.vlned 
at its present scope. It is our opinion that the Agency v/iil desire to 
expand the project to the maximum extent possible within the' limits 
of security and the limits of the Post Office Department's cooperation. 

■ 10, It is desired to point out that the Security Office advises 

that they cannot continue the project unless added slots are made 
available to them. From the DD/P standpoint, we believe that we 
are not at the stage of cither developing the project as indicated or 
■ discontinuing it, since the material is not being exploited nearly to 
the extent that it could be. 

U. • The cost of the project appears large; however, from the 
above analysis you can sec that this cost is almost entirely the salaries 
of staff employees, including he. adc. carters processing. The cost of 
1 many oi~iacTA^c1rTcy T ^pr"6Jects v.-ouici appear very high if the to'.al sto££ 
personnel (including headquarters) cost was added to them. 

.. ^ ... Sicaed: j.?.23s Agister* 

- • '•' ■."'■' ,\ J J?.rn : rt Anrlctcn ■ 

' ■'•■- " ■ •/ ■ ' , . CHrJ^ Counter intelligence Staff 

Attachment (1) "' "'' * ;. ' . % . ',•'* ... - . ■" ' /...''? 

/v 'DC/CI:Iden 4 :jbr (iS Nov 55) • • .- ' - : /" : .- ; "' 

Distribution: •.. '.-.".'..;". ;•■ 

Orig Is 1 - Addressee •' '* * '.-•'-. ' : * • '■";. 

V* * ■'-"•' -.i^-ci/siu • ; [_,'. : r : '- , - • -' '•';;' :v - 

. Si - C/CI Chrono ' •' • •" '•-'■ '•"..'■: 

1 - To he informally handed to Iden 15 by J.dcn 4 

11/21/55: Mote by Mr. Aur;le?on on the cover sheet to COP: 

Dic'k: The work n\i this was done by Irion 4 and Jdrn 20 


Exhibit 54 

O-UnKev. 10-16-70) ) 


Federal Bureau 01 Investigation 

Uarch 10, 1972 

Director . BY CIA COURIER 

Central Intelligence Agency 
Washington, D. C 20505 - 

ATTENTION: Deputy Director (or Plans f JAMES . AfiGLETOH 


T>ear Sir: 

| — | i. For your information, i ..* cades'"- communications which may be 
of interest to you. 

the investigation conducted W 
dum and furnish the results. ^\ 

Q 2. U will be appreciated if you will have 

as requested in the enclosed memorandum 

r~| S No further investigation is contemplated with regard to this matter. -, , 

REC-50 ;'--. ■ • 7fc? 

[— ] 4, You will be advised of the pertinent developments in connection 

with this inquiry. _ ^^^^ ^mm^i 

I — I 5. Please note change in caption of this case. 

LJ ro MAI 10 1972. 

| — | 6. Status of case: □ Completed CJ Incomplete ^ **// 

Very truly yours. 

eirncratlii.j aitf Yfcrli Edgar Hoo«lr I ( /V» 

de = liS3i"i^- lon ^Director \, (' 

Ene mx,*xx*JiztxMXiixjmx£MjMix 

Kb, Reference Is made to go»r Y^ic^t^tion on 

Hunter Report »•■. J V^> "!, traffic we 

9,i'M/'\f\' f ^ ljj/2" 


Exhibit 55 

8 AurU 1?69 --' : 


L On 7 April 1969 I ran into Bill COTTER as he was leaving '*•' ' 
Headquarters Building during the early a:'tsmoca; Ha asked for a few 
words and then proceeded to^ell tae that he waj oaiii3 way o:;t for the 
last time and would bo sworn in as Chief Postal Inspector, the samo 
evening. . . . . . 

2. COTTER said that in his conversation with the DDP, COTTER 
had mentioned his concern about the future of HTUNGu'AL, and iha DD? 
had told him todiscuss it in detail with .the CI Staff. 

3. COTTER then expressed himself to me as follows: COTTE?. 
comes to the post Office Department from the Agency and in fact 
knows how HTLINGUAL. works, whereas the former Chief Postal . ' 
Inspector, Keary MONTAGUS, theoretically knew only that the opera- 
tion was a "cover," " which, was permitted under the regulations. This 
placed MONTAGUE in a position to testify under oath en the Kill in. 
such a way as to — in effect -- protect HTLINGUAL,. COTTER will not 
be in such a position and will he particularly vulnerable in the event 

of a flap in view of his own past affiliation with the Agency. 

4. At the moment COTTER feels that he will probably have to ' 
brief the Postmaster General in 3ll fairness to the PMG and the DCI, ' 
who placed COTTER in hi3 new job. COTTER plans, however, to enter ' 
into hi 3 new job without making any internal incuirie3 relating to 
HTLINGUAL, and h-s will do nothing ume.-s the'ope ration is mentioned 

to him by MOXTAGUE (who will he gone in a few days), or in seme 
other context. In any event, COTTER will ultimately take a look at the 
operation, but, before talcing any action, will contact tha CI Staff for 

-685 O - 76 - 24 


a discussion. • COTTHIl regards KTLINGUAL, =.3 CI Staff busies a a * 
rather t h-**" Office of Security "business. 

5. It is noted that the Long Committee, -which, was causing the* 
Bureau and the Post Office Department some difficulty, i3 no longer 
functioning and that Mr. COTTZR in under no immediate jrhreat from 
the Congress to justify the activities of his Department. Y/hile 
Mr. COTTH3. will undoubtedly inspect the HTUNGuAL activity in 
his new capacity and may even find it brief the Postmaster 
General, ha has given U3* assurance that he will consult with us prior 
to. taking 'any action. Therefore, the CI Stall sees no requirement for ' 
concern at this time and would not -wnnt any action taken to suspend the 
KTLINGUAL. operation* ■:. ; *.," 


Orig to DDP; DCI-on 24 apr w/note from 

CCI on cover sheet: This is a new memo on the subject - 
the first one did not take into account 
the facts- 3et forth in paras.' 4 and 5. J. A. 


1 copy - SA/CCI chron 



Exhibit 56 

.^'3 Kay 19/1 

SlJejSCT : DCI's Meeting Concerning HTLINGUAL 

^ 1- A t 10:00 A.M. this date, Mr. Helns convened the follow- 
ing in his office to discuss the HTLINGUAL operation: the DD?, 
the C/CI, the D/S, the DC/CI, a.-.:i C/CI/?ro-J2.-.-i.. 

2. The DCI opened the meeting with a reference to an in- 
quiry as to possible mail tampering by Government agencies, ad- 
dressed to the Chief Postal Inspector, Mr.. Cotter, by Dr. Jeremy 
J. Stone on behalf of tha Federation of American Scientists. On 
the question as tey/jt may have prompted the letter, the DD? men- 
tioned the possibility that the information might have come from 
Herbert Scoville, a member of the Federation's Council who, while 
in CIA employ, had been briefed on the Project. It was stated 
'-" that Mr. Scoville had not been a consumer of HTLINGUAL material 
for many years, and could not know that HTLINGuAL had continued 
beyond the time when he was informed of it. The DCI stated that 
he was not over-concerned about Mr. Scoville. 

3. The DCI then asked, who outside of CIA knows about the 
HTLINGUAL operation or gets its material. The C/CI replied: 
only the FBI. The D/S added, "and the little gray man." He ex- 

- plained that a postal" cleric "had been engaged since "the beginning 
to bring the bags to the room in the airmail facility where the 
material is screened for "take"'; that the man had been checked 
and cleared by Security, and was paid a $50 monthly bonus for 
this duty. (The D/S did not state what this clerk knew about the 
^ — 'activity beyond the screening and copying of exteriors.) 

4. The DCI then asked, who in the POD knows the full extent 
of the operation - beyond cover surveillance. The C/CI replied 
that only Mr. Cotter knows, for he had been witting while with 

. CIA and the O/S. The previous Chief Postal Inspector, Mr. Monta- 
gue, had never wanted to know the extent of examination actuallv 
done, and was thus able to deny on oath before .1 congressional 
co.ifaittee that there was any tampering. Mr. Colter would be u.-.- 


v. able. to make such denial under oath. In an exchange betv/ean 

loyalty to CIA ccald b-; assumed, his cile-.-r.?. is that hi eves 
- loyalty now to the Postmaster General. 

5. When the DCI mentioned the theft of ?2I cdcu::=- is frt.r. 
. their Media, Pa., office, the DO? stated that ha had beer, -in- 
formed that the copy of the letter mentioned in the press had 
come from HTLIMGUAL. The C/CI/Project interposed, with apulc ~ : . : : .-. 
to the DDP, that it had been positively verified front the Project's 
record, and a raep had been written to the effect, that the Project 
had never seen the letter, and that, as a piece of domestic mail, 
the letter would not have been available to HTLIilGUAi., which has 
access only to an international airmail facility. 

6. Mr. Helms stated that ha would accept the evidence of 
the ETLINGUAL record, but he then' asked, how long has the FBI 
known about the operation and how long have they been getting its 
material. The C/CI replied that F3I awareness came in 1958 when, 
in January., they requested permission from Chief Postal Inspector 
Stevens to examine mail to/from the USSR. Stevens had advised 
CIA of the request and had sanctioned CIA's revealing the opera- 
tion to the FBI and therefater servicing- the Bureau with items of 
national security interest. • This was five years after the opera- 
tion had started in 1953. 

7. Mr. Helms asked whether the FBI passes the material to. 
other agencies, or' outside its headquarters office. The D/CI 
replied that it did not, in accordance with the original agree- 

— ' -riant; that the unit receiving the material passes only sani- 
tized leads within the Bureau whenever investigation is war- - 

3. The DCI then inquired how many persons in the F3I know 
about the operation or are privy to its take. The C/CI/Projact 
stated that he had originally been told that only a small unit of 
t-.'o or three see and handle the material, and that this had been 
ronnir^pn 'iv rhe FBI liaison officer., idr. Papich, about three 


in the r'3I know about it una . 

~~> 9. On the question of continuance, the DD? stated that he 

is gravely concerned, for any flap would cause CIA. the worst pos- 
sible publicity and embarrassment. He opined that the operation 
should be done by the FBI because they could better withstand 
such publicity, inasmuch as it is a type of domestic surveillance. 
The D/S stated that he thought the operation served nainiy an 
F3I requirement. The C/CI countered that the Bureau would not • 
take over the operation now, and could not serve essential CXA 
requirements as we have served theirs;, that, moreover, CI Staff 
sees the operatic, •. ■ - ioreicn - surveillance. 

10. Mr. Heliai asked what should be done: do we want to 

continue the operation in view of the known risks? The C/CI re- 
plied that we can and should continue to live with then. • 

- - J 11. The DCI then stated that he would have to discuss the 
matter with Mr. Cotter, and requested the D/S to arrange a meet- 
ing. After that meeting, he said, he would determine whether Mr. 
Blount should be i. ...orraed. 

12. As the meeting closed, the DCI told the C/CI/Project to 
monitor the operation niost discreetly, and bring any problem or 
difficulty directly to him. '. 

13. The meeting ended at about 10:45. 


Exhibit 57 

3 June 1971 



SUBJECT. : Meeting at DCI-'s Office Concerning 

1. At 10:30 a.m. this date, Mr. Helms convened in • 
his office the DDP, the C/CI , the D/S, and C/CI/?roject 
to report on recent action taken by him concerning the 
HTLIMGUAL operation.. 

2. Mr. Helms stated that en Monday he had briefed 
Attorney General Mitchell on the operation. (Noter Mr. ■ ■ 
Helms may have meant Tuesday, 1 June, Monday having been 

a holiday) . Mr. Helms indicated that Mr. Mitchell fully 
concurred in the value of the operation and "hang- 
ups" concerning it. When discussing the advisability of 
also briefing Postmaster General Blount, .Mr. Mitchell 
encouraged Mr. Helms to undertake such a briefing. 

3. The DCI then indicated that yesterday, 2 June 
1971, he had seen Postmaster General Blount. Mr. Blount's 
reaction, too, was entirely positive regarding the opera- 
tion and its continuation. He opined that "nothing 
needed to be done", and rejected a moments rilv held 
thought of his to have someone review the legality of the 
operation as such a review would,' of necessity, widen the 
circle of witting persons. ' Mr. Helms explained to the 
PMG that Mr. Cotter, the Chief Postal Inspector, has been 
aware of the operation for a considerable period of time 
by virtue of having been on the staff of CIA's New York" 
Field Office. Mr. Helms shewed the Postmaster General a 
few selected examples of the operation's product, in- 
cluding an item relating to Eldridge Cleaver, which at- 
tracted the PMG's special interest. A mention by Mr. 
Helms of the I! little gray man" in Mew York (the postal 
clerk at the Airmail Facility in Jamaica who provides 

the mail to our intercept personnel) brought forth Mr. 
Blount's remark that he hoped that this man would not re- 
tire prematurely to take advantage of the Post Office 
Department's currently . of fered attractive bonuses for early 

i. In an aside, Mr. Osborne mentioned that; he had 
seen Mr. Cotter since Mr. Helms' meeting with the Post- 



roastor General and that Mr. Cotter reported that he felt 
that his stock v/itn the Postmaster General had oor.2 up 
several notches. 

'5. . It was obvious that all present vers gratified 
by' the favorable reception'Mr; Keims had in briafin- 
the two mentioned Cabinet officers. ""* 

6. The DCI took the occasion to stress again the 
security aspects of the operation and stimulated that, 
in the event of any sort of security f lao or even a 
suspicion that a leak of soss sort had occurred, the 
intercept operation was to cease immediately and our men 
were to be withdrawn to the New York City base. Mr. 
Helms wished to convey the importance of stooping first 
and investigating later . ' If a subsequent investigation . 
showed that indeed no damage had occurred, it would then 
be possible to resume the operation. 

7. Both Mr. Helms and Mr. 
tight control over the number cf Agency persons cleared 
for, and witting of, the operation. 

8. The meeting ended at 10:40 a.m. 

Z2 July 1971 


Exhibit 58 

me:\:cra:-::.l'm eor the record 


1. The following is to record my :^nov/le:djc o± events 
rc^r-rcTr.^ the SRPOINTER Project during the last few months. 
A]roi-o;:iinately May 1970, I was required to designate curtain 
clots to be released by IOS during FY -197?.. Amonj; these, I 
designated three .slots for SRPOINTER based on the premise 
that these slots and the Project contributed nothing to the Office 
o£ Security, hi:': were of direct interest to and in support of the 

2. At approximately the same time, it was learned that 
j'oen Uc-y ■ If.den h<) , .had contacted' 

1A\'. Karnrncs nines and advised that, he would like to see 
SRPClriTER, since he felt that with all of the various 
Congressional investigations being conducted in various areas, 
SRPOINTER was vulnerable to possible compromise. He advised, 
that if SRPOINTER was not abolished, he felt ih-r^t it. was necessary 
for him to brief Postmaster General Blount on the Project. 

- 3. It is understood thai; the DD/P was amenable to the idea 
of abolishing SRPOJMTER, but the Chief, CI Staff, did not concur 
and indicated that lie would appeal to the OCI on the basis of the 
value of the information bein^ obiaiaed by SRPOINTER. 

4. It is understood sometime later, a meeting win held 
by the OCI at which time he agreed that eRorts should be made to 
continue SRPOINTER. It was subsequently learned, that the DCI 
discussed the Project with the Attorney General who stated -h-at 
he was convinced of the value of thp Project if the Postmaster 


General concurred. Subsequently, the DC1 met with Postmaster 
General and briefed him on the Project. The Postmaster General 
advised that if the UCI and the Attorney. General v/crc convinced 
of the value of the Project, he would concur in the continuance of 
the Project, but that the Agency must understand th?„t the Project 
should be kept in such a statu:; that it could be discontinued imme- 
diately if it appeared that a comoromisc was imminent. He also 
suggested thnt we determine the status of the Post Office repre- 
sentative assigned to the Project, since many Post Office employees 
v/cvo retiring u:ider the liberalized retirement pro;-;r?-m i:\ the Post 
Office.- 1 subsequently had the New York Field Office check this 
and was advised tiiat the Post*! representative assigned to the 
Project had no intention of retiring. 

" 5. In regard to the. three slots for SUPOINTER, I had pre- 
viously indicated to the Director of Security that during discussions 
with the DD/P, he should indicate that if the Project was to continue, 
it would be necessary for the DD/P to give us the three slots which 
we would be losing. After the decision of the DCl, the Director of 
Security stated that he felt that, since the DCI had now made the 
Project an Agency Project arj opposed to merely DD/P, that it 
would probably be better to approach the .Executive Director- 
Comptroller on ill:: basis of returning the three slots to cur T/O. 
He advised the DD/P of this, and the DD/P. concurred. Subsequently 
the Director of Security stated that he had discussed it with the 
DD/S, who concurred and suggested thai the Office of Security pre- 
pare ?.n appropriate memorandum to the Executive Dircctor-Cornptrolle 

Jclen 18 
Deputy Director of Security (IOS) 


Exhibit 59 

Id £ {jD-ruurr l •; i j 

SUBJECT: Mail Intercept Program 


1. The attached memorandum from Chief, CI v.-as orally briefed 
to the Director (and the DDCI), he was shown the activity reflected on 
page 12, and he read the entire attachment giving random examples of 
production. I used the attached Talking Paper as a basis of presentation . 
to the Director. The Director expressed his agreement with, the desir- 
ability that this project be passed to the FBI and his lack of conviction 
that the product to CIA is worth the risl-; o£ CIA involve m ent. Ke directed 
the DDCI to discus3 the activity with th.2 Acting Director, FBI, with a 

^ view to offering the FBI the opportunity to take over the project, including 
the" offer of detailing the CIA personnel involved to the FBI to implement 
it under FBI direction and responsibility. 

2. Since Mr. William Cotter had indicated that he was unwilling to 
continue to collaborate on the project beyond 15 February unless it were 
cleared with appropriate superior authority, t he Dir ector agreed that the 
activity would be suspended unless Mr. Cotter would accept its contiau- 

ancc for the time beisg unde r our assurances that the matter is being 
pfo5ecutcd~at a very high level. 

3. Mr. Osborn advised Mr. Cotter of this conclusion, and Mr. 
Cotter requested that the project be suspended until appropriate resolution 
of the problems involved. This has been done. ' . 


W. E. Colbv 


^ WECrblp 

' Orir.i=il - C/CI via DD/P 

1 - IVi-rMrnl Security 


SUBJECT: Mail Intercept Program 


— 1. A program of intercepting mail between tha United States and 

' the USSR has been in. existence in New York since 1952. This program 
{has provided inform atio n n[ Interest to the F3t, ?.s w£ un de r s tan d' i t A 
.dealm g^^i^JJoviet a ctiviti es vis-a-vis inz United 5:a tes and wi th respect 
ito /imericana who maintain active contacts with Soviet and other Com- 

^munist areas. The program was most recently briefed to thrm Attorney 
General Mitchell and Postmaster General Blount in June 1971. 

2. Considerable efforts are made to conduct this operation on a 
totally secure basis, but it is of course possible that it leak. V/hile the 
recording of the addresses and return addresses is totally legal, the 
opening of first-class' mail is in conflict with 39 U.S. Code, Section 4057. 
A contention can be made that the operation is nonetheless within the 
constitutional powers of the President to obtain foreign intelligence in- 
formation or to protect against foreign intelligence activities (powers 
statutorily recognized in 18 U.S. C, Section 119, with respect to bugging 
and wiretapping. 

■ 3. The political risk of revelation of CIA's involvement in this 
project is in any case substantial. In my view, this political risk is not 
justified by the operation's contribution to foreign intelligence and 
counterintelligence collection. It may well be justified by the contribu- 
tion it makes to the FBI's responsibilities for internal security, a matter 
best judged by the FBI. If this is viewed as sufficient, I recommend 
strongly that the project be assumed by the FBI rather than running the 
extra, risk of possible public revelation of its association with CIA. CIA 
would naturally provide any support desired by the FBI and would hope to 
receive such material as might be of value to CIA from the FBI. 

4. Pending resolution of the above, the project is suspended. 


The Project 


n? s 








i ;ic 
c t tic 
ir> t 
s in 
,](is t 
s i.-'.ii 

3 i f.n 



i an 
;li c 

: to 



d a 


tcrccnt !'ro] 
to give US i 
viot intclli 
ornation abo 
viet realiti 
dc&iic, econo 
ble fron any 
ot be obtain 
is Agency an 

cct IS 
ut Sov 
es 'and 
mic, s 
o tiler 
to So 
ed fro 
d the 






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e s 
t i 








e o 



cs a 
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d go 

c I'r 
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d re 






ts a 
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ct a 






i nc 
e Agcn 1 
a dc ~. i c 
or. orj; 
c basi 
d fron 
scd on 
that the 
i.e., a 
tain cor 


3 a 

Project is particularly produ 
cy and the PHI in pursuing in 
ends to visiting. Soviet stude 
ians and intellectuals, trade 
anizatior.s such as the USSR I 
s for exploiting the Project 
c we have fron every Soviet B 

that each visitor to the V.'es 
vc Security Service. The Pro 

the USSR and the USA, is bas 
als the KC3 approves because 
s, their foreign exchange 

KG1! and CRU defector infor 

visitor is a KCB agent or 
'cooptec:" It is also knov 
rcspondence to thc^ United S 





t i 










vc in 
, exc 
c c i a 1 

s apn 
t, li 
lly c 

n, it 
t no 


vc r 
of i 
n cc r 
Is t 
is p 

orting b 
no opera 
and exnc 
he USA', 
osc is i 
n cc s e r v 
by the 
to -nil 
■Asd with 
her: , the 
, etc. 

h the ;;c 

can r.a 
GB aopro 


sts , 







In n 
ssing a 



. serve 

n.'.e rep 


the ac 


urccs h 

d A: 






c o 1 o g 
c US. 

c US 
den ti 

cs tli 
C con 
ans . 

he ;' 
in an 
c or 
y con 

nic y 

e Project provides the only r.cans 
tact between KCB controlled cxchr.n 

Tiic concern is the spotting and a 
missionary v:ork these Soviet studo 

Soviet student not only nnintains 

ocs back to the USSR but often ret 

fficial canncitv as a scientist, 






r.c rcnev:: 

.-r- !. 

is contacts 

is illustrated by 
32 Soviet exchange students, in 
r 1371-1972 reliable collateral 
as coopted KGB agents and ID ns 


coohted GKu arcnts. To Gate 10 of the 35 Soviet exchange 
students here for the' ncudcr.ic year 1972-1975 have been 
identified as ;XU cooptces. 

'S>. The Project provides irtfornation o thcrv.'isc unavailable 
about tiic Soviet contact.-, am! travel of .'v-cricaus to the 
USSP. v:iiicli is often important i.hcn checking applicants for 
Agency or other Govcrnnont cr.ployirer.t and in con firkin;; re- 
ports fror; Clandestine Service, Poncstic Contact Service 
and PSI agents, contacts and informants. 

i". Project material recorded- for 18 years ^ives basic in- 
formation about Soviet ' individuals and institutions useful 
to the analyst looking for specific leads and in iraunin.p 
trends in Soviet interests and policies. .. 

P. In addition to the obvious value of the Project to the 
CS , tiic PP.1 recently advised us when kc ucre reviewing its 
current ts that the Project information is c>:- 
trencly valuable v:it!i respect to information about East- 
'.'.'cst exchange students. Project information 'helps the V'M 
develop sources and assess Soviet students. The -P2I r.ntici- 
-' pates the Project uill provide insirht into the developing 
trade relations ulicro no PP,I .coverage 'is possible. The 
Pi! I has benefitted from leads to Ar.ericnn students '.:hc have 
been in the USSR and, in particular,, from the kiiowledfa that 
. the sons and daughters of CPtiSA and Pront Croup officials 
who they expect will be tiie left leaders in 5 to 10 years 
'nave studied in the b'SS, - *. Often there arc no other leads to 
this inforration. The PBI also notes that quite often the 
Project information nernits it to correlate lead information 
which lias been outstanding for several years. 

II. A. The P-roject originated in the Spring of 1952 i.iicn the 
then SR Division' of the CS (now SB) bc.^nn to examine the 
positive, operational and information 
potential which might be obtained fror, a" systematic rconitor- 
int of postal communications between the United States and 
the Soviet union. • ' ■ 

". In November 1952 an a[; v:as readied with tiic then 
Chief Postal Inspector Clifton GARNER to survcill and photo- 
graph postal covers (exteriors) at the Mew York City postal 


t'r.cility v.-Jiic.:-. processed n 1 rnai 1 to anC fron t'le ;?SS':'.. As 
agreed, v.-i til New York Posts] Inspector ilonry "OXTACUE , ex- 
amination of mail covers by CIA personnel documented .is 
"est Office Department officials was begun on 17 February 
103 5. . 

{.'.. exploratory openings conducted at a secure 
CIA jr* t.ill.'itior. nearby "roved so rewarding that continua- 
tion on- a hiyhly selective basis v:as deemed necessary in the 
national security interest.. .. •-...■........, 

1). In .':av 1954 ?!r. Allen '.'.'. DULLES, DCI , and ;ir. Richard ' 
IIELIIS, the Chief of Operations, DDP , too!: the first initia- 
tive in the series of briefings to insure that each Admini- 
stration has known the Project existed. They advised Post- 
master General Arthur E. SUNMERFIELD that an exar.ina.ticn. 
was being made of the "covers" of nail to and fro- the 
Soviet Union (such examination is legal) . While "r. -SU!n!F.R.- 
FIELi; did not cor.uent specifically, it was clear that he was 
in favor of the activity. 

P. . When the yield fron the activity transcended the inter- 
ests of the Soviet Division, responsibility for it was 
transferred in 1955 to the Counter Intelligence Staff of the 
BDP, v:hpre it has remained to the present. 

!\. In January' 195S, the FBI requested the Postal jnsnecticr. 
Service's permission to examine mail to and fron the Soviet 
Union. CIA was advised of the Bureau's request and arranged 
in February 195 8 to regularly provide the Bureau with iters 
of internal', security interest. . The FBI is the only non-CIA 
agency which receives copies of the Material in its raw form. 

. G. In February 1901 :'.t. DULLES and Mr. i :!:!.? 'S discussed the 
"mail surveillance" activity with Post-aster General Edward 
;;.V.' and Chief Postal Inspector MONTAGUE. "r. DAY agreed 
that the activity should continue and made the caveat that 
the Post Office Department need not know the extent of the 
mail exa.-.ination . . . 

:!. The first US postal official to be fully aware of the 
clandestine aspect of the mail surveillance was ex-CIA 
er.nlovce :ir'. William COTTER upon his appointment in April 
.19 60 as Chief Postal .Inspector. :ir. CO .Tip knows about the 
1'rojoct because of his duties while wit:'. CIA. 


T. I- cnrlv .Jisnc 1971 "r. K^I."?, I'd, briefed t-.t tnrncy 
■~ c :: r r a 1 "ITTCiliU.i. and Pes trvn." tcr 0::cral ?i. '*'..'!;':' p.r.'J sh. ~".-*'. : . 
.) selected samples oT information obtained. This the: 
Tirr.t ti.r:c officials at ti:is level v.erc briefed about the 
details of the operation. Doth Cabinet norbers concurred 
in the continuation of the activity, ilr. iiiii.iSS advised 
"!r. Bi.GLW'T that '.lr. COTTLiP knew about the operation as a. 
result of his CIA service. 

•J. The present Postmaster General has not been briefed by' 
any CIA official. 

[I. A. Fro- its initiation the security risk associated v.'ith 
this undertaking has been fully recognized. The security 
:r.ccha:iics of this Project whicii \:crc carefully laid ini- 
tially arc continuously 'reexamined and, witli the possible 
exceptions noted bcloi:, it is believed that security is as 
tifht as it possibly can be. 

J. ."ail is examined only in a vault area i.'ithin a restric- 
ted secure area of federal Buildinr. Ho. Ill at JPIC Inter- 
national Aimort. "" 

C. Prior to June 1972 a CIA Technical Services Division 
(TSD) technician participated in openinr the r.ail to es- 
tablish if- it had been previously opened. Until the 7S!) 
laboratory closed in .lime 1972, a considerable r.r.'.cun.C 
of valuable postal intelligence and chemical censorshin 
information on the Soviet l.'nion vas collected. 

D. In every instance, the openinrs are nade as technical 1\- 
secure as possible Following standard surreptitious entry 
•Procedures evolved by the "Agency. Kxpertly rosealed en-' 
vclopes arc returned promptly to the mail flov.', Kith the 
delay never exceeding. 24 hours. 

Z. Control over copies of the examined letters' in the 
''reject oTfice at Headquarters is strinrcnt. Each iter, is 
lof.gcd. Each person, translator, analyst, and cleared 
recipient directly, involved iii the Trojoct or with Project 
".-.terial is thoroughly briefed and continually ir-pressed 
•■.ith. the sensitivity of -the Project.' P.outin," of material 
is via scaled envelope, by hand, to named recipients only. 


: j y r, t " 
i cor. tr 

The co-;inrtPcntcd unit within the '.'"■'. ' r. .'nrrsv.c I'ivisicn, '..'hich receives cpnj?.-; of the Projrc 
'.', observes rigid security procedures, restr: 
\c r.-itc rials to a United nurficr of S-'eci.-.l 
isors in that Division who rcpularly handle 
Dre sensitive information and arc aware of 
f this Material. PiU Pieid OfCjccs receive 
roject in i on and even the;: a cautionn 

A rent 

me r- 



t!ic senr.i 

tivi ty 

only dis 


;-•■' stater 


CIA is ti- 

.c sour 


the ir.for 


".a teriols 

; arc 

Luced and 


included and hi ghlighted. .Ti'.e fact that 
of the inforpation is protected by scurcing 
to a coded identification. ' The rsi; Project 

never placed in case files, arc never renroc 
sent to PiJI Pield Offices. ' 

G. The "flap" potentials in this Project arc csscntia.lly 
the same iiypothe tical problems tl'.is Agency and the nil. face 
every day ir. our operations, However, to give a perspec- 
tive to problems v:e have considered, the following areas of 
concern arc noted:- 



ti-.a Jar: 
t.ahes .p 
:-.ovcd t 
the re a 
only ob 
ted cxt 

i s g r 

o .1 
c fo 



Air n 
v.- Yor 
, cou 
for '■ 
inn t 
rs v.-h 


!'OS t 

1 Pa 
v;h c 


c re 



h is 

Office department employee .at 
cility near .77:; International 
re tlic screening of t!ic —.nil 
ego that sachs of nail arc re- 
lic could only speculate as to 
noval, however. (In the event of 
into the roor, at the 

officers' worl:ir.'p hours, the 

v would he the copying of sclec- 

legal. ) 


uc av; 


cess a - 
r. r o f 


osc ti 
ami n a ; 


years , texts 
lo on a rcstri 
Is v:itkin the 
p. rotational a 

pahe n fairly 
Project inateri 
on. An indivi 

all appro ciat 
ail was being 
however ,• no on 
is done and vc 





al - 


an d 
e n 

'.cd rial 


: ten 
)t to 
be co 
'..' i 
: it 

1 :ir. 
rvicc . 
re , it 
of. per 
the' r.c 
rs dis 
ty col 



p. runt 
lu di 




3>" CIA. 


fro-, the Airmail facility 

JFh Iritcrr.ational Airport. 

transporting these letter!: 

r.r. accident or be -attached by thujs , disc 

session of ti:e r.sil outside the facility. 

reason would be unknown. 

to the Federal lluilclri 

Conceivably the pers 

could becor-e in vol ve- 


4. Conies of the examined nail arc couriered weekly 
fron tile Federal Buildinp. at .JFK International Airport"' 
to tiic y.c\i Vorl: City Field Office of CIA's Office of 
Security for transmittal to Headquarters. it in pos- 
sible that these copies could fall into unauthorized - 
hands if the vehicle used was involved in an accident'' 
or if the individuals transporting the letters wore 
subjected to a holdup. •' ' ";: : 

5. Copies of the letters arc forwarded by the Office 
of Security in Nov; York to a Headquarters-controlled 
post office box by registered nail. A nail robbery 
or train/aircraft accident is possible, resulting in 
the loss of the nail. 

ii. Fast incidents or publicity r.bcut US Government inter- 
est in nail coverage which caused sonc concern with 
respect to Project activities are. cited to jive sor.e 
additional background. . ■ ' 

1. In rud-April 1965 there were press accusations 
that the Internal Revenue Service had been cxar:inin^ 
mail to nttenpt to uncover information about foreign 
asset of US citj ions who were seeking to 
evade or were delinquent in their taxes. Confressman 
Ih;rward C, . HALL (n.->:oh) also claimed that he had -. 
received unevaluated information t!:at other agencies ■ 
v.'crc "snoopinn' : into the nails. Senator "usr.cll F.. 
LOaG's Congressional Sub-Comi7.ittec to the Joint Cor-- 
r'.ittce on Internal Revenue tax conducted henrinfs into 
these accusations. In !!ay 1905 then Postmaster General 
GP.OXOL'SKi' stated publicly that the Post Office Depart- 
ment had cooperated with requests for nail cover 
examination froir. a nunber of Federal apencies including 
the Food and Drug Administration, the Internal P.evcnue 
Service, and the Department of Justice. :!r. CF.Oh'O'JSKI 

62-685 O - 76 - 25 


stated that he would hence forth ;ir;t severely the 
nur'.iev of officers in the Post " r fico !'-epprt~cnt who 
could authorize cf the rail. It should 
be noted tlut Scnntor i,i\".T, 's Sub-Cn:--r.i ttcc dealt 
nrinarily with .the examination of the by the In- 
ternal Revenue Service s-:'. the . Pepartpon t of Justice. 
Vh.o Post Office Bcnr.rtr.cnt w.-.s not unduly concerned 
by the Congressional hearings and press accusations, . 
and CIA's cxnr.ininf: Project v;as not affected. 

2. On 4 June 196S the late colu-nist Drew PliAP.SO:. 
■.;rote: "Senate investigators have discovered that the 
CIA not only watches suspicions i^ail , but actually 
opens the letters as part of its secret intelligence 
v;orh." There is no indication that cither Cor.j-rcss cr. 
the -cncral public reacted to these allegations. 

3. On 13 January 1971 Jcrcny STO.'.'E, Director of the ■' 
redcration of American Scientists, V.'nshinrton , u.'C. , 
addressed a letter to Kill in-. J. COTTHP., referred to 
above, who was then and is now the Chief Postal In- 
spector, raisinf. sonc very precise questions apparently 
designed to assist bin. with respect to legislation 
S-TONT; had in ir.ind rcf.irdin^ entry into domestic and nail. Mr. COTTH-l forwarded a copy of the let- 
ter to '-r. Howard DSnOiJ;-, 1 , Director nf Security, CIA,- _ 
soliciting; advice about what his. reply to ST0.':!2's 
questions should include. Concern over the "flan - 
potential" for the Ar.ency which the letter nip'.t'ca-';. . 
p,cnccr pronptcd :!r. illiL.'IS to brief bet!: '.'.r. -JLOUMT , .. 

' the Postn-.nster General, and i'r. !:ITCl:i"LL, the Attorney 
General, in early June 1971. To our knowledge. STORE'S 
letter was never- answered. 

The following is n tabulation of Agency personnel briefed 
'.c Project fron 1952 to 31 December 1972 and their current 

A. Total number of persons briefed since inception . . . .- 43G- 

thereof currently on duty in D'JP area .... 276 
(h'ote:' only 90 persons arc cur- 
rently active recipients of Project 
r.'atcrial: sec separate breakdown) 


on duty in other Directorates . '; 

terminated (re tircd/rcsirncd/dece.-iscd) . . . . IZ( 

"excludes Project perse.-..-!"! , TSD .involves! ir. the 
technical aspects, am: OfL'icc of Security operating per- 
sonnel in Ficlc and at Headquarters 

IS. Active recipients of Project material ir. DDP area (as 
ot 31 •JcccE'jer 19 72) 

CI Staff . . ' .;g 

Soviet Bloc Division 29 

'..'cstern Hemisphere Division S 

Africa Division 3 

roreij.n Resources Division 5 

-N'car Hast Division 1 

Total DDP S9 

Office of Security l 


V. Present consumers of Project material anc! the typo of infor- 
mation thcyVcccivc is as follows. In addition to current in- 
formation, the Project provides file data dating bad: to 1955. 
Tiic 'Project naintains a cor.paTtm'er. ted machine record system 
•.."Hie': includes about two million nancr, of persons involved in 
e'SA-USSP. contact. Institutional and organisation files are 
also- for reference and analytical purposes. The. 
analysts in the Project office- reference and collate information 
to assist CI Operations and the Operating Divisions 

A. CI Staff components' which oversee and coordinate cxnloi- 
tation of tlic Project material receive material of interest 
to the operational divisions, as v:ell as the foilov;ir.n : 

Specific requirements which-indicate operational methods. 


Specific requirements which indicate operational methods. 

>>. i:io Soviet iiloc Hiyisicr. uses Proicct ratcri.-U for o^crh- 
tionr.l lends and counterintelligence investif atior- . - It ex- 
tracts and supplies infornn tior. for basic Tiles r-orsonnUt" 
<-ossiers, nnd certain r.ncninc record p-o^rp-s sh D^visic-' 
receives nnteri.ils to/froa or conccrnin/'thc<- tvnes 
of information: . • ••..*•=> 

Specific requirements which indicate operational methods. 

383 -•-.._.-. 

Specific requirements which indicate operational ivuM.hcd 

C. The .\l : jiivision receives Project material idea tifylr.jj' 
ar.i! con corn in;:: . 

Specific requirements which indicate operational methods. 

i). The i;li Division receives Project r.atorial v.'hich: 

Specific requirements which indicate operational methods. 

i:. The Iiiforr.ation Services Division (IS: 1 ) nnu the Di)P 
Area .Divisions concerned receive extracted information 
iiioiitiryin,", .foreign students in the US5". 7;isscn-inaticr. 
is by sterile'orandur, which, does not identify the 
Project as the source'. • ■.• 

T. The Fill requests and receives infornnticn and loads 
fro:-: the Project material to/fro;?., identifying, or concern, 
ia. f, :' ■" 

1. Current- and former Soviet officials assigned to 
the 'JS and UN' . . . " 


2. Other Soviets in the lis - students, scientists, 
v.-ritcrs, etc. (current and forr-er). 

5. US students, scientists in tiic USSP., nncl subsequent 
contacts (especially students who v.'cre sponsored by 
subvorsivc organizations, and subversive individuals 
\:':\o have received special invitations or special treat- 
ment fron the Soviets] . 

''■ . CPUSA and front organization officials' ar.d nenbers ' 
contacts with, and travel- in, the USS.U. 

5. US defectors in the USSR. " > ' . 

6. Contacts of radicals and subversives with the USSR. 

7. Contacts with the USSR of r.ilitant, dissident, and • 
protest groups. 

8. Exchanges between US and USSR scientists. 

9. Contacts with the Soviet Red Cross, particularly . 
those by individuals rather than by the institutions 
because experience has shown that the Soviets have used 
Ucd Cross cover to help establish illc"al entrants . into 
the US. - 

10. Cubans and pro-Castro individuals in the US, USSP, 
or third countries. . • 

■11. Soviet Co-n-.ittee for Cultural Relations Abroad 
(contacts with emigres and o:.ii'r;rc organizations in the 

>'s) . - . ■ • . • . • • ■..-,.; 

12. Correspondence between US nationals and aliens in 
tne US with individuals attending such institutions 
as the Central Konsor.ol School and .the .Friendship 
University, including alien's i.r. the US who have pre- 
viously been in the USS!l as students. .'.••-• 

me :.issc;.iinntion of Project raaterial, i.e., the nur.oer of 
.'ts sent to the PSI's Honcstic Intelligence division subsc- 
-. *° ~e agreement of January 195S totalled 41,1.3s by 31 
•jor 1972. On the average one report usually consists of 


c : . I " 
00 y. 

'..":) individual ite:r.s - ..-it!i a r,i;~.r..-.ry and trans 1 at i.-.r. , as 
■ printe, '■.v.ic!'. also provides some correlated and analytical 
'5?.cos based 0:1 Project file materiel. 

s of 31 ileccn'icr 1-372 the Fill's active 1:: tci\ 1 j s t of n.av.cs • 
. teres t consisted of approximately 200' of t'.'.c approximately 
.:::.:es •.-::itc:! 1 istcd. (The'.icr of nas-cs '•.ntci'.iis teti varies 
;::ont:i to nonth.) 

i:c procc-ssir.;: and dissemination statistics for 
1071 and 1972 are as follows-: 

:'ac calendar 

Total itcr.s through facility 

iotai items CIA screened 

1'ctal exteriors recorded 

.'.<— >ai interiors (contents) recorded 

Votnl interiors for intelligence 

."otal for technical examination 

. ctal selected on basis watclilist 

.'otal (approximate) examined, analyzed, 
translated, summarized, etc. (in- 
des i tor.s on file not previously 
tossed) ' ' 

(approximate) ite;r,s dissernina- 
•.;it!iin T!DP 

itens disseminated to P3I 


10 71 



2 5,000 


] ,750 


2 000 














5 . 




•reject is operated usir.fl the f o 1 1 ov; i r- p. • : 

V'.r. (2) officers of the Office' of Security (.'.'ov; Yorl; 
«.'■ lOfTice) -.viio arc cnjrnncc! full time in screening and 
ct:r.;> items to open and tiien opening, rd.ctocopyir.j; anc 


tlie ite-r.s. 


.'■ . ilever. (7} officers .-,".,; t'..c, (3) do;!:? o" the lib? 
Counter In tcili;" Staff i:.t. the i'roU'Cl of at iie.ij- 
.-.L:::r;crr, and arc enja^cd full ti::c ir. processing, iter's . 
This processing includes translation, si:~.".arizir. ; ";, cor- 
relating and indexing the in.forr.alion . 

FK. The total cost' of the operation is nnnro.-iinately J2";0,031 
per nnnun. Salaries account for approximately i 1 75, 000 of the 
total cost '..•it!', the renainirir funds spent on film and other 
reproduction costs., travel and equip-cnt main tcncncc. 

X. Attached are rancor, sanplss of the nroductior. fror. the 
Prbiect. ■ .'• 


Exhibit 60 

t 1697 


Pace 4322 


Reviser's JVnfc— nosed on title 10. U. 3. C. 1940 ed- 
it 304. 306. MO (Mar. 4. 1009. eh. 321. }J 101. 183. 166. 35 
SLat. 1123. 1121; June 22, 1934. ch. 710.40 Stal. 1207). 

Section consolidates sections .104, 306, and 309 of title 18. 
U. S. C. 1040 cd. Reference It) persons causing, procuring. 
Aiding or assisting was omitted ns such persona arc prin- 
cipals under section 2 of this title. 

Minor chnnges were made In phraseology. 


1070 — (c). Pub. I,. 91-375 substituted "section 
001 of title 39" for "section 500 of tluc 30". 

Effective Date of 1970 Amendment 

Amendment by Vub. I.. 91-375 effective within 1 year 
ftftr Aug. 12, 11)70, on dale established thcrclor by the 
Hoard of Governors of the United Stales Postal Service 
and published by It In the Fedrrnl Register, see section 
15(n) of Pub. L. 91-375, Pet out a* a note preceding section 
101 of Title 30. Postal Service. 

Studt or Private Cartage or Mail; Reports to President 
and Conchess 
Congressional findings of nerd for study rind rcc valua- 
tion of restrictions, on private cnrrlane of letters mid 
packets contained In thin section and submission by 
United Stales Postal Service of reports to President nnd 
Congress for modernization of law, regulations, and ad- 
ministrative practice/;. .«cc section 7 of Pub. L. 01-375, set 
out or a note under section G01 of Title 30. Postal Service. 

§ J697. Transportation of persons acting as private ex- 

Whoever, having charge or control of any convey- 
ance operating by land, air, or water, knowingly con- 
veys or knowingly permits the conveyance of any 
person acting or employed ns n private express for 
the conveyance of letters or packets, and actually In 
possession of the same for the purpose of conveying 
them contrary to law, shall be fined not more than 
$150. (June 25. 1948. ch. 645, G2 Stat. 777.) 


nrvlser's ffotr.— Vnsnl on title. 10. U. S. C, 1040 ed., I 305 
(Mar. 4, 1900, ch. 321, ! 102, 35 Stat. 1124). 
Same changes were made as In section 1604 of this title. 

§1098. Prompt delivery of mail from vobroI. 

Whoever, having charge or control of any vessel 
passing between ports or places In the United States, 
and arriving at nny such port or place where there Is 
a post office, falls to deliver to the postmaster or at 
the post office, within three hours after his arrival. If 
In the daytime, nnd If at night, within two hours after 
•the next sunrise, all letters and packages brought by . 
him or within his power or control nnd not relating 
to the cargo, addressed to or destined for such port 
or place, shall be fined not more than $150. 

For each letter or package so delivered he shall 
receive two cents unless the snmc Is carried under 
contract. (June 25. 19411, ch. G45. 02 Stat. 777.) 
I.Kcisr.AT!vc History 

lievlscr's fVofr.—Unsfd on title. 18. U. S. C, 1940 cd. 
I 323 (Mar. 4. 1000, ch. 321. i 200. 35 Stat. 1120). ■ 

Chnnges were made In phrnseology. 

§ 1699. Certification of delivery from vessel. 

No vessel nrrlving within a port or collection dis- 
trict of the United States shall be allowed to make 
entry or break bulk until' all letters on board nre 
delivered to the nearest. post office, except where 
waybllled-for discharge at other ports In the United. 
States at which the vessel Is scheduled to call and- 
the Postal Service does not determine that un- 
reasonable delay in the mails will occur, and the 

master or other person having charge or control 
thereof has signed and sworn to the following dec- 
laration before the collector or other proper cuslonii 

I, A. B.. master - , of the , arriving 

from . and now lying In the port bf , 

do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I have to the best 
of my knowledge and belief delivered to the post. 

office at every letter and every bag. packet, 

or parcel of letters on board the said vessel during 
her last voyage, or in my possession or under my 
power or control, except where waybillcd for dis- 
charge at other ports in (he United States at which' 
the said vessel is scheduled to call and which the 
Postal Service has not determined will be un- 
reasonably delayed by remaining on board the said 
vessel for delivery at such ports. 

Whoever, being the master or other person having 
charge or control of such vessel, breaks bulk before 
he has arranged for such delivery or onward car- 
riage, shall be lined not more than $100. (June 25, . 
194(1. ch. G45.- C2 Stat. 777; July 3, 1952, ch. 553. 
fiG Stat. 325; Aug. 12. 1970, Pub. L. 91-375, 5 G(J)(15), 
84 Stat. 778.) 

Legislative IIistout 

ncviscr's JYofc— n.nsrd on title 10. U. s. c, 1040 ed., I 327 
(M:.r. 4, 1003. ch. 321, 5 204, 35 Stat. 11271. 

Minor chnnges were made In phraseology, 


. I07O-- Pub. I.. 01-375 siibstltiilM "Postal Service" for 
"Por.tmoijtcr General" in two Instances. 

1052— Act July 3. 11152, provided for only the unloading 
of mall from n vessel as can be expedited by discharge at 
8Uch port. 

CrrrXTiVE D*tk or 1070 Amendment 

Amendment by Pub. I,. 01-375 **f!ecl1ve within I year 
after Aug. 12, 1070, on ditto established therefor by the 
llnard of Governors of tin; United Slatc-i Pontal Service 
and published by it iti the Federal Hegl^tcr, see section 
15(a) of Pub. L. 01-375. .net out ns a note preceding section 
101 of Title 30, Postal Service. 


Foreign letters carried out of the malls, see section 602 
of Title 30, Postnl Service. 

Section RrrEnnm to in Other Sections 
This section Is referred to In title 30 section G02. 

§ 1700. -Desertion of mails. 

Whoever, having taken charge of any mall, volun- 
tarily quits or deserts the same before he has deliv- 
ered It Into the post olllcc at the termination of the 
route, or to some known moil carrier, messenger, 
agent, or other employee in the Postal Service au- 
thorized to receive the same, shall be fined not more 
than $500 or Imprisoned not more than one year, or 
both. (June 25, 1940, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 778.) 


Reviser's A'ofr.— Uased on title tfl. U. S. C. 1040 cd., I 322 
(Mar. 4, 1000, ch. 321. f 100. 35 Stat. 1120). 
Minor changes were made In phraseology. 

§ 1701. Obstruction of mails generally. 

Whoever knowingly and willfully obstructs or re- 
tards the passage of the mail, or any carrier or con- 
veyance carrying the mall, shall be fined not more 
than $100 or Imprisoned not more than six" months, 
or both. .(June 25; 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 778.) 


Jteitf jar's Note— on title 18, U. 8. C. 1040 cd.. 
11 324, 325 (Mar. 4, 1009, ch. 321, if 201, 202, 35 Stat. 1127). 


*. fiiiip 4323 

1III.K Id. -litlMK.S ANIJ ■ Kl.UlNAl, PliUl.r IMJUK 

li- Rrrll'ins 321 nnd 325 of Mile in. U. K. C. 1010 I'd., were 
I Ida ted with changes of' phraseology ncccssnry to 

'. effect rolisnlldatloil. 

Words "cnrrlae.1-. horse, driver or", "car, steamboat". nn«| 
"or vrstri" were omitted as covered by "nny cnrrlcr or 
' conveyance". 

The punishment provision In deilved from said section 
324 rather than (mm sr-fMrni 325 which provided only n 
fine of not more thnn 5100 nnd irlntcd only to ferrymen. 

Ciifiss Hi:h:rf.ncf.s 

Temporary employees of the postal service or enrrters 

with custody, sec section lOOf) of Title 39, Poslnt' Service. 

§1702. Obstruction nf correspondence. 

Whoever lakes ntiy letter, postal card, or packacc 
'. out of nny post olltrc or any authoiized depository 
.for mail ma'ter. or from nny letter or mail carrier, 
or which has b<-en In any posl office or authorized 
. (.repository, "i" i" 'he custody of any letter or mail 
► carrier, before it has hern delivered to (he person to 
[ whom it was directed, with desinn (o obstruct the 

correspondence, or in pry inlo the business or secrets 

'. of another, or opens, secretes, embezzles, or destroys 
the same, shall be fined nut. more than $2,000 or im- 
prisoned not more than five years, or both. (June 25, 

K 1948. cli. G45. 62 Stat. 77B.) 

£* I. re IS I. ATI VB Hi ST OUT 

£■'' fleeter'* ,Vo(r\--liased on title 18. U. S. C, 1040 cd.. { 317 

■- (Mnr. 4. 1D99. ph. .121. ( 194. 35 Strtt. 1 125: Feb. 25. 1925. 

r. ch. 31R. 43 RlnL. 077; Aug. 26. 1035, ch. 093, 49 Stnt. 007; 

i* Aur. 7. 1939. ch. 557. 53 Strtt. 1250). 

r . section 317 of Mid title 1R. U. S. C. 1940 cd., was ln- 

{ corpnrntcd In this and srctlon 170n of this title. 

t . Minor chnngc* were mrtdc In phraseology. 

V % 170.1. Delay or destruction of mail or newspapers. 
I (in Whoever, beiiif,' a Postal Service officer or 

*: employer, unlawfully secretes, destroys, detains, dc- 
l lays, or opens any letter, postal card, package, bay. 
t or mail, entrusted to him or which shall come into 
£.his possession, and which wa.s intended to be con- 
y veyed by mail, or carried or delivered by any carrier 
\ or other employee of Die Postal .Service, or for- 
warded throup.h or delivered from any post ofllcc 
or station thereof established by authority of the 
Postmaster General or the Postal Service, shall be 
fined not more lha.ii $500 or imprisoned not more 
i than five years, or both. 

• Mj) Whoever, brine a Postal Service officer or 
'. employee, improperly detains, delays, or destroys any 

■ newspaper, or permits any other person to detain, 
' delay, or destroy the same, or opens, or permits. any 
'.'other person to open, any mail or package of-news- 

* papers not directed to the office where he is cm- 
? ployed: or" 

Whoever, without authority, opens, or destroys any 

mall or package, of newspapers not directed to him. 

1. shall be lined not more than $100 or imprisoned not 

more than one year, or both. (June 2f», 1948. ch. G4!>, 

■ C2 Stat. 770; May 24. 1943, ch. 130. §37. 63 Stat. 
OS; Am:. 12. 1970, Pub. L. 91-375, $G<J>UG>. 84 
Stat: 778.) ' 

LrctSLAnvr. UrsTonT 

rtcvtxrr:* r.'o/r.- B.^cd on title in. U. S. C. 1940 cd., 
If 318. 310 (Mnr. 4. 1909, ch. 321. (f 105, 100, 35 Stnt. 1125. 

6cctIon consolidated sections 318 and 319 of sold title 10. 
U. 3. C 1040 cd. The embezzlement nnd theft provisions 
of men were Incorporated In sections 1709 nnd 1710 of 
this title. 

Minor chnngca were mnde In phrnscology. 


H170— Suhscc. (ix). rid). '11.375. 5 fHJi (10) <A>. Inserted 
"nrrrclCfi. deploys." prr<-edin|: •■dr1:ilie." :r; n MihsllUilc 
for ". or sccrcles. or destroys nny such iclier, |n*;.1:\l card, 
package. Imi;. or mall" d'-lchd ImMowIih: "IVj^trn -isier tlen- 
rr.'il". substituted "Postal Service or employee" for 
"pMStina-Mer or i'^-tnl IWvlrc employee", unci |n->cr'cd 
"or ihr* Postal Service" lollowlnj; "Po^ma-Mcr". 

Suhscc. (b). rub. I.. 9l-:»7;.. S «ij( ll«HH». substituted 
"rosLil Service olliccr «r employee" for "postmaster or 
Postal Service employee". 

1949— Subscc. (a). Act May 21. 1M9. S 37 (a), sub- 
stituted "secretes" for "secrets" following "Postmnsler 

Stibscc. (b). Act May 24, 19-19, 5 37 (b). substituted 
"newspapers" for "newspaper". 

Kmsntvi: Daib or lf>70 Ahi:niimi:ht 
Amendment by Pub. I.. 0I-37R rilertlve uliliin I yenr 
nfter Aui*. 12. l'.'TO, on date estal'llshrrl then-fnr by the 
Hoard of Governors of the United States l'or;lnl St vie 
nnd puhllr.hed by It in the Fedfral It''j;lster, see wctlon 
15(a) ol Pub. I., n 1-375. set unt ns a note preceding section 
101 of Title 39. Postal Service. 

§ 1701. Keys or locks stolen or reproduced. 

Whoever steals, purloins, embezzles, or obtains by 
false pretense any key suited to any lock adopted by 
the Post Ollicc Department or the Postal Service 
and In use on any of the mails or baqs thereof, or 
any key to any lock box. lock drawer, or other 
authorized rcreptaclc for the deposit or delivery of 
mail matter; or 

Whoever knowingly and unlawfully makes, forces 
or counterfeits any such key, or possrsser. any such 
mall lock or key with the inlenl unlawfully or Im- 
properly to use. sell, oj- otherwise dispose of the same, 
or to cause the same to be unlawfully or improperly 
used. "sold, or otherwise disposed of; or 

Whoever', beinr; cne.artcd as a contractor or other- 
wist: in the manufacture ol any such mail lock, or key 
delivers any finished or untmishrd'lorl: or the into- ■ 
rior part thereof, or key, used or designed for use by 
tho department, lo any pcr.'.on not duly authorized 
under the hand of the Postmaster General and the 
seal of the Post Ollicc Department or the Postal 
Service, to receive the same, unless the person re- 
ceiving it is the contractor for Turnishinn the same 
or encaced in the manufacture thereof in the man- 
ner authorized by the contract, o** the npent of such 
manufacturer — 

Shall bo fined not more than $500 or imprisoned 
not more than ten years, or both. (June 25, 1948, 
ch. G45. G2 Stat. 778; Aur. 12 ,1970. Pub. L. 91-375, 

Leg isi, ATI vr Histout 

nrviw's Natr. -l!:iscd on title 10. U. S. ('.. 1910 cd., 
I 3H (Mar. 4. 1909. ch. 321, S 191. 35 Slat. 1 1 2S > . 

lleferetice lo persons alillni:, rau.'dnr, or" aislsllni; was 
omlltrd. Such. piTMins nrc principals under flection 2 of - 
this title. 

Mandatory punishment provision wits rephrased In the 

Minor changes wcic mnde In phraseology. 

1970— Pub. L. !»|.-37.'i Inserted "or the Postul Service" 
followlne 'Tost Onicc Depaitnicuf in. first ami Udrd pars. 

ErFKTTivn 1*)atb or 11)711 Amtnomknt 
Ameiidmciit hy Tub. I,. ni-37. r i elloctlve wllhln 1 year 
after Aug. 12. 1970, on date established therefor by the 
Board 'of Governors of the United Slates Postal Service 


Exhibit 61 

1? MAY W 3 

SUBJECT: Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc) 
Chairman, Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, June 1970 

1. On Friday, 5 June 1970, the President held a conference 
with Director!} and officials of the intelligence community. This 
resulted in the establishment of the subject Ad Hoc Committee. 

2. The White House representative to the Working Sub- 
committee of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence was Tom C. 
Huston. Tie stated that the President's primary concern was to 
strengthen and improve American intelligenc 
possible in orde **""* "* ' * ' ' " 

Ligence field. The 
American intelligence community, 
in spite of its achievements, had never fully realized its great poten- 
tial nor had it functioned to the maximum of its capacity. 

3. In the same vein, the Committee was informed that it had 
been given by the President a unique and unparalleled opportunity to 
make a great and enduring contribution to intelligence operations and 
thereby to the national security posture as a whole. The Committee 
was assured that there were no obstacles of any kind in its path. 

4. Thefirst meeting of the Interagency Working Subcommittee 
was chaired by W. C. Sullivanof the FBI and attended by Mr. Helms. 
The following personnel attended: 

FBI Donald E. Moore who was subsequently 

succeeded by Charles D. Brennan. 
Mr. Fred J. Cassidy was added to FBI 

George C._ Moore _ _ 

NSA Benson K. Buffham 

Navy Capt. Edward tUfenburgb 

AF Col. Rudolph Holler 

Army Lt. Col. John Downie 


DIA James Stilwcll 

CIA James Angleton 

Mr. Helms gave a brief resume of the President's conference 
and turned the meeting over to Mr. Sullivan. Mr. Sullivan echoed 
the remarks of Mr. Huston a*nd stated that the "deadline for the first 
draft of the Committee Report would be due at the close of business, 
?.?. Juno 1970, and the final version was to be on the President's desk 
on 1 July 1970. 

5. The Interagency Working Subcommittee met a total of 
four times, to wit: 9, 12, 18, and ?..3 June. The agenda which was 
gradually formulated in response to the President's request covers 
all matters set forth in the Special Report which was submitted by 
Mr. J. Edgar Hoover to the President and which was signed by Mr. 
J. Edgar Hoover, FBI; Mr. Richard Helms, CIA; U. General D. V. 
Bennett, USA, Director, DIA; and Vice Admiral Noel Gaylcr, USN, 
Director, NSA. Minutes of each meeting were maintained and 
submitted for approval during the course of each succeeding meeting. 
The CIA representative, Mr. James Angleton, was assisted by Mr. 
Richard Obcr of the Agency, and Mr. William O. Crcgar of the FBI, 
functioned as secretary for the Working Subcommittee. 

6. Mr. Huston kept reminding the Working Subcommittee 
that its duty was to present the most thorough program and options 
to the President and he expressed at times annoyance when the sub- 
ject of political considerations were introduced into the discussion, 

7. By way of background, it should be noted that Mr. Sullivan 
and Mr. Huston had been in frequent contact on these matters before, 
because Mr. Sullivan was extremely displeased by the number of 
restrictions wbich had been placed on the FBI by Mr, Hoover. 

8. It should also be noted that Mr. Huston informed the mem- 
bers of the Working Subcommittee that his role would be comparable 
on domestic affairs to that of Dr. Kissinger on foreign affairs. After 
the report had been submitted, he issued an instruction from the 
White House that all material relating to matters of domestic intelli- 
gence or internal security interest be directed to his exclusive atten- 
tion. (Sec attachment). 


9. Mr, Hoover was known to have voiced his most strcnuouB 
personal objections to the Attorney General regarding the establish- 
ment of the Committee. It is our understanding that the Attorney 
General interceded on Mr. Hoover's behalf at the White House and that-" 
Mr. Huston was eventually relieved of hla duties. 

10. Subsequently, with the emergence of Mr. Mrtrdinn as 
Assistant Attorney Genoral for Internal Security, the Intelligence 
Evaluation Committee was formed which held its first meeting on 

3 December in Mr. Dean's office at tho White House. In' attendance 
were interagency representatives. 

IEC Membership 

CIA: Richard Ohur 

White House: John W. Dean III 

Justice: Robert C. Mardian 

FBI: George C. Moore 

Treasury: Eugene Rossides - 

' NSA: Benson K. Buffam 

Defense: Colonel John Downie 

Secret Service: Thomas T. Kelly 

11. Intelligence Evaluation Committee met seven times 
between 3 December 1970 and 20 July 1971. The work of the 
Committee has been carried on by a permanent interagency ntaff, 
the Intelligence Evaluation Staff, which has met regularly under 
the Chairmanship of the Department of Justice official (currently 

Mr. Bernard A. Wells) from January 1971 to the present. The Agency 
representative, Uichard Ober, contributes Intelligence on foreign 
aspects of papers prepared by the staff. Staff papers are distributed 
to the White House (Mr. John Dean) and to the heads of the participating 

12. In time, Mr. Mardian returned to the question of the report 
and had many discussions with Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Dean on these 
matters- at a time when Mr. Sullivan was having hie problems with 
Mr. Hoover. 

13. To the best of ourknowledge, the origin of this exercise 
began when Mr. John Dean was at the Department of Justice and was 
concerned with the May Day demonstrations (May 1, 1970). He was 
subsequently transferred as Counsel to the President where he con- 
tinued his close relations with Mr. Mardian. It is our understanding 


that widespread civil disorders prompted the President to address 
himself to this problem. It should also be noted that the President 
and the Attorney General were aware of the complete breakdown of 
personal liaison between the" FBI and the .intelligence community. 

14. ■ The question of gaps in intelligence collection is embodied 
in correspondence between Mr. Hoover and the Director of Central 
Intelligence of March 1970. Prior to that period in January and 
February 1970. Director Helms conferred with Attorney General 
Mitchell regarding the inadequacies of domestic collection. Also 
on 13 February 1970, Admiral Gayler. Director of the National 
Security Agency, saw the Attorney General to protest the Bureau's 
withdrawal from sensitive domestic operations of vital importance 
to the National Security Agency. 

15. William C. Sullivan resigned from the FBI on 6 October 
1971 (Washington Post, May 17, 1973, page 20). Robert C. Mardlan 
left the Department of Justice to work on the President's re-election 
campaign on April 1972 (according to information from FBI and 
Department of Justice officials). Executive Registry states on the 
evening of 17 May 1973, that after checking the records, thoro is no 
indication of any memorandum prepared by Mr. Helms concerning 
the 5 June 1970 meeting with the President. 

16. Most of the gaps In collection still remain as set forth in 
the Report. There are two subjects of possible concern: 

a. International airmail to and from the Union of 
Socialist Soviet Republics and the United States has been 
screened by this Agency under conditions of maximum 
security control at a single international air facility in this 
country beginning in November 1952. In some Instances, data 
on the envelopes were recorded, and in some cases the envelopes 
wore opened, contents recorded and rcscaled. This activity 

■ was suspended in Fobruary 1973. 

b. . Tho second concerns itself with thef '■ 

16 April 1971: Tho Agency proposed to the FBI the installa- 

tion of technical coverage of the 

23 April 1971: FBI Director Hoover turned down the proposal 

4 ' 


23 April 1971: CIA Director Helms sent a letter to 

Attorney Genera 1 . Mitchell requesting that 
tho FBI turn-down be rcvoreed. 

24 April 1971: The Attorney Genornl reversed the FBI 


26 April 1971: Technical equipment was delivered from tho 

Agency to the FBI. 

18 May 1971; . All of the devices which had been Installed 

in the ; ■ '(during the period 27 April 

to IS Ma y~ wo r e""t o a ted and ill wore working. 

3 Feb. 1972: Coverage waa slopped at Agency request 

because Hoover had advised thnt he waa to 
testify In Congrefia and would advise the 

Congress that the installation in the/ ~ ~ 

'" " 'was initiated at CIA request. ~"— — 

8 Dec. 1972: The Agoncy requested the Fill re institute 

coverage of the 

20 Dec. 1972: Tho Department of Elate requested the F_ni 

institute all possible coverage of the, 

22 Dec. 1972; Coverage was partially relnatitutcd. 

26 Doc. 1972: '^institution of coverage completed. 

16 Feb. 1973; CIA roquustod tho FBI to discontinue 

tho coverage. 

22 Feb. 1973: 

Jamoa Anplcton 


'- " ' THZ While. ,-:Ouo.- ; 

«* WA 5 H I N G TO N 

) ■ ■'"■ ■ . ' 

-• ' ••■•'. •■..'' July 9, 1970 


MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Richard Helms 

.Director, Central Intelligence .Agency 

SUBJECT: Domestic Intelligence and Internal Security Affairs 

In the future,. I would appreciate it if your agency 
would address all material relating to matters of domestic 
intelligence or internal security interest to my exclusive 

The President is anxious to centralize the 
coordination at the White House of all information of this 
~\ l yP e . and your cooperation in this regard would be appreciated. 

Dr. Kissinger is aware of this new procedure. 



Exhibit 62 


Exhibit No. 42 . ' ,'<?) 

MEMORANDUM /y£&**~^ 



September. 21, 1970 . 

SUBJECT: IRS Cc Ideological Organizations 

I am attaching a copy of a report from the IRS on the activities of Its 
"Special Service Group" which la supposed to monitor the activities of 
Ideological organizations [e.g., Jerry Rubin Fund, Black Panthers, etc.) 
and take appropriate action when violations of IRS regulations turn up. 
You will note that the report Is loog on words and short on substance. 

Nearly 18 months ago, the President Indicated a desire for IRS to move 
against- leftist organizations taking advantage of tax shelters, rhave been 
pressing IRS since that time to no avail. 

What we cannot do to a courtroom via criminal prosecutions to. curtail 
the activities of some of these groups, IRS could do by administrative action. 
Moreover, valuable Intelligence-type Information could be turned up by IRS 
as a result of their field audits. 




62-685 O - 76 - 26 


Exhibit 63 

pr e sid'ehtla l" t ai::---\c- -papek 

Maetin; with J. idgar 


Richard Helms, Lt. Gen. Sennett (DIA) 
iayier, (XSA) ' 


The magnitude of the internal security pforSIem we face 
today rriay perhaps best be described in semantic terms. We have 
moved from the " student activism" which characterized the civil' 
rights movements in the early '60s through the " protest movement s" 
which rallied behind the anti-war banner beginning with the March 
on the Pentagon in 1967 to the " revolutionary terrorism " being 
.perpetrated today by determined professionals. 

iWe are now confronted with a new and grave crisis in pux 
country -- one which we know too little about. Certainly hundreds, 
perhaps thousands, of Americans -- mostly under 30 — are 
determined to destroy our society. They find in. many of the legitimate 
grievances of our citizenry opportunities for exploitation which never 
escape the attention of demagogues. They. are reaching out for the 
support — ideological and otherwise --of foreign powers and they 
are developing their own brand of indiginous revolutionary activism 
which' ia as dangerous as anything which they could import from 
Cuba, China, or the Soviet Union.. ' 

The internal security problem we face today is complicated 
by many factors: 


- coirtAissa xiraa: 



, :ir , - ;' un:i.<i; "ne trazitisr-al party organization., 
the new rev-luiionary groups are not tightly structured 
ar.c ciscipiined -- which means th;y are less susceptible to 

?.biiUy -?;;-. ciscar.i. r.oir.m-.r.icaiior. lir>.s requires 
far breeder coverage than has beep, traditionally required! 

third, our people -- perhaps as a the 
excesses of the McCarthy era -- are unwilling to admit 
the possibility that 'Yr.eir children? 1 could wish to destroy 
their country. This is particularly true of the media . 
and the academic commuriitv. 


** ^ our fo > &i & newer revolutionary organizations place a high 
premium on violence. Terrorism has replaced subversion 
as .the immediate threat. 


The Government must know more about the activities of these 
■ groups and we must develop a plan which will enable us to curtail 
the illegal activities of those who are determined to destroy our society. 
The immediate problem is the increasing recourse to terrorism. 
■ This must be halted before innocent people are killed. 



I want each cf you to rino-.v personally ^hat this 
is 'committed to the preservation of internal stability in this country. 
I do not intend c.i 3it idly by while self-appointed r-jvoUitionaries 

.is. being mobilized to halt these illegal activities. Our naw s.::U- 
bombing legislation is an important first s:ep, but it io an' "titer-: 
the.fact" measure. Good intelligence is tV.e best way to stop 

.opportunity to act, 

receiving at the White House,. I am convinced inai we are not 
currently allocating sufficient resources within the intelligence 
community to the collection of intelligence data on the activities 
of these revolutionary groups. We need more hard information upon . 
which to make decisions about courses of action open to the Government 
in dealing with these problems as they arise. ~. 

Consequently, I would like Dick Helms to designate the USIB 
representatives from the FBI, CIA, NSA ( DIA and military services to 
serve on a special sub-committee to review the collection efforts of 


rec=--....ssd to -..= adiiriDcil st^cs ■:-;'rJ. ci. can be taken to strengthen 

of the 5- ub-cornvr •.::?>-:. 
."■.,'. Tom Huston can provide the sub-corr.rr-ltjee ".--ife detailed information 
on the scope ox thi r C ', :<;,•. which :■:-.=.. = in. r.:iivi. I * Ju." d like to" 


which has the capacity to; 1 ; -ji:s tc- nu'r understanding 
of this problem should reorient its priorities so as to reflect the 
concern which. I have just expressed. V.'e need to insure that ' . . 
the fullest possible inter-agency cooperation is being realized and 
that all our resources are being utilized to gather the types of 
information which will enable us to halt the spread of this terrorism 
before it gets completely out of hand. 

- •. I know_tbat_you \vill_cooperate_irL every wayiin seeing, tiiat— 
this joint effort is mounted at once. 


Exhibit 64 

v.i :\'.;i2:-a;-'ru-'<:irjw s-Virri-'o-.i-:.:-: 

;'.-:.\.cha.itx;m .:-"ch yss^i 

■ .._- .. ...... . — 

. .. 

.... •', 


j K; : 'C : - : ^\ ; . C - 

r ^ 


| ■ *,.!:■ .., 




Apvii u, 1970. 

! • ki. : V-- ..v.". 




,\ L^rr.corutio r.loci^ •' 

■:/ — 

o.V 'JOiirrl'-iiccrJ 

iVjii. .V.'ri^i ox' ACC -'i.-.d -Jco Heagsmuhla o'C tsa F3i caiiaCl to ^ilc vJietber 
•;".;•« i-'31! could furai:i tha TTnita i-cuss thu list ot'.oorf co."-':— Lcut:;r., vhich 
•vi-.j i''J.-rJ.3ied to cr.o 331 by J3S. 'Ihd 731 bj-> t-v-yji r.-cu-jj'^.i jy tha 
Whi-3 i!ou*3 to .furnish a report on ti-.a funding or' v;--.ricud nilltx-i b 
(5r;;ani-i'-tiO! , .3. &«y vculd lil;o 'to send the lnro~::ation •./a c.- 1 - •-'acufc 
.uO.S 'io (;.•:.=; '.ihita h'oiisa. 

t f.dvisy-i t'r..Vc i'rcrr) -i. didcloaurs :;Uat;'!poi::i, it' '& 'ih:.t-:s i!c)'J3>-! i; t;ii - " 
i.-iinied taij en 1;c-uiHli J of -the Preslca/i;,. thefts v?.;i no :ll.r.clo:-;uf! 
pr:i"oIa::i; bv.t in vv-jv oi' tha s'-iiwi'tLvB JiVctir-s r.<' fh:j !:;:'.ir.r>f .'•.ml of 
o : 'hsr invr;j!ii<<ici"r:d :/.r.d yrccljpji^ I ";/or. tid in c'.r-s •':;•: this -r.'ji 
'.'.::. Craea to ,';it hij ripproyrii. 

v 'fold i-ir- J'Onv,sif.'.u0.3 ("..'ho aloo -./natrsO. 'i:o ".-"-^ '■.'•:« ItJCo ":•'■'■ c'-^n ho ths 
;\':. y ainsj Cfl::«.ry.l) '•''.V'.i'; .'r.srj -..-.w v.o ';:.'cV>..;. 1 > l:i , i , u. An .Y.;s i.;; >.;■..»'■; 
Attorney 0.:ner-_il had r.;<;.usstsd ths :>.2;xo~.Vit-Vja J.'rcni i:a in ■.!cjc":i:i. , .ncs 'hfcii t'.i - .; clcsur-3 rrs^ulucion.^ . fj'iiio.s th.ys ,\':'zax~a:/ C-sMrai. ■v-u ir/ar 
'this AjiHj^-a!; AtVirnsy G-Tsfiersi, thsr-.; certain."!../ •; !, .3 ;:o lirjo t'.s.'a in 
i'umlshln^ difc-?. to hi;n. 

X c'.'.il*:d '-'~~ Cirsrta ccn^omin^: this luatter ; .'~d .V-s './.'J.! .'.'..: t r,.y '-.nov 
.".:•• r.:oon iwj jOojjVjIj . 


3. 0. Vi.rd.Li 

:;::: i;r. CV^isrn 

tlr. Vf.l;vib . • / 

f/'jfx. :■ :i i.;-.(.i: V : OI , Apr.l ". 10, J.vVO, in th.v (;o!,i:.i.l:;s"!.oiVir'!! i>.L'i" '.;:.?, r. toW 
;..r. (;:-;.;n £.',i.i;. til.? f.lC t;.Mit;!tl i,o Uiiuw i.o;'a/ :.!)■.! i.':i.^;:- l.i--.:/ <;o!:.!.t! .f. r. in l;-.i 
our >'..-;-j.->. to l.ii'.; '.•;•;i i!olK3a. 'j.'iici l/hi.t.j i!oi;J : i ."..s-.^Lvl tV:': rr.iL-! ■i-.. I i!o-r. 
"..:•, C.H.-ifi -vid to t..yL.'..V.i.i yj.r to =;o .•■;v'.->.il ?.:\:i \-jL.-y.\3-i o".r :V;'i'"iri . 
:vr-d :>cy emit! r:i;o.ty ih:vt it c;:tic.! fvo:^ r;;;; n?.:;i. / 


Exhibit 65 

10 February. 1?5? 

IlS-JDRAirnUK FOR: Th3 Honorable Kenry A. Kissinger 
Tho Ar,siatcr.t to. the President. 

for national Security Affairs 
Tho V/hito Kcasa 

SUBJECT: Stucbnt Unrest 

?.. }kro:-rlth i3 e. syr/ay' of studsnfc disslcianco vorld- 
vico p.;-. requested, by tl'.o President. 

.2. In on effort to rcund-oMt our dlsousnion of this 
subject, vo hsvo inclM-.iecl a section on Arrjricsn studsruta. 
.This Ik m area not within tl.o' charter' of this Agency, so I 
noc-ri r.nt crch-viizo hr.r o:ctrer:sly scr.ait.ivo this riskss fchf! 
p-sj::i.r. Should Anyc>.id learn of .its exlctencn it Would prova 
rccsfc e:il-arr£03i«:2 for all. concerned. 

3« Also par the President's request,' T a.-i prsrarad to 
glvo p. thirty : .-:ir.ut«j briefing based on this study "nhsncvcr 
it i;cetD Ms convenience. 

\ ' • ' " • ' 

Richard "-fa Las 
Att-chrwnt - 1 

"Rastlc;:.- Icuth", Copy ?. ; o. 1 
No. 05;.'-5/u?. 

OCI/PCorsc dc!'.;n:da - 11/2/69 .. 
Rfivritt'.-n: MHo'. , .r.i-/oc-.i - 13/2/6? 
D5.ntri.buti n: Oris & 1 -'addressee 

1 - DCI . 

1 - K3/I 

1 - O/HCI rils 

.0;:.b ; -:../ 


- 2 - 

3. I *■*"* thought Ion- and ):;;rd etoui. th:> latter aspect 
of thi-3 problem. An t!io conr-jq^ncc, I or. cnbclu::^:! to r.i-:o n 
cur.-estio-i -..-hlch lias outsit;.-: tho ra'.r-;c of ~.y raspor.LrLbilitlcs: 
Kvcccnlsins that, the Federal Bureau of Invcsti cation oparr.tca 
et present on a. rectrictr.d baala in^ information on 
United States radicals, you m-ay -wish to connl.-ior having tho Furss'.'. 
ouvhoris^d to use -ore advanced invL;i ; ;Ur,aUve tocJinlquso in deal- 
ing vith tlsi.i problr ; .u. 

).io Yo'-x .and Mr. Rc-nto*.* ha 1 , o tho only two copies of tiiia 
report -.,-hich sra outsit tho custody of this Agency. 

^...■■--/ »■ ■■- 

Richard rclrno 

Att.^tacr.t - 3. 

Copy !io. 1 - ?,'o. C513/6B - 523TII-S3 lOUTH. 

cci V : r* Krlt Hostc-.i -;/.?. tt.v.chn'. out (Cory ? : 'o. 2) 

RHelr.s/ecd - 3/9/63 

Distribution: OriE^-i • addressee 

1 ■- Kr. Corscr*ddcn 
1 - F.H . 


U ScpteHbsr 1?£3 • , 

..KEI-O.TAJ.'DWM FO.-i.i Tha President. • 

1. 5o~3 tir;<j 0-2° y° u requested that I r,"ko occaalcml round- 
vp reports on youth rr.d atudcnt movements vorldv/ldo, Soapor.dLn-j to 
this roqusc-ti, and f-uicod by consents and suggest t.oiis i'roa V:'abt 
Rostov,-. '.i2 hay-3 prepared ths attached study. Tou i.J.Uj cf couro3>, 
bo aware cf the peculiar ccnrsltlvity which atta.o!-.-?.o to tho f?.ct 
that CIA has prepared a report on student cctdvitic;; both hero nnd 

2. T fesil th-at thin is -a -Rood imi cfirsfnl report, probably 
tho bscit that car J be; do: o r/o thi-j tir.a, I Jin disappointed, however. 
r.3 porhaps you i&ll bs f . by our inr.bllL'.y to bo nora precise about 
tbo r.otivnt.ion end dtvction'of this v>rldwidc Eoycr^nt. Sc:.-;d of 
this^iity d-rivc:.. Proa tho sor.evhat unfocused nature o.C tho 
novcz-.cnt itself. Ueyjrtd that, ::;y fe;r-lo- that v:o ray ho lacking h;-.t 

— precision- of, inCo.rnc-ii on -v.h.ich viou-ld- n-'.:3 -n no-re -positive* report — 
' possible.